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Abstract	  	  	  	  This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   provide	   a	   cultural	   history	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Specifically,	   it	  explores	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  British	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  provided	  the	  understandings	  that	  guided	  policy	  decisions.	  These	  understandings	  did	  not	  consist	  purely	  of	  ideas	  driven	  by	  strategic	  logic.	  Rather,	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  building	  on	  the	  initial	  works	  of	  European	  travelers,	  the	  British	  developed,	  refined,	  and	  acted	  upon	  an	  amorphous	  and	  contested	   ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan;	  one	  that	  was	  more	  than	   simply	   the	   function	  of	   great	  power	   geopolitics.	  The	   sources	   informing	  this	   imagined	   entity	   were	   cultural,	   intellectual,	   moral,	   political,	   and	   social-­‐scientific,	   as	  much	   as	   they	  were	   emotional.	   It	  was	   an	   idea,	   or	   collection	   of	  ideas,	   that	  would	   evolve	   and	   become	   trammeled	   by	   events,	   and	   ultimately	  leave	   a	   legacy	   that	   persists	   to	   this	   day.	   	   This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   make	   two	  contributions:	   firstly,	   to	   recover	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   from	   a	  historiography	   dominated	   by	   great	   power	   relations,	   specifically	   Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations	  and	  the	   ‘great	  game’.	  Secondly,	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	  wider	  debate	   on	   the	   contributions	   that	   imperial	   history	   can	   offer	   to	   the	  International	  Relations	  discipline.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  develops	  in	  three	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  examines	  how	  British	  official	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  constructed	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  early	   British	   explorers	   and	   their	   published	   travel	   accounts,	   focusing	   in	  particular	  on	  the	  works	  of	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone,	  Alexander	  Burnes,	  and	  Charles	  Masson.	  The	  second	  section	  looks	  at	  how	  key	  policy	  decisions	  leading	  to	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  an	  Afghanistan	   ‘knowledge	   community’.	   The	   third	   section	   on	   ‘exception’	  considers	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  on	  diplomatic	   relations,	  and	   charts	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   particular	   ‘idea’	   of	  Afghanistan	  mediated	  by	  the	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  influences	  of	  a	  particular	  frontier	  mentality.	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  would	  have	  been	  possible,	  and	  in	  so	  many	  ways	  they	  have	  been	  crucial	  in	  completing	  this	  work.	   Their	   unwavering	   belief	   is	   a	   continual	   source	   of	   inspiration.	  Melody	  Cox	  has	  been	  on	  the	  frontline	  of	  this	  PhD	  experience	  throughout,	  and	  met	  it	  all	  throughout	  with	  a	  smile,	  her	  unflinching	  support,	  and	  a	  remarkable	  talent	  for	  feigning	  interest.	  For	  all	  of	  these	  things	  and	  much	  more	  I	  am	  very	  grateful,	  and	  very	  fortunate.	  Finally,	  this	  thesis	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  Elfreda	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Bayly,	   whose	   constant	   interest	   and	   encouragement	   I	   will	   always	   miss.	  Although	   she	   never	   got	   the	   chance	   to	   read	   the	   first	   work	   of	   yet	   another	  ‘bloody	  expert’,	  she	  was	  instrumental	  in	  his	  emergence.	  	  Martin	  J.	  Bayly,	  Delhi,	  2013	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Note	  on	  Transliterations	  and	  Archival	  References	  	  In	   dealing	   with	   transliterations	   I	   borrow	   from	   other	   works	   in	   striking	   a	  compromise	   between	   the	   demands	   of	   consistency,	   convention,	   simplicity,	  literacy	   and	   closeness	   to	   spoken	   language.1	  People,	   place	   names,	   ethnic	  groups,	   tribal	   groupings,	   et	   cetera	   therefore	   adhere	   to	   conventional	  transliterations	   (e..g.	   Afghan,	   not	   Afghaun,	   or	   Affghan;	   Kabul,	   not	   Caubul,	  Cabool,	   or	   Kaubul;	   Kandahar,	   not	   Candahar	   or	   Qandahar;	   Pashtun	   not	  Pushtoon,	  Pashtoon).	  In	  terms	  of	  nationality	  I	  utilize	  those	  forms	  familiar	  to	  the	  historical	  context	  to	  which	  I	  am	  referring,	  hence,	  ‘Afghan’	  when	  referring	  to	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period	   can	   be	   taken	   as	   referring	   to	   a	   national	   of	  that	   territory,	   whereas	   prior	   to	   independence	   it	   generally	   referred	   only	   to	  those	   inhabiting	   the	   southern	   belt	   of	   what	   is	   today	   ‘Afghanistan’,	   in	   other	  words	  the	  largely	  Pashtun	  tribes	  stretching	  from	  Kabul,	  through	  Kandahar	  to	  Herat.	  Likewise,	  ‘Persian’	  or	  ‘Persia’	  is	  used	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	   but	   ‘Iranian’	   or	   ‘Iran’	   today.	   When	   quoting	   others	   I	   have	   left	   the	  transliterations	  as	  per	  the	  original.	  	  The	  archival	  references	  have	  been	  recorded	   in	  order	   to	  best	  allow	  for	   their	  location	   in	   the	   archives.	   Accordingly,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   India	   Office	   Material	   I	  have	   provided	   the	   classmark	   first.	   This	   is	   the	   reference	   that	   would	   be	  inputted	  into	  the	  data	  catalogue	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  retrieval	  (omitting	  ‘IOR’	  or	   ‘BL’).	  The	  precise	  detail	   on	  where	   to	   find	   the	   specific	   archive	  within	   the	  given	   collection	   is	   then	   provided.	   Where	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   title	   to	   the	  particular	  archive	  I	  have	  provided	  a	  description	  without	  inverted	  commas.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   material	   drawn	   from	   the	   National	   Archives	   of	   India,	   where	  possible	   I	   have	   adopted	   the	   ‘subject’	   and	   topic	   line	   as	   per	   the	   reference	  guides.	  For	  example,	  ‘Afghanistan:	  Papers	  relating	  to	  the	  affairs	  of’	  would	  be	  found	  in	  the	  reference	  guide	  under	   ‘A’	   for	  Afghanistan.	  The	  department	  and	  consultation	   section	   are	   also	   provided.	   Two	   versions	   of	   Elphinstone’s	   An	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Richard	  Tapper	  (ed.),	  The	  Conflict	  of	  Tribe	  and	  State	  in	  Iran	  and	  Afghanistan	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  1983).	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Account	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Caubul	  have	  been	  consulted	  (the	  second	  edition	  of	  1819,	  and	  the	  third	  edition	  of	  1842)	  these	  are	  distinguished	  in	  the	  footnotes.	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Glossary	  	  	  
akhbar	  	   	   	   newspaper	  
akhbarat	  	   	   	   newsletter	  
angrez	   English	  
Barakzai	   Sub-­‐tribe	  of	  the	  Zirak	  branch	  of	  the	  Durrani	  tribal	  confederation.	  
cafila/kafila	   	   	   caravan,	  a	  long-­‐distance	  conveyance	  of	  goods	  
cossid/kassid	   messenger,	  a	  runner,	  or	  post-­‐carrier	  (often	  of	  ‘intelligence’)	  
dak	   	   	   	   post,	  convayance	  of	  mail	  or	  people	  
darbar	  	   	   	   court	  of	  government	  
Durrani	   Tribal	  confederation	  of	  Pashtun	  tribes	  under	  the	  dynasty	  of	  Ahmad	  Shah,	  the	  first	  ruler	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul	  from	  1747.	  
elchi	   	   	   	   envoy	  
feringhi	  	   	   foreigner	  (generally	  European)	  
ghairilaqa	   	   unadministered	  territory	  
ghazi	   	   holy	  warrior	  
haukim/hakam	   	   governor	  
harkara	   	   	   an	  intelligence	  agent	  
hamsaya	  	   (humasauyehs)	  literally:	  shade	  sharing;	  neighbourliness	  (towards	  minority	  groups)	  	  
Khorassan	   A	  Persian	  historical	  region	  encompassing	  the	  north-­‐east	  of	  modern	  day	  Iran,	  western	  Afghanistan	  and	  parts	  of	  Central	  Asia	  
Kuzilbash	   	   see	  ‘qizilbash’	  
lakh	   South	  Asian	  numerical	  unit	  equivalent	  to	  100,000	  
Lohani	  	   Nomadic	  merchant	  group	  of	  Afghans,	  believed	  to	  descend	  from	  a	  group	  of	  Shepherd	  herders	  from	  Ghor,	  East	  of	  Herat.	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munshi	  	   	   	   secretary	  
nawab	  	   	   	   deputy;	  quasi-­‐Royal	  title.	  
nuzzerana	   A	  form	  of	  political	  tribute	  through	  monetary	  means.	  
oolooss/oolus/wulus	   Understood	  by	  early	  European	  explorers	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  equivalent	  to	  ‘tribe’	  but	  in	  fact	  linguistically	  encompassing	  ‘nation’,	  and	  ‘relatives’.	  
ooloossee	   	   	   a	  general	  rising	  of	  the	  oolooss	  
Padshah	   	   	   Persian	  honourific	  meaning	  ‘King’	  
Pakhtunwali	   	   	   Pakhtun	  tribal	  code	  
Pashtun	   	   Principal	  ethnic	  group	  of	  Afghanistan	  
Pathan	  	   British	  colonial-­‐era	  neologism	  encompassing	  the	  Pakhtun	  and	  Pushtun	  people	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  northern	  Pakistan.	  	  
pir	  	   	   	   	   muslim	  Sufi	  spiritual	  guide	  
qawm	   	  	   	   	   people,	  tribe,	  community	  (See	  Wulus,	  Tyfah)	  
qizilbash	  	   Personal	  bodyguards	  of	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Durrani	  Empire,	  Ahmad	  Shah	  and	  later	  a	  principal	  military	  contingent	  of	  succeeding	  Afghan	  rulers.	  	  
saiyid	   a	  descendent	  of	  the	  Prophet	  
Saddozai	   Sub-­‐tribe	  of	  the	  Zirak	  branch	  of	  the	  Durrani	  tribal	  confederation.	  
shura	  	   	   	   	   consultation/council	  
sirdar	   Military	  title	  held	  by	  heads	  of	  Durrani	  clans	  during	  Saddozai	  era,	  referring	  to	  all	  make	  members	  of	  the	  Royal	  family	  during	  the	  Muhammadzai	  (Barakzai)	  era.	  
tiyul	  	   	   	   	   land	  granted	  in	  return	  for	  military	  service	  
tyfah	  	   	   	   	   clan,	  tribe,	  group	  (see	  wulus,	  qawm)	  
vakil	   	   	   	   official	  envoy	  to	  a	  foreign	  court	  
wulus	  (oolus)	  	  	   	   nation,	  tribe,	  relatives	  (see	  qawm,	  tyfah)	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yaghi	   	   	   	   rebel/rebellion	  	  
yaghistan	   	   	   literally	  ‘land	  of	  the	  rebels’.	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   Chapter	  One	  	  	   Introduction	  	  	  In	   1783	   a	   servant	   of	   the	   East	   India	   Company,	   George	   Forster	   journeyed	  across	  Afghanistan	  on	  his	  way	  from	  Bengal	  to	  England.	  Forster’s	  trip	  was	  the	  first	   of	   many	   to	   follow	   as	   a	   succession	   of	   British	   and	   European	   explorers	  ventured	   across	   the	   ‘land	   of	   the	   Afghans’,	   recording	   their	   travels,	   and	  contributing	   to	   a	   vision	   of	   Afghanistan	   that	   would	   provide	   the	   intellectual	  universe	   upon	   which	   British	   officials	   would	   draw	   to	   guide	   their	   policy	  decisions	   throughout	   the	  nineteenth	  century.1	  Collectively,	   these	  works	  and	  the	   travels	   they	   narrated	   provide	   the	   overture	   to	   more	   than	   a	   century	   of	  direct,	   if	   spasmodic,	   British	   involvement	   with	   its	   frontier	   in	   India.	   In	  Afghanistan,	   this	   encounter	   would	   be	   defined	   by	   periodic	   bouts	   of	  engagement	  and	  retrenchment,	  each	  time	  warping,	  and	  forcing	  a	  reappraisal	  of	  such	  works	  as	  part	  of	  a	  pool	  of	  understanding,	  a	  pool	   that	  was	  gradually	  expanded,	  but	  frequently	  retrograde	  in	  its	  character.	  Like	  waves	  crashing	  on	  the	   shore,	   British	   engagement	   in	   Afghanistan	   advanced	   and	   retreated,	   and	  twice	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  resulted	  in	  war.2	  	  	  What	   follows	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   cultural	   history	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  diplomatic	   relations	   between	   1809-­‐1878.	   I	   use	   this	   terminology	   advisedly.	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  not	  to	  essentialize	  culture,	  or	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  an	  explanatory	  variable,	   but	   rather	   to	   explore	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   British	   perceptions	   of	  Afghanistan	   provided	   the	   understandings	   that	   guided	   them	   to	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  a	  list	  of	  these	  individuals	  see	  Appendices	  3	  and	  4.	  2	  The	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  took	  place	  between	  1838-­‐1842	  (though	  troops	  did	  not	  cross	  into	  Afghanistan	  till	  1839),	  the	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  occurred	  between	  1878-­‐1880.	  The	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  was	  effectively	  two	  invasions.	  The	  British	  were	  forced	  to	  withdraw	  in	  1841	  and	  in	  response	  to	  this	  heavy	  defeat	  sent	  forth	  an	  ‘army	  of	  retribution’	  that	  finally	  withdrew	  in	  1842.	  Some	  accounts	  thus	  refer	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  ‘wars’	  when	  describing	  what	  is	  more	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	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decisions.	   These	   understandings,	   I	   argue,	   did	   not	   consist	   purely	   of	   ideas	  driven	  by	  strategic	  logic.	  Throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  building	  on	  the	  initial	  works	  of	  European	  travelers,	  the	  British	  developed,	  refined,	  and	  acted	  upon	  an	  amorphous	  and	  contested	   ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan;	  one	  that	  was	  more	  than	   simply	   the	   function	  of	   great	  power	   geopolitics.	  The	   sources	   informing	  this	   imagined	   entity	   were	   cultural,	   intellectual,	   moral,	   political,	   and	   social-­‐scientific,	   as	  much	   as	   they	  were	   emotional.	   It	  was	   an	   idea,	   or	   collection	   of	  ideas,	   that	  would	   evolve	   and	   become	   trammeled	   by	   events,	   and	   ultimately	  leave	  a	  legacy	  that	  persists	  to	  this	  day.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  story	  that	  has	  two	  interwoven	  aspects;	  one	  based	  on	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  other	  based	  on	  sentiment.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  story	  of	  the	  formation	  and	  evolution	   of	   a	   colonial	   knowledge	   community.	   This	   story	   begins	   in	   chapter	  two	  and	   focuses	  on	   the	  build	  up	  of	   this	  knowledge	  prior	   to	   the	   first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	   It	   is	   a	   study	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   body	   of	   experts	   and	   their	  works,	  and	  how	  this	  knowledge	  became	  translated	   into	  policy	  and	  practice.	  This	  translation	  into	  policy	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  chapter	  three	  which	  looks	  at	  how	  this	  knowledge	  was	  applied	  in	  the	  policies	  that	  led	  to	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  argued,	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  Afghanistan’	  had	  a	  demonstrable	  impact	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Britain	  engaged	  with	  the	  country	  itself.	  However,	  the	  story	  is	  not	  one	  of	  straightforward	  translation	  from	  knowledge	  to	  practice.	  In	  their	   quest	   to	   understand,	   influence,	   and	   ultimately	   subjugate	   the	   Afghan	  strategic	  space	   to	   their	  own	  ends,	  British	  officials	  were	   forced	  to	  distill	  and	  codify	   this	   growing	   body	   of	   work	   into	   a	   digestible	   abstracted	   form.	   This	  process	  not	  only	  elided	   the	  complexities	  of	   the	  Afghan	  political	  community,	  but	  forced	  moments	  of	  ‘closure’3	  around	  key	  definitions	  and	  representations	  as	  complex	  understandings	  were	  simplified	  for	  policy	  ingestion.	  As	  such,	  this	  is	   as	  much	   the	   story	   of	   ‘unlearning’	   Afghanistan,	   as	   it	   is	   story	   of	   ‘learning’	  about	   the	   country.	  This	  was	   a	  process	   of	   converting	  of	  what	  Bernard	  Cohn	  has	   described	   as	   the	   investigative	   modalities	   of	   colonial	   knowledge	   into	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Jan	  Golinski,	  Making	  Natural	  Knowledge:	  Constructivism	  and	  the	  History	  of	  
Science	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  1998).	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‘policy	   science	   for	   the	   powerful’.4	  Afghanistan	   thus	   became	   beholden	   to	   a	  concentrated	   and	   partial	   knowledge	   order,	   one	   that	   shut	   down	   latitude	   in	  interpretation	  and	  became	  hostage	  to	  historical	  fortune.	  In	  effect	  then,	  this	  is	  the	  story	  of	  how	  a	  colonial	  state	  both	  sees	  and	  does	  not	  see;	  a	  process	  which	  as	  Priya	  Satia	  has	  observed	  is	  	  ‘intricately	  bound	  up	  with	  cultural	  history’.5	  	  Whilst	   this	   process	   of	   closure	   rigidified	   the	   parameters	   within	   which	  Afghanistan	  was	  imagined,	  the	  process	  of	  imagining	  did	  not	  stop.	  As	  chapter	  four	   argues,	   following	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   the	   idea	   of	   Afghanistan	  took	   on	   new	   forms	   and	   acquired	   new	   meanings.	   During	   this	   period	   we	  witness	   a	   greater	   role	   for	   the	   second	   aspect	   to	   this	   story,	   one	   that	   is	  more	  emotional,	   sentimental,	   and	   imaginative	   in	   its	   form.	   It	   is	   the	   story	   of	   the	  partial	   and	   spasmodic	   investigation	   of	   a	   space	   that	   both	   enchanted	   and	  terrified.	  Imagining	  a	  strategic	  space	  to	  which	  they	  had	  precious	  little	  access,	  the	  British	  relied	  on	  a	  cocktail	  of	  representational	  criteria.	  They	  increasingly	  viewed	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   security	   threat,	   not	   only	   due	   to	   fears	   of	   Russian	  activity,	  but	  due	  to	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  cognitive	  and	  ontological	  unease	  with	  a	  space	   that	   became	   subsumed	  under	   a	  particular	   ‘violent	   geography’,6	  and	   a	  people	  who	  frequently	  fell	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘tribals’,	  ‘fanatics’;	  ‘intriguers’;	  and	  ‘militants’.	  Following	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  Afghanistan	  was	  effectively	  closed	   off	   for	   European	   explorers	   and	   officials,	   and	   became	   defined	   by	   a	  peculiar	  form	  of	  imagined	  knowledge:	  a	  cartography	  of	  danger	  and	  exclusion,	  as	   Afghan	   society	   began	   to	   be	   viewed	   through	   British	   encounters	  with	   the	  communities	  on	  the	  north-­‐west	  frontier	  of	  India.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   ‘idea	   of	   Afghanistan’	   was	   swept	   up	   into	   a	   wider	   logic	   of	  imperial	   thought.	  Afghanistan’s	   exclusion	   from	  empire	  became	   justified	  not	  simply	  on	  normative	  grounds,	  but	  on	  legal	  grounds	  too	  as	  colonial	  knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Bernard	  S.	  Cohn,	  Colonialism	  and	  Its	  Forms	  of	  Knowledge	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Tarak	  Barkawi,	  ‘Empire	  and	  Order	  in	  International	  Relations	  and	  Security	  Studies’	  in	  Robert	  A.	  Denemark	  (ed.),	  The	  International	  Studies	  Encyclopedia,	  Vol.	  III	  (Chichester:	  Wiley-­‐	  Blackwell,	  2010),	  1360.	  5	  James	  C.	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State	  (Yale:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  Priya	  Satia,	  Spies	  in	  
Arabia:	  The	  Great	  War	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Foundations	  of	  Britain’s	  Covert	  Empire	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East,	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  2008).	  6	  Derek	  Gregory	  and	  Allan	  Pred	  (eds.),	  Violent	  Geographies:	  Fear,	  Terror,	  and	  Political	  
Violence	  (Oxford:	  Routledge,	  2007).	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was	   used	   to	   sustain	   the	   portrayal	   of	   an	   ‘uncivilized’,	   ‘outlaw	   state’;7	  one	  beyond	   the	   pale	   of	   standard	   diplomatic	   intercourse.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  bureaucratizing	   processes	   that	   paralleled	   an	   increasingly	   assertive	  military	  presence	   on	   the	   frontier	   provided	   a	   panacea	   to	   this	   state	   of	   unknowing,	  reducing	  Afghanistan	   to	   a	   problem	   of	  military	   science.	  Whereas	   previously	  the	   idea	   of	   Afghanistan	  was	   an	   idea	   dominated	   by	   the	  works	   of	   European	  explorers,	  and	  company	  men,	  a	  new	  ‘epistemic	  community’	  began	  to	  capture	  the	   definition	   of	   the	   problem.	   This	   capture	   was	   incomplete	   however.	  Although	  the	  period	  is	  frequently	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  competing	  notions	  of	  imperial	  defence,	   there	  was	  nuance	  within	   this	  debate.	  What	   is	  more,	   there	  were	  those	  voices	  that	  continued	  to	  advocate	  a	  policy	  of	  political	  engagement,	  once	  more	  activating	  the	  cultural	  canon	  of	  European	  Afghanistan	  ‘expertise’.	  	  	  Partly	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   influence	   on	   British	   thinking	   of	   their	   own	  culturally	  contingent	   intellectual	   fashions,	  and	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  simple	   lack	  of	   ‘time	   on	   the	   ground’,	   the	   British	   were	   often	   apt	   to	   see	   Afghans	   and	  Afghanistan	   through	   a	   glass	   darkly.	   This	   was	   either	   in	   loosely	   defined	  abstract	  terms	  based	  on	  often-­‐outdated,	  patchy	  empirics;	  through	  unrefined	  stereotypes	   that	   barely	   pretended	   to	   be	   based	   on	   anything	   more	   than	  conjecture;	   or	   through	   sterile	   concepts	   such	   as	   the	   ‘scientific’	   theories	  relating	  to	  imperial	  defence.	  As	  such,	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  this	  story,	  which	  can	  be	   described	   as	   the	   academic	   and	   the	   imaginative,	   (to	   borrow	   from	   Said),8	  never	   travelled	   alone.	   Whilst	   one	   occasionally	   took	   precedence	   over	   the	  other,	   in	   many	   ways	   they	   were	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin,	   mutually	  sustaining,	  feeding	  off,	  and	  interacting	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	  The	   British	   Empire’s	   periodic	   forays	   into	   Afghanistan	   rendered	   their	  encounters	  with	   the	   country	  both	  partial	   and	   spasmodic.	  Each	   intervention	  brought	  with	   it	   a	   scramble	   for	   knowledge	   and	   information,	   but	   a	   scramble	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Gerrit	  Gong,	  The	  Standard	  of	  ‘Civilization’	  in	  International	  Society;	  Simpson,	  Great	  Powers	  
and	  Outlaw	  States	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  1984).	  8	  Edward	  Said,	  Orientalism	  (London:	  Penguin,	  2003),	  2.	  Said	  identifies	  a	  third	  form	  of	  ‘Orientalism’,	  that	  of	  the	  ‘corporate	  institution	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  Orient’	  (ibid,	  2).	  This	  institution	  forms	  the	  primary	  subject	  of	  his	  study.	  As	  I	  outline	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  chapter	  two,	  this	  work	  does	  not	  take	  an	  avowedly	  Orientalist	  approach,	  but	  I	  do	  borrow	  from	  Said’s	  work.	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inevitably	  dominated	  by	   the	  prevailing	  policy	   themes	  of	   the	  day.	  Whenever	  the	   creaking	   information	   networks	   and	   knowledge	   communities	   were	   put	  into	  action,	   they	  were	   immediately	   infected	  by	   the	  sclerotic	   tendencies	  of	  a	  policy	  centre	  urging	  their	  own	  definition	  of	  the	  problem	  on	  their	  agents.	  This	  was	   not	   so	  much	   ‘covert’9	  or	   ‘informal’	   empire,10	  as	   incompetent	   empire	   or	  tendentious	   empire.	   When	   the	   next	   intervention	   came	   along,	   as	   it	   did	   36	  years	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	   the	   Afghan	   context	   had	  changed	   radically,	   but	   the	   colonial	   lens	   had	   become	   further	   tainted	   by	   the	  legacy	   of	   this	   long	   period	   of	   partial	   engagement.	   In	   their	   quest	   to	   render	  Afghanistan	  legible,	  the	  British	  continually	  forgot	  their	  own	  authorship	  of	  the	  world.11	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  study	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	   but	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   explore	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   states	   and	   their	  agencies	  attempt	  to	  comprehend	  regions	  that	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  unfamiliar,	  threatening,	   or	   incomprehensible.	   It	   is	   a	   study	   into	   the	   processes	   through	  which	  that	  considered	  ‘strange’	  is	  rendered	  ‘familiar’.	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	  is	  a	   cultural	  phenomenon	  concerning	  knowledge,	   society,	   and	   the	  sociology	  of	   knowledge.	   This	   study	   places	   us	   not	   only	   on	   the	   frontiers	   of	   colonial	  imagination,	   but	   also	   on	   the	   frontiers	   of	   thought	   in	   the	   International	  Relations	  (IR)	  discipline.	  It	  challenges	  comfortable	  assumptions	  pertaining	  to	  notions	  of	  ‘state’,	  ‘sovereignty’,	  ‘territory’,	  and	  ‘identity’,	  considering	  how	  this	  terminology	  may	  be	   contingent	  on	   a	   social,	   historical,	   and	  political	   context,	  rather	   than	   reducible	   to	   generic	   abstracted	   ideal-­‐types.	  As	   such,	   this	   thesis	  also	   challenges	   the	   comfortable	   position	   that	   IR	   has	   tended	   to	   take	   with	  respect	  to	  its	  use	  of	  history	  –	  particularly	  imperial	  history.	  What	  Jonathan	  B.	  Isacoff	  terms	  the	  ‘historical	  imagination’	  of	  IR,12	  has	  often	  been	  driven	  by	  the	  IR	  discipline	  itself	  rather	  than	  by	  any	  attempt	  to	  consider	  its	  correspondence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Satia,	  Spies	  in	  Arabia.	  10	  C.	  R.	  Fay,	  ‘The	  Movement	  Towards	  Free	  Trade,	  1820-­‐1853’,	  in	  J.	  Holland	  et	  al	  (eds.),	  The	  
Cambridge	  History	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  Volume	  II:	  The	  Growth	  of	  the	  New	  Empire	  1783-­1870	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  1968),	  399.	  11	  Peter	  L.	  Berger	  and	  Thomas	  Luckmann,	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Reality	  (New	  York:	  Doubleday,	  1966),	  86.	  12	  Jonathan	  B.	  Isacoff,	  ‘On	  the	  Historical	  Imagination	  of	  International	  Relations:	  The	  Case	  for	  a	  ‘Deweyan	  Reconstruction’’,	  Millennieum,	  31/3	  (2002),	  603-­‐26.	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to	   historical	   reality.	   In	   taking	   a	   more	   questioning	   attitude	   towards	   that	  discipline,	   and	   taking	  a	  more	   inclusive	  approach	   to	   the	  history	  upon	  which	  the	  discipline	  is	  built,	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  explore	  new	  frontiers.	  	  	  
Imagining	  Afghanistan:	  The	  Lasting	  Influence	  of	  Image,	  Narrative,	  and	  Myth	  	  All	   geographic	   spaces	  must	   acquire	   an	   attached	  meaning	   structure;	   spaces	  can	  rarely	  simply	  ‘be’,	  they	  must	  represent	  something	  or	  a	  collection	  of	  things.	  All	   geographies	   are	   thus	   to	   an	   extent	   ‘imagined’,	   and	   such	   imaginings	   are	  generally	   subjective	   appraisals.	   Geopolitics	   is	   in	   part	   the	   study	   of	   the	  ‘spatialization’	  of	  international	  politics	  ‘in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  represent	  a	  ‘world’	  characterized	  by	  particular	   types	  of	   places,	   peoples	   and	  dramas’;	   a	   process	  frequently	  carried	  out	  by	  ‘core	  powers	  or	  hegemonic	  states’.13	  As	  part	  of	  this	  spatialization	  there	  is,	  John	  Agnew	  notes,	  a	  tendency	  to	  essentialize,	  exoticize,	  and	   totalize,	   geographical	   space.14	  In	   the	   modern	   setting	   such	   tendencies	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  what	  Simon	  Dalby	  terms	  ‘tabloid	  realism’,	  the	  ‘presentation	  of	   the	   world	   in	   terms	   of	   dangerous	   places	   and	   the	   ever-­‐present	   threat	   of	  violence’.15	  This	   ‘cartography	   of	   danger’	   he	   argues	   has	   been	   particularly	  associated	  with	   the	   US	  War	   on	   Terror.	   Imagined	   geographies	   often	   cluster	  around	  binary	  narratives,	  of	  ‘our’	  territory	  and	  ‘theirs’,	  often	  springing	  from	  a	  particular	   ‘heartland’	   or	   ‘homeland’	   mentality. 16 	  Unsurprisingly,	   such	  narratives	  are	  particularly	  prevalent	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  frontiers	  -­‐	  areas	  that	  have	  historically	  preoccupied	  empires.	  As	  Manan	  Ahmed	  observes,	   ‘[t]o	   the	  centre	   of	   any	   empire	   the	   frontier	   is	   a	   site	   of	   anxiety,	   of	   potential	   harm,	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Gearóid	  Ó	  Tuathail	  and	  John	  Agnew,	  ‘Geopolitics	  and	  discourse:	  Practical	  geopolitical	  reasoning	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy’,	  Political	  Geography,	  11/2	  (1992),	  192;	  Gearóid	  Ó	  Tuathail,	  Critical	  Geopolitics,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996).	  14	  John	  Agnew,	  Geopolitics:	  Re-­visioning	  world	  politics,	  Second	  Edition	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  36.	  15	  Simon	  Dalby,	  ‘The	  Pentagon’s	  New	  Imperial	  Cartography:	  Tabloid	  Realism	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror’,	  in	  Derek	  Gregory	  and	  Allan	  Pred	  (eds)	  Violent	  Geographies:	  Fear,	  Terror,	  and	  Political	  
Violence	  (Oxford:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  255-­‐72;	  Malcolm	  Anderson,	  Frontiers:	  Territory	  and	  
State	  Formation	  in	  the	  Modern	  World,	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2004),	  295-­‐308.	  16	  Matthew	  Farish,	  ‘Targeting	  the	  Inner	  Landscape’	  in	  Derek	  Gregory	  and	  Allan	  Pred	  (eds)	  
Violent	  Geographies:	  Fear,	  Terror,	  and	  Political	  Violence	  (Oxford:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  255-­‐72;	  Malcolm	  Anderson,	  Frontiers:	  Territory	  and	  State	  Formation	  in	  the	  Modern	  World,	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2004).	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barbarians	  who	   could	   be	  marching	   towards	   the	   gate’.17	  Given	  what	   critical	  geopolitics	   and	   frontier	   studies	   suggest,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   equally	   unsurprising	  that	   Afghanistan	   is	   often	   subject	   to	   particular	   narrative	   renderings.	  Afghanistan	   is	   frequently	   cast	   as	   a	   ‘violent	   geography’;	   a	   ‘black	   world’18	  caught	   between	   manifest	   destiny	   and	   oblivion;	   paradoxically	   at	   the	  confluence	   of	   the	   ‘knowable’	   –	   of	   civilizations,	   empires,	   nation-­‐states,	   or	  societies	   –	   and	   yet	   resembling	   a	   land	   of	   the	   ‘unknowable’,	   of	   ‘wild	   tribes’,	  nefarious	  actors;	  a	  domain	  of	  rumour,	  intrigue,	  and	  violence.19	  	  	  Such	  spaces	  have	  regularly	  found	  their	  way	  into	  popular	  culture.	  In	  literature,	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  winning	  author	  J.	  M.	  Coetzee’s	  portrayal	  of	  imperial	  paranoia	  in	  Waiting	   for	   the	   Barbarians	   provides	   a	   chilling	   allegory	   on	   metropolitan	  fear	   of	   uprisings	   from	   the	   unknown	   wild	   beyond.	   James	   Michener’s	   1963	  novel	   Caravans,	   applies	   such	   thinking	   to	   Afghanistan,	   when	   an	   American	  damsel	  goes	  missing	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  is	  recovered	  by	  a	  dashing	  American	  serviceman.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  described	  it	  as	  ‘[a]n	  extraordinary	  novel’	  in	  which	   the	   ‘mountains	   sing	   and	   the	   deserts	   writhe	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   spasmodic	  horror	   of	   deathlessness’.	   The	   Minneapolis	   Tribune	   hailed	   an	   ‘imaginative	  journey	   to	   a	   barbarous	   land	   little	   changed	   in	   centuries’.20	  This	   denial	   of	  historical	   progress,	   an	   equally	   popular	   trope	   in	   such	   representations,	   was	  famously	   and	   controversially	   reprised	   by	   the	   former	   British	   Defence	  Secretary	   Liam	   Fox	   who	   in	   2010	   described	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   ‘broken	   13th	  century	   country’.21	  Such	   representations	   exhibit	   a	   powerful	   and	   enduring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Manan	  Ahmad,	  ‘Adam’s	  Mirror:	  The	  Frontier	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Imagination’,	  Economic	  and	  
Political	  Weekly,	  XLVI/13	  (2001),	  60.	  See	  also,	  Anderson,	  Frontiers.	  18	  Trevor	  Paglen,	  ‘Groom	  Lake	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Production	  of	  Nowhere’	  in	  Derek	  Gregory	  and	  Allan	  Pred	  (eds)	  Violent	  Geographies:	  Fear,	  Terror,	  and	  Political	  Violence	  (Oxford:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  237-­‐54.	  Paglen	  refers	  to	  a	  secret	  weapons	  testing	  site	  in	  the	  Nevada	  desert,	  formerly	  an	  Indian	  reserve	  before	  being	  swallowed	  up	  by	  the	  advancing	  American	  frontier.	  As	  he	  describes	  it,	  this	  space	  remained	  ‘a	  swath	  of	  uncharted	  land,	  a	  blank	  space	  on	  the	  map,	  a	  space	  in	  the	  crosshairs	  of	  manifest	  destiny,	  a	  space	  that	  stunk	  of	  death’	  (p.	  244).	  The	  description	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Afghanistan	  has	  occasionally	  been	  portrayed.	  	  19	  See	  Ahmed,	  ‘Adam’s	  Mirror:	  The	  Frontier	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Imagination’.	  See	  also	  Benjamin	  Hopkins	  and	  Magnus	  Marsden,	  Fragments	  of	  the	  Afghan	  Frontier	  (London:	  Hurst,	  2011).	  20	  James	  A.	  Michener,	  Caravans	  (New	  York:	  Fawcett	  Crest,	  1963).	  21	  The	  comment	  unsurprisingly	  provoked	  a	  furious	  response	  from	  the	  Karzai	  administration.	  David	  Batty,	  ‘Liam	  Fox	  calls	  for	  faster	  UK	  troop	  withdrawal	  from	  Afghanistan’,	  Guardian.co.uk,	  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/22/liam-­‐fox-­‐troop-­‐withdrawal-­‐afghanistan,	  22	  May,	  2010);	  Tom	  Coghlan,	  ‘Afghans	  accuse	  Defence	  Secretary	  Liam	  Fox	  of	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cultural	   presence	   partially	   reflected	   in	   a	   curious	   nostalgia	   for	   imperial	  derring-­‐do	   during	   the	   ‘great	   game’	   in	   Central	   Asia.	   Once	   again,	   popular	  culture	   has	   played	   its	   part	   as	   with	   the	   famously	   jingoistic	   exploits	   of	   the	  fictional	  antihero	  Captain	  Flashman,	  whose	  career	  begins	   in	  the	   first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	   Since	   2001	   the	   shelves	   of	   bookshops	   have	   groaned	   under	   the	  weight	  of	  new	  publications	  on	  Afghanistan,	  frequently	  alluding	  to	  its	  history	  as	  the	  venue	  of	  great	  power	  competition,	  imperial	  rivalries	  and	  intrigue,	  and	  a	  domain	  of	  violence,	  terrorism,	  and	  insurgency.	  	  	  For	  the	  British	  in	  India,	  their	  century-­‐long	  experience	  of	  policing	  the	  frontier	  from	   the	   annexation	   of	   the	   Punjab	   in	   1849,	   to	   partition	   and	   Indian	  independence	  in	  1947	  perpetuated	  a	  certain	  frontier	  mentality.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  arguably	   this	   prolonged	   British	   encounter	   with	   such	   ‘wild	   tribes’	   that	  promoted	   the	   most	   enduring	   –	   and	   most	   misleading	   -­‐	   stereotypes	   of	   the	  Afghans.22	  Engaging	  with	  these	  groups	  prompted	  the	  emergence	  too	  of	  new	  class	   of	   colonial	   hero,	   the	   man	   of	   the	   frontier,	   eulogized	   by	   such	   colonial	  luminaries	  as	  Olaf	  Caroe,	  and	  George	  Curzon,	  and	  providing	  the	  antithesis	  to	  the	  ‘wild’	  Pathan.23	  Whilst	  these	  stereotypes,	  and	  their	  progenitors	  have	  been	  well	  covered	  in	  the	  literature,	  less	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  impact	  these	  imaginative	  and	  bureaucratic	  processes	  had	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  British	  officials	  engaged	  with	  the	  government	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  mountains	  in	  Kabul.	  The	   idea	  of	  Afghanistan	  became	  partially	   filtered	  though	  this	  volatile	  relationship,	   as	   improving	   relations	   with	   other	   regional	   political	   entities	  further	  cast	  Afghanistan	  in	  a	  relatively	  exceptional	  light.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  racism	  and	  disrespect’,	  The	  Times,	  (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7134622.ece,	  24	  May,	  2010).	  22	  Mukulika	  Banerjee,	  The	  Pathan	  Unarmed	  (Karachi:	  OUP,	  2000);	  Charles	  Lindholm,	  ‘Images	  of	  the	  Pathan:	  The	  Usefulness	  of	  Colonial	  Ethnography’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  21/2	  (1980),	  350-­‐61;	  John	  Anderson,	  ‘Poetics	  and	  Politics	  in	  Ethnographic	  Texts:	  A	  View	  from	  the	  Colonial	  Ethnography	  of	  Afghanistan’	  in	  Richard	  Harvey	  Brown	  (ed.),	  Writing	  the	  Social	  Text:	  
Poetics	  and	  Politics	  in	  Social	  Science	  Discourse	  (New	  York:	  Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  1992),	  91-­‐116;	  Hopkins	  and	  Marsden,	  Fragments	  of	  the	  Afghan	  Frontier;	  Christine	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe	  in	  
Nineteenth-­Century	  Afghanistan:	  The	  Reign	  of	  Amir	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  (1826-­1863)	  (Richmond,	  Surrey:	  Curzon	  Press,	  1997),	  xv.	  23	  Olaf	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans:	  550	  B.C.	  –	  A.D.	  1957,	  (Karachi:	  OUP,	  2011),	  332-­‐45;	  Curzon,	  George	  N.,	  ‘Text	  of	  the	  1907	  Romanes	  Lecture	  on	  the	  Subject	  of	  Frontiers’,	  (http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/curzon.pdf).	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In	  the	  contemporary	  setting,	  Afghanistan	  has	  once	  more	  acquired	  a	  particular	  image	  as	  a	  domain	  of	  violence	  and	  great	  power	  failure.	  Rory	  Stewart,	  drawing	  on	   his	   own	   experience	   as	   a	   European	   Afghanistan-­‐explorer,	   turned	   policy	  advisor	  (turned	  Conservative	  MP),	  noted	   this	   trend	   in	  2009	  when	  he	  wrote	  ‘[w]e	   are	   accustomed	   to	   seeing	   Afghans	   through	   bars,	   or	   smeared	  windows,	  or	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  rifle:	  turbaned	  men	  carrying	  rockets,	  praying	  in	  unison,	  or	  lying	  in	  pools	  of	  blood;	  boys	  squabbling	  in	  an	  empty	  swimming-­‐pool;	   women	   in	   burn	   wards,	   or	   begging	   in	   burqas.’24	  Perhaps	   this	   is	   a	  perception	  that	  is	  beginning	  to	  change,	  but	  such	  representations	  are	  never	  far	  away.	  As	  international	  troops	  withdraw	  from	  Afghanistan,	  a	  degree	  of	  soul-­‐searching	  has	  crept	  in	  over	  the	  failings	  of	  America’s	  ‘longest	  war’,	  and	  the	   international	   community’s	   largest	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   state-­‐building	  project,	  there	  is	  a	  temptation	  to	  reach	  back	  into	  history	  and	  find	  parallels,	  or	  to	  look	  for	  excuses	  elsewhere.25	  Afghanistan	  is	  once	  again	  in	  danger	  of	  being	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  history	  as	  it	  arrives	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture.	  	  	  It	   is	   a	   key	   contention	   of	   this	   thesis	   that	   these	   representations	   have	   a	  history,	   and	   moreover,	   that	   they	   have	   at	   times	   given	   licence	   to	   policy	  decisions,	  and	  have	  been	  perpetuated	  by	  those	  policy	  decisions	  too.	   	  But	  accessing	  this	  first	  requires	  overcoming	  certain	  tendencies	  within	  parts	  of	  the	  existing	  literature.	  	  	  
Beyond	  the	  ‘Great	  Game’:	  Recovering	  Afghanistan’s	  Imperial	  Encounter	  
	  A	  key	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  recover	  Afghanistan’s	   imperial	  encounter	  from	  what	   can	   be	   described	   as	   the	   oblivion	   of	   great	   power	   politics.	   Historical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Rory	  Stewart,	  ‘The	  Irresistible	  Illusion’,	  London	  Review	  of	  Books,	  31/13,	  (9	  July,	  2009),	  3-­‐6.	  Available	  online:	  http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-­‐stewart/the-­‐irresistible-­‐illusion.	  25	  For	  a	  similar	  observation,	  and	  an	  example	  see:	  Myra	  MacDonald,	  ‘Do	  you	  think	  Afghanistan	  hasn’t	  changed	  since	  1842?’,	  Reuters,	  (http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2012/03/20/do-­‐you-­‐think-­‐afghanistan-­‐hasnt-­‐changed-­‐since-­‐1842/,	  March	  20,	  2012);	  The	  Editors,	  ‘Despair	  and	  Necessity	  in	  Afghanistan’,	  The	  National	  Review,	  (http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/293834/despair-­‐and-­‐necessity-­‐afghanistan-­‐editors,	  March	  20	  2012).	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accounts	  have	  tended	  to	  prioritize	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  rivalry	  and	  war,	  generally	  with	  the	  former	  leading	  to	  the	  latter.	  The	  key	  trope	  in	  this	  ‘master	  narrative’	  is	   the	   overwhelming	   presence	   of	   the	   ‘great	   game’	   thesis,	   one	   which	  prioritizes	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   rivalry	   as	   an	   explanatory	   factor.26	  The	   aim	  of	   this	  work	  is	  not	  to	  wish	  away	  the	  history	  of	  this	  rivalry,	  but	  rather	  to	  remove	  it	  from	   the	   centre	   of	   analysis.	   The	   problem	   here	   is	   not	   one	   of	   fact,	   but	   of	  emphasis.	  	  The	  reasoning	  for	  this	  will	  be	  discussed,	  but	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  where	  the	  ‘great	  game’	  narrative	  comes	  from,	  and	  why	  it	  has	  proven	  so	  stubborn,	  particularly	  given	  that	  the	  term	  is	  practically	  non-­‐existent	  in	  the	  archives.	  	  	  The	   phrase	   ‘great	   game’	   has	   been	   routinely	   deployed	   in	   key	   texts	   covering	  the	   history	   of	   Central	   Asia	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century;	   the	  most	   recent	  and	   famous	   of	   which	   is	   probably	   Peter	   Hopkirk’s	   work	   The	   Great	   Game.27	  Hopkirk	   acquired	   the	   phrase	   himself	   from	   a	   succession	   of	   historians	   who	  have	   borrowed	   from	   two	   sources.	   First,	   Rudyard	   Kipling,	   whose	   famous	  novel	  Kim	   immortalized	   the	  phrase	   in	   literary	   form;	  and	  second	   John	  Kaye,	  whose	   three-­‐volume	   account	   of	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	   dominated	   the	  historiography	  for	  decades.28	  His	  use	  of	  the	  terminology	  in	  chapter	  two	  of	  the	  second	  volume	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  more	  than	  an	  affectation,	  and	  one	  that	  was	  not	  meant	   to	   capture	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  competition,	   so	  much	  as	   the	  processes	  by	  which	  British	  India	  could	  persuade,	  cajole,	  and	  coerce	  its	  frontier	  regions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Shah	  Mahmoud	  Hanifi,	  ‘Shah	  Shuja’s	  ‘Hidden	  History’	  and	  its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Historiography	  of	  Afghanistan’,	  South	  Asia	  Multidisciplinary	  Academic	  Journal	  [Online],	  (May	  2012).	  Available	  online:	  http://samaj.revues.org/3384;	  Benjamin	  Hopkins,	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Game’:	  The	  Anglo-­‐Sikh	  alliance	  and	  rivalry’,	  Centre	  of	  South	  Asian	  Studies	  Occasional	  
Paper,	  No	  5,	  (Cambridge:	  University	  of	  Cambridge,	  2004);	  James	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  
State:	  British	  Colonial	  Knowledge	  and	  Empire-­Building	  in	  Asia,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2012),	  9.	  27	  Peter	  Hopkirk,	  The	  Great	  Game:	  On	  Secret	  Service	  in	  High	  Asia	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  2006),	  William	  Dalrymple	  also	  reprises	  the	  narrative	  in	  his	  recent	  work:	  William	  Dalrymple,	  
Return	  of	  a	  King	  (London:	  Bloomsbury,	  2013).	  28	  James	  Hevia	  suggests	  that	  Kipling	  in	  fact	  took	  the	  phrase	  from	  John	  Kaye’s	  account.	  The	  phrase	  is	  regularly	  ascribed	  to	  Arthur	  Conolly,	  one	  of	  a	  clutch	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  explorers	  who	  travelled	  through	  Afghanistan,	  though	  as	  Hevia	  points	  out	  Conolly	  makes	  only	  one	  reference	  to	  the	  phrase	  in	  his	  published	  account,	  describing	  a	  child’s	  game	  in	  a	  remote	  Central	  Asian	  town.	  His	  oft-­‐cited	  correspondence	  with	  Henry	  Rawlinson	  is	  dismissed	  by	  Hevia	  as	  being	  a	  throw-­‐away	  comment	  by	  a	  man	  writing	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  make	  the	  mail.	  Hevia,	  
The	  Imperial	  Security	  State,	  11.	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into	  accepting	  the	  benefits	  of	   ‘civilization’.29	  Yet	  the	  term	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  life	  all	   of	   its	   own	   –	   perhaps	   due	   to	   its	   poetic,	   dramatic,	   alliterative	   and	   even	  sterilizing	   qualities.	   As	   James	   Hevia	   has	   noted,	   the	  metaphor	   obscures	   the	  enormous	   amounts	   of	   violence	   that	   occurred	  during	   this	   period,	   as	  well	   as	  obscuring	   a	   litany	   of	   historical	   facts	   that	   demonstrate	   its	   relatively	   weak	  analytical	   value.30	  The	   narrative	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   rivalry	   is	   a	   prominent	  theme	   in	   the	   archives,	   but	   this	   has	   all-­‐too-­‐often	   been	   unproblematically	  subsumed	   under	   the	   ‘great	   game’	   rubric.	   The	   logic	   underpinning	   this	  narrative	   is	   often	   drowned	   out	   as	   commentators	   have	   striven	   to	   identify	  great	   power	   rivalries	   as	   an	   enduring	   international	   theme.	   Following	  Benjamin	  Hopkins,	  whilst	   this	   narrative	   of	   competition	  may	   (on	  occasions)	  ‘be	   the	   dominant	   one	   of	   the	   archives,	   it	   is	   far	   from	   the	   only,	   or	   indeed	   the	  most	   important	   one.’31	  The	   great	   game	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   classic	   case	   of	   the	  historian’s	   maxim	   that	   “history	   does	   not	   repeat;	   historians	   repeat	   one	  another”.32	  	  Aside	  from	  terminological	  concerns,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  reasons	  why	   the	   great	   game	   as	   a	   narrative	   should	   be	   questioned.	   As	   the	   sources	  reveal,	  this	  rivalry	  -­‐	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  existed	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  -­‐	  was	  much	  more	  fragmented	  in	  its	  rationale,	  and	  more	  contested	  than	  a	  simple	  bi-­‐polar	  analysis	   allows.	   	   The	   actors	   with	   a	   central	   role	   in	   this	   game	  were	   also	   far	  more	  numerous,	  and	  arguably	  more	  instrumental	  in	  the	  machinations	  of	  the	  ‘game’	  than	  such	  a	  narrative	  suggests.	  	  As	  Hopkins	  highlights	  for	  example,	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  Anglo-­‐Sikh	  relations	  than	  it	  did	  with	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations.33	  The	  British	  had	  reached	  the	  opinion	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  reconcile	  the	  rulers	  of	   the	  Sikh	  Kingdom,	  Ranjit	  Singh,	  and	  the	  ruler	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Afghanistan,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  in	  order	  to	   create	   the	   regional	   stability	   they	   craved	   and	   therefore	   sought	   a	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Seymour	  Becker,	  ‘The	  ‘Great	  Game’:	  The	  History	  of	  an	  Evocative	  Phrase’,	  Asian	  Affairs,	  43/1	  (2012),	  63.	  30	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  State,	  11.	  31	  Benjamin	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008),	  34.	  32	  Michael	  Howard,	  ‘The	  uses	  and	  abuses	  of	  military	  history’,	  RUSI	  Journal,	  138/1	  (1993),	  27.	  33	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan;	  Hopkins,	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Game”.	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system.34	  During	   this	   time	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   were	  mainly	   of	   indirect	  concern	  via	  the	  suspected	  Perso-­‐Russian	  alliance.	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  for	  our	  purposes	  here,	  the	  territory	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself,	   as	   defined	   in	   modern	   terms,	   constituted	   at	   least	   three	   semi-­‐autonomous	  entities	  at	  this	  time,	  dominated	  by	  the	  cities	  of	  Kabul,	  Kandahar,	  and	   Herat.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   were	   the	   territories	   of	   Balkh,	   Balochistan,	  Sistan,	   and	   Ghazni.	   	   Whilst	   it	   would	   be	   inaccurate	   to	   describe	   these	   as	  independent	   city-­‐states,	   the	   particular	   forms	   of	   rule	   that	   were	   familiar	   to	  these	  areas	  rendered	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul	  less	  absolute	  than	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  label	   ‘Afghanistan’.	   	  Indeed,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  well	  understood	  by	  certain	  East	  India	  Company	  officials	  who	  occasionally	  factored	  this	  into	  their	  policy	  planning.	  Aside	  from	  this	  city-­‐based	  territorial	  construct,	  British	  officials	  frequently	  discussed	  the	  variety	  of	  ‘independent’	  peoples	  that	  interspersed	   in	   between	   major	   population	   areas,	   and	   inhabited	   the	   less	  accessible	  regions.	  These	  groups	  often	  intrigued	  and	  occasionally	  fascinated	  the	  British.	  This	  geographic	  ambiguity,	  in	  terms	  of	  where	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Kingdom	   of	   Kabul	   extended	   to,	   and	   therefore,	   where	   the	   territory	   of	  Afghanistan-­‐proper	  lay,	  has	  further	  confused	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  great	  game	  narrative	  with	  respect	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  development	  as	  a	  political	  community.	  The	   narrative	   leads	   to	   the	   presumption	   that	   Afghanistan	  was	   a	   single	   unit	  over	  which	  Britain	  and	  Russia	  competed.	  This	  was	  simply	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  archives	   show	   that	   deciding	  what	   Afghanistan	   really	  was,	   or	  whether	   it	   in	  fact	   existed	   at	   all,	   was	   a	   recurrent	   question	   animating	   policy	   decisions.	  Therefore,	   knowledge	   and	   information	   was	   constantly	   sought	   on	   the	  individual	   rulers	   of	   this	   fragmented	   polity	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   their	   likely	  adherence	  to	  any	  wider	  social	  compact.	  	  	  A	  further	  doubt	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  great	  game	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  throughout	   the	  nineteenth	   century,	   the	   evolving	  polity	  of	   ‘Afghanistan’	  was	  accepted	   to	   have	   been	   under	   the	   British	   ‘sphere	   of	   influence’	   by	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See	  also	  Yapp,	  although	  this	  account	  prioritizes	  European	  concerns	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  diplomacy	  in	  Central	  Asia	  at	  this	  time.	  Malcolm	  Yapp,	  Strategies	  of	  British	  India:	  Britain,	  Iran,	  
and	  Afghanistan	  1798-­1850	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  1980).	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governments	  involved;	  British,	  Russian,	  and	  Afghan	  rulers.	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  chapter	   four,	   the	  area	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  to	  a	  degree	  sealed	  off	   from	  the	  most	   dramatic	   activities	   of	   those	   who	   played	   the	   ‘game’	   through	   the	  exclusionary	   policies	   that	   were	   ascribed	   to	   it.	   This	   is	   often	   attributed	   to	   a	  ‘buffer	  state’	  policy	  but	  again	  this	  reading	  prioritizes	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations,	  and	   regularly	   fails	   to	  deal	  with	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  a	   ‘state’	   at	   this	   time.	   In	  chapter	  four	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  exclusionary	  policy	  had	  a	  logic	  of	   its	  own	  that	  derived	   in	   large	   part	   from	   British	   anxieties	   over	   a	   space	   they	   struggled	   to	  comprehend.	   The	   fallout	   from	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   War	   and	   constant	  warnings	  from	  the	  Amir	  of	  Afghanistan	  that	  he	  could	  not	  guarantee	  the	  safety	  of	   any	   British	   travelers	   suppressed	   most	   attempts	   to	   send	   forth	   agents,	  however	   heavily	   disguised.	   Whilst	   this	   put	   a	   strain	   on	   information	   and	  inhibited	   regularized	   diplomatic	   intercourse,	   it	   does	   not	   follow	   that	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  were	  therefore	  non-­‐existent	  –	  rather	  they	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  beyond	  the	  signing	  of	  treaties	  and	  the	  exchanging	  of	  envoys.	  At	  the	  heart	   of	   this	   was	   an	   irresolvable	   dilemma	   for	   the	   British,	   a	   dilemma	   that	  described	   imperial	   relations	   with	   other	   excluded	   regions	   of	   the	   Indian	  frontier;	  one	  of	  ‘the	  will	  to	  knowledge	  yet	  the	  inability	  to	  satisfy	  that	  desire’.35	  	  The	  great	  game	  defined	  as	  a	  perception	  of	  Russian	  threat,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  early	  stages	   of	   its	   chronology	   has	   also	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   often	   a	   figment	   of	   the	  British	   imagination. 36 	  As	   Hopkins	   argues,	   it	   provided	   a	   familiar	   ‘threat	  conceptualization’	   both	   to	   ‘initiate	   and	   justify	   action’	   but	   the	   far	   more	  pressing	   concern	   for	   the	   British	   was	   the	   potential	   damage	   caused	   to	   the	  company’s	  prestige	  by	   rumours	   of	  British	  weakness	   and	   advancing	  Russian	  arms.37	  As	  such,	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  initial	  stages	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to,	   and	   following	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	   (1839-­‐42),	   the	   spectre	   of	   the	  Russian	   threat	   became	   inflated	   beyond	   reasonable	   levels,	   distorting	   the	  historiography	  which	  later	  became	  dominated	  by	  this	  imperial	  rivalry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ulrike	  Hillemann	  Asian	  Empire	  and	  British	  Knowledge	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2009),	  1.	  36	  This	  is	  not	  universally	  so.	  Drawing	  on	  Russian	  sources	  William	  Dalrymple	  has	  recently	  pointed	  to	  evidence	  of	  Russian	  desires	  for	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  Yet	  the	  tendency	  to	  essentialize	  Russian	  military	  threat	  both	  in	  the	  archives	  and	  in	  the	  historiography	  can	  be	  disputed.	  Dalrymple,	  Return	  of	  a	  King.	  37	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  36.	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  In	  focusing	  on	  the	  activities	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  great	  powers,	  Afghanistan’s	  own	   agency,	   and	   what	   could	   be	   described	   as	   the	   ‘Afghanistan	   context’	   is	  suppressed.	  As	  Thomas	  Barfield	  has	  eloquently	  put	  it,	  ‘[a]ll	  the	  focus	  on	  war	  and	  visiting	  conquerors	  overshadows	  the	  country’s	  own	   inhabitants,	  except	  as	   the	   rough	   warriors	   who	   served	   as	   speed	   bumps	   on	   the	   highway	   of	  conquest	   or	   more	   recently	   earned	   a	   reputation	   for	   making	   the	   place	  ungovernable.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Afghanistan	  itself	  remains	  just	  the	  vague	  backdrop	  in	   a	   long-­‐running	   international	   drama	   where	   others	   hold	   the	   speaking	  parts.’38	  This	   historiographical	   preoccupation	   has	   encouraged	   the	  mistaken	  idea	   that	   Afghanistan	   is	   somehow	   the	   ‘graveyard	   of	   empires’,39 	  further	  sustaining	  the	  myth	  that	  the	  country	  resembles	  a	  perpetual	  stage	  for	  tragedy	  and	  violence.	  As	  many	  have	  observed	  however,	  before	  becoming	  an	  imperial	  frontier	   region	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   and	   twentieth	   centuries,	   Afghanistan	  was	  for	  millennia	   at	   the	   crossroads	   of	   empires	   and	   host	   to	   passing	   trends	   and	  peoples.40	  As	   Afghanistan’s	   cultural	   history	   demonstrates,	   the	   country	   was	  not	  founded	  on	  the	  trapping,	  destruction,	  and	  ending	  of	  empires,	  but	  on	  their	  development,	  exchange,	  and	  their	  reinvention.41	  	  Moving	  on	  from	  the	  perils	  of	  the	  great	  game	  thesis,	  the	  ‘graveyard	  of	  empires’	  narrative	   is	   a	   further	   example	   of	   tendentious	   and	   misleading	   engagement	  with	  Afghanistan’s	   imperial	   encounter.	   Such	  narratives,	  particularly	   in	   light	  of	   the	   international	  presence	   in	  Afghanistan	   since	  2001,	   tend	   to	  portray	  an	  ‘illusory	   present’42	  and	   encourage	   the	   instrumentalization	   of	   Afghanistan’s	  history	   for	  political	  ends.	  As	  Rob	   Johnson	  observes,	  Afghanistan’s	  history	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Thomas	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan:	  A	  Cultural	  and	  Political	  History	  (Oxford:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  1-­‐2.	  39	  Seth	  G.	  Jones,	  In	  the	  Graveyard	  of	  Empires:	  America’s	  War	  in	  Afghanistan	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2009).	  40	  Louis	  Dupree,	  Afghanistan	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  1997);	  Fredrick	  Hiebert	  and	  Pierre	  Cambon	  (eds.),	  Afghanistan:	  Crossroads	  of	  the	  Ancient	  World	  (London:	  British	  Museum	  Press,	  2011);	  Arnold	  J.	  Toynbee,	  Between	  Oxus	  and	  Jumna	  (London:	  OUP,	  1967).	  41	  Martin	  Bayly,	  ‘Allow	  it	  to	  speak	  for	  itself’,	  Times	  Higher	  Education,	  10	  March	  (2011),	  47-­‐8.	  Available	  online:	  http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/415457.article.	  42	  George	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Promise	  of	  Historical	  Sociology	  in	  International	  Relations’,	  
International	  Studies	  Review,	  8:3	  (2006),	  404.	  See	  also:	  Lawson,	  George,	  ‘The	  Eternal	  Divide?	  History	  and	  International	  Relations’,	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  18	  (2012),	  203-­‐226.	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often	   ‘contested’,	   ‘used	   to	   reinforce	   particular	   agendas	   and	   score	   moral	  points	   either	   in	   favour	   of	   continued	   intervention,	   or	   against	   it’.43	  This	   is	   of	  course	   nothing	   new.	   Writing	   in	   1856	   Kaye	   remarked	   in	   his	   monumental	  account	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  that	  he	  felt	  he	  was	  ‘walking,	  as	  it	  were,	  with	  a	  torch	  in	  my	  hand	  over	  a	  floor	  strewn	  thickly	  with	  gunpowder.	  There	  is	  the	  chance	  of	  an	  explosion	  at	  every	  step.’44	  He	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  be	  fearful.	  Following	  the	  war	  the	  inquest	  into	  the	  decisions	  that	  led	  to	  hostilities	  became	  a	   political	   football	   in	   Parliament.	   The	   opposition	   Tories	   sought	   to	   present	  certain	   Company	   officials	   in	   a	   negative	   light	   to	   further	   their	   own	   political	  agendas.	   Questions	   over	   the	   wisdom	   of	   the	   Afghanistan	   campaign	   shifted	  from	  questions	  of	  appropriateness,	  to	  questions	  of	  professional	  competence.	  	  	  Many	  historians	  followed	  suite.	  Despite	  his	  fears	  of	  ‘explosions’,	  Kaye’s	  study	  cast	   Auckland	   and	   his	   circle	   of	   advisors	   as	   a	   cabalistic	   collective	   who	   had	  captured	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	   for	  their	  own	  paranoid	   ‘Russophobic’	  ends.45	  Henry	   Durand,	   writing	   in	   1879	   turned	   his	   sights	   instead	   on	   the	  political	   officer	   Alexander	   Burnes,	   a	   man	   he	   described	   as	   ‘of	   inordinate	  ambition	   but	   of	   average	   ability	   and	   shallow	   acquirements’.46	  Auckland,	   he	  argued	  had	  been	  ‘misled	  by	  the	  reputation	  which	  Burnes’s	  amusing	  but	  most	  inaccurate	  book	  of	  travels	  had	  obtained	  for	  its	  author’.47	  Norris	  too	  sought	  to	  recover	   Auckland’s	   reputation	   in	   his	   1969	   account.48	  Military	   operations	  came	   in	   for	   similarly	   forensic	   analysis.	   Such	   ‘great	   man’	   accounts	   of	   the	  history	   have	   tended	   to	   linger	   on	   points	   of	   professional	   competence,	  personality	  and	  reputation	  whilst	  overlooking	  the	  wider	  socio-­‐structural	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	   environment.	   Defeat	   has	   therefore	   become	   attributed,	   as	  Noelle	   notes,	   to	   a	   series	   of	   ‘theoretically	   reversible	   political	   and	  administrational	   blunders’,49	  directing	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   specifics	   of	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  Rob	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	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  War	  (London:	  Hurst	  and	  Company,	  2011).	  44	  John	  William	  Kaye,	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  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Volume	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  (London:	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1857),	  x.	  45	  Kaye,	  History	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  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan.	  46	  Henry	  Marion	  Durand,	  The	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  War	  and	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  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green,	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  Durand,	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  The	  First	  Afghan	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  (Cambridge:	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Afghanistan	  itself	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  British	  went	  to	  war.	  	  Contestations	   at	   the	   time	   further	   disrupted	   the	   archival	   bias.	   Indeed,	   even	  before	  the	  ‘Army	  of	  Retribution’	  had	  withdrawn,	  a	  dispute	  erupted	  between	  the	   Crown	   and	   the	   East	   India	   Company	   (EIC)	   over	   the	   crippling	   financial	  costs	   of	   the	   intervention.	   It	   was	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   EIC	   to	   play	   up	   the	  Russian	   threat	   in	   this	   debate	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   its	   claim	   that	   the	   Crown	  should	  assist	   in	  covering	  these	  costs.	  This	  was	  not	  because	  the	  EIC	  believed	  that	   this	   threat	  was	   credible	   –	   quite	   the	   opposite	   in	   fact	   –	   rather	   it	  was	   in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  the	  fictitious	  casus	  belli	  related	  to	  ‘European’	  not	  ‘Indian’	  affairs,	  thereby	  relieving	  the	  EIC	  from	  full	  financial	  indemnity.50	  This	  had	  the	  added	  effect	  of	   further	  presenting	  the	  war	   in	  terms	  of	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  rather	  than	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations.	  	  	  The	  treatment	  given	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  international	  history	  generally,	  and	  its	  imperial	   encounter	   specifically,	   has	   often	   obscured	   alternative	   narratives	  beyond	   the	   positioning	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   great	   powers.	   Recovering	   the	  sunken	  histories	  of	   this	  period	  begins	  with	  a	   relocation	  of	   the	   subjects	  and	  objects	  of	  study.	  	  	  
Relocating	  the	  History	  	  Put	  simply,	  this	  thesis	  prioritizes	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  as	  an	  area	  of	  focus.	  Rather	   than	   reducing	   these	   relations	   to	   a	   function	   of	   geopolitical	   concerns,	  either	  in	  Central	  Asia	  or	  elsewhere,	  I	  seek	  to	  study	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  on	  their	   own	   terms.	   Again,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   wider	   questions	   of	  
realpolitik	   were	   not	   significant	   –	   clearly	   they	   were	   –	   but	   without	  understanding	  first	  what	  Afghanistan	  itself	  meant	  to	  the	  British,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  comprehend	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   British	   chose	   to	   engage.51	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  50	  IOR/L/PS/3/12,	  p.497-­‐513.	  51	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe	  in	  Nineteenth-­Century	  Afghanistan,	  40.	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knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars,	   it	  did	  make	  those	  conflicts	  imaginable	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  was	  more	  to	  this	  relationship	  than	  the	  wars	  themselves.	  	  	  Recent	   scholarship	   has	   aided	   this	   shift	   in	   emphasis	   by	   providing	   more	  detailed	   accounts	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   history.	   Thomas	   Barfield’s	   cultural	   and	  political	  history	  is	  a	  key	  text	  in	  this	  respect.52	  A	  major	  weakness	  in	  the	  great	  power	   narrative	   is	   that	   it	   rarely	   grapples	   with	   the	   reasons	   for	   instability	  within	  Afghanistan	  during	   the	  nineteenth	  century	   that	  was	   the	  source	  of	  so	  much	   concern	   within	   British	   officialdom.	   Shining	   light	   on	   this,	   Barfield	  identifies	  the	  key	  driver	  of	  political	  instability	  in	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  political	  authority	  to	  groups	  not	  traditionally	  part	  of	  the	  ruling	  dynastic	  elite.	   The	   nineteenth	   century,	   he	   argues,	   was	   defined	   by	   the	   authority	   of	  ‘professional	   rulers’,	   ‘hereditary	   elites	   who	   saw	   government	   as	   their	  business’.53	  Whilst	  competition	  could	  come	  from	  within	  this	  ruling	  elite	  (as	  it	  frequently	   did)	   such	   authority	   was	   rarely	   challenged	   by	   ‘outsiders’.	  Successive	   rulers,	   Barfield	   argues,	   abided	   by	   the	   logic	   of	   avoiding	   conflict	  with	   the	   independent	   communities	   within	   the	   loose	   territorial	   concept	   of	  Afghanistan.	   Imperial	   encounters	  did	  however	   serve	   to	  disrupt	   this	  pattern	  through	   inciting	   the	   rise	  of	   competing	  groups,	  and	  by	  extension,	   competing	  moral	  orders	  underpinning	  legitimacy.	  In	  opposing	  foreign	  invaders,	  Afghan	  rulers	  were	   often	   compelled	   to	  mobilize	   certain	   sections	   of	   the	  population,	  often	  with	  a	  call	  to	  faith,	  or	  through	  exploiting	  other	  affective	  ties.	  This	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  nineteenth	  century	  phenomenon.	  The	  opposition	  to	  competing	  Persian	  Safavid	  and	  Indian	  Moghul	  empires	  in	  the	  fifteenth	  century	  had	  first	  given	   rise	   to	   Pashtun	   consciousness	   that	   later	   evolved	   into	   an	   anti-­‐Moghul	  movement	   in	   the	   later	   sixteenth	  and	  seventeenth	  centuries.54	  In	   the	   case	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan.	  See	  also,	  Thomas	  J.	  Barfield,	  'Problems	  in	  establishing	  legitimacy	  in	  Afghanistan',	  Iranian	  Studies,	  37/2	  (2004),	  263-­‐93.	  53	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan,	  3;	  Barfield,	  ‘Problems	  in	  establishing	  legitimacy	  in	  Afghanistan’.	  54	  M.	  Nazif	  Shahrani,	  ‘Statebuilding	  and	  Social	  Fragmentation	  in	  Afghanistan:	  A	  Historical	  Perspective’,	  in	  Ali	  Banuazizi	  and	  Myron	  Weiner,	  The	  State,	  Religion,	  and	  Ethnic	  Politics:	  
Afghanistan,	  Iran,	  and	  Pakistan,	  (Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  28.	  In	  a	  similar	  argument	  Nile	  Green	  has	  shown	  how	  Mughal-­‐era	  diasporic	  networks	  had	  fostered	  a	  sense	  of	  ‘Afghan’	  identity	  amongst	  Pashtun	  elites	  in	  advance	  of	  British	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  Nile	  Green,	  ‘Tribe,	  Diaspora,	  and	  Statehood	  in	  Afghan	  History’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies,	  67/1	  (2008),	  171-­‐211.	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the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  external	  influence	  on	  the	  socio-­‐political	  character	  of	  the	  Afghan	  community	  included	  a	  greater	  role	  for	  Islam	  in	  political	   life	   and	   a	   greater	  degree	  of	   tribal	   stratification	   -­‐	   a	   legacy	  of	   the	  campaign	  to	  expel	  the	  British.55	  Meanwhile,	  the	  reliance	  of	  successive	  Afghan	  rulers	  on	  British	  subsidies	  up	  to	  independence	  in	  1919	  inhibited	  the	  search	  for	   a	  more	   sustainable	   form	   of	   political	   legitimacy.	   By	   drawing	   on	   outside	  support,	   Afghan	   rulers	   could	   avoid	   seeking	   revenue	   from	   the	   Afghan	  population	   in	   return	   for	   political	   representation.	   The	   apogee	   of	   this	   policy	  was	   Abdur	   Rahman	   Khan’s	   rule	   following	   the	   second	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war,	   a	  period	   that	   witnessed	   a	   process	   of	   ‘internal	   imperialism’,56	  buttressed	   by	  British	  military	   and	   financial	   support,	   turning	  Afghanistan	   into	   a	   politically	  centralized	  nation-­‐state.	  Once	  again,	  this	  incited	  new	  competitors	  for	  political	  power,	   only	   this	   time	   they	  were	   provoked	   by	   opposition	   to	   the	   policies	   of	  their	  own	  ruler	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  invasions	  of	  the	  British.	  	  	  Benjamin	  Hopkins	  meanwhile	  has	  sought	  to	  locate	  Afghanistan’s	  emergence	  as	  a	  ‘proto-­‐state’	  within	  an	  evolving	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  context.	  Hopkins’	   account	   encompasses	   the	   changing	   intellectual	   and	   bureaucratic	  practices	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  –	  including	  practices	  related	  to	  colonial	  knowledge	  -­‐	  and	  also	  considers	  Afghanistan’s	  location	  within	  wider	  regional	  patterns	   of	   economic	   and	   military	   change	   associated	   with	   early	   forms	   of	  globalization.57	  Similarly,	  Hanifi	   has	   turned	  attention	   towards	   the	   impact	  of	  the	   changing	   commercial	   environment	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   neighbouring	  territories	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   and	   the	   effect	   this	   had	   on	   the	  economic	   geography	   of	   the	   country	   as	   well	   on	   identity	   politics.	   In	   an	  interesting	  counter-­‐narrative	  to	   those	  who	  favour	  the	   idea	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	   immune	   to,	   or	   excluded	   from,	   colonialism	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	  Hanifi	  argues	  that	  Afghan	  communities	  retained	  ‘colonial	  moorings’58	  in	  India	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan,	  122.	  Again,	  the	  rise	  of	  Islam	  demonstrates	  deeper	  roots	  in	  the	  civil	  wars	  that	  wracked	  Afghanistan	  from	  around	  1804	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  intervention	  in	  1838-­‐9.	  See:	  Shahrani,	  ‘Statebuilding	  and	  Social	  Fragmentation	  in	  Afghanistan,	  33-­‐4.	  56	  The	  term	  belongs	  to	  Louis	  Dupree.	  Cited	  in	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan,	  151.	  57	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	  58	  Shah	  Mahmud	  Hanifi,	  Connecting	  Histories	  in	  Afghanistan:	  Market	  Relations	  and	  State	  
Formation	  on	  a	  Colonial	  Frontier	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  Available	  Online:	  http://www.gutenberg-­‐e.org/hanifi/index.html,	  2.	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and	   that	   despite	   being	   defined	   by	   limited	   access,	   these	   moorings	   had	   the	  effect	  of	  perpetuating	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  fluidity	  in	  ‘Afghan’	  identity	  as	  a	  response	  to	   competition	   over	   market	   opportunities.	   Thus	   the	   strong	   state	   that	  emerged	   under	  Abdur	  Rahman	  Khan	   from	  1880	   in	   fact	   inhibited	  what	   had	  previously	  been	  a	  naturally	  open	  cultural,	  political,	  and	  economic	  order	  –	  one	  that	  was	  favourable	  to	  a	  market	  environment.59	  	  	  These	   secondary	   sources	   are	   of	   immense	   value	   in	   recovering	  Afghanistan’s	  imperial	  encounter	   in	  a	  way	  that	   is	  appreciative	  of	   the	  Afghanistan	  context.	  However,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   relative	  dearth	  of	   literature	   covering	  Afghanistan’s	  diplomatic	   relations	   with	   the	   British	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   Existing	  accounts	  have	   tended	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  periods	   immediately	  preceding	   these	  conflicts,	   and	   those	   accounts	   that	  have	   taken	  a	   longer	  view,	  or	   covered	   the	  period	   in	   between,	   have	   tended	   to	   discuss	   this	   in	   terms	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	  rivalry.	   Both	   conflicts	   had	   a	   defining	   impact	   on	   nineteenth	   century	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   and	   for	   this	   reason	   they	   are	   a	   prominent	   feature	   of	   this	  study.	   However,	   new	   insights	   can	   be	   gained	   through	   focusing	   on	   these	  relations	   on	   their	   own	   terms,	   and	   particularly	   by	   looking	   at	   those	   periods	  less	  frequently	  subject	  to	  scholarly	  attention.	  Afghanistan	  did	  not	  only	  come	  into	  view	  during	  moments	  of	  crisis	  for	  the	  British,	  but	  was	  a	  region	  that	  they	  constantly	  monitored.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   scope	  of	   this	  work	   considers	   the	  
longue	  durée	   in	  order	   to	  more	  adequately	  assess	   these	  relations.	  Relocating	  the	  history	  to	  allow	  such	  an	  account	  requires	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  imperial	  policy-­‐making.	  	  Crucially,	  in	  recovering	  British	  understandings	  of	  Afghanistan	  itself,	  we	  must	  concentrate	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘men	   on	   the	   spot’:	   Governors,	   Viceroys,	  Procounsels,	  and	  especially	  political	  officers.60	  For	  the	  British	  administrators	  of	   empire,	   it	   was	   neither	   possible	   nor	   desirable	   to	   operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  centralized	   control.	   Imperial	   administration,	   at	   its	   core,	   was	   thus	   ‘a	  continuous	   interplay	   between	   mother	   country	   and	   colonial	   communities,	  between	  centre	  and	  periphery,	  a	   series	  of	  essentially	  bilateral	   relationships	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Hanifi,	  Connecting	  Histories	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  60	  Yapp,	  Strategies	  of	  British	  India,	  8.	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which	   entailed	   constant	   negotiation	   rather	   than	   the	   imposition	   of	   rule	   and	  the	   acceptance	   of	   subjection.’61	  The	   individuals	   in	   between	  were	   of	   critical	  importance	   in	   the	   flow	  of	   information	  and	   the	  decisions	   that	   followed	   from	  such	  information.	  They	  were	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  pointsman	  on	  the	  railway	  of	  thought	  between	  two	  stations’.62	  The	  structure	  of	  this	  system	  was	  of	  course	  subject	  to	  alteration,	  and	  evolved	  with	  the	  shifting	  institutional	  framework	  of	  imperial	  rule.	   Improvements	   in	   technology	   also	   aided	   the	   speed	   at	   which	   decisions	  could	  be	  made,	  and	  ameliorated	  some	  of	   the	  deficiencies	   in	  the	   information	  system.63	  	   This	   system,	   the	   individuals	   that	   populated	   it,	   and	   the	   decisions	  they	  were	  responsible	  for,	  provide	  a	  principal	  site	  for	  study	  in	  relocating	  the	  history	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  at	  this	  time.	  	  	  At	  the	  far	  end	  of	  this	   information	  chain	  were	  the	  political	  officers	  providing	  the	   optic	   through	  which	   the	   imperial	   gaze	   could	   observe.	   These	  men	   (and	  they	  were	  all	  men	   in	   this	   case)	  were	   the	  official	   face	  of	   colonial	  knowledge	  and	   information	   management,	   yet	   their	   background	   and	   their	   actions	  frequently	  blurred	  the	  boundaries	  between	  official	  and	  non-­‐official	  practice.	  In	   the	   early	   nineteenth	   century,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Afghanistan,	   these	   officials	  were	   often	   not	   on	   official	   business	   at	   all,	   rather	   there	  was	   entrepreneurial	  spirit	  to	  their	  activities.	  The	  East	  India	  Company,	  often	  took	  a	  passing	  interest	  in	   such	   pursuits,	   and	   in	   certain	   cases,	   the	   full	   regalia	   of	   the	   British	  Government	   supported	   the	   ventures,	   as	   was	   case	   in	   Mountstuart	  Elphinstone’s	   1809	  expedition	   to	  Peshawar.	  But	  more	  often	   than	  not,	   early	  Afghanistan	  explorers	  were	  simply	   fulfilling	  a	  masculine	   ideal	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  adventurism	  with	  tacit	  Company	  support.	  	  	  An	   outcome	   of	   such	   adventures	   was	   a	   significant	   body	   of	   literature.	   Often	  these	   works	   are	   passed	   off	   as	   the	   antiquated,	   offensive	   ramblings	   of	   a	  peculiar	   breed	   of	   imperial	   chauvinist.	   Whilst	   this	   aspect	   certainly	   comes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Peter	  Burroughs,	  ‘Imperial	  Institutions	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Empire’,	  in	  Porter	  and	  Low	  (eds.),	  The	  Oxford	  History	  of	  the	  British	  Empire:	  Volume	  III,	  The	  Nineteenth	  Century,	  170.	  62	  Burroughs,	  ‘Imperial	  Institutions	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Empire’,	  176.	  63	  Duncan	  Bell	  has	  argued	  that	  such	  changes	  even	  wrought	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  perceptions	  of	  what	  empire	  could	  achieve.	  See:	  Bell,	  Duncan,	  ‘Dissolving	  Distance:	  Technology,	  Space,	  and	  Empire	  in	  British	  Political	  Thought,	  1770-­‐1900’,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History,	  77/3	  (2005),	  523-­‐62;	  Duncan	  Bell,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Greater	  Britain	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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through	   in	   these	  accounts,	   they	  also	  provide	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  data,	  aided	  by	  the	  prevailing	  intellectual	  trend	  of	  empiricism.	  This	  tradition	  encouraged	  the	  seemingly	   endless	   recording	   of	   observations	   of	   any	   kind.	   Such	   men	   were	  therefore,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Dupree,	  the	  U2	  spyplanes	  of	  their	  day,64	  or	  perhaps	  to	   update	   the	   metaphor,	   the	   aerial	   drones	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   To	  varying	  degrees,	   this	  knowledge	  was	   incorporated	   into	   the	  official	   canon	  of	  colonial	   knowledge.	   Elphinstone’s	   work	   was	   the	   most	   famous	   of	   these,	  leading	  Hopkins	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  ‘Elphinstonian	  episteme’,	  one	  that	  definitively	  delineated	   the	   universe	   of	   the	   knowable	   regarding	   Afghanistan’.65	  Hopkins’	  groundbreaking	  work	  on	  Afghanistan	  offers	  many	  avenues	  for	  scholarship	  on	  this	  period	  and	  location.	  In	  chapter	  two	  I	  seek	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  ‘Ephinstonian	  episteme’	   and	   consider	   those	   Europeans	   who	   appropriated	   and	   developed	  Elphinstone’s	  work.	   In	   particular,	   I	   explore	   the	  works	   of	   those	  who	  would	  subsequently	   serve	   in	   an	   official	   capacity,	   constituting	   a	   loose	   ‘knowledge	  community’,	  informing	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  company	  and	  later	  the	  Crown.	  	  	  Whereas	   Hopkins	   focuses	   on	   the	   narrowing	   of	   the	   ‘episteme’	   through	   the	  professionalization	  and	  bureaucratization	  of	  the	  company’s	  ranks,	  in	  chapter	  three	   I	   focus	   specifically	   on	  narrowing	   resulting	   from	   the	  decision	   to	   go	   to	  war,	  which	  served	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  ‘closure’	  enacted	  upon	  understandings	  of	  the	   Afghan	   polity.	   Policy	   makers	   were	   in	   effect	   cognitively	   trapped	   by	  Elphinstone’s	   works,	   and	   those	   of	   his	   intellectual	   successors	   –	   particularly	  those	  who	  informed	  policy.	  This	  process	  of	  closure	  was	  therefore	  a	  dialectic	  between	  political	  action	  and	  colonial	  knowledge	  -­‐	  the	  knowledge	  community	  supplied	   the	   realms	   of	   possibility;	   political	   action	   made	   the	   ‘possible’	  manifest.	  	  Chapter	  four	  turns	  to	  the	  period	  following	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  and	  to	  the	  more	   pernicious	   and	   negative	   representations	   of	   Afghanistan	   that	   took	  on	  a	  greater	  prominence	  at	  this	  time.	  These	  projections	  also	  exhibited	  a	  more	  self-­‐justificatory	   nature.	   The	   Afghans	   were	   no	   longer	   to	   be	   seen	   as	  fragmented	   and	   fractious	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   violent	   recent	   past,	   but	   rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Dupree,	  Afghanistan,	  371.	  65	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  17.	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they	   were	   inescapably	   so	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   inherent,	   intransigent	   nature.	  Seeking	  to	  atone	  for	  their	  brutal	  ejection	  from	  the	  country,	  the	  British	  found	  solace	   in	   placing	   Afghan	   character	   firmly	   beyond	   the	   pale	   of	   ‘civilized’	  international	  society.	  This	  served	  both	  emotional	  and	  practical	  ends.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  allowed	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  catharsis,	  whereby	  British	  prestige	  could	  be	  rescued	  through	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  barbaric,	  uncivilized	  and	  perhaps	  unsporting	  way	  in	  which	  their	  armies	  had	  been	  cast	  out	  of	  Afghanistan.	  This	  was	  mainly	  a	  narcissistic	  reflex,	  but	  one	  that	  was	  also	  prompted	  by	  the	  long	  running	   fear	   that	   their	  military	  position	  owed	   to	  a	   fragile	   image	  of	  military	  authority,	  and	  that	  any	  inkling	  of	  weakness	  would	  spark	  a	  wave	  of	  instability	  as	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  colonized	  lands	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  throw	  off	  their	  colonial	  overlords.	  	  	  On	  a	  more	  practical	  level,	  these	  representations	  also	  offered	  a	  rationale	  for	  a	  limit	   to	   the	   Indian	   frontier,	   thereby	   stabilizing	   the	   associated	   cost	   of	  continual	   expansion,	   and	   providing	   a	   loose	   sense	   of	   cartographic	   stability.	  From	   a	   legal	   perspective	   too,	   the	   presentation	   of	   an	   uncivilized	   ‘beyond’	  justified	   the	   oppressive	   practices	   meted	   out	   on	   the	   frontier	   tribes,	   whilst	  preserving	   the	   image	   of	   British	   adherence	   to	   the	   evolving	   standards	   of	  international	   law	   as	   they	   related	   to	   more	   'civilized'	   states.	   Meanwhile	   the	  presentation	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Afghans	  as	  interminably	  violent,	  rapacious,	  duplicitous,	  and	  intriguing,	  justified	  a	  resilient	  policy	  of	  non-­‐engagement,	  one	  that	   slowly	   evolved	   into	   a	   more	   permissive	   policy	   of	   non-­‐intervention,	   at	  least	  in	  a	  physical	  sense.	  	  	  This	   period	   demonstrates,	   therefore,	   the	   tendency	   for	   the	  more	   pejorative	  aspects	   of	   the	   orientalist	   discourse	   to	   be	   partly	   a	   function	   of	   crisis	   and	  conflict,	  in	  this	  case,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.66	  But	  in	  addition	   it	   shows	   how	   wider	   developments	   in	   imperial	   thought	   informed	  these	   representations,	   giving	   them	   a	   more	   concrete	   form	   and	   purpose,	  including	   in	   policy	   terms.	   The	   colonial	   knowledge	   of	   Elphinstone	   et	  al	   still	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Tarak	  Barkawi	  and	  Keith	  Stanski,	  Orientalism	  and	  War	  (London:	  Hurst,	  2012);	  Keith	  Stanski,,	  “So	  these	  folks	  are	  aggressive’:	  An	  Orientalist	  Reading	  of	  Afghan	  Warlords’,	  Security	  
Dialogue,	  41/1	  (2009),	  73-­‐94;	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information.	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provided	  a	  backdrop	  to	  this,	  but	  it	  was	  an	  increasingly	  sclerotic	  schemata,	  as	  the	  formalizing	  processes	  of	  the	  increasingly	  bureaucratic	  colonial	  state	  took	  hold.	   As	   they	  moved	   away	   from	   the	   sweeping	   gaze	   of	   colonial	   knowledge,	  images	  of	  Afghanistan	  were	  becoming	  mediated	  by	  a	  new	   techno-­‐cultural67	  enterprise	  of	  frontier	  management	  and	  a	  more	  insistent	  British	  government	  in	  India.	  	  Relocating	  the	  history	  in	  the	  ideas,	  the	  institutions,	  and	  the	  processes	  shaping	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  not	  only	  recovers	  a	  sunken	  history	  from	  a	   literature	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  geopolitical	  great	  power	  rivalries,	  it	  also	  gives	  crucial	   insight	   into	  why	   the	  Russian	   threat	  mattered	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	  British	   were	   developing	   their	   own	   culturally-­‐contingent	   understanding	   of	  how	   the	   weak	   Afghan	   polity	   would	   fall	   prey	   to	   outside	   influences.	   This	  inevitably	   drew	   them	   to	   consider	   the	   categories	   and	   characteristics,	   the	  histories	   and	   grievances,	   and	   the	   vicissitudes	   and	   intrigues,	   of	   the	   Afghan	  socio-­‐political	  community.	  With	  a	  basic	  grasp	  of	   these	  categories	   they	  were	  able	   to	   construct	   their	   own	   ‘quasi-­‐causal’	   representations68	  and	   began	   to	  imagine	  how	   their	  neuroses	  might	  manifest	   themselves	   in	  actual	  outcomes.	  Certain	   communities	   became	   branded	   therefore	   as	   potentially	   threatening,	  due	  to	  their	  perceived	  affinity	  with	  nefarious	  outside	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  Shi’a	  communities	  and	  the	  Persian	  government.	  	  	  Colonial	  knowledge	  served	  a	  dual	  purpose.	  As	  well	  as	   identifying	   threats,	   it	  allowed	  insight	  into	  how	  such	  threats	  might	  be	  countered.	  For	  many	  policy-­‐makers	  (though	  not	  all)	  this	  demanded	  a	  functioning	  coherent	  polity,	  a	  social	  compact.	   In	   order	   to	   construct	   a	   plausible	   story	   of	   how	   this	   might	   be	  achieved	   they	  drew	  once	  more	  on	  colonial	  knowledge.	  However,	   they	  were	  frequently	  stymied	  in	  this	  quest,	  often	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  own	  actions.	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  Derek	  Gregory,	  ‘From	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  view	  to	  kill:	  Drones	  and	  late-­‐modern	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  Theory	  Culture	  Society,	  27/7-­‐8	  (2011),	  188-­‐215.	  68	  Jutta	  Weldes,	  ‘Constructing	  National	  Interests’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  2/3	  (1996),	  281-­‐2.	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Disciplinary	   Importance:	   International	   Relations,	   Imperial	   History	   and	  
Afghanistan	  	  Beyond	  the	  specifics	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations,	  a	  wider	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	   to	  contribute	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	   interface	  between	  imperial	  history	  and	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations.	  The	  academic	  disciplines	  of	  History	  and	  IR,	  it	  has	  been	  noted,	  have	  not	  always	  enjoyed	  an	  easy	  relationship.69	  In	  the	  early	  2000s	  there	  was	  a	  refocusing	  on	  this	  ongoing	  schism.70	  On	  the	  one	  hand	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   such	   a	   debate	   would	   help	   to	   overcome	   certain	  ahistorical	   attitudes	   that	   had	  plagued	   IR	   throughout	  much	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  period,	   an	   attitude	   that	   was	   in	   part	   a	   result	   of	   the	   transhistorical	  commitments	  inherent	  to	  the	  dominant	  rationalist	  and	  positivist	  theoretical	  approaches.71	  In	   a	   good	  example	  of	   this	   critique,	  George	  Lawson	  noted	   IR’s	  tendency	  to	  present	  history	  as	  ‘scripture’:	  ‘the	  mining	  of	  the	  past	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	   suppositions	   about	   the	   present;	   the	   smoothing	   out	   of	   differences,	  varieties,	   and	  processes	  of	   change	   in	   the	   interests	  of	  methodological	  purity	  and	   theoretical	   rigidity;	   and	   the	  bracketing	  off	   of	  history	  behind	  an	  eternal	  ‘‘illusory	  present’’’.72	  In	  short,	  IR	  was	  not	  just	  ahistorical,	  but	  also	  ahistoricist;	  reluctant	   to	   engage	   reflectively	   with	   categories	   such	   as	   ‘state’,	   ‘system’,	  ‘sovereignty’,	  ‘power’	  and	  ‘empire’.73	  	  	  As	  these	  scholars	  pointed	  out,	  a	  more	  historically	  sensitive	  IR	  would	  uncover	  the	   nuanced	   nature	   of	   such	   categories,	   demonstrating	   their	   historically	  contingent	  meanings,	   rather	   than	   black-­‐boxing	   them	   as	   essentialized,	   even	  reified	   categories.	  The	   coincidental	   rise	  of	   critical	   theory	  and	   constructivist	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  Colin	  Elman	  and	  Miriam	  Fendius	  Elman	  (eds),	  Bridges	  and	  Boundaries:	  Historians,	  Political	  
Scientists,	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  Relations	  (London:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  2001);	  George	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Eternal	  Divide?‘;	  David	  Armitage,	  ‘The	  Fifty	  Years’	  Rift:	  Intellectual	  History	  and	  International	  Relations’,	  Modern	  Intellectual	  History,	  1:1	  (2004),	  pp.	  97-­‐109.	  70	  See	  for	  example,	  Michael	  Cox,	  Tim	  Booth,	  and	  Ken	  Dunne,	  ‘Empires,	  Systems,	  and	  States:	  Great	  transformations	  in	  international	  politics’,	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  27:1	  (2001),	  pp.	  1-­‐15.	  71	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  ‘Reading	  History	  through	  Constructivist	  Eyes’,	  Millennium	  37:2	  (2008),	  p.	  395.	  72	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Promise	  of	  Historical	  Sociology	  in	  International	  Relations’;	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Eternal	  Divide?’.	  73	  Hobson,	  John,	  George	  Lawson,	  and	  Justin	  Rosenberg,	  ‘Historical	  Sociology’,	  LSE	  Research	  
Online,	  June	  2010	  (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28016).	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approaches	  with	  their	  emphasis	  on	  linguistics,	  subjectivity,	  and	  the	  continual	  reproduction	  of	  social	  institutions	  offered	  a	  more	  questioning	  attitude	  to	  core	  categories	  and	  ontologies.74	  Yet	  for	  some,	  this	  had	  only	  gone	  so	  far.	  As	  Colin	  Wight	   argued,	   ‘rather	   than	   embarking	   on	   new	   theoretical	   or	   empirical	  avenues,	   many	   scholars	   merely	   “poured	   the	   newly	   emerging	   patterns	   of	  thought	   into	   the	   old	   framework”’.75	  The	   ‘cultural	   turn’	   that	   constructivist	  approaches	   had	   carried	   into	   the	   field	   remained,	   for	   some,	   lacking	   in	  emancipatory	  spirit,	   tied	  as	  they	  often	  were	  to	  simple	  identity-­‐based	  binary	  narratives	  of	  enemy/friend,	  or	  wedded	  to	  familiar	  (state-­‐based)	  objects	  such	  as	   ideas	   of	   national	   strategic	   cultures.	   The	   prospect	   that	   constructivism	   –	  with	   its	   intellectual	   heritage	   deriving	   in	   part	   from	   critical	   theory	   –	   would	  offer	  a	  more	  historicist	  approach	  in	  IR’s	  engagement	  with	  history	  has	  in	  some	  respects	  fallen	  short	  of	  expectations.76	  	  	  The	   ‘historical	   turn’	   (or	   ‘re-­‐turn’	   as	   Lawson	   rightly	   labels	   it)77	  entailed	   a	  move	   away	   from	   IR’s	   preoccupation	   with	   diplomatic	   history,	   which	   was	  becoming	  increasingly	  marginalized	  within	  disciplinary	  history	  anyhow,	  and	  a	  turn	  towards	  social	  and	  cultural	  history.	  Some	  called	  for	  greater	  attention	  in	  particular	  to	  imperial	  history,78	  a	  field	  that	  had	  itself	  undergone	  a	  ‘cultural	  turn’,	  yet	  one	  by	  which	   IR	  remained	  curiously	  unmoved.	  As	  Tarak	  Barkawi,	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  proponents	  of	  an	  ‘imperial	  turn’	  pointed	  out,	  ‘[r]epeatedly,	  it	  would	  seem,	  IR	  was	  founded	  amidst	  empire,	  but	  discovered	  instead	  only	  a	  world	  of	  sovereign	  states	  and	  their	  collective	  action	  problems.’	  As	  he	  notes,	  the	   failure	   of	   social	   science	   and	   IR	   to	   deal	   with	   questions	   of	   empire	   and	  imperialism	  left	  the	  discipline	  inadequate	  ‘to	  the	  experiences	  and	  histories	  of	  most	   of	   the	   peoples	   and	   places	   on	   the	   planet’.79	  For	   Barkawi	   and	   Laffey,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  ‘Reading	  History	  through	  Constructivist	  Eyes’.	  75	  Quoted	  in	  Daniel	  Jacobi,	  ‘On	  the	  ‘Construction’	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  of	  ‘Construction’’,	  International	  Political	  Sociology,	  5/1	  (2011),	  94-­‐7.	  76	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Eternal	  Divide?’,	  209-­‐10.	  Armitage,	  ‘The	  Fifty	  Years’	  Rift’,	  100.	  77	  Lawson,	  ‘The	  Eternal	  Divide’,	  205.	  78	  Tarak	  Barkawi	  and	  Mark	  Laffey,	  ‘Retrieving	  the	  Imperial:	  Empire	  and	  International	  Relations’,	  Millennium,	  31/1	  (2002),	  109-­‐27;	  Robert	  Vitalis,	  ‘Birth	  of	  a	  discipline’,	  in	  David	  Long	  and	  Brian	  Schmidt	  (eds),	  Imperialism	  and	  Internationalism	  in	  the	  Discipline	  of	  
International	  Relations	  (Albany,	  NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2005),	  159-­‐82.	  	  79	  Barkawi,	  ‘Empire	  and	  Order	  in	  International	  Relations	  and	  Security	  Studies’.	  See	  also	  David	  Long	  and	  Brian	  Schmidt	  (eds),	  Imperialism	  and	  Internationalism	  in	  the	  Discipline	  of	  
International	  Relations	  (Albany,	  NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2005).	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engagement	  with	  Imperial	  History	  offered	  a	  threefold	  benefit	  of	  escaping	  the	  ‘territorial	   trap’,80	  highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   hierarchy	   in	   international	  relations,	  and	  engaging	  with	  international	  relations	  as	  ‘thick’	  social,	  political,	  cultural,	   and	   military	   exchange.	   Central	   to	   this	   was	   the	   proposal	   that	  histories	   of	   the	   European	   and	   non-­‐European	   world	   were	   co-­‐implicated	   in	  each	  other;	  that	  imperialism	  highlighted	  processes	  of	  co-­‐constitution	  in	  state	  identity.81	  	  	  As	   this	   suggests	   however,	   in	   addition	   to	   enriching	   disciplinary	   knowledge,	  accounts	   of	   imperial	   history	   from	   the	   IR	   perspective	   also	   offer	   important	  insights	   into	   disciplinary	   foundations	   as	   scholars	   have	   used	   the	   ‘historical	  turn’	   to	   enquire	   into	   the	   intellectual	   history	   of	   international	   political	  thought.82	  Alongside	   this	   ‘turn’	   there	   emerged	   a	   new	   sensitivity	   to	   political	  theory,	  seeking	  to	  historically	  contextualize	  the	  international	  political	  theory	  at	  the	  core	  of	  prevailing	  IR	  theoretical	  accounts.83	  As	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	   this	   endeavour	   found,	   attention	   to	   imperialism	  put	   a	   different	   spin	   on	   a	  curious	   disciplinary	   presumption	   that	   the	   tenets	   of	   international	   theory	  travelled	  more	  or	  less	  progressively	  from	  the	  likes	  of	  Thucydides,	  to	  Hobbes,	  to	   the	   treaty	   of	   Westphalia	   and	   on	   to	   the	   contemporary	   states	   system.	  Drawing	  attention	  specifically	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  Schmitt	   and	  Long	  noted	  how	   the	   ‘willful	   forgetting	  of	   empire’	  obscured	   the	  reality	   that	   the	   discipline	   was	   not	   born,	   as	   the	   conventional	   account	  suggested,	  in	  the	  ‘first	  debate’	  between	  idealists	  and	  realists,	  but	  within	  a	  far	  more	   important	   theme	   concerning	   deeper	   tensions	   between	   competing	  conceptions	   of	   imperialism	   and	   internationalism.	   This	   is	   a	   tension	   that	  complexifies	  the	  presumptions	  surrounding	  the	  ontological	  stability	  of	  ‘state’,	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  John	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  of	  International	  Relations	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  Review	  of	  International	  Political	  Economy,	  1/1	  (1994),	  53-­‐80.	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  Tarak	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  and	  Mark	  Laffey,	  ‘Retrieving	  the	  Imperial’;	  Martin	  Shaw,	  ‘Post-­‐Imperial	  and	  Quasi-­‐Imperial:	  State	  and	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  in	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  Global	  Era,	  Millennium,	  31/2	  (2002),	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  Armitage,	  ‘The	  Fifty	  Years’	  Rift’;	  Bell,	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  Visions	  of	  Global	  Order;	  Bell,	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  World’.	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  Duncan	  Bell,	  ‘International	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  of	  a	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  turn?’,	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Journal	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  115-­‐26.	  
	   39	  
‘sovereignty’,	   ‘nation’,	   and	   indeed	   ‘empire’	   itself.84	  In	   effect	   therefore,	   the	  ‘historical	   turn’	   to	   imperial	   history,	   and	   the	   ‘historiographical	   turn’	   could	  inform	   one	   another,	   allowing	   substantive	   and	   theoretical	   reflection	   within	  the	  discipline,	  and	  towards	  the	  discipline	  itself.	  	  This	  historical	  turn	  has	  opened	  up	  enquiry	  by	  IR	  scholars	  into	  the	  modalities	  of	   imperial	   expansion.	   Jordan	   Branch	   has	   shown	   how	   the	   spread	   of	   the	  territorial	   state	   was	   not	   simply	   the	   exporting	   of	   Eurocentric	   constructs	   of	  sovereign	   authority,	   but	   rather	   a	   process	   of	   ‘colonial	   reflection’	   whereby	  colonial	   officials	   unfamiliar	   with	   local	   spatialities	   of	   power	   and	   authority	  were	   forced	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   more	   intelligible	   ‘scientific’	   approach	   through	  cartography	   –	   a	  method	   that	  was	   then	   imported	   back	   to	   Europe.85	  Edward	  Keene,	   through	   his	   reappraisal	   of	   Grotius’	   work	   has	   highlighted	   how	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘divided	  sovereignty’,	  the	  idea	  that	  sovereignty	  could	  be	  shared	  by	  two	   powers,	   provided	   theoretical	   justification	   for	   imperialist	   ventures	  throughout	   the	   nineteenth	   century.86	  By	   focusing	   on	   this	   core	   disciplinary	  concept,	  Keene’s	  work	  shows	  how	  imperialism	  was	  in	  large	  part	  the	  story	  of	  the	  disassembling	  of	   sovereignty,	   justified	  by	   the	   same	  political	   theory	   that	  later	  IR	  scholars	  would	  use	  to	  sustain	  a	  concept	  of	  international	  society	  and	  ultimately	  the	  international	  system	  based	  on	  a	  concept	  of	  sovereign	  states.87	  Meanwhile,	   Gerry	   Simpson	   -­‐	   although	   not	   focusing	   exclusively	   on	   empire	   -­‐	  has	   shown	   how	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   imperial	   entities	   were	  responsible	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  legal	  framework	  that	  institutionalized	  a	  form	  of	  ‘legal	  hegemony’	  and	  ‘anti-­‐pluralism’;	  one	  that	  mandated	  distinctions	  between	   ‘Great	  Powers’	  and	   ‘outlaw	  states’,	  a	  distinction	  that	  he	  argues	  has	  left	  a	  legacy	  to	  this	  day.88	  In	  these	  three	  examples	  then,	  the	  core	  disciplinary	  criteria	  of	   the	   territorial	   state,	   sovereignty,	   and	  anarchy	  are	  placed	   in	   their	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  of	  International	  
Relations.	  See	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  Duncan	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  World’;	  Duncan	  Bell	  The	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  of	  Greater	  Britain;	  Duncan	  Bell	  (ed.),	  Victorian	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  of	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  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2007).	  85	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  origins	  of	  sovereign	  statehood’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  18/2	  (2012),	  277-­‐97;	  Jordan	  Branch,	  ‘Mapping	  the	  Sovereign	  State:	  Technology,	  Authority,	  and	  Systemic	  Change’,	  International	  
Organization,	  65/1	  (2011),	  1-­‐36.	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  Edward	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  University	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  (Cambridge:	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historical	   context,	   rescued	   from	   the	   transhistorical	   formulations	   that	  positivist	  approaches	  had	  long	  propounded.	  	  Perhaps	   more	   intriguing	   -­‐	   as	   highlighted	   in	   Keene’s	   work	   on	   divided	  sovereignty	   and	   Simpson’s	   work	   on	   ‘outlaw	   states’	   -­‐	   is	   the	   story	   of	   the	  normative	  policing	  of	  such	  terminology;	  an	  activity	  frequently	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	   powerful.89	  Simpson	   notes	   how	   states	   could	   be	   ‘differentiated	   in	   law	  according	  to	  their	  moral	  nature,	  material	  and	  intellectual	  power,	   ideological	  disposition	   or	   cultural	   attributes’. 90 	  The	   act	   of	   dividing	   sovereignty,	   or	  designating	  a	  state	  as	  an	  ‘outlaw’	  thus	  required	  a	  (sometimes	  deliberate)	  act	  of	   social	   construction;	   the	   marshaling	   of	   a	   certain	   set	   of	   representations	  drawing	  on	  culturally	  contingent	  understandings.	  A	  key	   trope	  here	  was	   the	  distinction	   between	   ‘civilized’	   and	   ‘uncivilized’	   states,	   and	   as	   Gerrit	   Gong	  shows,	   the	  standards	  by	  which	   this	  status	  was	   judged	  exhibited	  a	  profound	  cultural	  bias	  towards	  European	  practices,	  and	  allowed	  latitude	  for	  subjective	  (or	  even	  hypocritical)	  appraisals	  based	  on	  such	  taboo	  practices	  as	  polygamy,	  
sati,91	  and	  slavery.92	  	  	  In	   reality,	   the	   power	   of	   racialist	   sentiments	   meant	   that	   South	   and	   Central	  Asian	   states	   were	   never	   likely	   to	   escape	   such	   depictions,	   although	  distinctions	   within	   these	   ideas	   of	   race	   –	   the	   ‘other’	   within	   the	   ‘other’	  phenomenon	  –	  were	  apparent.	  But	  the	  sustenance	  of	  such	  distinctions	  rested	  too	   on	   rhetorical	   collusion	   between	   imperial	   entities.	   This	   raises	   an	  important	   point.	   Accounts	   that	   emphasize	   great	   power	   rivalries	   in	   the	  imperial	   setting	  neglect	   the	   common	  perspectives	  held	  by	   rival	   empires	  on	  the	   subject	   of	   non-­‐European	   or	   ‘uncivilized’	   states.	   Whilst	   in	   Europe	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  See	  also	  Thomas	  J.	  Bierstecker	  and	  Cynthia	  Weber	  (eds.),	  State	  Sovereignty	  as	  Social	  
Construct,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  1996);	  David	  Strang,	  ‘Contested	  sovereignty:	  The	  social	  construction	  of	  colonial	  imperialism’,	  in	  Thomas	  J.	  Bierstecker	  and	  Cynthia	  Weber	  (eds.),	  
State	  Sovereignty	  as	  Social	  Construct,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  1996),	  22-­‐49.	  90	  Simpson,	  Great	  Powers	  and	  Outlaw	  States,	  6.	  91	  The	  ritual	  self-­‐immolation	  of	  widowers	  on	  the	  death	  of	  their	  husband.	  	  92	  Gong,	  The	  Standard	  of	  ‘Civilization’	  in	  International	  Society,	  14-­‐15.	  See	  also	  Jennifer	  Pitts,	  ‘Boundaries	  of	  Victorian	  International	  Law’	  in	  Duncan	  Bell	  (ed.),	  Victorian	  Visions	  of	  Global	  
Order	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2007),	  67-­‐88;	  Duncan	  Bell,	  ‘Empire	  and	  International	  Relations	  in	  Victorian	  Political	  Thought’, The	  Historical	  Journal,	  49/1	  (2006),	  281–98;	  Antony	  Anghie,	  ‘Finding	  the	  Peripheries:	  Sovereignty	  and	  colonialism	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  international	  law’,	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  Journal,	  40/1,	  (1999),	  1-­‐71.	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balance	   of	   power	   between	   sovereign	   states	   was	   a	   shared	   perspective,	   in	  South	   and	   Central	   Asia,	   Britain	   and	   Russia	   respectively	   justified	   their	  subjugation	  of	  these	  spaces	  by	  perpetuating	  representations	  that	  underlined	  a	   concept	   of	   ‘unequal	   sovereigns’. 93 	  Sovereignty,	   or	   the	   possibility	   of	  sovereignty,	   thus	   held	   different	  meanings	   in	   different	   geographic	   locales,	   a	  state	  of	  affairs	  perpetuated	  by	  great	  power	  collusion.	  	  	  Attention	   to	   imperial	   history	   can	   uncover	   alternative	   readings	   of	   core	  disciplinary	   criteria	   providing	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   historical	   contingency	   of	  these	   categories	   whose	   ontological	   stability	   is	   often	   taken	   for	   granted.	  Equally,	   it	   shows	   that	   these	   categories	  were	   continually	   contested,	   not	   just	  within	   imperial	   political	   thought,	   but	   in	   the	   process	   of	   global	   exchange,	   of	  which	   imperialism	  was	  simply	  one	  variant.	  Very	  often	   this	  was	   the	  story	  of	  the	   exchange	   along	   ‘webs	   of	   empire’	   from	   the	   (imperial)	   centre	   to	   the	  periphery	  and	  back	  again.94	  In	  turn	  this	  highlights	  how	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  the	  centre	  depended	  upon	  the	  periphery	  itself.	  Whilst	  the	  constitutive	  effects	  of	   imperial	   exchange	  are	  often	  overlooked	  by	  an	   IR	  discipline	   that	   remains	  analytically	   imprisoned	   by	   its	   own	   theory-­‐driven	   orthodoxies,	   attention	   to	  imperial	  history	  can	  help	  to	  alleviate	  this	  bias.	  New	  avenues	  of	  research,	  and	  new	  political	  geographies	  as	  sites	   for	   the	  constitution	  of	  power,	  are	  opened	  up	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	  
Methods	  and	  Approaches:	  An	  Agnostic	  Constructivism	  
	  As	   discussed	   then,	   alongside	   the	   recovery	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations,	   a	   key	  objective	  of	  this	  work	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  interface	  between	  IR	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	   imperial	   history	   on	   the	   other.	   However,	   arguing	   simply	   for	   a	   dialogue	  between	   these	   two	   fields	   of	   study	   says	   nothing	   of	   the	  mode	   in	   which	   this	  should	   occur.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   making	   a	   disciplinary	   contribution	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  an	  approach,	  or	  at	  least	  an	  attitude	  towards	  this	  mode	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Simpson,	  Great	  Powers	  and	  Outlaw	  States.	  	  94	  Tony	  Ballantyne,	  ‘Rereading	  the	  Archive	  and	  Opening	  up	  the	  Nation-­‐State:	  Colonial	  Knowledge	  in	  South	  Asia	  and	  Beyond’,	  in	  Antoinette	  Burton,	  (ed.)	  After	  the	  Imperial	  Turn:	  
Thinking	  with	  and	  through	  the	  Nation	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  104.	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investigation.	   I	   describe	   this	   approach	   and	   attitude	   as	   one	   of	   ‘agnostic	  constructivism’.	  This	  term	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  I	  believe	  approaches	  offered	  by	  constructivism	  to	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  purposes	  I	  set	  out	  in	  this	  work,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  describe	  or	  outline	  a	  constructivist	  ‘theory’,	  nor	  do	  I	  seek	  to	  ‘test’	  such	  a	  theory.95	  	  	  This	  perspective	  is	  far	  from	  unique	  –	  the	  very	  questioning	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  paradigm	  theory	  of	   IR	   informed	  the	  work	  of	  constructivist	  scholars	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘first	   generation’.96	  Nicholas	   Onuf’s	  World	  of	  Our	  Making	   that	   first	  introduced	   the	   term	   ‘constructivism’	   to	   the	   field	   was	   in	   large	   part	   a	  questioning	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘social	  science’	  that	  claimed	  universality	  for	  itself.	  Key	  to	  this	  critique	  was	  the	  observation	  that	  IR	  did	  not	  apparently	  resemble	   a	   paradigm	  of	   an	   ‘operative	   kind’,	   defined	   as	   ‘those	   ensembles	   of	  human	   practices	   seen	   by	   those	   engaging	   in	   or	   observing	   them	   to	   have	  coherence	  setting	  them	  apart	  from	  other	  practices’97.	  On	  this	  account	  whilst	  the	  operative	  paradigm	  of	  science,	  for	  example,	  is	  largely	  ‘naturally	  real’,	  the	  social	   sciences	  are	   in	   large	  part	   socially	   constructed,	  dependent	  on	  a	   social	  reality	   constituted	   by	   human	   practices	   as	   well	   as	  material	   conditions.	   The	  theoretical	   claims	   put	   forward	   by	   IR	   scholars	   that	   attempted	   to	   demarcate	  ‘international	   relations’	   as	   an	   operative	   paradigm	   constituting	   an	   anarchic	  state-­‐based	  system,	   for	  example,	  were	  simply	  one	  example	  of	  a	  disciplinary	  claim	  that	  distracted	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  a	  social	  science	  IR’s	  operative	   paradigm	   is	   ‘heterogeneous,	   amorphous,	   [and]	   elusive’.98	  Before	  constructivism	  became	  equated	  with	  the	  maxim	  that	  ‘anarchy	  is	  what	  states	  make	  of	  it’	  therefore,	  it	  carried	  the	  far	  more	  emancipatory	  suggestion	  that	  IR	  is	  what	  social	   theorists	  make	  of	   it	  –	  a	  maxim	  that	  highlights	  the	  historically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Jeffrey	  T.	  Checkel,	  ‘The	  Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory’,	  World	  
Politics,	  50/2	  (1998),	  324-­‐48.	  96	  The	  ‘second	  generation’,	  meanwhile	  aimed	  their	  sights	  at	  the	  so-­‐called	  neo-­‐neo	  synthesis	  arguably	  neglected	  this	  original	  insight,	  instead	  attempting	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  ontology	  whilst	  retaining	  the	  empirical	  preoccupation	  of	  existing	  ‘neo-­‐utilitarian’	  scholarship.	  See	  Emanuel	  Adler,	  ‘Constructivism	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Sources,	  Contributions,	  and	  Debates’	  in	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  Thomas	  Risse,	  and	  Beth	  A.	  Simmons	  (eds.),	  Handbook	  of	  
International	  Relations,	  Second	  Edition	  (London:	  Sage,	  2013),	  112-­‐44.	  97	  Nicholas	  Onuf,	  World	  of	  Our	  Making	  (Columbia,	  South	  Carolina:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1989),	  14.	  98	  Onuf	  World	  of	  Our	  Making,	  16.	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contingent	  nature	  of	   any	   claim	   to	   a	  universal	   social	   theory,	   including	   those	  relating	  to	  core	  categories.	  	  The	  danger	  of	  going	  too	  far	  down	  this	  deconstructivist	  route	  is	  that	  we	  argue	  away	  the	  possibility	  of	  International	  Relations	  as	  a	  discipline.	  Rather	  I	  prefer	  to	  keep	  with	   the	   term	   ‘International	  Relations’	  and	  adopt	   the	  constructivist	  insight	   that	   as	   a	   brand	   of	   social	   theory	   its	   study	   is	   necessarily	  interdisciplinary99 	  and	   necessarily	   historically	   contingent.100 	  In	   this	   light,	  what	   is	  understood	  as	   ‘International	  Relations’	   today	  –	  both	  as	  a	  discipline,	  and	   as	   relations	   between	   states	   -­‐	   is	   simply	   one	  historical	   instantiation	   of	   a	  constellation	   of	   understandings	   that	   has	   been,	   and	   will	   continue	   to	   be,	  subject	   to	   change.	   This	   attitude	   supposes	   that	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	  scholar	  of	  IR	  operating	  in	  a	  historical	  mode	  is	  to	  incorporate	  those	  aspects	  of	  ‘social	   theory’	   that	   may	   reasonably	   contribute	   to	   a	   concept	   of	   the	  ‘international’	   at	   a	   given	   historical	  moment,	   rather	   than	   to	   retrofit	   existing	  thinking	  to	  that	  context.	  This	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  in	  studying	  a	  period	  of	  history	  in	  which	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR	  did	  not	  exist.	  In	  short	  then,	  this	  study	  is	  primarily	  a	  work	  of	  international	  history	  that	  seeks	  a	  constructivist	  dialogue	  with	   IR,	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   fruitful	   for	   both	   the	   historical	   topic	   under	  examination,	   and	   the	   discipline	   of	   IR	   toward	   which	   it	   is	   directed.	   Each	  chapter	   corresponds	   roughly	   to	   a	   theme,	   around	   which	   this	   dialogue	  operates	   and	   through	   which	   constructivist	   approaches	   are	   incorporated.	  These	  themes	  are	  knowledge,	  policy,	  and	  exception.	  	  	  
Knowledge	  	  	  Accessing	   the	   meanings	   that	   Afghanistan	   held	   for	   the	   British	   specifically	  requires	   attention	   to	   the	   key	   site	   of	   colonial	   knowledge	   in	   shaping	   British	  perceptions.	   Often	   overlooked	   in	   existing	   histories,101	  the	   information	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Onuf,	  World	  of	  Our	  Making,	  16;	  Derek	  Gregory,	  Geographical	  Imaginations,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1994),11.	  100	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  ‘Reading	  History	  Through	  Constructivist	  Eyes’.	  101	  Although	  see	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	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knowledge	  systems	  established	  by	  the	  British	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  their	  South	  Asian	  territories	  were	  a	  key	  edifice	  of	  their	  power	  and	  reach,102	  and	  a	  key	  site	  for	   the	   construction	   of	   social	   reality.	   These	   practices	   of	   imperial	   ‘meaning-­‐making’	   are	   a	   reminder	   that	   imperialism	   is	   not	   simply	   the	   invasion	   and	  conquest	   of	   physical	   space,	   but	   of	   epistemological	   space	   as	  well,103	  and	   (as	  constructivism	  highlights)	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  identity	  is	  about	  ‘the	  continual	  contest	   for	   control	   over	   the	   power	   necessary	   to	   create	   meaning	   within	   a	  social	  group’.104	  At	  the	  forefront	  of	  this	  epistemological	  invasion	  were	  a	  core	  group	  of	  European	  explorers,	  diplomats,	  military	  men,	  and	  company	  officials;	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  I	  describe	  in	  chapter	  two	  as	  ‘knowledge	  entrepreneurs’	  due	   to	   their	   crucial	   role	   in	   elaborating	   an	   proto-­‐episteme,	   or	   knowledge	  order	   by	   which	   Afghanistan	   could	   be	   rendered	   ‘legible’.105	  Constructivism	  drew	  on	  the	  Durkheimian	  injunction	  to	  ‘consider	  social	  facts	  as	  things’106	  and	  as	   such	   this	   immediately	   offers	   an	   approach	   in	   which	   colonial	   knowledge,	  and	  the	  sociology	  of	  that	  knowledge	  can	  become	  the	  subject	  of	  analysis.	  	  	  Driving	   the	   analysis	   is	   the	   presumption	   that	   such	   knowledge	   appertains	   to	  particular	  ‘social	  contexts’;	  that	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  knowledge	  is	  acquired,	  ordered,	   and	   interpreted	   is	   culturally	   contingent;	   and	   that	   knowledge	   is	   in	  part	   a	   ‘participation	   in	   the	   cultural	   resources	   of	   society’.107	  Whilst	   many	  constructivists	  have	   focussed	  primarily	  on	  cultural	  resources	  (ideas,	  norms,	  identities)	  as	  explanatory	  factors	  in	  observed	  behaviour,	  this	  risks	  creating	  a	  further	  variant	  of	   theory-­‐laden	  observation	  by	  essentializing	  culture.108	  The	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sociology	   of	   knowledge	   approach	   offers	   a	   method	   that	   views	   information,	  ideas,	   and	   understanding	   as	   emergent	   phenomena,	   wherein	   cultural	  resources	   –	   including	   knowledge	   of	   others	   -­‐	   are	   in	   the	   ontological	   state	   of	  becoming	  rather	  than	  simply	  being.109	  By	  extension,	  this	  approach	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  the	  simple	  deployment	  of	  one	  society’s	  form	  of	  knowledge	  on	  another	   society,	   but	   rather	   the	   enacting	   of	   that	   knowledge	   in	   a	   dynamic	  process	  of	  exchange	  and	  renewal.	  There	  were	  two	  sides	  to	  this	  story.	  	  The	  basis	  of	  British	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	   through	  colonial	  knowledge	  in	  a	  wider	  sense	  resembles	  a	  moment	  of	  encounter	  across	  cultural	  difference.	  An	  example	  of	  ‘friction’,	  giving	  rise	  to	  what	  anthropologist	  Anna	  Lowenhaupt	  Tsing	  describes	  as	  ‘the	  awkward,	  unequal,	  unstable,	  and	  creative	  qualities	  of	  interconnection	   across	   difference’.110 	  As	   a	   moment	   for	   the	   definition	   of	  cultural	   form	   and	   agency,	   friction	   ‘inflects	   historical	   trajectories,	   enabling,	  excluding,	   and	   particularizing’,	   creating	   new	   collaborations	   and	   new	  identities	  and	  interests	  that	  may	  not	  be	  to	  everyone’s	  benefit.111	  The	  British	  encounter	   with	   Afghanistan	   through	   colonial	   knowledge	   was	   therefore	   a	  creative	   moment	   –	   one	   in	   which	   paradigm	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   existing	  knowledge)	   and	   practice	   came	   together	   in	   the	   ongoing	   re-­‐formation	   of	   the	  ‘corpus’	  of	   that	  knowledge.112	  Although	  Eurocentric	  practices	  predominated	  in	  this	  encounter	  (and	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  encounter	  was	  unequal),	  this	  did	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  dependency	  of	  Europeans	  on	  existing	  Afghan	  social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	   institutions.	   European	   travelers,	   particularly	   those	   who	   stayed	   for	  longer	   periods	   were	   also	   susceptible	   to	   occasional	   moments	   of	   ‘epistemic	  insurgency’,113	  the	   reshaping	   of	   their	   observations	   by	   local	   actors,	   through	  their	   reliance	  on	   certain	   informants	   –	  particularly	  by	   those	   in	   a	  position	  of	  power.	   Therefore	  whilst	  wider	   intellectual	   trends	   and	   ideas	   shaped	  British	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understandings	  of	  Afghanistan,	   these	  understandings	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  synonymous	   with	   those	   ideas	   and	   trends.	   Accessing	   the	   particularity	   of	  Afghanistan	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   the	   British	   requires	   an	   appreciation	   of	   the	  cultural	  milieu	  of	  those	  who	  observed	  and	  reported	  on	  the	  country,	  as	  much	  as	   it	   requires	   an	   appreciation	   of	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   this	   encounter	   was	  determined	  and	  shaped	  by	  moments	  of	  friction	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  initial	  stages.	  	  	  This	  appreciation	  links	  us	  to	  the	  tricky	  problem	  of	  facticity.	  The	  claim	  here	  is	  not	   that	   colonial	   knowledge	  was	   entirely	   arbitrary	   or	   imaginary;	   observers	  had	  to	  refer	  to	  something.	  Rather,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  in	  the	  social	  world	  we	  may	  ‘“make	  up	  people”	  in	  a	  stronger	  sense	  than	  we	  “make	  up	  the	  world”’.114	  The	  recording	  of	  a	  tribal	  group,	  for	  example,	  may	  attract	  the	  accusation	  that	  it	  is	  no	  more	  than	  an	  ‘ethnographic	  fiction’	  but	  such	  groupings	  were	  not	  entirely	  imaginary,	   rather	   they	   were	   social	   realities	   mediated	   through	   the	   practice	  and	  perspective	  of	  European	  colonial	  knowledge.	  Whilst	  this	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  more	   detail	   in	   chapter	   two	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   here	   that	   it	   was	   the	   values	  accorded	  to	  ‘tribal	  society’,	  and	  the	  distinctions	  made	  between	  the	  characters,	  lineages,	   histories,	   and	   claims	   to	   authority	   of	   those	   tribes	   that	   bestowed	  further	   socially	   constructed	   ideas	   upon	   such	   notions.	   The	   description	   of	  Afghanistan	   through	   colonial	   knowledge	   therefore	   generated	   ‘constitutive	  effects’:	   When	   ideas	   or	   social	   structures	   	   ‘create	   phenomena	   –	   properties,	  powers,	   dispositions,	   meanings,	   etc.	   –	   that	   are	   conceptually	   or	   logically	  dependent	  on	  those	  ideas	  or	  structures,	  that	  exist	  only	  “in	  virtue	  of”	  them.’115	  This	  didn’t	  just	  apply	  to	  ‘tribe’.	  By	  delimiting	  the	  territory	  of	  ‘Afghanistan’	  the	  British	  formulated	  an	  entity	  to	  which	  they	  could	  refer,	  however	  imperfectly.	  Meanwhile	   the	   distinctions	   between	   geographies	   within	   that	   territory	   also	  carried	  their	  own	  meaning	  structures	  –	  such	  as	   the	  distinction	  between	  the	  settled	   populations	   of	   the	   plains,	   and	   the	   ‘wild	   tribes’	   of	   the	   mountains.	  Cumulatively	  therefore,	  colonial	  knowledge	  provided	  the	  basis	   for	  the	   ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  distinct	  cultural	  form.	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Policy	  	  The	  manifestation	   of	   these	   constitutive	   effects	   came	   in	   the	   enacting	   of	   this	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  policy	  science,	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  chapter	  three.	  The	   translation	  of	   colonial	   knowledge	   into	  policy	  marked	   the	   realization	  of	  the	   constructivist	   notion	   that	   ‘people	   act	   towards	   objects,	   including	   other	  actors,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  meanings	  that	  the	  objects	  have	  for	  them’.116	  It	  was	  a	  formative	  stage	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  what	  Claude	  Levi	  Strauss	  called	  a	  ‘science	  of	  the	  concrete’117;	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  collection	  of	  knowledge	  to	  the	  crafting	  of	  a	  regime	  of	  legibility	  by	  which	  colonial	  interventions	  could	  be	  designed.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  colonial	  state	  could	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘state’	  at	  all,	  this	  was	  a	  moment	   for	   the	   elaboration	   of	   what	   James	   C.	   Scott	   has	   termed	   a	   ‘state	  simplification’;	  a	  series	  of	  ‘abridged	  maps’	  that	  ‘when	  allied	  with	  state	  power	  would	  enable	  much	  of	  the	  reality	  they	  depicted	  to	  be	  remade.’118	  	  The	  process	  of	   deciding	   on	   the	   policy	   choice	   reformulated	   disparate	   understandings	  under	  distinct	  policy	  goals	  resulting	  in	  new	  narratives	  and	  what	  Jutta	  Weldes	  has	  termed	   ‘quasi-­‐causal’	  representations	  of	   the	  world.119	  In	  chapter	  three	  I	  describe	   this	   process	   in	   more	   detail	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   use	   of	   colonial	  knowledge	   in	   the	   decisions	   that	   led	   to	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war.	   This	  process,	  I	  argue,	  amounted	  to	  one	  of	  ‘closure’,	  in	  which	  the	  previous	  latitude	  in	   understanding	  was	   shut	   down	   as	   definitive	   interpretations	  were	   sought.	  As	   this	   chapter	   demonstrates,	   the	   contestations	   between	   competing	   goals	  and	  competing	  understandings	  of	  the	  situation,	  was	  a	  key	  part	  in	  the	  process	  of	  closure.	  	  	  The	   contestability	   of	   understandings	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	   their	   relevance	   to	  policy	   debates	   is	   a	   theme	   that	   stretches	   throughout	   the	   period	   but	   these	  contestations	  are	  a	  particular	  feature	  of	  chapter	  three.	  This	  theme	  is	  returned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  ‘Anarchy	  is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  it:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics’,	  International	  Organization,	  46/2	  (1992),	  396-­‐7.	  117	  Quoted	  in	  Said,	  Orientalism,	  53.	  118	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State,	  3.	  119	  Weldes,	  ‘Constructing	  National	  Interests’,	  282.	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to	  in	  the	  policy	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  ‘forward’	  and	  ‘close’	  border	  schools	  of	   thought	   in	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   century.	   Policy	   debates	   highlight	   the	  importance	  of	  what	  Thomas	  Risse	  terms	  a	   ‘logic	  of	  arguing’	   in	  which	  actors	  may	   challenge	   validity	   claims	   and	   reach	   new	   agreements	   on	   the	   nature	   of	  certain	  problems.120	  Crucially	   though,	   these	  debates	  were	   conducted	  on	   the	  raw	   material	   provided	   by	   colonial	   knowledge.	   As	   such,	   the	   importance	   of	  knowledge	  did	  not	   go	  away,	  but	   rather	  became	   the	   foundation	  upon	  which	  the	   idea	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	   constructed,	   and	   reconstructed,	   through	  acting	  upon	  policy.	  	  
	  
Exception	  	  In	  chapter	  four	  I	  explore	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  newly	  exclusionary	  form	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  Afghanistan	  that	  could	  be	  described	  as	  ‘Afghan	  exceptionalism’.121	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   closed	   Afghanistan	   off	   for	   the	   British,	   as	   they	   feared	   the	  consequences	   of	   sending	   their	   troops,	   or	   even	   their	   officials	   beyond	   the	  frontier.	  As	  discussed,	   this	   served	  a	  practical	  goal	  of	   removing	   the	  need	   for	  further	  expansion	  and	  accorded	  with	  the	  wishes	  of	  successive	  Afghan	  rulers,	  but	  it	  also	  gave	  rise	  to	  its	  own	  representational	  effects	  as	  Afghanistan	  became	  cast	   as	   a	   peculiar	   ‘violent	   geography’.	   An	   increasing	   sense	   of	   coherence	  within	   the	   British	   colonial	   state,	   both	   institutionally	   and	   ideologically,	   left	  Afghanistan	   and	   other	   frontier	   regions	   as	   an	   unstable	   periphery	   against	  which	  the	  centre	  could	  be	  reaffirmed.	  	  	  The	  annexation	  of	   the	  Punjab	  and	   the	  establishing	  of	   a	  new	   line	  of	  defence	  was	  key	   to	   this	  new	  geography	  of	  exclusion.	  But	   the	  disasters	  of	   the	   Indian	  mutiny	  in	  1857,	  and	  the	  shift	  from	  company	  rule	  to	  the	  viceregal	  system	  also	  prompted	   changes	   in	   the	   intellectual	   and	   institutional	   character	   of	   frontier	  policy	  that	  had	  implications	  for	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations.	  New	  experts	  entered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Thomas	  Risse,	  ‘”Let’s	  Argue”:	  Communicative	  Action	  in	  World	  Politics’,	  International	  
Organization,	  54/1	  (2000),	  1-­‐39.	  121	  The	  term	  belongs	  to:	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  62.	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the	   fold	   adding	   to	   the	   accumulation	   of	   knowledge	   on	   the	   country,	   but	   the	  difficulties	   in	   accessibility	   meant	   that	   these	   experts	   were	   generally	   drawn	  from	   officialdom,	   and	   especially	   the	   military.	   New	   knowledge	   and	  information	   was	   relatively	   sparse	   and	   that	   which	   was	   available	   became	  immediately	  consumed	  by	  a	  watchful	  community	  of	  officials.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  reliable	  insight,	  prevailing	  attitudes	  of	  exception	  and	  exclusion	  exhibited	  a	  powerful	   grip	   on	   policy.	   Yet	   the	   relative	   information	   drought	   constantly	  worried	  officials	   and	  highlighted	  an	  ever-­‐present	   tension	  between	  a	  will	   to	  know	  yet	  a	  reluctance	  to	  engage.	  	  	  Behind	   this	   more	   practical	   concern	   however,	   lay	   wider	   ideas	   over	   the	  foundations	   of	   international	   order.	   This	   tension	   could	   be	   described	   as	   one	  between	   the	   ‘internationalist’	   outlook	   in	  which	   Afghan	   ‘independence’	   was	  asserted,	  and	  the	  ‘imperialist’	  outlook	  in	  which	  Afghanistan’s	  status	  was	  only	  guaranteed	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   served	   imperial	   interests.	  This	  provides	   an	  alternative	  perspective	  to	  the	  prevailing	  narrative	  of	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  rivalry	  at	  this	  time.	  Indeed	  as	  chapter	  four	  shows,	  there	  were	  in	  fact	  examples	  of	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   collusion	   over	   the	   status	   of	   Afghanistan	   that	   refutes	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  security	  dilemma	  prevailing	  across	  the	  region.	  Shared	  imperialist	  outlooks	  on	  the	  status	  of	   ‘uncivilized’	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  shared	  opinions	  on	  the	  duties	  of	  great	   powers	   allowed	   a	   common	   language	   between	   British	   and	   Russian	  diplomats.	   As	   such,	   London	   and	   St	   Petersburg	  were	   able	   to	   routinize	   their	  relations	   in	   Central	   Asia	   in	   a	   way	   in	   which	   Kabul	   and	   Calcutta	   could	   not	  achieve	  –	   in	   large	  part	  due	  to	  the	  prevailing	  British	  view	  that	  Afghan	  rulers	  were	  incapable	  of	  engaging	  in	  ‘civilized’	  diplomatic	  intercourse.	  	  	  On	   an	   institutional	   level,	   the	   changing	   structures	   of	   frontier	   defence	   in	   the	  late	   1860s	   and	   early	   1870s	   encouraged	   militarization	   of	   British	   frontier	  policy	  that	  put	  further	  distance	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  British.	  A	  new	  epistemic	  community	  captured	  frontier	  policy	  in	  the	  1870s	  and	  became	  a	  key	  voice	   concerning	   British	   policy	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Historians	   have	   tended	   to	  interpret	  this	  as	  a	  schism	  between	  ‘forward	  policy’	  adherents	  and	  advocates	  of	   the	   ‘close	  border’	   school.	  Whilst	   this	  broadly	  describes	   the	  debate,	   it	   can	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obscure	   the	   origins	   of	   this	   language	   in	   what	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	  ‘knowledge	   failure’	   with	   respect	   to	   Afghanistan.	   Knowledge,	   policy,	   and	  exception	  therefore	  converged	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  encouraged	  a	  highly	  sterile	  representation	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  emerge.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  
Imagining	   Afghanistan	   seeks	   to	   bring	   imperial	   history	   back	   into	   IR	  scholarship	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   fruitful	   for	   the	   historical	   period	   under	  investigation,	   and	   for	   the	   discipline	   of	   IR	   itself.	   By	   focusing	   on	   colonial	  knowledge,	   and	   its	   uses	   in	   a	   policy	   setting,	   this	   work	   seeks	   to	   trace	   and	  explore	   the	  meanings	   that	   Afghanistan	   itself	   held	   for	   the	  British	   as	  well	   as	  how	   these	   meanings	   were	   culturally	   constructed	   and	   co-­‐constituted	   in	  moments	  of	  encounter.	   In	   this	   ‘re-­‐turn’	   to	  empire	   in	   IR,	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  sociology	  of	  that	  knowledge	  becomes	  a	  key	  site	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  state	  identity.	   This	   work	   offers	   explorers	   new	   avenues	   in	   the	   conversation	  between	   IR	  and	   imperial	  history,	  and	  a	  new	   interpretation	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  century.	   	  This	   thesis	  also	  offers	   to	  place	  current	  western	  engagement	   in	  historical	  context,	  and	  offers	  historical	   insights	   into	  the	   enduring	   public	   policy	   challenges	   faced	   by	   states	   seeking	   to	   engage	   in	  regions	  of	  which	  they	  have	  little	  understanding,	  or	  with	  which	  they	  have	  little	  engagement.	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  Chapter	  Two	  	   Early	  European	  Explorers	  and	  the	  Afghanistan	  Knowledge	  Community	  	  	  	  
	  	  As	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   East	   India	   Company’s	   state	   expanded	   in	   the	   late	  eighteenth	   and	   early	   nineteenth	   century,	   European	   officials	   increasingly	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  South	  Asian	  communities	  with	  whom	  they	  had	   little	  previous	   engagement.	   The	   encounters	   at	   these	   new	   fronts	   of	   intercultural	  dialogue	   took	   on	   different	   forms	   in	   different	   locales.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	  chapter	   is	  to	  describe	  this	  series	  of	  encounters	  with	  respect	  to	  early	  British	  engagements	  with	  Afghanistan.	  The	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  describe	  the	  intellectual	  development	   of	   British	   imaginings	   of	   this	   space	   in	   the	   early	   to	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   and	   is	   divided	   into	   two	   principal	   sections.	   In	   the	   first	  section	   I	  describe	   the	   ‘corpus’	  of	   colonial	  knowledge	   that	  was	  developed	   in	  the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century.1 	  In	   the	   second	   half	   I	   focus	   in	  particular	  on	  certain	  key	   individuals	  whose	  works	  were	  more	   instrumental	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  official	  understanding	  of	  the	  Afghan	  polity,	  namely	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone,	  Charles	  Masson,2	  and	  Alexander	  Burnes.	  	  I	  describe	  these	   individuals	  as	   ‘knowledge	  entrepreneurs’	   in	  recognition	  of	   the	   impact	  their	  understandings	  had	  on	   colonial	   conceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	   a	   state,	  space,	  and	  people.	  To	  varying	  degrees,	  this	  status	  is	  also	  afforded	  to	  them	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  British	  foreign	  policy-­‐making.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  adopting	  this	  terminology	  I	  refer	  to	  Jon	  Anderson’s	  work	  in	  which	  focussing	  on	  a	  ‘corpus’	  means:	  Paying	  attention	  to	  ‘the	  middle	  range,	  intermediate	  phenomena	  between	  context	  and	  text.	  These	  include	  phenomena	  of	  social	  organization	  in	  which	  ethnographic	  production	  becomes	  accessible	  as	  a	  corpus,	  an	  intermediate	  phenomenon	  between	  paradigm	  and	  practice	  that	  together	  produce	  a	  corpus.	  Focussing	  on	  a	  corpus	  opens	  this	  ground	  between	  macroscopic	  structures	  and	  microscopic	  processes	  from	  which	  to	  ask	  After	  deconstruction,	  what?	  and	  to	  restore	  critique	  of	  ethnography	  to	  social	  analysis'.	  Anderson,	  ‘Poetics	  and	  Politics	  in	  Ethnographic	  Texts’,	  92.	  2	  Masson	  was	  a	  deserter	  from	  the	  Bengal	  Army	  whose	  real	  name	  was	  James	  Lewis.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  work	  I	  will	  stick	  with	  convention	  and	  adopt	  his	  public	  pseudonym.	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Of	   the	   handful	   of	   scholars,	   diplomats,	   military	   personnel,	   and	   adventurers	  who	   visited	   Afghanistan	   and	   wrote	   on	   their	   experiences	   in	   the	   early	  nineteenth	   century,	   many	   –	   though	   not	   all	   -­‐	   were	   co-­‐opted	   into	   the	  machinery	   of	   the	   Indian	   Government	   or	   the	   East	   India	   Company	   at	   some	  point.	  	  That	  this	  should	  be	  the	  case	  is	  partly	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  sheer	  paucity	  of	  information	  (from	  a	  European	  perspective)	  available	  on	  Afghanistan.	  	  The	  figures	  are	   remarkable.	   	  Prior	   to	   the	   first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   the	  number	  of	  individuals	   who	   had	   travelled	   to	   any	   part	   of	   what	   was	   loosely	   termed	  ‘Afghanistan’	  and	  were	  associated	  either	  privately	  or	  publicly	  with	   the	  East	  India	  Company	  numbers	  fewer	  than	  150.	  	  Over	  100	  of	  those	  were	  part	  of	  the	  escort	   to	   the	  mission	  of	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone,	  who	   in	  1808	  became	   the	  first	  British	  envoy	   to	   the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul.3	  	  Counting	  only	  Europeans,	   the	  number	  of	  documented	  visitors	  to	  Afghanistan,	  in	  any	  capacity,	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  numbers	  just	  twenty-­‐five.4	  	  	  For	  those	  who	  did	  make	  the	  trip,	  publications	  often	  followed.	  	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  was	  Elphinstone’s	  1808	  mission.	  	  The	  two-­‐volume	  Account	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Caubul	   that	  resulted	   from	  this	  expedition	  became	  a	   core	   text	  within	  a	   limited	   reading	   list.	   	  As	  Blackwood’s	  Edinburgh	  
Magazine	   lamented	   as	   late	   as	   1887,	   ‘[w]hen	   he	   looks	   over	   the	   information	  available	   about	   the	   county	   that	   has	  been	   gathered	   at	   first	   hand,	   the	   reader	  will	   not	   take	   long	   to	   exhaust	   it.	   	   Elphinstone’s	   ‘Cabul’,	   though	  written	   sixty	  years	  ago,	  is	  still	  a	  valuable	  though	  limited	  record.’5	  Despite	  its	  limitations	  as	  far	   back	   as	   1887,	   the	   work	   retains	   its	   importance	   to	   this	   day.	   	   Indeed,	  reissues	  of	  the	  work	  correlate	  with	  the	  dates	  at	  which	  Afghanistan	  has	  been	  of	  significant	  international	  concern.	  	  	  Alongside	   Elphinstone,	   two	   others	   visitors	   stand	   out.	   They	   are	   the	   soldier,	  scholar	   and	   (eventually)	   British	   informant,	   Charles	   Masson,	   and	   the	  adventurer	  and	  diplomatist	  Alexander	  Burnes.	  These	   two	  men,	  each	  having	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Hopkins,	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Game’’.	  4	  See	  Appendix	  3	  for	  a	  list	  of	  these	  individuals	  from	  1793-­‐1839.	  5	  ‘In	  the	  Heart	  of	  Afghanistan’,	  Blackwood’s	  Edinburgh	  Magazine,	  January	  1887	  -­‐	  April	  1887,	  87.	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spent	   more	   time	   than	   any	   other	   British	   officials	   in	   Afghanistan,	   including	  Elphinstone	  himself,	  were	  seen	  as	  ideally	  placed	  to	  inform	  policy	  debates	  that	  began	   in	   the	   1830s	   over	   how	   best	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   ‘Afghanistan	   question’.	  	  Their	  works	   are	   not	   only	   a	   study	   in	   the	   intellectual	   and	   cultural	   history	   of	  British	   understandings	   of	   Afghanistan,	   but	   they	   also	   demonstrate	   the	  contested	  nature	  of	  these	  understandings.	  I	  focus	  on	  their	  publications	  in	  the	  second	   half	   of	   this	   chapter.	   In	   the	   first	   half	   I	   discuss	   their	   wider	   cultural	  milieu	  as	  early	  European	  explorers	  of	  Afghanistan.	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Part	  One:	  Early	  European	  Explorers	  of	  Afghanistan	  
	  
Approaches	  to	  Colonial	  Knowledge	  	  At	   the	  centre	  of	  analysis	   in	   this	  chapter	   lies	   the	  published	  and	  unpublished	  works	   and	   correspondence	   of	   a	   select	   group	   of	   Europeans	  whose	   opinions	  formed	   a	   corpus	   of	   knowledge	   on	   Afghanistan.	   Such	   a	   focus	   immediately	  suggests	  a	  methodology	  familiar	  to	  that	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  by	  Edward	  Said’s	  
Orientalism.6	  It	  is	  worth	  explaining	  why	  this	  approach	  is	  not	  taken	  here.	  From	  the	   outset	   the	  Orientalism	   school	   should	   not	   be	   reduced	   to	   Said,	   but	   his	   is	  perhaps	   the	   clearest	   statement	   of	   its	   core	   tenets:	   specifically	   that	  ‘Orientalism’	  refers	  to	  ‘the	  corporate	  institution	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  Orient	  …	  by	   making	   statements	   about	   it,	   authorizing	   views	   of	   it,	   describing	   it,	   by	  teaching	  it,	  settling	  it,	  ruling	  over	  it:	  in	  short,	  Orientalism	  as	  a	  Western	  style	  for	  dominating,	  restructuring,	  and	  having	  authority	  over	   the	  Orient.’7	  At	   the	  centre	  of	  this	  formulation	  lies	  the	  discursive	  product	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  ‘east’	  and	   ‘west’	  wherein	   the	  west	   is	   seen	   as	   superior	   to	   the	   east.	   Orientalism	   is	  fundamentally	  a	  process	  of	   ‘othering’	  and	  the	  production	  of	  representations	  and	  categories	  that	  rely	  on	  this	  east/west	  distinction.	  	  	  The	  danger	  with	  an	  overly	  rigid	  adherence	  to	  this	  approach	   is	   firstly	   that	   it	  negates	   the	   possibility	   for	   intercultural	   penetration. 8 	  According	   to	   the	  Orientalist	  school	  (as	  a	  critique),	  for	  ‘the	  west’	  -­‐	  and	  Europeans	  in	  particular	  -­‐	  ‘the	   orient’	   is	   largely	   inaccessible	   to	   description	   beyond	   the	   productive	  results	  of	  the	  Orientalist	  discourse.	  In	  fairness,	  Said	  does	  not	  completely	  rule	  out	   the	   accessibility	   of	   social	   reality	   beyond	   representations,	   but	   the	  emphasis	   on	   the	   internal	   coherence	  of	   the	  Orientalist	   discourse	   -­‐	   as	   one	  of	  Europeans	  writing	  for	  other	  Europeans	  and	  drawing	  on	  European	  knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Said,	  Orientalism.	  7	  Said,	  Orientalism,	  3.	  8	  John	  M.	  Mackenzie,	  Orientalism:	  History,	  Theory	  and	  the	  Arts	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Pratt,	  Imperial	  Eyes;	  Hillemann,	  Asian	  Empire	  and	  British	  Knowledge.	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to	  describe	  the	  Orient	  -­‐	  does	  reflect	  the	  prevailing	  sense	  of	   ‘exteriority’	  that	  describes	  the	  Orientalist	  critique.	  By	  overlooking	  moments	  of	  collaboration,	  collusion,	  alliance,	  and	  dialogue	  -­‐	  including	  of	  an	  epistemic	  nature	  -­‐	  between	  Europeans	   and	   South	   Asian	   actors,	   Orientalism	   moves	   us	   away	   from	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   local	   influence	   on	   European	   actors.9	  This	   influence	   was	  particularly	  pertinent	  in	  those	  areas	  in	  which	  colonial	  reach	  was	  at	  its	  most	  limited.	   In	   these	   regions	   British	   knowledge	   was	   at	   its	   most	   parasitic	   on	  indigenous	   networks	   and	   local	   informants.	   This	  was	   undoubtedly	   inflected	  with	   a	   heavy	   European	   bias,	   but	   as	   Bayly	   highlights,	   although	   ‘European	  knowledge	   may	   have	   been	   hegemonic	   …	   it	   was	   never	   absolute’. 10 	  The	  processes	   of	   achieving	   a	   degree	   of	   ‘legibility’11	  over	   subject	   populations,	   of	  spatializing,	   and	   of	  mapping	  was	   not	   a	   process	   initiated	   by	   Europeans,	   but	  rather	   appropriated,	   warped,	   and	   ultimately	   irrevocably	   changed	   by	   their	  presence.12	  	  	  This	   more	   balanced	   account	   isn’t	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   representations	   of	  Afghanistan	   through	   travel	  accounts	  do	  not	   sit	  within	  a	  wider	  discourse	  on	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  west	  –	  indeed	  this	  is	  certainly	  in	  evidence	  in	  the	  texts	  –	  rather	   the	   question	   is	   what	   relevance	   this	   has	   to	   the	   questions	   addressed	  here,	  specifically	  those	  that	  seek	  to	  access	  the	  particularity	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Afghanistan	  came	  to	  be	  known	  through	  colonial	  knowledge.	  Deploying	  a	  blanket	  narrative	  of	  Orientalism	  threatens	  to	  render	  the	  genesis	  of	  British	  thinking	  on	  Afghanistan	  merely	  a	  function	  of	  imperial	  arrogance,	  whereas	  the	  sources	  demonstrate	  a	  more	  complex	  genesis	  in	  this	  mode	  of	  understanding.	  As	   this	   chapter	   will	   show	   there	   was	   a	   cultural,	   intellectual,	   and	   practical	  context	  within	  which	  a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  these	  works	  can	  be	  attained.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Eugene	  Irschick,	  Dialogue	  and	  History:	  Constructing	  South	  India,	  1795-­1895	  (Berkley,	  LA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press).	  10	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  370.	  11	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State,	  12	  Irschick,	  Dialogue	  and	  History;	  Firoozeh	  Kashani-­‐Sabet,	  Frontier	  Fictions:	  Shaping	  the	  
Iranian	  Nation	  1804-­1946,	  (London,	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2000).	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The	  label	  of	  ‘Orientalism’	  also	  threatens	  to	  drown	  out	  the	  nuance	  in	  European	  perceptions,	   offering	   little	   insight	   into	   which	   aspects	   of	   European	  representations	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  came	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  more	  valid.	  Accessing	  this	   requires	  an	  approach	   that	  pays	  attention	   to	   the	   intellectual	  progeny	  of	  European	  observers;	  an	  approach	  that	  is	  more	  dynamic,	  and	  more	  specific.	  In	  particular	   there	   was	   a	   clear	   attempt	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   variety	   of	  factions	   that	  made	   up	   ‘Afghan’	   society.	   The	   distinctions	  made	   between	   the	  various	   tribes	   and	   sub-­‐tribes	   often	   carried	   with	   them	   an	   attached	   value	  judgement.	  	  Certain	  tribes	  were	  considered	  more	  regal,	  learned,	  or	  ‘civilized’	  than	  others.	   	  Often	   this	   corresponded	   to	   their	  means	  of	   self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  their	   proximity	   to	   royal	   authority.	   These	   value	   judgments	   are	   frequently	  contested	   between	   the	   accounts	   and	   reveal	   a	   degree	   of	   latitude	   in	  interpretations	  that	  Saidian	  Orientalism	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  as	  a	  blanket	  term.	  	  	  	  A	   further	   aspect	   of	   specificity	   that	   applies	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Afghanistan	   –	   and	  potentially	   other	   ‘frontier’	   states	   –	   was	   its	   exclusion	   from	   what	   might	   be	  described	   as	   the	   more	   pervasive	   architecture	   of	   the	   colonial	   state.	  Afghanistan	   was	   never	   directly	   colonised	   and	   therefore	   the	   application	   of	  colonial	  knowledge	  was	  always	  partial	  and	  spasmodic.	  This	  status	  often	  fed	  representations	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  Afghans	  as	  something	  of	  an	  ‘other’	  within	  the	   ‘other’.	   It	   is	   precisely	   the	  mystery	   of	   the	   lands	   beyond	   the	   frontier,	   of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  terra	  incognita,	  as	  only	  ever	  partially	  knowable,	  and	  always	  dangerous,	   that	  presents	  Afghanistan	  as	  deserving	  special	   treatment	  within	  the	   colonial	   imagination;	   as	   perhaps	   a	   locution	  within	   the	  wider	   discourse.	  To	   the	  extent	   that	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   interactions	  could	  be	  described	  as	  dialogic	  therefore,13	  this	   was	   a	   fleeting	   dialogue,	   constantly	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   host	   of	  background	  pejorative	  descriptors	  that	  could	  serve	  to	  justify	  failure	  and	  fill	  in	  the	  gaping	  holes	  in	  British	  understandings.	  	  	  In	   drawing	   lines	   between	   the	   societies	   they	   observed	   it	   is	   true	   that	   these	  individuals	   were	   developing	   ‘essentialised’	   categories	   that	   would	   go	   on	   to	  colour	   British	   engagements,	   but	   the	   Orientalist	   critique	   risks	   loading	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Irschick,	  Dialogue	  and	  History.	  
	   57	  
argument	   too	   much	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   imperialist	   agenda	   rather	   than	  problematising	  the	  development	  of	  these	  categories	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  what	  follows,	   I	   outline	   the	   cultural,	   the	   intellectual,	   and	   the	   practical	   worlds	   of	  these	  European	  explorers	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  describe	  how	  their	  observations	  were	  guided	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  shared	  mentalité.	  But	  also	  to	  highlight	  how	  their	  differences	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  diverging	  cultural,	  intellectual,	  and	  practical	  situations.	  This	  offers	  a	  more	  nuanced	  appraisal	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  such	  individuals	  imagined	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  
The	  Cultural	  World	  of	  Early	  Afghanistan	  Explorers	  	  The	   outward	  march	   of	   Britain’s	   colonial	   frontiers	   in	   South	   Asia	   during	   the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  placed	  a	  premium	  on	  accurate	  and	  up	  to	  date	  information	  on	  the	  territories	  that	  lay	  beyond	  them.	  In	  Nepal,	  Burma,	  and	  the	  Punjab	   and	   Afghanistan	   the	   British	   were	   often	   ‘confronted	   with	   a	   virtual	  information	   famine	   which	   slowed	   their	   advance	   and	   sometimes	   put	   the	  whole	   edifice	   of	   their	   power	   in	   peril.’14	  The	   example	   of	   Nepal	   provides	   in	  some	  ways	  an	  instructive	  case	  for	  later	  problems	  in	  Afghanistan.	  In	  order	  to	  supplement	   their	  meagre	   information	  on	  Nepal,	   the	  British	  were	  compelled	  to	  seek	  alternative	  sources:	  travelers,	  merchants,	  court	  servants	  and	  religious	  men	   amongst	   them.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   reliable,	   comprehensive	   knowledge	  British	  understandings	  often	  fell	  back	  on	  prejudicial	  speculation	  that	  tended	  to	   view	   the	   Nepali	   state	   ‘as	   a	   barbarous	   tyranny	   from	   whose	   thrall	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   hill	   population	  were	  waiting	   to	   be	   liberated.’15	  Such	   hubris	  would	   be	   challenged	   in	   the	   subsequent	   military	   intervention	   when	   the	  British	  would	  meet	  with	   a	   less	   than	   acquiescent	  population,	   and	   a	   political	  elite	  that	  was	  impermeable	  to	  attempts	  at	  infiltration.	  Faced	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  conquest,	   the	  British	  concluded	  that	  withdrawal	  and	  a	  system	  of	   indirect	  rule	  was	  the	  best	  option.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  97.	  15	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  109.	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In	   Afghanistan,	   the	   situation	   was	   arguably	   worse.	   	   The	   paucity	   of	   regular	  European	   trade	  meant	   that	   individuals	   travelling	   to	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Kabul	  were	  few	  in	  number.16	  Early	  attempts	  to	  open	  information	  channels	  with	  the	  Afghan	   government	   had	   failed.	   Meanwhile	   the	   geographical	   challenges	   of	  traversing	   the	  mountain	   passes,	   particularly	   in	  winter	   time,	   along	  with	   the	  threat	   of	   plunder	   along	   the	  way	   contributed	   to	   an	   information	  picture	   that	  was	  both	  ‘patchy	  and	  tendentious’	  throughout	  the	  1820s	  and	  1830s.17	  It	  was	  into	  this	  picture	  that	  the	  travels	  of	  early	  European	  Afghanistan	  explorers	  can	  be	  placed.	  	  	  In	  truth,	  the	  thirst	  for	  knowledge	  on	  Afghanistan	  came	  slightly	  later	  than	  that	  which	  related	  to	  other	  ‘frontier	  states’.	  The	  early	  expeditions	  of	  Elphinstone	  to	   Kabul	   –	   as	   well	   as	   his	   counterpart	   Henry	   Pottinger,	   who	   was	   sent	   to	  Tehran	  via	  Balochistan	  and	  Herat	  –	  were	  admittedly	  driven	  by	  concerns	  over	  Napoleonic	   designs	   on	   India’s	   north-­‐western	   perimeter.	   But	   this	   fear	   was	  soon	  diminished.18	  For	  those	  who	  did	  make	  the	  trip,	  some	  were	  disappointed	  with	   the	   official	   indifference	   they	   met	   upon	   their	   return.	   Edward	   Stirling,	  who	   travelled	   through	  Afghanistan	   in	   1828	  noted	  with	   some	  dismay	   in	   his	  memoirs	   on	   the	   ‘general	   apathy’	   prevailing	  within	   government	   at	   this	   time	  complaining	   that	   the	   ‘knowledge	   that	   I	   had	   been	   in	   these	   interesting	  countries	   produced	   no	   desire	   for	   intelligence	   regarding	   them,	   and	   my	  reception	   gave	   no	   encouragement	   for	   the	   production	   of	   it.’19	  For	   others,	  official	  ambivalence	  occasionally	  put	  their	  endeavours	  at	  risk	  of	  failure.	  The	  biographer	  of	  William	  Moorcroft	  described	  his	  1819	  expedition	  as	  being	  met	  with	   only	   a	   ‘cold	   permission’	   from	   officials.	   ‘The	   government	   of	   India’,	   he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Appendices	  3	  and	  4	  for	  a	  list	  of	  these	  individuals	  from	  1793-­‐1878.	  17	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  131-­‐2.	  18	  Jules,	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains:	  The	  Story	  of	  Britain’s	  Afghan	  Wars	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2011),	  3.	  19	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  I,	  174.	  The	  unfortunate	  Stirling	  had	  been	  encouraged	  in	  his	  venture	  by	  the	  British	  envoy	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  Tehran,	  Sir	  John	  MacDonald,	  a	  noted	  Russophobe	  who	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  gather	  intelligence	  on	  the	  routes	  through	  Persia	  and	  western	  Afghanistan.	  Unfortunately	  MacDonald’s	  enthusiasm	  was	  not	  matched	  by	  Company	  officials	  in	  Ludhiana,	  whereupon	  arriving	  twenty-­‐three	  days	  after	  his	  official	  period	  of	  absence	  had	  expired,	  Stirling	  was	  surprised	  to	  find	  that	  rather	  than	  returning	  to	  his	  post,	  a	  replacement	  had	  been	  found	  for	  him	  and	  his	  pay	  had	  been	  cut	  by	  half.	  J.	  Leveen	  Lee,	  ‘The	  Journals	  of	  Edward	  Stirling	  in	  Persia	  and	  Afghanistan,	  1828-­‐29.	  Notification	  of	  Future	  Publication’,	  Journal	  of	  Persian	  Studies,	  24	  (1986),	  191.	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noted,	   ‘never	   recognized	  Mr.	  Moorcroft	   in	   any	   diplomatic	   capacity,	   and	   his	  supposed	   assumption	   of	   it	   occasionally	   incurred	   their	   displeasure.’20	  The	  delay	  that	  met	  Moorcroft’s	  request	  for	  additional	  financial	  support	  when	  he	  was	   detained	   in	   Ladakh	   prompted	   an	   acerbic	   riposte	   to	   the	   Company’s	  Resident	  at	  Delhi	  from	  Moorcroft	  himself:	   ‘In	  what	  way	  I	  have	  merited	  such	  pointed	  contempt	  and	  abandonment	  I	  am	  yet	  to	  learn’	  he	  wrote,	  ‘but	  if	  I	  had	  become	   obnoxious	   to	   you,	   what	   had	   my	   party	   done	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	  punishment	  with	  which	  I	  was	  visited?’21	  	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   official	   indifference	   disturbs	   the	   common	  perception	  that	   such	   trips	  were	  centrally	  driven	  by	   fears	  of	  Russian	   inroads	   in	  Central	  Asia,	  or	  that	  these	  individuals	  were	  somehow	  players	  in	  the	  opening	  scenes	  of	   the	   ‘great	   game’.	   Whilst	   many	   of	   these	   individuals	   held	   their	   own	  convictions	  concerning	  Russian	  activity,	  official	  recognition	  of	  this,	  at	  least	  till	  the	   1830s,	   was	   patchy	   and	   limited. 22 	  Beyond	   this	   observation,	   the	  continuance	  of	   these	   trips,	   despite	   this	   indifference,	   highlights	   the	   fact	   that	  there	  was	  often	  more	   to	   such	   adventure	   travel	   than	  King	   and	  Country.23	  In	  the	   case	  of	  Moorcroft,	   a	   veterinary	   surgeon	  of	   the	  East	   India	  Company,	   the	  primary	  motive	  was	  to	  seek	  out	  new	  breeding	  stock	  for	  the	  Company’s	  stud	  from	  the	  apparently	  well-­‐bred	  steeds	  of	  the	  Turcoman	  states	  of	  Central	  Asia.	  Charles	  Masson	  was	   a	   deserter	   of	   the	  Bengal	  Army	   and	  making	   his	  way	   to	  Central	   Asia,	   partly	   as	   a	   means	   of	   escape.24	  Meanwhile,	   even	   those	   tasked	  with	  official	  duties	   could	  not	   resist	  exhibiting	  more	  sentimental	  motives,	   at	  least	   in	   their	   published	   works.	   James	   Abbott,	   a	   Bengal	   Artillery	   officer,	  remarked	   that	   ‘the	  personal	   narrative	   of	   a	   traveller	   through	   the	   steppes	   of	  Tartary	  could	  only	  be	  interesting,	  by	  drawing	  largely	  upon	  his	  sensations	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  William	  Moorcroft	  and	  George	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces	  of	  Hindustan	  
and	  the	  Panjab	  (London:	  William	  Murray,	  1841),	  xvii,	  xxviii.	  21	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  xl.	  Moorcroft	  met	  further	  problems	  later	  in	  his	  trip	  when	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  George	  Baring	  refused	  his	  request	  for	  an	  official	  letter	  of	  introduction	  to	  the	  Amir	  of	  Bokhara.	  	  22	  Rob	  Johnson,	  Spying	  for	  Empire:	  The	  Great	  Game	  in	  Central	  and	  South-­East	  Asia,	  1757-­1947	  (London:	  Greenhill	  Books,	  2006),	  42.	  23	  Queen	  Victoria	  ascended	  to	  the	  throne	  in	  1837.	  24	  Bijan	  Omrani,	  ‘Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan:	  Deserter,	  Scholar,	  Spy’,	  Asian	  Affairs,	  39/2,	  (2008),	  199-­‐216;	  Whitteridge,	  Gordon,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan	  (Warminster,	  Wiltshire:	  Aris	  and	  Phillips	  Ltd.,	  1986).	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emotions’.25	  Indeed	  Abbott	  was	  so	  moved	  by	  this	  aesthetic	  urge	  that	  upon	  his	  arrival	   on	   the	   shores	   of	   the	   Caspian	   he	   was	   inspired	   to	   write	   a	   poem,	   a	  surprising	   choice	   given	   the	   apparently	   more	   pressing	   issue	   of	   a	   Kazakh	  armed	  attack	  that	  was	  unfolding	  at	  the	  time.26	  	  	  Uniting	   these	   European	   travelers	  was	   an	   eagerness	   to	   explore	   the	   ruins	   of	  previous	   conquering	   empires,	   exhibited	   in	   a	   fascination,	   sometimes	  bordering	   on	   obsession,	   with	   Alexander	   the	   Great.	   Those	   with	   a	   classicist	  persuasion	   –	   Godfrey	   Vigne,	   Masson,	   and	   Burnes	   in	   particular	   –	   made	  frequent	  reference	  to	  the	  geography	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  European	  historical	  significance.27	  Vigne	  carried	  with	  him	  copies	  of	  Arrian	  and	  Quintus	  Curtius’	   studies	   of	   Alexander,	   regularly	   deploying	   this	   knowledge	   in	   his	  observations,	   speculating	   in	   one	   instance	   that	   ‘[i]f	   Jalalabad	  be	   the	  Nysa	   of	  Arrian,	   as	   it	   most	   likely	   is,	   I	   should	   certainly	   think	   that	   the	   Sufyd	   Koh,	   or	  “white	  mountain”,	  was	  Mount	  Meros’.28	  Indeed,	   for	  Vigne	   and	  Masson,	  who	  collaborated	   on	   their	   studies	   in	   Kabul,	   Afghanistan	   seemed	   to	   resemble	   a	  large-­‐scale	  archaeological	  site.	  	  	  The	  legacy	  of	  Alexander’s	  exploits	  fascinated	  too	  for	  the	  rumours	  of	  ancient	  descendents	   of	   the	   Macedonian	   General	   living	   in	   the	   remote	   areas	   of	  
kaffiristan	  (in	  present	  day	  Nuristan),	  potentially	  providing	  a	   living	  museum,	  geographically	   sealed	   off	   from	   the	   surrounding	   influences	   of	   Islam	   and	  ‘oriental’	  culture.29	  Masson	  dedicated	  an	  entire	  chapter	  of	  his	  travel	  account	  to	  these	  mysterious	  people,30	  who	  it	  was	  also	  suggested	  might	  be	  the	  fabled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  James	  Abbott,	  Narrative	  of	  a	  Journey	  from	  Heraut	  to	  Khiva,	  Moscow,	  and	  St	  Petersburgh	  
During	  the	  Late	  Russian	  Invasion	  of	  Khiva	  (London:	  H.	  Allen	  and	  Co.,	  1843),	  xvi-­‐xvii.	  26	  This	  poem,	  an	  ode	  to	  empire,	  Queen,	  and	  country,	  forms	  the	  opening	  to	  his	  travel	  account,	  although	  he	  apparently	  only	  had	  time	  to	  write	  the	  first	  two	  stanzas	  at	  the	  time.	  Abbott,	  
Narrative.	  	  27	  Burnes	  was	  quite	  explicit	  in	  his	  desire	  to	  ‘visit	  the	  conquests	  of	  Alexander’	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  his	  first	  travel	  account:	  Alexander	  Burnes,	  Travels	  into	  Bokhara,	  Vol	  I.	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  1835),	  ix.	  28	  Godfrey	  T.	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative	  of	  a	  visit	  to	  Ghuzni,	  Kabul,	  and	  Afghanistan,	  Second	  Edition	  (London:	  George	  Routledge,	  1843),	  10,	  232.	  29	  This	  particular	  rumour	  appears	  to	  have	  originated	  with	  Elphinstone.	  Burnes	  dissented	  from	  this	  view	  believing	  them	  to	  be	  instead	  the	  ‘aborigines’	  of	  Afghanistan,	  unconnected	  with	  Alexander	  the	  Great.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  166.	  30	  Chapter	  11,	  Charles	  Masson,	  Narrative	  of	  Various	  Journeys	  in	  Balochistan,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  
the	  Panjab,	  Vol.	  I	  (London:	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1842).	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‘lost	   tribes	   of	   Israel’.	   Other	   mythological	   incentives	   –	   albeit	   of	   a	   more	  fantastical	  kind	  -­‐	  were	   found	   in	   the	  mysterious	  sung-­i-­fars	  or	   ‘philosopher’s	  stone’,	   that	   was	   rumoured	   to	   be	   in	   the	   region	   north	   of	   the	   Indus,	   and	  reportedly	   sought	   by	   Nawab	   Jabbur	   Khan,	   the	   vizier	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	  Khan.31	  	  Biblical	   references	   abounded	   too,	   the	   Suleiman	   mountain	   range	   that	   fell	  between	   the	   Derajat	   north	   of	   the	   Indus,	   and	   Afghanistan	   itself,	   were	  reportedly	  named	   for	   their	   resemblance	   to	  King	  Soloman’s	   throne;	   a	   status	  that	   afforded	   them	   a	   detour	   for	   Elphinstone’s	  mission	   in	   1809.32	  The	  Safed	  
Koh	   (white	   mountain),	   south	   of	   Jalalabad,	   and	   forming	   part	   of	   the	   Safed	  mountain	   range	   that	   links	   Peshawar	   and	  Kabul	  was	   pointed	   to	   as	   the	   final	  resting	  place	  of	  Noah’s	  ark.33	  Whilst	  ‘Lamghan’	  (or	  Laghman	  province	  as	  it	  is	  known	  today),	  was	  identified	  by	  Vigne	  as	  the	  resting	  place	  of	  Noah’s	  father.34	  	  These	   European	   explorers	   were	   not	   however	   utterly	   preoccupied	   with	  European	  cultural	  signifiers	  in	  Afghanistan.	  As	  classicists,	  many	  of	  them	  were	  interested	   too	   in	   the	   legacies	   of	   Babur	   and	   Tamerlane.	   The	   significance	   of	  these	   legacies	   drove	   a	   more	   recent	   European	   explorer,	   Rory	   Stewart,	   to	  follow	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  some	  of	  his	  European	  forbears,	  and	  Babur	  himself,	  in	  his	  2004	  travel	  account	  The	  Places	  in	  Between.35	  Animating	  such	  works	  as	  these	  is	  an	  enduring	  fascination	  with	  a	  space	  that	  appeared	  to	  present	  itself	  as	   a	   paradox:	   both	   as	   a	   venue	   for	   the	   passing	   of	   an	   incredibly	   rich	  civilizational	   history,	   yet	   at	   the	   same	   time	   interminably	   viewed	   as	  unexplored	   and	   awaiting	   rediscovery.	   Indeed,	   many	   early	   European	  explorers	   were	   seeking	   fame	   in	   such	   exploits.	   Writing	   to	   Masson	   in	   1834,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  At	  the	  Garden	  of	  Ali	  Murdan	  Khan,	  near	  Peshawar,	  Burnes	  reported	  the	  claim	  by	  local	  chiefs	  that	  the	  nobleman	  who	  prepared	  the	  garden	  had	  owned	  the	  sung-­i-­fars	  but	  had	  opted	  to	  throw	  it	  into	  the	  Indus,	  ‘which	  at	  least	  eases	  them	  of	  the	  dilemma	  as	  to	  his	  heir’,	  he	  noted.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  90,	  160.	  32	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone,	  An	  Account	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Caubul	  and	  its	  Dependencies	  in	  
Persia,	  Tartary	  and	  India,	  Second	  Edition,	  Vol.	  I	  (London:	  Longman,	  Hurst,	  Rees,	  Orme,	  and	  Brown,	  1819),	  50-­‐3.	  33	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  117.	  34	  Vigne	  was	  particularly	  taken	  with	  the	  etymology	  of	  Afghan	  place	  names	  and	  their	  biblical	  significance,	  identifying	  Kabul	  with	  Cain;	  Dusht-­‐i-­‐Ham	  with	  Ham;	  and	  Balkh	  as	  the	  grave	  of	  Seth.	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  205-­‐6,	  218.	  	  35	  Rory	  Stewart,	  The	  Places	  in	  Between	  (London:	  Picador,	  2005).	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Henry	   Pottinger	   pointed	   to	   the	   recent	   celebrity	   status	   that	   Burnes	   had	  enjoyed	  in	  London	  following	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  1831	  journey,	  expressing	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  ‘enthusiasm	  which	  obtains	  in	  Europe	  regarding	  the	  regions	  in	  which	  you	  are	  residing	  …	  will	  perhaps	  add	  to	  your	  anticipated	  gratification	  in	  hereafter	  laying	  your	  researches	  before	  the	  Public.’36	  	  	  Perhaps	   with	   half	   a	   mind	   on	   their	   European	   audiences,	   this	   voyage	   of	  (re)discovery	   was	   frequently	   described	   with	   richly	   evocative	   language.	  Writing	   on	   the	   view	   over	   Kabul	   from	  Babur’s	   tomb,	   Burnes	  was	  moved	   to	  remark	  ‘I	  do	  not	  wonder	  at	  the	  hearts	  of	  the	  people	  being	  captivated	  by	  the	  landscape,	  and	  of	  Baber’s	  admiration,	  for,	  in	  his	  own	  words,	  “its	  verdure	  and	  flowers	  render	  Cabool,	  in	  spring,	  a	  heaven”.’37	  Vigne	  noted	  how,	  ‘[t]he	  plains	  of	   Lombardy	   as	   seen	   from	   the	   Apennines,	   do	   not	   exceed	   the	   Kohistan	   of	  Kabul	  in	  richness	  or	  brilliancy	  of	  verdure’.38	  Echoing	  this	  Francophone	  theme	  and	   ruminating	   on	   the	   inaccessibility	   of	   it	   all,	   Conolly	  was	  moved	   to	   quote	  Montesquieu	   -­‐	   ‘Il	   est	   triste	  de	  voir	  une	  belle	  campagne,	   sans	  pouvoir	  dire	  à	  quelqu’un,	  voilà	  une	  belle	  campagne!’39	  	  	  This	   wider	   imaginative	   aspect	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	   was	  represented	   through	   such	   texts	  manifested	   itself	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways,	   and	  often	  took	  on	  a	  darker,	  more	  pejorative	  character.	  Alongside	  the	  intrigue	  and	  wonder	   that	   described	   this	   ‘unexplored’	   space	   sat	   an	   unrefined	   and	   often	  violent	   concept	   of	   the	   people	   inhabiting	   these	   lands,	   one	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	  conflicted	   observations.	   As	   Elphinstone	   remarked,	   the	   ‘enthusiasm	   with	  which	   they	   [the	   Durranis]	   speak	   of	   the	   varieties	   of	   scenery	   through	  which	  they	   pass,	   and	   of	   the	   beauties	   and	   pleasures	   of	   spring,	   is	   such	   as	   one	   can	  scarce	  hear,	  from	  so	  unpolished	  a	  people,	  without	  a	  surprise.’40	  He	  noted	  the	  apparent	   inconsistency	   between	   the	   ‘peaceful	   and	   social	   disposition’	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  IOR	  20876	  MSS	  Eur	  E161/6-­‐7	  (Microfilm),	  6a,	  Pottinger	  to	  Burnes,	  27	  July	  1834.	  37	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  143.	  38	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  217.	  39	  ‘It	  is	  a	  shame	  to	  see	  such	  beautiful	  countryside	  without	  being	  able	  to	  tell	  someone,	  look	  at	  this	  beautiful	  countryside!’	  Conolly,	  Arthur,	  Journey	  to	  the	  North	  of	  India,	  Vol.	  II	  (London:	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1834),	  73.	  40	  Elphinstone,	  Mountstuart,	  An	  Account	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Caubul	  and	  its	  Dependencies	  in	  
Persia,	  Tartary	  and	  India,	  Vol.	  II	  (London:	  Longman,	  Hurst,	  Rees,	  Orme,	  and	  Brown,	  1842),	  114.	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Achikzai	   tribe	   and	   their	  Pastoral	  mode	  of	   subsistence,	   combined	  with	   their	  ‘predatory	  and	  martial	   spirit’.41	  Masson,	   in	  an	  unusually	  aesthetical	   flourish	  upon	   arriving	   in	   the	   Khyber	   region	   reflected	   ‘I	   was	   lost	   in	   wonder	   and	  rapture	   on	   contemplating	   this	   serene	   yet	   gorgeous	   display	   of	   nature,	   and	  awoke	   from	  my	   reverie	   but	   to	   lament	   that	   the	   villany	   [sic]	   of	   man	   should	  make	  a	  hell	  where	  the	  Creator	  had	  designed	  a	  paradise,	  –	  a	  train	  of	  thought	  forced	  upon	  my	  mind	  when	  I	   thought	  of	   the	   lawless	  tribes	  who	  dwell	   in,	  or	  wander	  over	  these	  delightful	  scenes.’42	  	  	  Accordingly,	   many	   European	   explorers	   adopted	   some	   form	   of	   disguise	   for	  fear	   of	   the	   perceived	   inherent	   rapacity	   of	   these	   ‘lawless	   tribes’.	   Burnes,	  travelling	  with	   a	   small	   retinue	   of	   ‘native’	   companions	   opted	   for	   local	   dress	  yet	  retaining	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  European	  if	  pressed.	  Masson,	  having	  originally	  attempted	   to	   disguise	   his	   ‘feringhi’	   (foreigner)	   status,	   discovered	   to	   his	  surprise	   that	   being	   open	   about	   his	   identity	   afforded	  him	   ‘better	   treatment’	  since	   it	   avoided	   his	   being	   mistaken	   for	   an	   ‘infidel	   Sikh’	   or	   a	   Hindu.43	  J.	   P.	  Ferrier,	  who	  was	  the	  first	  European	  to	  voluntarily	  travel	  through	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	   the	   first	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  and	  publish	  his	  account,	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  at	  risk.	  To	  his	  perpetual	  annoyance	  the	  French	  General	  was	  repeatedly	  mistaken	  for	  an	  Englishman.44	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  ‘Orientalist’	  discourse	  was	  in	  evidence	  depended	  on	  the	  individual	  –	  personality	  mattered	  –	  but	  it	  was	  also	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  location.	   Before	   an	   extant	   border	   existed	   between	   the	   territories	   of	   this	  region,	   European	   explorers	   frequently	   imparted	   a	   sense	   of	   crossing	   the	  Rubicon	   upon	   their	   entry	   into	   Afghan	   territory.	  Within	   the	   loosely	   defined	  territory	   itself	   this	  movement	   became	   distinguished	   by	   tribal	   descriptions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  As	  was	  frequently	  the	  case	  with	  Elphinstone,	  this	  was	  passed	  off	  with	  a	  comparison	  to	  the	  Scottish	  clansmen	  (in	  this	  case	  those	  of	  the	  Scottish	  border)	  where	  ‘the	  songs	  of	  its	  inhabitants	  alternately	  exult	  in	  the	  pillage	  and	  havoc	  of	  a	  foray,	  and	  breathe	  the	  softest	  and	  tenderest	  sentiments	  of	  love	  and	  purity.’	  For	  good	  measure	  Elphinstone,	  threw	  in	  a	  further	  example	  of	  the	  Arcadians	  ‘from	  whom	  we	  draw	  all	  our	  notions	  of	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  shepherds’,	  but	  were	  also	  ‘a	  warlike	  race’.	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  116.	  42	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  85.	  43	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  79,	  82.	  This	  became	  apparent	  as	  Masson	  made	  his	  way	  into	  the	  areas	  north	  of	  the	  Indus	  that	  had	  been	  contested	  by	  the	  Afghans	  and	  Sikhs	  for	  some	  time.	  44	  J.	  P.	  Ferrier,	  Caravan	  Journeys	  and	  Wanderings	  in	  Persia,	  Afghanistan,	  Turkistan,	  and	  
Beloochistan	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  1856).	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Accordingly,	   guided	   by	   local	   trackers	   or	   by	   the	   works	   of	   European	  trailblazers,	   these	   explorers	   were	   often	   aware	   of	   when	   they	   were	   moving	  into	  new	  territories	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  this.	  	  Certain	  regions	  of	  the	  ‘land	  of	   the	  Afghans’	  were	  marked	  out	  as	  particularly	   lawless.	  The	   inhabitants	  of	  the	   Khyber	   Pass,	   or	   ‘khyberees’	   as	   the	   British	   referred	   to	   them,	   were	  regularly	   cast	   in	   such	   light;	   ‘a	   race	   of	   notorious	   thieves’	   as	   one	   observer	  summarized.45	  Elphinstone	   was	   perhaps	   most	   informative	   in	   outlining	   this	  ethnographic	  cartography	  of	  danger:	  	   ‘The	   tribes	   most	   addicted	   to	   rapine	   in	   the	   West	   are	   the	   Atchukzye	  branch	  of	  the	  Dooraunees,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  Noorzyes,	  who	  inhabit	  the	  desart	  [sic]	  country	  on	  the	  borders	  of	  Persia	  and	  Belochistan,	  and	  that	  part	  of	  the	  Tokhee	  branch	  of	  the	  Ghiljies	  ...	  The	  lands	  of	  the	  rest	  might	  be	  passed	  with	  a	  tolerable	  safety,	  unless	  in	  times	  of	  great	  confusion	  ...	  	  The	   pastoral	   tribes	   in	   the	   West	   are	   said	   to	   be	   more	   given	   both	   to	  robbery	  and	  theft,	  than	  those	  who	  live	  by	  agriculture.	  	  All	  the	  tribes	  of	  the	  range	  of	  Solimaun,	  especially	  the	  Khyberees	  and	  the	  Vizeerees,	  are	  notorious	  plunderers,	  and	  rob	  under	  the	  express	  direction	  or	  sanction	  of	   their	   internal	   government.	   	   The	   other	   Eastern	   Afghauns	   are	   all	  disposed	   to	   plunder	   when	   they	   dare.	   	   When	   quite	   free	   from	   all	  apprehension	   of	   the	   royal	   power,	   they	   openly	   rob	   on	   the	   highway.	  	  When	   their	   security	   is	  not	   so	  great,	   they	   levy	  exorbitant	   customs,	  or	  beg	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  to	  be	  refused,	  and	  steal	  when	  they	  dare	  not	  rob;	   but	   for	   a	   considerable	   extent	   round	   the	   towns	   a	   traveler	   is	  tolerably	  safe	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  royal	  authority.’46	  	  This	  was	  not	  purely	  an	  imaginative	  exercise;	  much	  of	  this	  fear	  was	  borne	  out	  of	  experience.	  Masson,	  for	  example,	  came	  to	  lose	  his	  possessions	  on	  a	  number	  of	   occasions.	   Elsewhere,	   the	   reputation	   for	   rebellion	   was	   willingly	  communicated	  to	  European	  travelers	  as	  with	  the	  ‘Khyberee	  chief’	  that	  Burnes	  referred	  to,	  who	  described	  his	  country	  as	  ‘Yaghistan’	  or	  ‘land	  of	  the	  rebels’.47	  But	  such	  occurrences	  and	  such	  characteristics	  became	  reified	  and	  transposed	  to	   a	   general	   ‘character’	   of	   the	   Afghans	   themselves.	   The	   Afghans,	   Conolly	  wrote,	  	  ‘are	  all	  expert	  thieves,	  and,	  like	  the	  Spartans	  of	  old,	  only	  know	  shame	  in	  detection;	   that	   is,	   in	  being	  detected	  before	   they	  have	  accomplished	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  348.	  46	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  362-­‐3.	  47	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  113.	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robbery;	   for	   afterwards,	   it	   is	   a	   very	  good	   joke	  with	   them.’48	  The	  Europeans	  were	   often	   at	   their	   most	   offensive,	   and	   their	   most	   conflicted,	   when	  attempting	   to	   outline	   this	   character.	   In	   an	   oft-­‐quoted	   section	   Elphinstone	  declared:	  ‘To	  sum	  up	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Afghauns	  in	  a	  few	  words;	  their	  vices	  are	   revenge,	   envy,	   avarice,	   rapacity,	   and	  obstinacy;	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   they	  are	   fond	   of	   liberty,	   faithful	   to	   their	   friends,	   kind	   to	   their	   dependants,	  hospitable,	   brave,	   hardy,	   frugal,	   laborious,	   and	   prudent;	   and	   they	   are	   less	  disposed	  than	  the	  nations	  in	  their	  neighbourhood	  to	  falsehood,	  intrigue,	  and	  deceit.’49	  	  
	  Arriving	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  then,	  these	  early	  European	  explorers	  were	  carrying	  with	  them	  a	  heavy	  load	  in	  the	  form	   of	   cultural	   baggage.	   Absent	   any	   significant	   body	   of	   preexisting	  knowledge	  on	   these	   regions,	   and	  driven	  by	  a	   sense	  of	  mystery	  and	  danger,	  these	  individuals	  drew	  upon	  their	  own	  cultural	  signifiers;	  memories	  of	  home;	  antiquity;	  religion;	  and	  a	  loosely	  formed	  battery	  of	  oriental	  stereotypes.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  initial	  foray	  was	  significant	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  future	  visitors.	  As	  it	  transpired,	  this	  impact	  would	  be	  magnified	  by	  the	  sheer	  absence	   of	   European	   outsiders	   visiting	   Afghanistan	   post-­‐1842	   due	   to	   the	  perceived	  danger.	  Therefore,	   in	  a	  process	   similar	   to	   that	  observed	  by	  Priya	  Satia	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   later	   exploration	   of	   Arabia,	   before	   Afghanistan	  became	  a	  cartographic	  definition	  it	  was	  beginning	  to	  resemble,	  to	  the	  British,	  ‘a	   geographic	   and	   cultural	   imaginary’. 50 	  Driving	   this	   was	   a	   ‘cultural	  formation’;	   ‘a	  particular	  set	  of	   ideas	  and	  cultural	  concepts’;	  perhaps	  even	   ‘a	  
mentalité’.51	  But	  this	   formation	  remained	  a	   loose,	  ethereal	  collection	  of	   ‘free	  floating’	   concepts	  and	  stereotypes,	   informed	  not	   so	  much	  by	   ‘science’	  as	  by	  sentiment.	   As	   suggested	   in	   the	   introduction,	   this	   is	   only	   half	   the	   story.	  Alongside	   this	   ‘imaginary’	   cultural	   baggage	   was	   carried	   an	   intellectual	  baggage	   that	   allowed	   a	   more	   concrete	   definition	   of	   Afghanistan	   to	   be	  recorded.	   As	   well	   as	   operating	   in	   an	   imaginary	   register,	   Afghanistan	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  Conolly,	  Journey,	  II,	  69.	  49	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  400.	  50	  Satia,	  Spies	  in	  Arabia,	  14.	  51	  Satia,	  Spies	  in	  Arabia,	  12.	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explorers,	   and	   particularly	   those	   schooled	   in	   the	   methods	   of	   the	   newly	  bureaucratizing	   East	   India	   Company,	   were	   operating	   in	   an	   intellectual	  register	   of	   surveying	   and	   information-­‐gathering.52	  This	   aspect	   is	   turned	   to	  next.	  	  	  	  
Intellectual	  Worlds	  	  Whilst	   the	   more	   imaginative	   aspects	   outlined	   above	   were	   largely	   an	  unintentional	  aspect	  of	  the	  works	  of	  European	  explorers	  of	  Afghanistan,	  the	  more	  data-­‐driven	  aspects	  of	   their	  collective	  enterprise	  were	  deliberate.	  The	  style	   and	   substance	   of	   this	   empirical	   quest	   varied	   dependending	   on	   the	  particular	   intellectual	   trends	   of	   the	   time,	   and	   the	   particular	   educational	  background	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  question,	  but	  all	  viewed	  their	  activities	  in	  this	  regard	   as	   resembling	   in	   part	   a	   ‘scientific’	   endeavour.	   For	   those	   whose	  research	  did	  not	  meet	  with	  official	   interest,	   the	  public	  bodies	  of	   the	  Asiatic	  Societies	  in	  India,	  and	  later	  on	  the	  Royal	  Geographic	  Society	  in	  London,	  were	  avid	   consumers	   of	   new	   geographic	   findings.	   Indeed	   many	   explorers	  published	   sections	   of	   their	   works	   in	   the	   journals	   of	   these	   public	   bodies.	  Masson	  and	  Burnes	   in	  particular	   found	  an	  outlet	   to	  boost	   their	   future	  book	  sales	  in	  this	  respect.	  Moorcroft’s	  equine	  pursuits	  also	  opened	  up	  avenues	  in	  the	   Agricultural	   Societies	   of	   Calcutta	   and	   the	   Board	   of	   Agriculture	   in	  England.53	  	  One	   of	   the	  more	   striking	   features	   of	   these	   European	   travel	   accounts	   is	   the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  data	  they	  carry.	  This	  style	  was	  not	  simply	  an	  extreme	  form	  of	   empiricism,	   but	   was	   rooted	   in	   a	   wider	   intellectual	   milieu	   of	   colonial	  knowledge	  collection.54	  To	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  his	  successors,	  Elphinstone	  exhibited	  the	  intellectual	  trends	  heralded	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Enlightenment,	  and	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  Cohn,	  Colonialism	  and	  Its	  Forms	  of	  Knowledge;	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan;	  Irschick,	  Dialogue	  and	  History.	  53	  Moorcroft’s	  papers	  were	  first	  sent	  to	  the	  Asiatic	  Society	  of	  Calcutta	  upon	  his	  death	  in	  1825.	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  xxvii,	  li.	  54	  Cohn,	  Colonialism	  and	  Its	  Forms	  of	  Knowledge.	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a	   collection	   of	   techniques	   and	   methodologies	   associated	   with	   what	   Jane	  Rendell	   has	   termed	   ‘Scottish	  Orientalism’.55	  Inspired	  by	   the	  works	  of	  Adam	  Smith	   and	   under	   the	   tutelage	   of	   Dugald	   Stewart	   at	   Edinburgh,	   Elphinstone	  and	   his	   peers	   were	   taught	   the	   importance	   of	   identifying	   the	  interrelationships	  between	  all	  aspects	  of	  man’s	  life	  within	  society:	  economic,	  political,	   cultural	   and	   social.	   The	   object	   was	   to	   ascertain	   at	   what	   stage	   of	  development	   the	   society	   could	   be	   said	   to	   exist	   (hunting;	   pastoral;	  agricultural;	   or	   commercial),	   and	   necessitated	   a	   wealth	   of	   collected	   data,	  including	   historical	   trajectories. 56 	  This	   particular	   brand	   of	   academic	  orientalism	   exhibited	   two	   central	   themes.	   Firstly,	   there	   was	   a	   focus	   on	  comparative	  philology.	  Language,	  it	  was	  believed,	  offered	  a	  series	  of	  clues	  to	  the	  developmental	  history	  of	  societies	   including	   their	   interpenetration	  with	  other,	  perhaps	  ostensibly	  more	  ‘developed’	  societies.	  Closely	  linked	  with	  this	  was	   the	   second,	   and	   related	   intellectual	   tradition	   of	   ‘philosophical’	   or	  ‘conjectural’	   history	   which	   suggested	   that	   through	   the	   accumulation	   of	   a	  wealth	   of	   data,	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   development	   of	   these	  societies,	   and	   what	   is	   more,	   identify	   affinities	   with	   societies	   elsewhere.57	  These	   methods	   created	   a	   generic	   set	   of	   interpretations	   by	   which	   it	   was	  proposed	  ‘Asiatics’	  could	  be	  judged.58	  	  	  This	   epistemic	   imperialism	   was	   therefore	   mediated	   by	   a	   European	  conception	   of	   what	   social	   ‘science’	   looked	   like,	   and	   at	   times	   this	   included	  European	   conceptual	   categories.	   Yet	   in	   addition	   there	   was	   a	   cross	  fertilization	  of	  ideas	  drawn	  from	  ‘academic	  orientalism’59	  –	  an	  importation	  of	  notions	   developed	   from	   the	  more	   prolonged	   European	   contact	  with	   Indian	  princely	  states,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   influence	  of	  knowledge	  developed	  on	  Persian	  communities.	  Both	   tendencies	  demonstrated	  an	  attempt	  at	   the	  crafting	  of	  a	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  Jane	  Rendell,	  ‘Scottish	  Orientalism:	  from	  Robertson	  to	  James	  Mill’,	  The	  Historical	  Journal,	  25:1	  (1982),	  pp.	  43-­‐69.	  Rendell	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘Orientalism’	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  academic	  sense	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  the	  nineteenth	  century	  study	  of	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  well	  as	  in	  the	  Saidian	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  as	  the	  corporate	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  the	  western	  study	  of	  the	  east.	  	  56	  Rendell,	  ‘Scottish	  Orientalism’.	  57	  Rendell,	  ‘Scottish	  Orientalism’;	  Ballantyne,	  ‘Re-­‐reading	  the	  Archive	  and	  Opening	  up	  the	  Nation-­‐State’,	  115.	  58	  Said,	  Orientalism.	  59	  As	  opposed	  to	  what	  Said	  calls	  ‘imaginative’	  orientalism:	  A	  ‘style	  of	  thought	  based	  upon	  an	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  distinction	  made	  between	  “the	  Orient”	  and	  (most	  of	  the	  time)	  “the	  Occident”’.	  Said,	  Orientalism.	  2	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‘science	  of	  the	  concrete’,60	  converting	  this	  terra	  incognita	  into	  a	  more	  familiar	  ‘realm	   of	   possibility’.61	  Tribal	   groupings	   were	   duly	   documented,	   as	   well	   as	  their	   geographical	   spread.	   These	   categorizations	   encompassed	   patrilineal,	  ethnic,	   and	   dynastic	   descent.	   Groups	   were	   also	   distinguished	   by	   their	  confessional	   identities	   (Sunni	   or	   Shi’a);	   by	   the	   geographical	   nature	   of	   their	  territories	   (highlands	  or	  plains);	   as	  well	   as	   their	  mode	  of	   subsistence.	  This,	  latter	  category	  in	  turn	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  a	  distinction	  between	  nomadic	  and	  settled	  populations.	  Whereas	  elsewhere	  in	  India,	  the	  term	  ‘tribe’	  conjured	  up	  a	  sense	  of	  illegitimacy,	  Afghanistan	  presented	  an	  entire	  society	  build	  on	  such	  lineage	   structures.	   The	   nomadic	   population	   therefore	   provided	   an	   ‘other’	  against	  which	  to	  pitch	  the	  ‘other’,	  thereby	  allowing	  the	  crafting	  of	  a	  particular	  ‘civi-­‐territorial	  complex’62	  wherein	  the	  authority	  of	  settled	  communities	  was	  seen	   as	   superior	   to	   the	   nomadic	   populations,	   simply	   because	   it	   implied	   a	  sense	   of	   ownership	   over	   a	   defined	   space.	   This	   logic	   of	   land	   ownership	   as	  political	   legitimacy,	   which	   drew	   on	   Rousseau’s	   social	   contract	   theory,	   was	  apparent	   in	   equivalent	   travel	   narratives	   elsewhere,	   including	   Alexis	   de	  Tocqueville’s	   Democracy	   in	   America,	   in	   which	   native	   Americans	   were	   also	  painted	   as	   ‘nomads’.63 	  Territory	   and	   civilization	   were	   thereby	   mutually	  reinforcing,	  creating	  a	  place	  and	  space:	  the	  ‘land	  of	  the	  Afghans’.	  	  The	   British	   view	   of	   the	   polity	   and	   society	   of	   Afghanistan	   was	   in	   part	   a	  reflection	   of	   intellectual	   fashions,	   and	   in	   part	   the	   importation	   of	   familiar	  models	   of	   South	   Asian	   (and	   Persian)	   societal	   development.	   Moreover,	   this	  methodology	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  infusing	  colonial	  histories	  of	  foreign	  territories	  with	   imported	   notions	   of	   legitimacy.	   Through	   conjectural	   history	   the	  development	   of	   a	   political	   community	   was	   often	   viewed	   through	   these	  accounts	  as	  the	  history	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  one	  elite	  group	  over	  another.	  This	  would	  become	  of	  significant	   importance	  in	   later	  attempts	  to	   identify	  which	  groups	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	  term	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Claude	  Levi-­‐Strauss,	  quoted	  in	  Said,	  Orientalism,	  53.	  61	  Robert	  A.	  Stafford,	  ‘Scientific	  Exploration	  and	  Empire’	  in	  Andrew	  Porter	  and	  Alaine	  Low	  (eds.),	  The	  Oxford	  History	  of	  the	  British	  Empire:	  Volume	  III,	  The	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  1999),	  311.	  62	  William	  E.	  Connolly,	  ‘Tocqueville,	  Territory,	  and	  Violence’	  in	  Michael	  J.	  Shapiro	  and	  Hayward	  R.	  Alker	  (eds.),	  Challenging	  Boundaries	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1996),	  141-­‐64.	  63	  Connolly,	  ‘Tocqueville,	  Territory,	  and	  Violence’,	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to	  ally	  with.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  interacting	  with	  these	  communities	  the	  British	  were	   therefore	   crafting	   their	   own	   structures	   of	   significance,	   interpreted	  through	  their	  own	  culturally	  located	  intellectual	  understandings.	  	  	  
Practical	  Worlds	  	  Elphinstone’s	  Account	  was	  by	   far	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   and	   complete	  of	  these	  works	  and	  although	  his	  intellectual	  roots	  would	  soon	  be	  subsumed	  by	  a	  shift	   towards	   Anglo-­‐German	   schools	   of	   philological	   thought,	   and	   the	  wider	  rise	   to	   prominence	   of	   English	   utilitarianism,64	  his	   status	   as	   the	   foremost	  colonial	   expert	   on	   Afghan	   matters	   had	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	   subsequent	  works.	   Rather	   than	   retracing	   his	   steps,	   subsequent	   explorers	   would	   often	  attempt	  to	  describe	  events	  subsequent	  to	  his	  account,	  or	  to	  travel	  routes	  and	  explore	   regions	   that	   his	   work	   had	   not	   covered. 65 	  Many	   explorers	  encountered	   his	   influence	   on	   the	   ground	   too,	  meeting	   individuals	  who	  had	  been	   co-­‐opted	   by	   the	   network	   of	   informants	   he	   set	   up	   to	   gather	  information.66	  	  Elphinstone	   himself	   never	   ventured	   beyond	   Peshawar	   and	   therefore	   relied	  heavily	   on	   so-­‐called	   ‘native	   informants’. 67 	  This	   approach	   to	   information	  procurement	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   matter	   of	   practicality	   but	   reflected	   the	  methods	   by	   which	   the	   colonial	   state	   was	   familiarizing	   itself	   with	   Asian	  peoples	  at	  this	  time	  through	  embedding	  itself	  within	  preexisting	  information	  systems,	   societal	   groups,	   and	   geographically	   mobile	   networks	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Rendell,	  ‘Scottish	  Orientalism’.	  In	  1832	  the	  first	  chair	  for	  Sanskrit	  studies	  opened	  at	  Oxford	  University	  marking	  a	  geographical	  shift	  for	  the	  centre	  of	  Philology	  in	  Great	  Britain	  from	  Scotland	  (Edinburgh)	  to	  England.	  The	  first	  holder	  of	  this	  chair,	  Horace	  Hayman	  Wilson,	  would	  later	  become	  the	  collator	  and	  editor	  of	  William	  Moorcroft	  and	  George	  Trebeck’s	  
Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces.	  He	  co-­‐wrote	  Ariana	  Antiqua,	  on	  the	  coins	  and	  antiquities	  of	  Afghanistan,	  with	  Charles	  Masson.	  He	  was	  also	  acknowledged	  for	  his	  contributions	  to	  Burnes’	  published	  works.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  xv.	  65	  E.g.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  89-­‐90;	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  80;	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  
the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  II,	  376.	  66	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  46,	  127;	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  380-­‐1;	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  162;	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  I,	  xxxii.	  67	  Hanifi,	  ‘Shah	  Shuja’s	  Hidden	  History’.	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diasporas.68	  At	  the	  fringes	  of	  British	  influence,	  where	  Company	  power	  was	  at	  its	  most	  tenuous	  (if	  not	  non-­‐existent),	  European	  explorers	  relied	  heavily	  on	  co-­‐opted	   local	   figures	  and	   Indian	   collaborators.	  Not	  only	  did	   this	   aid	   in	   the	  translation	   of	   an	   unfamiliar	   cultural	   terrain,	   but	   it	   also	   often	   provided	   a	  degree	  of	  safety.	  William	  Moorcroft’s	  1819	  venture,	  for	  example,	  was	  almost	  entirely	  reconnoitered	  in	  advance	  by	  Mir	  Izatullah	  Khan	  who	  set	  out	  in	  1812	  and	  would	   join	   the	   later	  venture	   too.69	  Moorcroft	  was	  also	  accompanied	  by	  Ghulam	  Haidar	  Khan,	  a	  Pathan	  horse	   trader,	  and	  he	  drew	  on	   links	  with	   the	  Pathan	  horse	   trading	  community	   to	  ease	  his	  progress	   from	  Delhi	   to	  Lahore	  and	   beyond.70	  Burnes	   travelled	  with	  Mohan	   Lal,	   a	   Kashmiri	   Brahmin	   and	   a	  new	   breed	   of	   Indian	  munshi71	  well	   connected	   as	   a	   descendent	   of	   the	   Delhi	  nobility,	   educated	   at	   Delhi	   College,	   and	   lauded	   by	   colonial	   officials	   as	  evidence	  for	  the	  potential	  positive	  impact	  effect	  of	  European	  ideas	  on	  Indian	  society.72	  	  These	  local	  informants	  (or	  at	  least	  more	  ‘local’	  than	  the	  British)	  provided	  an	  interface	   between	   the	   European	  worldview	   and	   the	   South	   Asian	   episteme.	  The	  British	  therefore	  tended	  to	  experience	  what	   they	  saw	  not	  only	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  their	  own	  intellectual	  culture,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  inflections	  that	  were	  a	  result	  of	   their	   informants.	   In	  addition,	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  form	  of	  official	   conveyance,	   many	   of	   the	   more	   itinerant	   explorers	   embedded	  themselves	   in	   local	   mobile	   populations.	   Masson,	   Burnes,	   and	   Vigne,	   for	  instance	  each	  exploited	  to	  varying	  degrees	  kafila	  (caravan)	  routes,	  especially	  those	   of	   the	   Lohani	   merchants,	   a	   community	   of	   Afghan	   pastoralists	   who	  traversed	  the	  trade	  routes	  between	  India,	  Kabul,	  and	  the	  northern	  markets	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information;	  Hillemann,	  Asian	  Empire	  and	  British	  Knowledge.	  69	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels,	  I;	  Johnson,	  Spying	  for	  Empire,	  41-­‐8;	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  
Information,	  135.	  70	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  133,	  135.	  71	  Although	  munshi	  translates	  approximately	  to	  ‘secretary’	  this	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  role	  in	  this	  context.	  As	  descendents	  of	  the	  Mughal	  era	  court	  scribes,	  munshis	  were	  employed	  by	  the	  British	  initially	  as	  Persian	  language	  instructors,	  then	  increasingly	  as	  expert	  advisors	  on	  ‘diplomatics	  and	  social	  comportment’.	  Between	  1820	  and	  1850	  a	  new	  type	  of	  
munshi,	  educated	  within	  the	  British	  system	  began	  to	  emerge.	  Mohan	  Lal	  was	  an	  example	  of	  this	  latter	  type.	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  75	  (on	  munshis),	  229-­‐33	  (on	  ‘new’	  munshis).	  72	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  133,	  230-­‐2.	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Central	  Asia.73	  The	  commercial	  instincts	  of	  this	  community	  in	  particular,	  and	  their	   potential	   usefulness	   as	   a	   source	   of	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   information	   left	   a	  favourable	   impression	  on	   their	  European	  guests,	  and	  buttressed	   the	  British	  view	   that	   Afghanistan	   could	   function	   as	   a	   trade	   corridor	   in	   Company	  interests.74	  	  	  Through	   embedding	   themselves	   in	   such	   larger	   groups	   explorers	   also	   came	  into	   contact	  with	   local	   elites	   through	   the	   payment	   of	   transit	   duties	   as	   they	  travelled	   through	   the	   towns	   and	   villages	   on	   the	   route.	   This	   provided	  numerous	   opportunities	   for	   the	   collection	   of	   political	   insight,	   albeit	   from	  what	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  partial	  narrative.	  Masson,	  and	  others,	  also	  integrated	  into	   networks	   of	   roving	   religious	   notables,	   teachers	   (mullahs),	   pilgrims	  (hajis),	   and	   spiritual	   leaders	   (pirs),	   the	   latter	   often	   being	   in	   the	   employ	   of	  political	   elites	   and	   therefore	   also	   knowledgeable	   on	   political	   affairs.	   These	  religious	  figures	  also	  filled	  a	  diplomatic	  role	  in	  arbitrating	  disputes	  between	  competing	  communities.75	  	  Through	   such	   networks	   the	   British	  were	   gaining	   insight	   into	   the	   power	   of	  indigenous	   information	   systems	   that	   outclassed	   anything	   the	   British	   could	  construct	   through	   their	   own	   tenuous	   system	   of	   informants.	   The	   arrival	   of	  European	   travelers	   in	  major	   population	   areas	  was	   often	   anticipated	   by	   the	  rulers	   of	   these	   towns	  who	  would	   regularly	   invite	   the	   feringhi	   travelers	   for	  discussions.	  This	   elite	   engagement	  offered	   telling	  moments	  of	  dialogue	  and	  exchange.	   The	   explorers	   were	   regularly	   courted	   as	   official	   representatives	  despite	  their	  protestations	  to	  the	  contrary,	  and	  often	  solicited	  for	  assistance	  in	   local	   power	   struggles.	   In	   a	   surprisingly	   prescient	   example,	   Shah	   Shuja	  addressed	  Elphinstone	  on	  his	  wish	  for	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  British	  upon	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Masson,	  I,	  Narrative,	  67-­‐8;	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  2,	  41-­‐2,	  53,	  104,	  118;	  Burnes,	  
Travels,	  III,	  335-­‐6.	  74	  As	  Vigne	  offered,	  ‘I	  look	  upon	  the	  Lohanis	  as	  the	  most	  respectable	  of	  the	  Mahomedans,	  and	  the	  most	  worthy	  of	  the	  notice	  and	  assistance	  of	  our	  countrymen.’	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  118.	  See	  also	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  335-­‐6.	  75	  For	  instance	  the	  saiyid	  mentioned	  by	  Masson	  who	  arbitrated	  between	  Kandahar	  and	  the	  Hazara	  communities	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  city.	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  357.	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withdrawal	   of	   the	   embassy	   in	   1809.76	  Masson	   was	   offered	   the	   position	   of	  
vizier	   under	   by	   Taj	   Muhammad	   Khan	   Khakar,	   or	   Haji	   Khan	   as	   he	   was	  commonly	  known	  -­‐	  the	  governor	  of	  Bisut,	  in	  the	  Hazarajat,	  west	  of	  Kabul,	  and	  a	  rival	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.77	  Vigne	  was	  courted	  by	  Nawab	  Jabbar	  Khan,	  a	  deputy	   to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  and	   later	  a	  key	   intelligence	  provider	   to	  the	   British. 78 	  Whilst	   these	   encounters	   served	   to	   perpetuate	   a	   British	  perception	   of	   the	   inherently	   ‘intriguing’	   nature	   of	   the	   Afghan	   political	  community,	  such	  openness	  and	  political	  fluidity	  also	  gave	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  were	  opportunities	  for	  manipulation.	  	  	  Engagement	  with	  elites	  also	  gave	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  consultation	  of	  local	  histories,	  including	  scriptural	  accounts.	  Elphinstone	  appeared	  to	  derive	  much	  from	  consultation	  of	   the	  genealogical	  histories	  of	   the	   founding	   father	  of	   the	  Afghan	   nation,	   Qais	   Abdur	   Rashid.79	  Likewise,	   Vigne	   benefitted	   from	   the	  reading	  of	   the	  majma’	  al-­ansab	   (collection	  of	  genealogies)	  by	  Mullah	  Khoda	  Dad	   during	   his	   stay	   in	   Kabul.80	  At	   a	   more	   local	   level,	   interactions	   with	  prominent	   community	   leaders	   allowed	   the	   collection	  of	   local	   folk	   tales	   and	  myths.	   For	   example	   (and	   perhaps	   reflecting	   their	   innate	   fear	   of	   the	  environment),	   many	   of	   the	   explorers	   reported	   stories	   of	   the	   apparently	  deadly	  ‘pestilential	  wind’	  called	  the	  ‘simoom’,81	  ‘simum’,82	  or	  ‘sirrocco’,83	  that	  seemingly	   originated	   somewhere	   on	   the	   plains	   between	   Jalalabad	   and	  Kabul.84	  Whilst	   the	   recording	   of	   such	   story-­‐telling	   was	   perhaps	   meant	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  113.	  This	  request	  was	  preceded	  by	  a	  similar	  request	  from	  Shuja’s	  court	  officials	  for	  a	  British	  alliance	  against	  the	  then	  ruler	  of	  Persia,	  Shah	  Mahmud.	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  372.	  77	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II.	  360-­‐1.	  78	  Vigne,	  Personal	  Narrative,	  149-­‐50;	  Hanifi,	  ‘Shah	  Shuja’s	  Hidden	  History’,	  12.	  79	  As	  he	  later	  noted,	  ‘they	  [the	  Afghans]	  are	  very	  proud	  of	  their	  descent;	  a	  great	  part	  of	  their	  histories	  is	  taken	  up	  by	  genealogies;	  they	  will	  hardly	  acknowledge	  a	  man	  for	  an	  Afghaun,	  who	  cannot	  make	  his	  proofs	  by	  going	  back	  six	  or	  seven	  generations’.	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  253,	  398;	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans;	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan,	  24-­‐5.	  80	  Vigne,	  Personal	  Narrative,	  166-­‐7.	  81	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  224;	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  120.	  82	  Moorcroft	  and	  Trebeck,	  Travels	  in	  the	  Himalayan	  Provinces,	  II,	  356.	  83	  Ferrier,	  Caravan	  Journeys,	  272-­‐3.	  	  84	  As	  Elphinstone	  relates:	  ‘When	  a	  man	  is	  caught	  in	  it,	  it	  generally	  occasions	  instant	  death.	  	  The	  sufferer	  falls	  senseless,	  and	  blood	  bursts	  from	  his	  mouth,	  nose	  and	  ears.	  	  His	  life	  is	  sometimes	  saved,	  by	  administering	  a	  strong	  acid,	  or	  by	  immersing	  him	  in	  water.	  	  The	  people	  in	  places	  where	  the	  simoom	  is	  frequent,	  eat	  garlic,	  and	  rub	  their	  lips	  and	  noses	  with	  it,	  when	  they	  go	  out	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  summer,	  to	  prevent	  their	  suffering	  by	  the	  simoom.’	  Elphinstone,	  
Account,	  I	  (1819),	  225.	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indicate	   the	   natural	   superstition	   of	   the	   Afghans,	   and	   undermine	   their	  supposed	   capacity	   for	   ‘rational’	   or	   ‘scientific’	   thought,	   it	   also	   indicated	   the	  reliance	  on	   local	   informants,	   and	  raises	   the	   intriguing	  conundrum	  as	   to	   the	  capacity	  of	  the	  Europeans	  to	  distinguish	  between	  myth	  and	  reality;	  substance	  and	  spin.	  	  	  The	  recording	  of	  these	  oral	  histories	  reveals	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	   European	   observations	  were	   conditioned	   by	   their	   reliance	   on	   elites,	  and	   by	   their	   own	  worldviews.	   The	   explorers,	   quite	   inadvertently	   it	   seems,	  imposed	   an	   artificial	   distinction	   between	   the	   validity	   of	   these	   histories.	   As	  such,	   the	   stories	   of	   religiously	   or	   spiritually-­‐inspired	   leaders	   were	   often	  relayed	  with	   a	  dismissive	   tone,	   or	   attributed	   to	   ‘fanaticism’.85	  Such	  was	   the	  case	   with	   saiyid	   Ahmed	   Shah,	   of	   the	   Yusufzai	   territories,	   who	   Masson	  dismissed	  in	  his	  account	  as	  a	  ‘celebrated	  fanatic	  and	  imposter’,	  driven	  by	  an	  assumed	   ‘delegated	   power	   from	   above	   to	   exterminate	   the	   Sikhs	   and	  make	  himself	  master	  of	  the	  Panjab,	  Hindostan,	  and	  of	  China’.86	  	  This	  interpretation	  was	   offered	   despite	   the	   saiyid’s	   minor	   role	   in	   the	   rise	   to	   power	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  who	  was	   in	   contact	  with	   him.	   Ahmed	   Shah’s	   religiously-­‐inspired	  attempts	  on	  Peshawar	  helped	  to	  distract	   the	  rival	  brothers	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  who	  ruled	  that	  city.	  	  However,	   political	   histories	   that	   were	   communicated	   by	   ostensibly	   more	  creditable	  sources,	  learned	  men,	  court	  officials,	  or	  prominent	  local	  leaders	  –	  particularly	   those	   that	   avoided	   suggestions	   of	   fanaticism	   or	   irrationality	   -­‐	  were	   afforded	  more-­‐or-­‐less	   official	   status.	   A	   key	   example	   here,	   explored	   in	  more	   detail	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   this	   chapter,	   is	   the	   rise	   to	   power	   of	   the	  Barakzai	  tribal	  federation,	  against	  the	  dominant	  Saddozai,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  extremely	   violent	   murder	   of	   Fitih	   Khan,	   a	   prominent	   Barakzai	   leader,	   and	  deputy	   to	   the	   ruler	  of	  Kabul.	  Both	  Masson	  and	  Burnes,	   arguably	   shaped	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  An	  example	  is	  Masson’s	  account	  of	  Muhammad	  Shah	  Khan,	  ‘a	  simple	  weaver,	  who	  rose	  one	  morning,	  and	  fancied	  himself	  destined	  to	  be	  padshah	  [King]	  of	  Delhi.	  Grasping	  his	  musket,	  he	  left	  his	  house	  alone,	  shot	  the	  two	  or	  three	  first	  men	  he	  met,	  to	  show	  that	  he	  was	  in	  earnest,	  and	  took	  the	  road	  to	  Kabal.	  Before	  reaching	  Ferzah	  he	  had	  been	  joined	  by	  several,	  and	  then	  crowds	  began	  to	  flock	  in	  to	  him’.	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  123.	  86	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  75-­‐6.	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their	  engagement	  with	   ruling	  Barakzai	   elites,	  documented	   this	  account	   in	  a	  manner	   favourable	   to	   the	   new	   rulers,	   as	   Burnes	   described	   it,	   a	   ‘tragedy	  …	  without	  parallel	  in	  modern	  times’.87	  The	  shout	  of	  the	  Wazir	  Fitih	  Khan,	  as	  he	  was	  murdered,	  Masson	  imparted,	  ‘was	  that	  of	  the	  expiring	  Afghan	  monarchy’.	  Fitih	  Khan’s	  death,	  he	  said,	  had	  bequeathed	  to	  the	  Barakzai,	  ‘the	  ample	  means	  of	  securing	  their	  independence,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  of	  avenging	  him’.88	  	  It	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	   check	   the	   historical	   accuracy	   of	   such	   accounts,	  what	  matters	   for	   our	   purposes	   here	   is	   that	   the	   British	   recorded	   such	   oral	  histories	  partly	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  what	  constituted	  a	  legitimate	  political	  order.	  This	  in	  turn	  was	  shaped	  by	  the	  sources	  they	  drew	  upon,	  and	  the	  narratives	  those	  sources	  offered.	  In	  short,	  these	  accounts	  were	  a	  narrative	  product	  of	  encounter.	  But	  to	  take	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  such	  histories,	  they	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  into	  what	  David	  Edwards	  has	  described	  as	  the	  competing	  ‘moral	  orders’	  that	  have	  long	  defined	  Afghan	  political	  culture;	  orders	  that	  he	  argues	   are	   visible	   in	   precisely	   such	   histories.89	  Driven	   by	   their	   European	  ideas	  of	   a	   legitimate	  political	   order,	   the	  British	   tended	   to	   ignore	   those	   that	  could	   be	   passed	   off	   as	   ‘fanaticism’	   and	   focused	   on	   those	   narratives	   that	  accorded	  with	   a	   straight	   forward	  understanding	  of	   one	  dynastic	   group	   (i.e.	  the	  Barakzai)	   in	   competition	  with	  another	   (i.e.	   the	  Saddozai).	  The	  works	  of	  European	  travelers	  were	  already	  beginning	  to	  impose	  certain	  interpretations	  on	   Afghan	   politics	   that	   would	   evolve	   into	   the	   received	  wisdom	   of	   colonial	  knowledge.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  A	  Knowledge	  Community?	  	  The	   first	   half	   of	   this	   chapter	   has	   introduced	   the	   works	   of	   early	   European	  explorers.	   These	   works,	   it	   has	   been	   argued,	   resemble	   the	   tentative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  241.	  88	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  35.	  89	  Edwardes	  describes	  these	  ‘moral	  faultlines’	  as	  ‘honour’,	  Islam,	  and	  ‘rule’.	  David	  B.	  Edwards,	  
Heroes	  of	  the	  Age:	  Moral	  Faultlines	  on	  the	  Afghan	  Frontier	  (Berkeley,	  LA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996).	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beginnings	  of	  British	  engagement	  with	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Understanding	   how	   the	   British	   were	   beginning	   to	   familiarize	   themselves	  with	  Afghanistan	  at	  this	  time	  requires	  a	  move	  beyond	  the	  standard	  tropes	  of	  the	   ‘Orientalist’	   critique.	   The	   British	   did	   view	   Afghans	   as	   inferior,	   but	   the	  specifics	   of	   how	   they	  viewed	  Afghanistan	  derived	   from	  more	   than	   imperial	  western	   arrogance.	   European	   explorers	   carried	   with	   them	   shared	   cultural	  signifiers	   with	  which	   they	   navigated	   the	   unfamiliar	   terrain	   of	   Afghanistan;	  they	  deployed	  shared	  intellectual	  currents	  in	  interpreting	  their	  findings;	  and	  they	  adopted	  similar	  practices	  of	  engagement	  with	  collaborators	  in	  collecting	  new	   information	   and	   knowledge.	   In	   each	   of	   these	   areas	   British	  understandings	   were	   being	   shaped	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   was	   specific	   to	   the	  Afghanistan	  case.	  	  	  These	   individuals	  did	  not	  simply	  share	  common	  approaches	   in	   theory,	   they	  consumed	  one	  another’s	  works	  too,	  occasionally	  encountering	  the	  legacies	  of	  earlier	   European	   explorers	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   coordinating	  their	  activities	  in	  person.	  As	  such,	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  there	  were	  the	  beginnings	  of	   an	   emergent	  Afghanistan	   colonial	   knowledge	   community.	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Part	  Two:	  Knowledge	  Entrepreneurs	  	  Having	   described	   the	   cultural,	   intellectual,	   and	   practical	   worlds	   of	   early	  European	  explorers	  of	  Afghanistan	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Elphinstone,	  Burnes,	   and	   Masson	   as	   examples	   of	   how	   these	   worldviews	   manifested	  themselves	  in	  the	  observations	  of	  key	  figures.	  I	  describe	  these	  individuals	  as	  ‘knowledge	   entrepreneurs’	   as	   they	   were	   particularly	   influential	   in	   their	  delineation	   of	   what	   was	   considered	   received	   wisdom	   on	   Afghanistan	   by	  policy-­‐makers.	   The	   wider	   Afghanistan	   knowledge	   community	   that	   these	  figures	  were	  members	  of	  reflect	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  familiar	  to	  what	  Peter	  Hass	  has	  termed	   ‘epistemic	  communities’:	   ‘a	  network	  of	  professionals	  with	   recognized	   expertise	   and	   competence	   in	   a	   particular	   domain	   and	   an	  authoritative	   claim	   to	   policy-­‐relevant	   knowledge	   within	   that	   domain	   or	  issue-­‐area’.90	  	  	  
	  
Mountstuart	  Elphinstone	  and	  The	  ‘Elphinstonian	  Episteme’	  
	  In	  assessing	  the	  significance	  of	  Elphinstone’s	  mission	  there	   is	  a	   tendency	  to	  emphasize	   its	  diplomatic	  motivations.91	  	  The	  year-­‐long	  expedition	  sought	  as	  its	  primary	  goal	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  court	  of	  Shah	  Shuja	  ul	  Mulk,	  at	  that	  time	  the	  ruler	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  as	  Elphinstone	  acknowledged	  the	  mission	  was	   throughout	   ‘employed	   in	   such	   inquiries	   [sic]	   regarding	   the	  kingdom	  of	  Caubul	   as	  were	   likely	   to	   be	   useful	   to	   the	   British	   Government.’92	  The	  wider	  strategic	   rationale	   for	   this,	   as	   also	   made	   explicit	   in	   the	   account,	   were	   the	  acquisitive	   movements	   of	   France	   in	   Asia,	   notably	   the	   presence	   of	   the	  Embassy	   of	   General	   Gardanne	   in	   Persia.	   	   It	   is	  worth	   pointing	   out	   however,	  that	  the	  zenith	  of	  France’s	  imperial	  menace	  in	  the	  region	  had	  arguably	  passed	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  mission	  in	  October	  1808.	   	  The	  prospect	  of	  a	  French	  force	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Peter	  Haas,	  ‘Introduction:	  Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  International	  Policy	  Coordination’,	  
International	  Organization,	  46/1	  (1992),	  3.	  91	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains;	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War.	  92	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1842),	  v.	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crossing	   the	   Indus	   in	  1808	  had	  been	   rendered	   all	   but	   impossible	   following	  Napoleon’s	  retreat	  from	  the	  Middle	  East.93	  By	  1809	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  treaty	  had	  constituted	  a	  defence	  pact,	  cancelling	  Persian	  treaties	  with	  other	   European	   states,	   and	   compelling	   the	   Shah	   of	   Persia	   not	   to	   enter	  ‘engagements	   inimical	   to	  Britain	  or	   ‘pregnant	  with	   injury	  and	  disadvantage’	  to	  British	  territories	  in	  India.’94	  The	  Franco-­‐Russian	  alliance	  notwithstanding,	  the	   prospect	   of	   a	   Russian	   threat	   at	   this	   time	  was	   arguably	  more	   of	   a	   post-­‐facto	  rationalisation.	  	  This	   then,	  was	   the	   grand	   strategic	   context	   in	  which	  Elphinstone	   eventually	  signed	  his	  1809	  treaty	  with	  Shah	  Shuja,	  at	  Peshawar,	  which	  at	  that	  time	  was	  the	  winter	  capital	  of	  the	  Kingdom.	   	  To	  get	  to	  Peshawar,	  Elphinstone	  and	  his	  embassy	  had	   covered	  much	  ground.	  With	   an	  embassy	  numbering	  over	  300	  and	  made	  up	  largely	  of	  native	  infantry	  and	  cavalry	  soldiers,	  Elphinstone	  had	  left	  Delhi	  on	  13	  October	  1808	  and	  headed	  west	  towards	  Bikaner.	  From	  there	  they	  swung	  north-­‐west	  to	  Multan	  in	  modern	  day	  Pakistan,	  or	  the	  Punjab	  as	  it	  was	  then	  known.	  By	  7	  January	  1809	  they	  were	  crossing	  the	  Indus	  river	  south	  of	  Dera	  Ismail	  Khan	  at	  Kahiri.	  The	  final	  leg	  of	  the	  journey	  saw	  them	  following	  the	   Indus	  river	  north	   to	  Peshawar	  where	  Elphinstone	  met	  with	  Shah	  Shuja.	  As	  the	  two	  men	  put	  it	  in	  their	  treaty	  agreement,	  the	  ‘veil	  of	  separation’	  was	  to	  be	   ‘lifted	   up	   from	   between	   them,	   and	   they	   shall	   in	   no	  manner	   interfere	   in	  each	   other’s	   countries’.95	  Despite	   such	   optimism	   the	   treaty	   was	   soon	   after	  rendered	  null	  and	  void	  after	  Shuja	  was	  ousted	  by	  his	  brother	  Mahmud.	  	  Shuja	  was	  eventually	  exiled	  in	  Ludhiana	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  British	  pension.	  	  The	  ructions	  that	  led	  to	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  were	  experienced	  by	  Elphinstone	  himself	   whilst	   the	   mission	   was	   stationed	   in	   Peshawar,	   leading	   to	   their	  eventual	  retreat.	  	  	  	  As	   such,	   the	  status	  of	   the	  Afghan	  state	  was	   in	  a	  process	  of	   flux	  at	   the	  exact	  moment	  at	  which	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  was	  attempting	  to	  form	  diplomatic	  ties.	  This	   fact	  was	  not	   lost	   on	  Elphinstone	  who	   remarked	  at	  Peshawar	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains,	  3.	  94	  Cited	  in	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  13.	  95	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  14.	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‘although	  some	  things	  (the	  appearance	  of	  the	  King	  in	  particular)	  exceeded	  my	  expectations,	  others	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  them,	  and	  all	  bore	  less	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	   state	   in	   prosperity,	   than	   of	   a	   splendid	   monarchy	   in	   decline.’96	  Indeed,	  despite	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   British	   information	   system	   with	   regard	   to	  Afghanistan	   at	   this	   time,	   certain	   diasporic	   networks	   were	   functioning.	  Opponents	   of	   Shuja	   were	   lobbying	   the	   British	   in	   Delhi	   with	   regard	   to	   his	  replacement.	   This	   information	   was	   being	   transmitted	   to	   the	   Elphinstone	  embassy	  at	  Peshawar,	  confirming	  the	  Afghan	  ruler’s	  precarious	  position.97	  	  Fortunately	  for	  Elphinstone,	  diplomacy	  was	  not	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  his	  visit.	  Amongst	   his	   cohort	   were	   those	   employed	   for	   the	   cartographic,	   botanic,	  historic,	  and	  economic	  study	  of	   the	  territory	  under	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul.98	  	  At	   Peshawar	   these	   individuals	   fanned	   out	   across	   the	   country	   or	   sought	  informants	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   research	   for	   them.	   Elphinstone	   reserved	   the	  study	  of	  the	  government	  and	  its	  people	  for	  himself,	  but	  never	  ventured	  any	  further	   than	   Peshawar.	   	   The	   collated	   result	   of	   these	   studies	   was	   a	   nine-­‐volume	   exhaustive	   account	   that	   was	   eventually	   distilled	   down	   into	   two	  volumes	  published	  in	  1815.99	  Given	  the	  breadth	  of	  this	  study	  and	  its	  impact,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  Elphinstone’s	  work,	  and	  his	  career	  in	  a	  wider	  sense,	  has	  escaped	  more	  substantial	  academic	  attention.100	  The	  one	  recent	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Benjamin	  Hopkins.	  For	  Hopkins,	  Elphinstone	  was	  the	  progenitor	  of	  the	  framework	   of	   understanding	   for	   colonial	   officials	   getting	   to	   grips	   with	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  policy	  problem.	  	  He	  labels	  this	  framework	  the	  ‘Elphinstonian	  Episteme’.101	  But	   how	   this	   ‘episteme’	  was	   developed,	   and	  how	   it	   connected	  with	  wider	   policy-­‐making	  merits	   further	   attention.	   The	   first	   area	   in	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II,	  (1842),	  83-­‐4.	  97	  Hanifi,	  ‘Shah	  Shuja’s	  ‘Hidden	  History”,	  8.	  98	  Details	  of	  the	  individual	  roles	  of	  the	  embassy	  representatives	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  preface	  of	  the	  1842	  edition,	  pages	  v-­‐vi.	  	  For	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  Embassy	  staff	  and	  its	  military	  escort	  see	  pages	  1-­‐2.	  99	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  26.	  100	  The	  only	  exception	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  biography	  by	  Thomas	  Colebrooke	  published	  in	  1884	  and	  republished	  in	  2011.	  	  The	  book	  was	  based	  on	  an	  earlier	  1861	  article	  in	  The	  Journal	  of	  the	  
Royal	  Asiatic	  Society.	  Thomas	  E.	  Colebrooke,	  Life	  of	  the	  Honourable	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2011);	  Sir	  Edward	  Colebrooke,	  ‘Memoir	  of	  the	  Honourable	  Mountstuart	  Elphinstone’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Asiatic	  Society,	  18	  (1861),	  221-­‐344.	  101	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	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this	  was	   achieved	   concerns	   the	   ‘where’	   of	   the	  Afghan	  polity,	   specifically	   its	  territory.	  	  	  BOUNDING	  AFGHANISTAN	  
	  In	  describing	  the	  territorial	  limits	  of	  Afghanistan	  Elphinstone	  was	  aware	  that	  he	  was	   facing	   a	   challenge.	   ‘It	   is	   difficult	   to	   fix	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   kingdom	   of	  Caubul’,	  he	  wrote.	  ‘The	  countries	  under	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  King	  of	  Caubul,	  once	  extended	  …	  from	  Sirhind,	  about	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  miles	  from	  Delly,	  to	  Meshhed,	   about	  an	  equal	  distance	   from	   the	  Caspian	   sea.	   In	  breadth	   they	  reached	   from	  the	  Oxus	  to	   the	  Persian	  gulph	  …	  But	   this	  great	  empire	  has,	  of	  late,	   suffered	   a	   considerable	   diminution,	   and	   the	   distracted	   state	   of	   the	  government	  prevents	  the	  King’s	  exercising	  authority	  even	  over	  several	  of	  the	  countries	   which	   are	   still	   included	   in	   his	   dominions.’102	  To	   overcome	   this	  ambiguity	   Elphinstone	   applied	   what	   he	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   appropriate	  measure:	  ‘In	  this	  uncertainty	  I	  shall	  adopt	  the	  test	  made	  use	  of	  by	  the	  Asiatics	  themselves,	   and	   shall	   consider	   the	  King’s	   sovereignty	   as	   extending	   over	   all	  the	   countries	   in	  which	   the	   Khootba103	  is	   read	   and	   the	  money	   coined	   in	   his	  name.’104	  	  Given	   this	   definition	   it	   is	   perhaps	   not	   surprising	   that	   Elphinstone’s	  cartographer	  produced	  the	  map	  of	  ‘The	  Kingdom	  of	  Caubul’	  (see	  Appendix	  5).	  This	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   territorialize	   Shah	   Shuja’s	   Kingdom	   based	   on	  sovereign	  influence,	  yet	  it	  did	  not	  take	  account	  of	  the	  particular	  nature	  of	  that	  rule,	  nor	  indeed	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  influence	  was	  rapidly	  shrinking.	  	  	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   more	   carefully	   delineate	   this	   complicated	   picture,	   Elphinstone	  also	   provided	   a	   description	   of	   the	   territorial	   reach	   of	   the	   ‘country	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  138.	  103	  As	  per	  the	  original:	  ‘The	  Khootba	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Mahommedan	  service,	  in	  which	  the	  king	  of	  the	  country	  is	  prayed	  for.	  Inserting	  a	  prince’s	  name	  in	  the	  Khootba,	  and	  inscribing	  it	  on	  the	  current	  coin,	  are	  reckoned	  in	  the	  East	  the	  most	  certain	  acknowledgement	  of	  sovereignty.’	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  138.	  104	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  138.	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Afghauns’.	  He	  described	  this	  as	  bounded	  by	  the	  Hindu	  Kush	  in	  the	  north,	  the	  Indus	  river	   in	   the	  east,	  Sewestan	   in	   the	  south,	  and	  the	  Seistan	  desert	   in	   the	  west. 105 	  The	   physical	   geography,	   Elphinstone	   noted,	   was	   linked	   to	  Afghanistan’s	   political	   geography.	   Thus	   the	   mountain	   dwellers	   exhibited	   a	  greater	   degree	   of	   freedom,	   and	   a	   higher	   propensity	   for	   ‘turbulence’	   than	  those	  who	  lived	  on	  the	  plains	  and	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  King.106	  Similarly,	  cities	  presented	  a	  more	  ordered	  society,	  where	  ‘[t]he	  peculiar	  institutions	  of	  the	  Afghan	   tribes	   are	   superseded	  by	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   strong	   government,	  regular	  courts	  of	  law,	  and	  an	  efficient	  police.’107	  This	  was	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  more	   heterogeneous	   nature	   of	   these	   population	   centres.	   The	   towns	   were	  observed	  to	  be	  mainly	  populated	  by	  non-­‐Afghans.	  Elphinstone	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  only	   Afghanus	   who	   reside	   in	   towns,	   are	   great	   men	   and	   their	   followers,	  soldiers,	  Moollahs,	  a	  few	  who	  follow	  commerce	  …	  and	  some	  of	  the	  poorest	  of	  the	   nation	   who	   work	   as	   labourers.’	   That	   said,	   Afghans	   did	   not	   apparently	  consider	  mercantile	  pursuits	  to	  beneath	  them,	  as	  did	  Persians	  or	  Indians	  for	  example.	   A	   prohibition	   against	   Muslims	   profiting	   from	   interest	   on	   loans	  meant	  that	  much	  of	  the	  business	  of	  banking	  was	  done	  by	  Hindus.	  The	  larger	  population	   centres	   therefore	   exhibited	   an	   even	   greater	   degree	   of	  cosmopolitanism.	   Kandahar,	   for	   example,	   was	   home	   to	   Tajiks,	   Aimaks,	  Hindus,	  Persians,	  Balochis,	  Uzbeks,	  Arabs,	  Armenians,	  and	  Jews.108	  	  	  ‘NATION’,	  ‘TRIBE’	  AND	  AFGHAN	  SOCIETY	  	  Whilst	   the	   ‘Kingdom	  of	   Kabul’	   referred	   to	   those	   areas	   under	   the	   sovereign	  authority	  of	  the	  King,	  this	  authority	  was	  ambiguous,	  and	  the	  ‘country’	  of	  the	  Afghans	   referred	   to	   a	   more	   geographically-­‐defined	   concept.	   But	   the	   most	  significant	  division	   that	  Elphinstone	   faced	   in	  describing	   the	  Afghan	   ‘nation’	  was	  that	  of	  the	  tribes:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  150-­‐1.	  106	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  3.	  107	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  133.	  108	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  133.	  
	   81	  
The	   description,	   which	   I	   have	   attempted,	   of	   the	   country	   of	   the	  Afghauns,	   has	   been	   rendered	   difficult	   by	   the	   great	   variety	   of	   the	  regions	  to	  be	  described,	  and	  by	  the	  diversity	  even	  of	  contiguous	  tracts.	  	  No	  less	  a	  diversity	  will	  be	  discovered	  in	  the	  people	  who	  inhabit	  it;	  and,	  amidst	   the	  contrasts	   that	  are	  apparent,	   in	   the	  government,	  manners,	  dress,	  and	  habits	  of	  the	  different	  tribes,	  I	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  select	  those	  great	  features,	  which	  all	  possess	  in	  common,	  and	  which	  give	  a	  marked	  national	  character	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Afghauns.109	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Part	  One	  of	  this	  chapter,	  Elphinstone’s	  Edinburgh	  University	  education	   had	   schooled	   him	   in	   the	   best	   traditions	   of	   the	   Scottish	  enlightenment,	   yet	  prior	   to	  his	   arrival	   in	   India	   in	  1795	  he	  had	   shown	   little	  apparent	  knowledge	  or	   interest	   in	  oriental	   scholarship.110	  At	   this	   time,	  East	  India	  Company	  officials	  were	  making	  the	  steady	  transformation	  ‘from	  traders	  into	   bureaucrats’,111	  and	   Elphinstone	   belonged	   to	   a	   cohort	   who	   cut	   their	  teeth	  in	  the	  oversight	  of	  revenue	  collection	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  some	  stability	   to	   Company	   finances.	   These	   individuals,	   who	   included	   Thomas	  Munro,	   Mark	   Wilks,	   and	   Charles	   Metcalfe,	   developed	   accordingly	   a	  preoccupation	  with	   the	  village.	  As	  Metcalfe	  noted:	   ‘The	  village	  communities	  are	   little	   republics,	   having	   nearly	   every	   thing	   they	   can	   want	   within	  themselves,	  and	  almost	  independent	  of	  any	  foreign	  relations	  …	  Dynasty	  after	  dynasty	   tumbles	  down;	  revolution	  succeeds	   to	  revolution;	  …	  but	   the	  village	  community	   remains	   the	   same’.112	  Elphinstone,	   a	   contemporary	   of	   Metcalfe,	  appeared	  to	  deploy	  this	  logic	  in	  his	  observations	  of	  Afghan	  tribal	  governance	  too.	  	  For	  Elphinstone,	  the	  tribe	  was	  central	  to	  understanding	  Afghan	  society.	  As	  he	  put	   it,	   ‘each	   tribe	   has	   a	   government	   of	   its	   own,	   and	   constitutes	   a	   complete	  commonwealth	   within	   itself’.113	  The	   basic	   tribal	   unit	   was	   identified	   as	   an	  
oolooss,	  a	  term	  which	  could	  apply	  to	  either	  an	  entire	  tribe,	  or	  a	  sub-­‐unit	  of	  a	  tribe.	   Each	   ooloos	   was	   headed	   by	   a	  Khan,	   who	  was	   drawn	   from	   the	   oldest	  family	   within	   that	   community.	   This	   selection	   was	   made	   by	   the	   King,	   or	  ‘elected	  by	  the	  people’,	  depending	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  grouping	  was	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  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  238.	  110	  Rendell,	  ‘Scottish	  Orientalism’,	  48.	  111	  Irschick,	  Dialogue	  and	  History,	  13.	  112	  Dirks,	  Castes	  of	  Mind,	  28.	  113	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  253.	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under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  King.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  selection	  was	  made	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   age,	   experience	   and	   character.114	  These	   moments	   of	   competition	  could	  prompt	  a	  fragmentation	  as	  factions	  emerged	  under	  competing	  would-­‐be	   leaders.	   If	   the	   King	  was	   involved	   in	   the	   decision	   these	   leaders	   could,	   if	  necessary,	   try	   to	   influence	   the	   court	   by	   offering	   terms	   of	   submission	   or	   by	  bribing	  ministers	  of	  court.	  In	  certain	  circumstances,	  even	  when	  the	  decision	  had	   been	   made,	   the	   disenfranchised	   group	   could	   form	   alliances	   with	   rival	  clans,	   thus	   further	   splintering	   the	   oolooss.	   Ultimately,	   these	   could	   include	  rivals	  to	  the	  throne	  itself.	  	  Despite	   this	   top-­‐down	   influence,	   the	  primary	  governing	  body	  of	   the	  oolooss	  was	   the	   jirga,	   a	   consultative	   body	   for	   important	   decisions	   affecting	   the	  community,	   including	   the	   selection	   of	   a	   Khan.	   Jirgas	   existed	   for	   each	  subdivision	  with	  the	  chiefs	  of	  each	  significant	  division	  sitting	  on	  the	  principal	  
jirga	  for	  the	  oolooss.	  This	  institution	  betrayed	  the	  essentially	  communitarian	  nature	  of	  the	  tribes.	   	  Although	  Khans	  could	  take	  a	  more	  dictatorial	  role	  they	  were	  generally	  constrained	  by	  the	  communitarian	  nature	  of	  tribal	  politics.	  	  Linguistically	   however,	   in	   idenitifying	   the	   oolooss	  as	   a	   principle	   organizing	  societal	  unit,	  Elphinstone	  was	  adopting	  an	  ambiguity.	  Ethnicity	  and	  kinship	  in	   Afghanistan	   were	   expressed	   through	   a	   family	   of	   terms	   that	   crossed	  European	  conceptual	  boundaries.	   ‘Wulus’	  (or	  oolooss)	  could	  refer	  to	  ‘nation’,	  ‘tribe’,	   or	   ‘relatives’;	   just	   as	   ‘qawm’,	   can	   refer	   to	   ‘people’,	   ‘tribe’,	   or	  community;115	  or	  ‘tyfah’	  can	  refer	  to	  ‘clan’,	  ‘tribe’,	  and	  ‘group’.116	  	  	  For	  Elphinstone,	   the	   tribal	  model	  provided	  a	   lens	  on	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  community,	  and	  indeed	  its	  identity	  as	  a	  nation,	  but	  it	  created	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  conceptual	   coherence.	   As	   he	   declared:	   ‘An	   assemblage	   of	   many	  commonwealths	  such	  as	  I	  have	  described	  composes	  the	  Afghaun	  nation,	  and	  the	   whole,	   or	   nearly	   the	   whole	   is	   formed	   into	   one	   state	   by	   the	   supreme	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  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1842),	  213.	  115	  To	  further	  confuse	  matters,	  in	  northern	  India	  qawm	  (or	  qaum)	  was	  also	  used	  to	  signify	  ‘caste’.	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  170.	  116	  Shahrani,	  ‘Statebuilding	  and	  Social	  Fragmentation	  in	  Afghanistan’,	  24.	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authority	   of	   a	   common	   sovereign.’117	  Yet	   he	   warned	   that	   ‘The	   system	   of	  government	  which	  I	  have	  described	  is	  so	  often	  deranged	  by	  circumstances	  …	  that	  it	  is	  seldom	  found	  in	  full	  force;	  and	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  considered	  rather	  as	   the	  model	  on	  which	  all	   the	  governments	  of	   the	  tribes	  are	   formed,	   than	  a	  correct	  description	  of	  any	  one	  of	  them.’118	  As	  this	  suggests,	  not	  all	  tribes	  were	  comparable	   in	   their	   forms	   of	   governance,	   nor	  were	   they	   equal	   in	   terms	   of	  their	  access	  to	  royal	  privilege.	  Moreover,	  Elphinstone	  seemed	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	   tenuous	  grasp	   that	  his	   republican	   sensibilities	  had	  on	   the	   reality	  of	   the	  Afghan	  political	  community.	  This	  was	  regularly	  overlooked	  in	  the	  subsequent	  use	  of	  his	  work	  however.	  	  	  Hopkins	   has	   described	   Elphinstone’s	   Account	   as	   having	   led	   to	   the	  ‘Pashtunization’	   of	   the	   Afghan	   political	   community,	   an	   observation	   drawn	  from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  account	  prioritizes	   the	  Pashtun	  ethnic	  group,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Afghan	  state	  incorporated	  other	  ethnicities.119	  But	  we	  could	  develop	   this	   further	   by	   noting	   the	   ‘Durranification’	   of	   the	   Afghan	   political	  class.	   Elphinstone	   exhibited	   a	   clear	   preference	   for	   the	   Durrani	   federation	  which	   he	   described	   as	   ‘the	   greatest,	   bravest,	   and	   most	   civilized	   in	   the	  nation’.	   ’Among	   the	   Dooraunees,	   the	   heads	   of	   clans	   also	   form	   the	   nobility,	  who	   enjoy	   the	   great	   offices	   of	   the	   court,	   the	   state,	   and	   the	   army;	   and	   they	  appear	   in	   the	   double	   character	   of	   patriarchal	   chiefs,	   and	   of	   wealthy	   and	  powerful	   noblemen,	   deriving	   command	   and	   influence	   from	   the	   King’s	  authority,	  and	  from	  their	  own	  riches	  and	  magnificence.’120	  The	  Durranis	  were	  therefore	  identified	  as	  the	  Royal	  clan,	  in	  particular,	  the	  Saddozai	  sub-­‐tribe	  of	  the	  Popolzai	  tribe,	  from	  which	  the	  King	  was	  drawn.121	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  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  275-­‐6.	  118	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  259.	  119	  The	  Pashtuns	  have	  been	  Afghanistan’s	  dominant	  ethnic	  group	  since	  the	  mid	  eighteenth	  century	  and	  today	  comprise	  around	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population.	  They	  include	  the	  tribal	  confederacies	  of	  the	  Durranis	  (Abdalis);	  the	  Ghilzais	  (Khalji/Ghilji);	  the	  Gurghusht;	  the	  Karlani	  (Pathans);	  and	  the	  nomadic	  Kuchi	  and	  Maldor.	  Pashtuns	  adhere	  to	  the	  Pashtunwali	  tribal	  code.	  Other	  major	  ethnic	  groups	  within	  Afghanistan	  include	  the	  Tajiks;	  The	  Uzbeks	  and	  Turkmen;	  the	  Aimaqs;	  and	  the	  Hazaras.	  See	  Thomas	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan.	  	  See	  Appendices	  1	  and	  2	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  for	  the	  tribal	  structure	  of	  the	  Pashtun	  ethnic	  group.	  On	  ‘Pashtunization’	  see	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  23.	  120	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  85-­‐6.	  121	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  groups	  of	  Afghanistan	  see	  Appendices	  1	  and	  2.	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  This	   status	   accorded	   a	   distinct	   form	   of	   ‘government’	   within	   the	   tribe,	  ‘occasioned	  by	   the	  more	   immediate	   connection	  of	   the	  Dooraunees	  with	   the	  King,	   and	   by	   the	   military	   tenure	   on	   which	   they	   hold	   their	   lands.’122	  These	  land	  grants	  were	  known	  as	  tiyuls.	  The	  King	  was	  not	  only	  the	  hereditary	  chief	  of	   the	   Durrani	   tribe,	   but	   also	   considered	   their	   military	   commander,	   to	   a	  greater	   extent	   than	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   other	   tribes.	   ‘With	   these	   [other	  tribes],	   the	  military	   service	  which	   they	   owe	   to	   the	   crown	   is	   an	   innovation,	  introduced	  after	  they	  had	  occupied	  their	  lands,	  which	  they	  had	  conquered	  or	  brought	  under	  cultivation	  without	  aid	  from	  any	  external	  power,	  and	  without	  an	   acknowledgement	   of	   dependence	   on	   any	   superior:	   but	   the	   lands	   of	   the	  Dooraunees	  were	  actually	  given	  to	  them	  on	  condition	  of	  military	  service,	  and	  the	  principal	  foundation	  of	  their	  right	  to	  the	  possession	  is	  a	  grant	  [or	  tiyul]	  of	  the	   king.’123	  Therefore,	   a	   dependency	   existed	   between	   the	   Durrani	   tribal	  leaders	  and	  the	  King,	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  with	  the	  other	  tribes.	  This	  royal	  privilege	  was	  manifested	  too	  in	  the	  titles	  bestowed	  upon	  these	  leaders.	  Whilst	   the	  non-­‐Durrani	   leaders	  held	   the	   title	  Khan	   (Chieftain),	   the	  heads	  of	  the	  Durrani	  clans	  were	  given	  the	  military	  title	  of	  sirdar	  (General),	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  rank	  in	  the	  King’s	  army.124	  	  The	  sense	  of	  prestige	  that	  Elphinstone	  attached	  to	  the	  Durranis	  is	  clear	  when	  one	  compares	   their	  description	  with	   that	  of	  other	   tribes.	   	  The	  Ghilzais	  who	  inhabited	   the	   area	  between	  Ghazni	   and	  Kandahar,	   and	  had	  previously	  held	  power	   in	   Kandahar	   prior	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   Ahmad	   Shah	   Durrani, 125 	  were	  described	  by	  Elphinstone	  as	  far	  more	  anarchic	  in	  their	  form	  of	  government,	  and	   bitter	   at	   their	   fall	   from	   power.	   ‘No	   Khaun	   of	   a	   tribe	   or	  Mullik126	  of	   a	  village	  ever	  interferes	  as	  a	  magistrate	  to	  settle	  a	  dispute	  or	  at	  least	  a	  serious	  one;	  they	  keep	  their	  own	  families	  and	  their	  immediate	  dependents	  in	  order,	  but	   leave	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   people	   to	   accommodate	   their	   differences	   as	   they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  100.	  123	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  100.	  124	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  102.	  125	  Founder	  of	  the	  Durrani	  Empire	  in	  1747.	  The	  capital	  of	  the	  Durrani	  Kingdom	  was	  formally	  Kandahar.	  126	  A	  village-­‐level	  leader.	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can.’127	  Yet	  there	  were	  exceptions	  to	  this.	  Those	  Ghilzai	  tribes	  living	  near	  the	  cities	  of	  Ghazni	  and	  Kabul	  were	  subject	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  royal	  authority	  and	   therefore	   exhibited	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   internal	   regulation.128	  However,	  amongst	   the	   eastern	   Ghilzais	   ‘the	   power	   of	   the	   chief	   is	   not	   considerable	  enough	  to	  form	  a	  tie	  to	  keep	  the	  clan	  together,	  and	  they	  are	  broken	  up	  into	  little	   societies	   (like	   the	   Eusofzyes),	   which	   are	   quite	   independent	   in	   all	  internal	  transactions.’129	  	  The	   Yusufzais	   (or	   ‘Eusofzyes’),	   who	   were	   based	   north	   of	   Peshawar,	   were	  described	  as	  amongst	  the	  most	  independent	  and	  antagonistic	  of	  all	  the	  tribes.	  For	  Elphinstone	  this	  stemmed	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  chiefs	  was	   derived	   from	   common	   descent,	   rather	   than	   from	   competence,	   or	   even	  wealth.	   A	  Khan’s	   ability	   to	  mediate	   between	  disputants	   for	   example	   (a	   key	  role	  for	  local	  leaders)	  was	  based	  ‘more	  on	  his	  arguments	  than	  his	  authority,	  and	  more	  on	  the	  caprice	  of	  the	  disputants	  than	  on	  either.’130	  For	  the	  Yusufzai,	  independence	  of	  the	  crown	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  pride	  rather	  than	  circumstance,	  indeed	  a	  famous	  Yusufzai	  saint	  reportedly	  left	  them	  with	  the	  curse	  that	  ‘they	  should	   always	   be	   free,	   but	   that	   they	   should	   never	   be	   united’.131	  This	   is	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Yusufzai	   were	   by	   descent	   part	   of	   the	   Durrani	  federation.	  As	  suggested	  elsewhere,	  Elphinstone	  explained	  this	  by	  reference	  to	  their	  remote	  location	  away	  from	  the	  centres	  of	  royal	  authority.	  	  The	  Achakzai	  provide	  a	   further	  example	  of	  a	  Durrani	  sub-­‐tribe	   that	  did	  not	  exhibit	   the	   regal	   characteristics	   that	  Elphinstone	  suggests	  were	  common	   to	  the	   tribe	   as	   a	   whole.	   Based	   in	   the	   hills	   and	   on	   the	   plains	   to	   the	   south	   of	  Kandahar	   the	  Achakzai	  were,	   according	   to	  Elphinstone,	   far	   from	  noblemen:	  ‘No	  traveller	  can	  enter	  their	  country	  without	  being	  plundered,	  and	  they	  often	  make	  nightly	  expeditions	   into	  the	   lands	  of	   their	  neighbours	  to	  steal.	  Skill	   in	  theft,	  and	  boldness	   in	  robbery,	  are	  great	  qualities	  among	   them;	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  conversation	  of	  the	  young	  men	  turns	  on	  the	  exploits	  of	  this	  kind	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  151.	  128	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  151.	  129	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  152.	  130	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  18-­‐19.	  	  131	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  19.	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which	   they	   have	   performed	   or	   projected.’132	  Despite	   their	   Khan	   enjoying	  more	  power	   than	  most	   the	  Achakzai	  were,	   according	   to	  Elpinstone,	   known	  for	  their	  unruliness:	  ‘Their	  manners	  are	  rough	  and	  barbarous	  …	  They	  are	  not	  hospitable;	   they	  have	  no	  mosques;	   and	   seldom	  pray,	   or	   trouble	   themselves	  about	  religion	  …	  All	  tribes	  are	  loud	  in	  their	  complaints	  against	  them,	  and	  the	  Dooraunees	  will	  hardly	  acknowledge	  them	  for	  clansmen.’133	  	  The	  tribal	  taxonomy	  that	  Elphinstone	  provides	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  aspects	  of	  his	  account,	  yet	  as	  his	  own	  work	  shows,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  tribes	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	   coherent	   whole	   was	   debatable.	   The	   tribes	  varied	  greatly	   in	   their	  adherence	  to	  centralised	  rule.	   In	   those	  areas	  close	  to	  the	   cities	   and	   towns,	   a	   degree	   of	   royal	   authority,	   and	   therefore	   coherence	  was	   attainable.	   Yet	   outside	   of	   these	   areas	   the	   tribes	   were	   more	   akin	   to	  ‘republics’.	   Indeed,	   this	   is	   how	   Elphinstone	   described	   them.	   In	   these	  republican	   settings	   the	   community	   was	   the	   government.	   The	   jirga,	   as	   a	  consultative	  body,	  allowed	  for	  a	  degree	  of	   ‘democratic’	  rule	  for	  Elphinstone.	  In	   such	   settings,	  when	   the	   jirga	   could	   not	   decide,	   disputes	  were	   settled	   by	  recourse	  to	  Shariah	  law	  and	  the	  mullahs.134	  As	  such,	  the	  description	  of	  Afghan	  society	   varied	   depending	   on	   where	   one	   looked,	   and	   how	   coherent	   one	  imagined	   a	   society	   to	   be.	   In	   beginning	   with	   an	   assumption	   of	   an	   Afghan	  ‘nation’,	   Elphinstone’s	   account	   becomes	   less	   convincing	   as	   the	   exact	  constitution	   of	   that	   nation	   is	   discovered.	   In	   addition,	   this	   nation	  encompassed	  more	  than	  the	  Durrani	  federation,	  and	  more	  than	  the	  Pashtun	  ethnic	   group.	   The	   Tajiks	   and	   the	   Hazaras	   were	   not	   the	   only	   groups	   to	   be	  sidelined	   in	   this	   implied	   hierarchy,	   but	   the	   account	   did	   appear	   to	   relegate	  their	   status	   as	   members	   of	   the	   governing	   elite.	   The	   legacies	   of	   this	  interpretation	  are	  still	  with	  us	  today.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  128.	  133	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  128-­‐9.	  134	  Religious	  leaders.	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RULING	  THE	  AFGHANS:	  GOVERNMENT	  AND	  GOVERNANCE	  	  Despite	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  tribal	  structure	   in	  understanding	  Afghan	  society,	  government	   authority	   provided	   an	   additional	   lens	   with	   which	   to	   view	   the	  Afghan	   polity.	   As	   Elphinstone’s	   embassy	   passed	   across	   the	   deserts	   of	   the	  Punjab	   and	   through	   the	   territories	   lining	   the	   Indus,	   and	   as	   he	   headed	  towards	  Peshawar,	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  government	  became	  ever-­‐more	  apparent.	  At	  Mojgarh135	  the	  envoy	  met	  a	  delegation	  of	  Bahawul	  Khan,	  a	  chief	  of	  one	  of	  Kabul’s	  eastern	  provinces.	  The	  Khan	   ‘praised	  the	  King	  of	  Caubul	  highly;	  but	  said	  he	  had	  never	  seen	  him.’136	  At	  Moultan,	  just	  before	  the	  reaching	  the	  Indus,	  the	   envoy	   received	   a	  Mehmandaur	   (official	   courier)	   of	   the	   King.	   North	   of	  Moultan	  at	  Layah,	  on	  the	  Indus,	  two	  Durrani	  horsemen	  met	  the	  envoy,	   ‘sent	  by	  the	  governor	  of	   the	  province	  to	  accompany	  me	  to	  his	   limits’.	  Ephinstone	  also	  recorded	  a	  visit	  by	  a	  Persian	  attendant	  of	  the	  King,	  admitting	  he	  was	  ‘a	  good	  deal	   surprised	  at	   the	   freedom	  with	  which	  all	  my	  visitors	   spoke	  of	   the	  government;	  and	  of	  the	  civil	  wars.’137	  Having	  crossed	  the	  Indus	  further	  north,	  Elphinstone	   was	   rewarded	   for	   a	   month’s	   wait	   at	   Dera	   Ismail	   Khan	   with	   a	  dress	  of	  honour	  from	  the	  King,	  but	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  the	  envoy	  reached	  the	  plain	  of	   Kalabagh,	   south	   of	   Kohat,	   that	   they	  met	  with	   Durrani	   nobleman	   sent	   to	  conduct	  the	  embassy	  to	  court	  at	  Peshawar.	  	  It	  was	  at	  Peshawar	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Afghan	  constitution	  was	  first	  made	  clear.	  The	  monarchy	  was	  based	  on	  a	  hereditary	   crown	  within	   the	  Saddozai	  sub-­‐tribe,	   although	   there	  was	  no	  apparent	   rule	   for	   its	  descent	   to	   the	  eldest	  son.	  Within	  the	  court	  there	  was	  also	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ‘Vizeer	  Auzim’	  (Grand	  Vizier)	  who,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  shared	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  King.	  Indeed	  the	  position	  of	  Vizier	  has	  often	  been	  overlooked	  in	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  history.	  Its	   importance	  derived	  not	   just	   from	   the	  powers	   enjoyed	  by	   the	  Vizier,	   but	  the	   fact	   that	   it	   was	   often	   a	   political	   appointment	   of	   the	   King,	   designed	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Mojgarh	  today	  sits	  just	  north	  of	  India’s	  border	  with	  Pakistan.	  A	  fort	  is	  the	  main	  remnant	  of	  its	  architecture.	  136	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  29.	  137	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  44.	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placate	  key	  constituencies.138	  The	  King	  had	  the	  right	  to	  coinage,	   the	  right	  to	  make	   war	   and	   peace,	   and	   the	   power	   to	   make	   ‘treaties	   of	   his	   own	  authority’.139 	  He	   also	   held	   power	   of	   all	   appointment	   although	   this	   was	  severely	   circumscribed:	   ‘in	  many	   cases	   his	   choice	   is	   confined	   to	   particular	  families;	   of	   this	  description	   are	   the	   chiefships	  of	   tribes.	   Some	  offices	  of	   the	  state,	  and	  many	  even	  of	  the	  King’s	  household	  are	  hereditary.’140	  He	  also	  had	  control	  of	  the	  revenue,	  control	  of	  military	  levies	  and	  command	  of	  the	  army,	  as	  well	   as	   part	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   justice,	   ‘[i]n	   cases	  where	   the	   crime	   is	  against	  the	  state.’141	  	  The	   Kingdom	   was	   divided	   into	   twenty-­‐seven	   provinces	   or	   districts,	   the	  eighteen	   most	   important	   of	   which	   were	   governed	   by	   a	   Haukim	   and	   a	  
sirdar.142	  The	  Haukim	  was	   responsible	   for	   command	  of	   the	   irregular	   troops	  and	   for	   collection	   of	   the	   revenue,	   and	   the	   sirdar	   commanded	   the	   regular	  troops,	  provided	  for	  the	  ‘public	  tranquility’,	  and	  enforced	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  
Haukim.	  Where	  the	  Haukim	  was	  a	  Durrani,	  he	  also	  filled	  the	  role	  of	  sirdar.143	  The	   remaining	   nine	   provinces	   were	   also	   assigned	   a	   Durrani	   sirdar	   but	   he	  resided	  at	  Kabul	  and	  only	  visited	  his	  province	  in	  cases	  of	  revenue	  collection.	  	  The	  main	  source	  of	  revenue	  was	  from	  land	  taxes	  and	  the	  principal	  expenses	  of	   the	   court	   were	   payment	   of	   the	   army,	   the	   household,	   the	   court	  establishment,	   and	   the	   clergy.144	  Interestingly,	   tax	   payments	   seemed	   to	   fall	  disproportionately	   on	   non-­‐Afghans.	   Elphinstone	   referred	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Other	  key	  positions	  included	  the	  ‘Moonsee	  Baushee’	  (chief	  secretary);	  the	  ‘Hircarrah	  Baushee’	  (head	  of	  intelligence	  department);	  the	  ‘Nushukchee	  Baushee’	  (superintendent);	  and	  the	  ‘Zubt	  Begee’	  (responsible	  for	  property	  seizures).	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  252.	  139	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  245.	  Although	  Elphinstone	  did	  point	  out	  that	  ‘it	  seems	  to	  be	  understood	  that	  [the	  King]	  cannot	  cede	  any	  part	  of	  the	  territory	  occupied	  by	  Afghaun	  tribes.’	  The	  only	  apparent	  exception	  to	  this	  was	  the	  territory	  of	  Shawl	  which	  was	  passed	  to	  the	  Prince	  of	  Balochistan	  by	  Ahmad	  Shah.	  140	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  245.	  141	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  245-­‐6.	  142	  These	  provinces	  were	  Herat,	  Farrah,	  Kandahar,	  Ghazni,	  Kabul,	  Bamiyan,	  Ghorband,	  Jalalabad,	  Laghman,	  Peshawar,	  Dera	  Ismail	  Khan,	  Dera	  Ghazi	  Kahn,	  Shirkarpur,	  Sibi,	  Sindh,	  Kashmir,	  Attock,	  Chuch	  Hazara,	  Leia,	  and	  Multan.	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  256.	  	  143	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  255.	  144	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  expenses	  Elphinstone	  notes,	  ‘[t]he	  pay	  of	  the	  great	  civil	  officers	  is	  small.	  They	  are	  in	  a	  great	  measure	  maintained	  by	  bribes	  and	  perquisites	  [sic],	  which,	  although	  they	  have	  the	  most	  pernicious	  effect	  on	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  state,	  do	  not	  diminish	  the	  revenue	  actually	  brought	  to	  account.’	  Elphinstone	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  269.	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‘infidel	  tax’	  which	  would	  fall	  on	  non-­‐Muslims	  (Sikhs	  and	  Hindus),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  general	   tax	   on	   ‘humsauyehs’,	   those	  who	   had	   attached	   themselves	   to	   a	   clan	  from	  which	   they	  were	  not	  descended.145	  The	  army	  was	  drawn	  mainly	   from	  the	  Durrani	   sirdars	  who	  were	   obliged	   to	   provide	   troops	   in	   return	   for	   their	  
tiyuls.	  In	  this	  sense,	  as	  Elphinstone	  summarized,	  ‘[t]he	  King’s	  object	  with	  the	  Afghaun	   tribes	   is,	   to	   get	   men	   from	   the	   western,	   and	   money	   from	   the	  eastern.’146	  Each	   clan	   formed	  a	   separate	   corps.	  For	  most	  Durranis,	  war	  was	  the	  only	  time	  that	  they	  would	  attend	  the	  King.147	  Other	  formations	  alongside	  the	   Durrani	   clans	   included	   the	  Gholami	   Shahs,	   established	   by	   Ahmad	   Shah	  and	  drawn	  from	  foreigners	  residing	  within	  the	  Kingdom.	  About	  one	  third	  of	  this	  corps	  was	  made	  up	  of	  the	  Qizilbash,	  a	  Turkic	  fighting	  unit	  who	  provided	  for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   King	   in	   Kabul.	   	   Perhaps	  more	   importantly	   for	   the	  British	  however	  was	  the	  ‘Ooloossee’,	  a	  ‘general	  rising	  of	  the	  people’	  for	  use	  in	  foreign	   invasions.	   As	   Elphinstone	   explained,	   ‘[o]nly	   those	   of	   the	   tribes	  nearest	  the	  scene	  of	  action	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  rise;	  they	  would	  be	  under	  no	  regulation	   on	   the	   King’s	   part,	   and	   no	   good	   could	   be	   expected,	   in	   regular	  actions,	  from	  so	  ungovernable	  a	  multitude;	  but	  if	  properly	  applied,	  this	  kind	  of	   force	   would	   not	   be	   without	   its	   advantages.	   …	   Ooloossee	   troops	   get	   no	  pay.’148	  	  Law	  was	   in	  the	   form	  of	   the	  Shariah,	  which	  was	  adopted	   in	  civil	  actions,	  but	  the	   Pashtunwali	   was	   considered	   more	   important	   in	   the	   internal	  administration	   of	   tribal	   justice.	   This	   was	   described	   as	   ‘a	   rude	   system	   of	  customary	   law,	   founded	   on	   principles	   such	   as	   one	  would	   suppose	   to	   have	  prevailed	  before	  the	  institution	  of	  civil	  government.’149	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Elphinstone’s	  trip	  the	  court	  consisted	  of	  two	  parties.	  The	  first	  headed	  by	  Akram	  Khan,	  a	  Durrani	  ‘lord’	  and	  also	  ‘Prime	  Minister’;	  the	  second	  made	   up	   of	   Persian	   ministers	   and	   headed	   by	   Mir	   Abul	   Hassan	   Khan	   ‘who	  being	   about	   the	   King’s	   person,	   and	   entirely	   dependent	   on	   his	   favour,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  264.	  146	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  247.	  147	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  266.	  148	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  II	  (1842),	  272.	  149	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  264-­‐5.	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possessed	   a	   secret	   influence,	   which	   they	   often	   employed	   in	   opposition	   to	  Akram	  Khan.’150	  Indeed	   the	   two	  parties	  appeared	   to	  be	   in	  competition	  with	  each	  other,	  with	  the	  Persians	  telling	  Elphinstone	  that	  the	  king	  was	  ‘jealous’	  of	  Akram	  Khan	  and	  the	  ‘great’	  Durranis.151	  	  Aside	   from	   the	   jealousies	   of	   the	   court,	   Elphinstone	   also	   learned	   of	   the	  regional	   players’	   attitudes	   to	   the	   British	   embassy’s	   trip	   to	   Kabul.	   The	  Marattas	  of	  India	  had	  already	  sent	  an	  embassy	  to	  solicit	  the	  king’s	  assistance	  against	  the	  British.	  Ranjit	  Singh,	  ruler	  of	  the	  bordering	  Sikh	  Kingdom	  had	  also	  warned	  the	  Shah	  of	  the	  ‘dangerous	  nature’	  of	  British	  designs.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
Haukims	   of	   Laya,	   Multan,	   and	   Sindh	   ‘did	   all	   they	   could	   to	   thwart	   [the	  mission’s]	  success’.152	  Even	  the	  Durrani	  lords	  were	  averse	  to	  an	  alliance	  that	  could	  diminish	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  aristocracy	  over	  the	  King.	  	  In	   assessing	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   King	   over	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole,	  Elphinstone	  faced	  the	  challenge	  of	  getting	  beyond	  the	  outward	  expression	  of	  this	  authority.	  He	  had	  already	  ascertained	  that	  the	  king’s	  authority	  extended	  to	  ‘a	  general	  superintendence	  over	  the	  whole	  kingdom,	  and	  to	  the	  levying	  [of]	  fixed	   proportions	   of	   troops	   or	   money,	   or	   both,	   from	   each	   tribe,	   for	   the	  common	   defence.’	   But	   as	   has	   already	   been	   discussed,	   he	   also	   found	   that,	  ‘[t]he	  whole	   nation	  …	   is	   seldom	   animated	   by	   one	   spirit,	   and	   the	   individual	  interests	   of	   each	   Oolooss	   attract	   more	   of	   its	   attention	   than	   the	   general	  welfare.’ 153 	  Rather	   than	   seeing	   this	   as	   a	   source	   of	   weakness	   however,	  positives	   were	   drawn	   from	   this	   state	   of	   affairs:	   ‘In	   Afghaunistaun	   …	   the	  internal	   government	   of	   the	   tribes	   answers	   its	   end	   so	  well,	   that	   the	   utmost	  disorders	  of	  the	  royal	  government	  never	  derange	  its	  operations,	  nor	  disturb	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  people.’154	  This	  ‘high-­‐spirited’	  republicanism	  ensured	  defence	  against	   ‘tyrants’	  and	  paradoxically	  guarded	  against	  a	  collective	  descent	   into	  ruin	  across	  the	  entire	  country.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  70.	  151	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  71.	  152	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  69.	  153	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  276.	  154	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  280.	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It	  is	  impossible	  to	  avoid	  the	  impression	  that	  Elphinstone	  developed	  a	  certain	  admiration	   for	  a	  system	  that,	  despite	   twelve	  years	  of	   ‘civil	  warfare’155	  as	  he	  put	   it,	   had	   allowed	   for	   ‘progressive	   improvement’	   in	   the	   welfare	   of	   the	  country.	  ‘[W]e	  cannot	  but	  be	  struck	  with	  the	  vast	  superiority	  of	  the	  materials	  [the	  Afghans]	  afford	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  national	  constitution	  …	  if	  a	  King	  of	  sufficient	  genius	  to	  form	  the	  design	  of	  cordially	  uniting	  his	  subjects,	  should	  spring	  up	  among	  the	  Afghauns,	  he	  would	  necessarily	  fall	  on	  a	  beautiful	  form	  of	   government,	   as	   the	   only	   one	   by	  which	   he	   could	   possibly	   accomplish	   his	  design.’ 156 	  Continuing	   this	   argument,	   he	   pointed	   out	   that	   ‘An	   ordinary	  monarch	  might	  endeavour	  to	  reduce	  the	  tribes	  to	  obedience	  by	  force;	  but	  one	  Afghaun	   King157	  has	   already	   had	   the	   penetration	   to	   discover	   that	   it	   would	  require	   less	   exertion	   to	   conquer	   all	   the	   neighbouring	   kingdoms,	   than	   to	  subdue	  his	  own	  countrymen.’158	  	  	  As	  such,	  whilst	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  king	  and	  the	  Afghan	  tribes	  was	  a	  key	   dynamic	   in	   understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   royal	   authority;	   the	   nature	   of	  that	  rule	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  was	  of	  equal	  importance,	  not	  least	  for	  the	  British	  whose	  own	  territorial	  influence	  was	  expanding	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	   Kingdom	   of	   Kabul.	   The	   conquering	   of	   neighbouring	   kingdoms	   had	  allowed	  Afghan	  kings	  to	  develop	  a	  revenue	  stream	  independent	  of	  the	  Afghan	  tribes.	  By	  taxing	  foreign	  territories	  the	  King	  could	  relieve	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  domestic	  population	  and	  therefore	  promote	  perceptions	  of	  Royal	   legitimacy	  within	   the	   Afghan	   nation.	   This	   meant	   that	   those	   areas	   in	   outside	   of	   the	  Afghan	  nation	  were	  ‘entirely	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  King’.159	  Those	  areas	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul	  that	  were	  either	  of	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  King’s	  domestic	  authority,	   or	   lacked	   the	   capacity	   to	   defend	   themselves,	   or	   indeed	   a	  combination	  of	  the	  two,	  were	  therefore	  considered	  to	  be	  most	  subject	  to	  the	  King’s	  sovereign	  yoke.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  It	  seems	  that	  Elphinstone	  was	  here	  referring	  to	  the	  civil	  war-­‐like	  struggles	  that	  were	  often	  rumbling	  between	  more	  ‘republican’	  tribes.	  He	  may	  also	  have	  been	  referencing	  the	  long-­‐running	  dynastic	  struggle,	  a	  part	  of	  which	  he	  witnessed	  at	  Peshawar.	  156	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  280-­‐1.	  157	  Elphinstone	  here	  cites	  Ahmad	  Shah	  Durrani,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Durrani	  Empire	  in	  1747.	  158	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  281.	  159	  Elphinstone,	  Account,	  I	  (1819),	  276.	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  CONCLUSION	  
	  Elphinstone’s	   account	   gives	   the	   distinct	   impression	   that	   he	   was	   seeking	   a	  cognitive	   framework	   that	   would	   order	   Afghanistan	   in	   familiar	   terms.	   This	  was	  a	  process	  of	   casting	  around	   for	   epistemic	   criteria,	  which	   led	   to	   certain	  emergent	   properties,	   perhaps	  most	   significantly	   was	   this	   illusion	   of	   order.	  This	  illusion	  was	  more	  a	  creation	  of	  the	  comparisons	  Elphinstone	  drew	  in	  his	  own	  mind,	   although	   he	   repeatedly	   pointed	   out	   the	   nuance	   in	   this	   reading.	  The	  search	  for	  a	  regular	  order	  rigidified	  the	  social	  structure	  in	  a	  way	  that	  did	  not	   capture	   the	   egalitarianism	   and	   fluidity	   that	   inhered	   within	   the	   Afghan	  system	   of	   rule.	   These	   qualities	   derived	   in	   part	   from	   the	   tensions	   between	  centre	  and	  periphery	  that	  were	  present	   in,	   for	  example,	   the	  Durrani	  system	  of	  land	  tenure	  in	  return	  for	  royal	  privilege.	  But	  what	  complicated	  the	  picture	  was	  the	  process	  of	  political	  change	  that	  the	  Afghan	  state	  was	  undergoing	  at	  the	   time.	   As	   more	   recent	   histories	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   political	   development	  have	   pointed	   out,	   the	   very	   logic	   of	   Afghan	   rule	   was	   changing	   in	   the	   early	  nineteenth	  century.160	  As	   the	  area	   from	  which	  revenue	  could	  be	  drawn	  was	  shrinking,	   the	   King’s	   own	   financial	   position	   became	   more	   precarious,	   not	  least	  because	  his	  ability	  to	  disburse	  royal	   favour	  through	  the	  non-­‐collection	  of	  taxes	  was	  decreasing.	  In	  response,	  Shah	  Shuja,	  and	  his	  predecessors	  were	  seeking	   to	   reform	   their	   own	   concept	   of	   royal	   legitimacy,	  whilst	   fighting	   off	  challengers	   who	   were	   seeking	   to	   undermine	   their	   increasingly	   vulnerable	  rule.	   Seeking	   to	   move	   beyond	   a	   system	   that	   bound	   royal	   authority	   to	   the	  tumults	  of	  tribal	  politics,	  Afghan	  rulers	  sought	  to	  legitimize	  their	  position	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  Islam,	  and	  royalism.	  But	  they	  could	  not	  escape	  the	  system	  that	  was	   already	   in	   place.	   The	   ‘civil	   war’-­‐like	   features	   that	   were	   witnessed	   by	  Elphinstone’s	   envoy	   were	   the	   spasms	   of	   a	   transitioning	   Afghan	   state,	   but	  lacking	  a	  context	  to	  put	  these	  changes	  in,	  their	  significance	  was	  missed	  at	  the	  time.	   It	  would	  take	   later	  knowledge	  entrepreneurs	  to	  provide	  a	  perspective	  on	   these	  processes,	   but	   these	   adventurers	  would	   remain	  hidebound	  by	   the	  structures	  that	  Elphinstone	  had	  already	  erected.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan;	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan;	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe	  
in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  Afghanistan.	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Alexander	  Burnes	  	  Burnes	  was	   just	  26	   in	  1831	  when,	  as	  an	  Army	  Captain,	  he	  was	   tasked	  with	  surveying	  the	  navigability	  of	   the	   lower	  Indus	  River.	  The	  survey	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  a	  view	  to	  its	  exploitation	  as	  a	  transit	  route	  from	  Karachi	  to	  Lahore,	  then	  onwards	   through	  Afghanistan	   to	   the	  markets	  of	  Turkistan	  and	  Central	  Asia.	  His	  cargo	  on	  this	  trip	  was	  five	  horses	  that	  were	  to	  be	  given	  as	  a	  gift	  to	  the	   ruler	   of	   the	   Sikh	  Kingdom	  Ranjit	   Singh;	   a	  deal	   sweetener	   in	   the	  British	  request	   to	  use	  his	   territory	   as	   a	   future	   transit	   route.	  Having	   completed	   the	  mission	  successfully	  and	  returned	  to	  Simla,	  he	  proposed	  a	  further	  journey	  to	  his	  superiors,	  one	  that	  would	  take	  him	  to	  the	  underexplored	  northern	  routes	  to	  India,	  through	  Kabul,	  across	  the	  Hindu	  Kush	  to	  the	  Oxus	  River	  and	  beyond	  to	  Bokhara.	  	  	  Burnes	  was	   deeply	   involved	   in	   British	   policy	   prior	   to	   and	   during	   the	   First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   eventually	   becoming	   the	   deputy	   British	   envoy	   at	   Kabul.	  His	  dedication	  to	  the	  cause	  would	  eventually	  prove	  fatal	  as	  he	  was	  killed	  by	  rioting	  Kabulis	  during	  the	  Kabul	  uprising	  of	  1841.	  	  In	  his	  later	  diplomatic	  role	  Burnes	  would	  negotiate	  the	  status	  of	  Peshawar	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  the	  ruler	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul	  since	  1826,	  and	  someone	  with	  whom	  the	  British	  had	  had	   little	  engagement	  with	  prior	  to	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  Burnes’	   meeting	   with	   him	   would	   be	   the	   first,	   and	   most	   significant	   of	   any	  British	  representative.	  Moreover,	  his	  political	  intelligence	  would	  provide	  for	  the	  British	  an	   important	   insight	   into	  the	  tumults	  that	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  was	  experiencing	   at	   this	   time.161 	  In	   this	   sense,	   Burnes’	   account	   provides	   an	  important	  update	  to	  the	  British	  framing	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  question	  at	  a	  time	  in	  which	  regional	  politics	  were	  becoming	  of	  increasing	  concern	  to	  them.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  ‘Reports	  and	  Papers,	  Political,	  Geographical,	  and	  Commercial.	  Submitted	  to	  Government,	  by	  Sir	  Alexander	  Burnes;	  Lieutenant	  Leech;	  Doctor	  Lord;	  and	  Lieutenant	  Wood’.	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  UPDATING	  ELPHINSTONE:	  THE	  FRAGMENTATION	  OF	  AFGHANISTAN	  1809-­‐1831	  	  A	  major	  contribution	  of	  Burnes’	  work	  comes	   in	  Book	   II	  of	   the	   third	  volume	  where	   he	   updates	   the	   reader	   on	   the	   period	   between	   1809	   and	   1831.	   	   The	  Afghan	  state	  had	  at	  this	  time	  undergone	  seismic	  changes.	  	  After	  Elphinstone’s	  mission	  made	  its	  way	  back	  across	  the	  Indus	  having	  been	  warned	  off	  by	  Shah	  Shuja,	   the	   unfortunate	   King	   of	   Kabul	   lost	   his	   crown	   at	   the	   battle	   of	   Nimla,	  three	   miles	   west	   of	   Gandamak.	   The	   fall	   of	   Shah	   Shuja	   was	   far	   from	  unexpected.	  	  His	  power	  had	  been	  on	  the	  wane	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  his	  Vizier	  and	  the	  murder	  of	  his	   ‘comrade’	   the	  Mir	  Waiz.	   In	   the	  key	  struggle	   for	  power	  as	  recorded	   by	   British	   accounts,	   Shuja	   had	   failed	   to	   conciliate	   the	   Kandahar-­‐based	  Barakzai	  chief	  Fitih	  Khan,	  who	  backed	  Shuja’s	  Saddozai	  rival,	  Mahmud	  Khan,	  to	  the	  throne.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  his	  defeat	  at	  Nimla,	  Shah	  Shuja	  fled	  to	  the	  Khyber	   Pass.	   	   He	  would	   resurface	   four	  months	   later	   in	   a	   failed	   attempt	   to	  take	  Kandahar.162	  	  Having	  ascended	  to	  the	  throne,	  the	  new	  government	  of	  Mahmud	  Khan	  set	  its	  sights	  on	  reclaiming	  Kashmir	  from	  the	  son	  of	  Shuja’s	  Vizier,	  Ata	  Muhammad	  Khan.	   In	   what	   would	   soon	   be	   an	   unthinkable	   alliance,	   Mahmud	   sought	  military	  support	   for	   this	  venture,	   from	  the	  Sikh	  Kingdom	  of	  Ranjit	  Singh.	   In	  return	  for	  troops	  and	  safe	  passage	  across	  his	  territory,	  the	  Sikh	  ruler	  would	  receive	  a	  share	  of	  the	  Kashmir	  revenue	  amounting	  to	  nine	  lakhs	  of	  rupees.163	  In	  1811	  Mahmud’s	  army,	  led	  by	  Fitih	  Khan,	  retook	  Kashmir	  with	  such	  speed	  that	  it	  did	  not	  require	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Sikhs	  who	  arrived	  two	  days	  after	  the	  Durrani	  army’s	  victory.	  The	  terms	  of	  the	  alliance	  were	  swiftly	  rejected	  by	  the	  new	   governor	   of	   Kashmir,	   the	   brother	   of	   Muhammad’s	   Vizier,	   Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan.	  The	  Sikhs	  left	  ‘in	  disgust’.164	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Three	  more	  failed	  attempts	  followed	  this.	  The	  first	  attempt	  via	  Kashmir	  in	  1815,	  an	  aborted	  attempt	  in	  1818,	  and	  then	  again	  1834	  which	  is	  covered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  three.	  The	  latter	  two	  had	  been	  followed	  from	  a	  distance	  by	  British	  officials	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1834	  expedition,	  supported	  by	  British	  financing.	  Dalrymple,	  Return	  of	  a	  King,	  36-­‐8,	  45-­‐6,	  66-­‐73.	  163	  Equivalent	  to	  900,000.	  A	  lakh	  is	  a	  South	  Asian	  numerical	  unit	  that	  equates	  to	  100,000.	  	  164	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  238.	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In	  the	  search	  for	  retribution,	  Ranjit	  Singh	  formed	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  then	  Commander	   of	   the	   Fort	   at	   Attock,	   and	   the	   brother	   of	   the	   recently	   deposed	  governor	  of	  Kashmir.	  Hearing	  news	  of	  this,	  Fitih	  Khan	  swiftly	  marched	  back	  to	  Attock	  and	  faced	  the	  Sikh	  army	  in	  battle	  at	  Chuch,	  south	  of	  Attock.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  battle	  that	  the	  brother	  of	  Fitih	  Khan,	  a	  young	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  led	  2000	   Afghans	   against	   the	   Sikh	   artillery.	   In	   the	   midst	   of	   the	   battle	   a	   false	  message	  was	  deliberately	  conveyed	  to	  both	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  and	  Fitih	  Khan	   leaving	   the	   impression	   on	   each	   that	   the	   other	   had	   failed.	   	   This	  prompted	  an	  Afghan	  retreat	  in	  error.	  The	  mistake	  would	  signal	  a	  collapse	  in	  the	  King	  of	  Kabul’s	  authority	  East	  of	   the	   Indus.	  Facing	  a	   further	  uprising	   in	  Herat,	   Fitih	   Khan	   would	   be	   forced	   to	   move	   his	   troops	   to	   Afghanistan’s	  western	   border.	   The	   vacuum	   of	   authority	   that	   this	   opened	   up	   in	   Kashmir	  soon	  led	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  that	  lucrative	  territory	  to	  the	  Sikhs	  as	  well.	  	  Through	   all	   of	   this,	   factions	   were	   beginning	   to	   emerge	   within	   Mahmud	  Khan’s	  court.	  	  The	  King	  was	  content	  to	  rely	  on	  his	  Vizier	  Fitih	  Khan	  who	  now	  ‘managed	   the	   whole	   affairs	   of	   the	   Kingdom’165,	   however	   his	   son	   was	   not	  content	  with	   the	   arrangement.	   In	   1818	  matters	   came	   to	   a	   head.	   Unable	   to	  stem	  his	   jealousies	   any	   longer,	   the	   crown	  Prince	  Kamran	  put	   Fitih	  Khan	   to	  death	   in	   gruesome	   fashion.	   This	   act	   drove	   Fitih	   Khan’s	   brothers	   into	   open	  rebellion.	  The	  King,	   fearing	   for	  his	   rule	   fled	   to	  Herat,	  and	  was	  succeeded	   in	  Kabul	  by	  his	  son	  Kamran.	  	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  governor	  of	  Kashmir	  and	  the	  eldest	  surviving	  member	  of	  Fitih	  Khan’s	  family,	  Azim	  Khan	  joined	  the	  rebellion	  against	  his	  murderer	  in	  Kabul.	  Seeking	  a	   replacement,	  Azim	  Khan	   then	   took	  what	  Burnes	  described	  as	   the	  ‘extraordinary	  step’	  of	  recalling	  Shah	  Shuja	  from	  prolonged	  exile	  with	  a	  view	  to	   installing	   him	   on	   the	   throne	   at	   Kabul.166	  Within	   touching	   distance	   of	  reclaiming	  his	  former	  title,	  Shuja	  returned	  to	  Peshawar	  where	  his	  arrogance	  got	  the	  better	  of	  him.	  Insulting	  a	  representative	  of	  Azim	  Khan	  he	  managed	  to	  turn	   the	  Barakzai	   family	  against	  him.	  Azim	  Khan	   turned	   instead	   to	   another	  Saddozai	  ruler,	  Ayub	  Khan,	  who	  submitted	  himself	  to	  Azim	  Khan’s	  authority	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  240.	  166	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  243.	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and	   took	   up	  his	   position	   as	   a	   ‘puppet	  monarch’.167	  Shuja	   fled	   once	  more	   to	  Shikarpur	   in	   Sindh	   before	   retiring	   in	   Ludhiana	   supported	   this	   time	  with	   a	  British	  pension.	  	  For	   Burnes,	   this	   period	   signalled	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Afghan	   system	   of	  government.	  In	  1823,	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Nowshera,	  halfway	  between	  Attock	  and	  Peshawar,	   the	   Sikhs	   defeated	   the	   Durrani	   army	   of	   Ghazis	   (holy	   warriors),	  marking	   the	   growing	   role	   for	   Islam	  as	   a	  motivating	   call	   to	   arms.	  The	   Sikhs	  went	  on	  to	  sack	  Peshawar,	  and	  so	  Burnes	  relates,	  ‘[a]s	  the	  battle	  with	  Futteh	  Khan	  on	  the	  plains	  of	  Chuch	  decided	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  Seiks	  eastward	  of	  the	   Indus,	   this	   campaign	   established	   their	   power	   between	   that	   river	   and	  Peshawar.	  That	   city	  has	  since	  paid	  an	  annual	   tribute	   to	  Runjeet	  Sing.’168	  On	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan,	  his	  riches	  passed	  to	  his	  son	  Habibullah	  Khan.	  However,	  Azim’s	  death	  also	  triggered	  internal	  family	  strife	  that	  would	  lead	   to	   Habibullah’s	   uncles	   conspiring	   against	   him.	   	   Mirroring	   Barnett	  Rubin’s	  observation	  over	  150	  years	  later	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Afghan	  civil	  war	  of	  the	  1990s,169	  this	  was	  the	  original	  fragmentation	  of	  Afghanistan	  of	  this	  period.	  In	  the	  wave	  of	  succession	  crises	  that	  followed,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  would	  eventually	  take	  Kabul	  in	  1826,	  ushering	  in	  a	  period	  of	  rule	  that	  would	  last	  till	  the	  British	  intervention	  in	  1839,	  but	  leaving	  the	  dynastic	  struggle	  unresolved.	  	  	  CHANGE	  IN	  CONTEXT:	  THE	  IMPLICATIONS	  FOR	  RULE	  	  Alexander	  Burnes’	   experience	  of	  Afghanistan	  came	   then,	   at	  a	   time	   in	  which	  political	  power	  across	  the	  kingdom	  was	  apparently	  in	  a	  process	  of	  flux.	  	  This	  had	  a	  clear	  impact	  on	  his	  attempts	  to	  describe	  ‘Afghan	  character’:	  	  	  The	  Afghans	  are	  a	  nation	  of	  children;	  in	  their	  quarrels	  they	  fight,	  and	  become	   friends	   without	   any	   ceremony.	   They	   cannot	   conceal	   their	  feelings	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  a	  person	  with	  any	  discrimination	  may	  at	  all	  times	  pierce	  their	  designs.	  If	  they	  themselves	  are	  to	  be	  believed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  246.	  168	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  248.	  169	  Barnett	  Rubin,	  The	  Fragmentation	  of	  Afghanistan:	  State	  Formation	  and	  Collapse	  in	  the	  
International	  System	  (Yale:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2002).	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their	   ruling	   vice	   is	   envy,	  which	   besets	   even	   the	   nearest	   and	   dearest	  relations.	  No	  people	  are	  more	  incapable	  of	  managing	  an	  intrigue.	  I	  was	  particularly	   struck	  with	   their	   idleness;	   they	   seem	   to	   sit	   listlessly	   for	  the	  whole	  day,	  staring	  at	  each	  other;	  how	  they	  live	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  discover,	  yet	  they	  dress	  well,	  and	  are	  healthy	  and	  happy.’	  	  	  In	  a	  further	  example	  of	  the	  contradictions	  that	  often	  defined	  British	  attempts	  to	  describe	  ‘Afghan	  character’,	  Burnes	  concluded	  this	  passage	  with	  the	  line,	  ‘I	  imbibed	   a	   very	   favourable	   impression	   of	   their	   national	   character.170	  This	  favourable	  impression	  perhaps	  sprung	  from	  their	  system	  of	  rule.	  Borrowing	  from	   Elphinstone,	   Burnes	   quickly	   came	   to	   identify	  with	   the	   ‘liberality’	   and	  egalitarianism	   inherent	   in	   the	  Afghan	  way	  of	   life:	   ‘There	   is	   a	   simplicity	  and	  freedom	  about	  these	  people	  greatly	  to	  be	  admired’,	  he	  wrote,	  ‘and,	  whatever	  the	  rule	  may	  be,	   I	  can	  vouch	  for	  petitioners	  having	  an	  ear,	  at	   least,	  given	  to	  their	   complaints.	   Every	   one	   seems	   on	   an	   equality	   with	   the	   chief,	   and	   the	  meanest	  servant	  addresses	  him	  without	  ceremony.’171	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   geography	   of	   the	   country,	   Burnes	   offered	   little	   by	   way	   of	  opinion,	  but	  on	  the	  question	  of	  political	  geography	  he	  took	  a	  narrower	  view	  than	   Elphinstone.	   For	   Burnes,	   passing	   into	   Hazara	   territory	   after	   Bamiyan	  was	  equivalent	   to	   leaving	   the	  Kingdom	  of	  Kabul	  behind.	  This	   is	  despite	   the	  fact	  that	  the	  chief	  of	  Saighan,	  north	  of	  Bamiyan	  was	  still	  at	  least	  half	  subject	  to	  Kabul	  rule.	  Physical	  appearance	  also	  mattered	  for	  Burnes,	  speaking	  of	  the	  Hazaras	  he	  noted	  they	  ‘are	  a	  simple-­‐hearted	  people,	  and	  differ	  much	  from	  the	  Afghan	   tribes.	   In	   physiognomy,	   they	   more	   resemble	   Chinese’. 172 	  This	  territorial	  boundary,	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  cognitive	  boundary	  for	  Burnes	  as	  well.	  Their	   loose	   adherence	   to	   Islamic	   custom,	   including	   the	   drinking	   of	   alcohol,	  and	  their	  disturbing	  propensity	  towards	  mass	  population	  displacement	  as	  a	  method	   of	   control	   and	   even	   income,	   repelled	   Burnes.	   By	   the	   time	   he	   had	  reached	   the	   Uzbek	   ruler	   of	   Kunduz,	   Muhammad	  Moorad	   Beg,	   his	   opinions	  were	  clear;	  of	  the	  Uzbeks	  he	  declared	  ‘no	  people	  are	  more	  simple’.173	  Despite	  Elphinstone’s	   wider	   concept	   of	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Kabul’s	   territory,	   Burnes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  144.	  171	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  93.	  172	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  178.	  173	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	  227.	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clearly	   saw	   this	   in	  more	   limited	   terms,	   a	   feature	   perhaps	   of	   the	   context	   of	  shrinking	   authority	   he	   found	   himself	   in.	   But	   it	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	  although	  Elphinstone	  may	  have	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  ‘Pashtunization’	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  community,	   it	  was	  individuals	  such	  as	  Burnes	  who	  developed	  it.	  	  Burnes’	   account	   gives	   us	   some	   insights	   into	   competing	   comprehensions	   of	  Afghanistan’s	  political	   space,	  but	  perhaps	   the	  more	   salient	   lesson	  springing	  from	   the	   work	   in	   terms	   of	   British	   understandings	   of	   Afghan	   political	  geography	   is	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   faultlines	   emerging	   from	   within	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  community.	   	  Behind	  the	  dynastic	  struggles	  for	  power	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  seizure	  of	  the	  throne	  in	  1826	   lay	   a	   complex	   inter-­‐clan	   rivalry,	   only	   partially	   accessible	   to	   Burnes’	  elite-­‐focussed	   information	   network.	   	   Although	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   was	  the	   first	  Barakzai	   leader	   to	  ascend	   to	   the	   throne	   since	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  Durrani	  kingdom,	  the	  Barakzai	  had	  often	  been	  the	  power	  behind	  the	  throne,	  acting	   as	   ‘kingmakers’174	  for	   a	   succession	   of	   Saddozai	   rulers,	   ending	   in	   the	  ‘puppet	  monarch’	  of	  Ayub	  Khan	  who	  was	  backed	  by	  his	  powerful	  vizier,	  Azim	  Khan,	  a	  Barakzai.	  	  Whilst	  the	  Barakzai	  uprising	  was	  attributed	  primarily	  to	  the	  murder	  of	  Fitih	  Khan	  by	  his	  Saddozai	  dependent,	  Mahmud	  Shah,	  this	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  longer	  saga	  of	  Saddozai	  ill-­‐treatment	  of	  their	  Barakzai	  brethren	  in	  the	  context	  of	   a	   weakening	   Saddozai	   dynasty.	   	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   was	   therefore	  taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  shift	   in	   the	  dynastic	  power	  balance	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  injustices	  and	  failures	  of	  his	  Saddozai	  predecessors.	  	  There	  were	   two	   implications	  of	   this	   shift.	   Firstly,	   the	   Saddozai	   family	  were	  seen	  as	  effectively	  ruled	  out	  of	  power	  by	  a	  fall	  in	  their	  perceived	  legitimacy,	  and	  in	  practice	  by	  the	  ascendant	  Barakzai	  clan.	  Burnes	  certainly	  gained	  this	  impression	   at	   Kabul.	   Drawing	   once	   more	   on	   the	   republican	   ideas	   of	  Elphinstone	  he	  argued:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	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  ‘All	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	  Afghans	   are	   favourable	   to	   a	   republic;	   and	  the	   supremacy	  of	   the	  Barukzye	   family	   in	  Cabool	   is	   acceptable	   to	   the	  people	  and	  I	  even	  think	  favourable	  to	  the	  prosperity	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  is	   by	   far	   the	   greatest	   clan	   of	   the	   Dooraunees,	   amounting	   to	   about	  60,000	  families,	  which	  will	  enable	  it	  to	  maintain	  its	  authority.	  The	  late	  royal	  family	  of	  the	  Sudozyes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  few	  in	  number	  and	  looked	  for	  support	  to	  other	  tribes.	  …	  The	  hatred	  of	  [the	  Saddozai]	  family	   to	   the	  house	  of	  Cabool	  …	   forbid	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  Barukzyes	  will	   ever	   consent	   to	   their	   restoration.	   It	   is	   certain	   that	   the	   aid	   of	   no	  other	  tribe	  can	  avail	  them,	  for	  the	  whole	  wealth	  of	  the	  country	  is	  in	  the	  hands	   of	   their	   enemies;	   and	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   people	   view	   their	  misfortunes	   with	   indifference	   …	   It	   is	   evident	   therefore,	   that	   the	  restoration	  of	  either	  Shooja	  ool	  Moolk,	  or	  Kamran,	   is	  an	  event	  of	   the	  most	   improbable	   nature.	   The	   dynasty	   of	   the	   Sudozyes	   has	   passed	  away,	  unless	  it	  be	  propped	  up	  by	  foreign	  aid’.175	  	  The	  second	  implication	  of	  this	  was	  an	  apparent	  emerging	  inter-­‐Barakzai	  feud	  as	   they	   consolidated	   their	   newly	   prominent	   position	   on	   the	   back	   of	   the	  collapsed	  Saddozai	  regime.	  This	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  three	  way	  split	   between	   Kabul,	   Peshawar	   and	   Kandahar.	   Dost	   Muhammad’s	   half	  brothers	   in	   Peshawar	   and	   Kandahar	   now	   viewed	   the	   Kabul	   regime	  covetously.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Burnes’	  trip	  Sultan	  Muhammad	  Khan	  at	  Peshawar	  was	   known	   to	   be	   scheming	   with	   Shere	   Dil	   Khan	   of	   Kandahar	   to	   mount	   a	  concerted	  attack	  on	  Kabul,	  although	  Burnes	  projected	  that	  it	  was	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  would	  be	  overrun	  by	  Dost	  Muhammad	  first.176	  In	  this	  eventuality	  he	  predicted	  that	  the	  Sikhs	  could	  be	  turned	  to	  by	  Sultan	  Muhammad,	  and	  he	  had	  already	  courted	  Burnes	  assiduously	  on	  his	  way	  through	  Peshawar,	  flattering	  the	  British	  official	  with	  a	  view	  to	  improving	  relations	  and	  possibly	  forming	  an	  alliance. 177 	  Herat	   meanwhile	   appeared	   to	   be	   drifting	   towards	   Persian	  suzerainty	  under	  the	  deposed	  Saddozai	  Durranis.	  	  In	   short	   therefore,	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan’s	   authority	   was	   severely	  circumscribed.	   	  To	  the	  east	  his	  effectual	  rule	  reached	  only	  to	  the	  gardens	  of	  Nimla,	   three	  miles	  west	   of	   Gandamak,	   and	   to	   the	  west	   it	   terminated	   at	   the	  territory	  of	  the	  Hazaras.	  To	  the	  routes	  of	  the	  north	  it	  barely	  reached	  Bamiyan,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  271-­‐2.	  176	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  257.	  177	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  255.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  I,	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whilst	   to	   the	   south	   it	   extended	   as	   far	   as	   Ghazni.178	  As	   Burnes	   summarized:	  ‘Dost	  Mohammed	  Khan	  cannot	  rise	  above	  the	  rank	  of	  chief,	  or	  be	  aught	  than	  one	   among	   many	   in	   Afghanistan.	   In	   the	   present	   state	   of	   politics,	   he	   is,	  nevertheless,	  the	  most	  rising	  man	  in	  the	  Cabool	  dominions.’179	  In	  this	  context,	  military	   power	   was	   paramount,	   and	   Burnes	   frequently	   detailed	   the	   troop	  numbers	  of	  the	  various	  chiefs	  he	  met	  along	  the	  way.	  	  Faced	  with	  a	  depleted	  revenue	  stream	  from	  the	  tribute	  of	  Kashmir	  and	  Sindh,	  which	  in	  many	  ways	  the	  Durrani	  Kingdom	  could	  not	  exist	  without,	  the	  basis	  of	   legitimate	   rule	   was	   exhibiting	   a	   change.	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   was	  demonstrating	   a	   shift	   towards	   a	   style	   of	   rule	   that	   would	   rely	   less	   on	   the	  Durrani	   nobility	   and	   more	   on	   a	   general	   perception	   of	   legitimacy.	   He	   had	  banned	  alcohol	  in	  Kabul,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Islamic	  practice,	  despite	  his	  own	  enjoyment	  of	  wine.	  He	  also	   took	  a	  more	  comprehensive	   role	   in	  governance	  within	  his	  sphere	  of	  authority	  and	  Burnes	  praised	  his	  efforts:	   ‘The	  justice	  of	  this	   chief’,	   he	   said,	   ‘affords	   a	   constant	   theme	   of	   praise	   to	   all	   classes:	   the	  peasant	   rejoices	   at	   the	   absence	   of	   tyranny;	   the	   citizen,	   at	   the	   safety	   of	   his	  home,	  and	  the	  strict	  municipal	  regulations	  regarding	  weights	  and	  measures;	  the	   merchant,	   at	   the	   equity	   of	   the	   decisions	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   his	  property;	  and	  the	  soldiers,	  at	  the	  regular	  manner	  in	  which	  their	  arrears	  are	  discharged.	  A	  man	  in	  power	  can	  have	  no	  higher	  praise.’180	  	  This	  style	  of	  leadership	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  at	  Kandahar	  where,	  as	  Burnes	  recorded,	   ‘[t]he	   government	   is	   not	   popular,	   nor	   would	   it	   appear,	   from	   the	  acts	  of	  oppression	  that	  it	  deserved	  to	  be	  so.’181	  Meanwhile	  Kamran,	  at	  Herat	  was	   seen	   as	   living	   on	   borrowed	   time,	   ruling	   ‘more	   from	   tolerance	   in	   his	  enemies	   than	  his	   own	  power.	  …	   [Kamran]	   has	   the	   character	   of	   a	   cruel	   and	  tyrannical	   man,	   is	   destitute	   of	   friends,	   and	   odious	   to	   his	   countrymen.’182	  Herat,	  Burnes	  said,	  was	  in	  effect,	  a	  dependency	  of	  Persia.	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  Travels,	  III,	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  179	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  Travels,	  III,	  265.	  180	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  III,	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One	   area	   in	   which	   Dost	   Muhammad	   had	   placed	   an	   emphasis	   was	   in	   the	  promotion	   of	   trade.	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	   this	   was	   driven	   by	   financial	  imperatives,	  but	  Burnes	  reported	  it	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  greater	  security	  of	  trade	  routes	  and	  a	   less	  onerous	  transit	  tax	  than	  other	  routes.	  Customs	  receipts	   in	  Kabul	  were	  up	   	  50,000	   rupees,	  with	   the	  King	  profiting	   from	   two	   lakhs183	  of	  rupees	   in	   revenue	   per	   annum. 184 	  Burnes	   was	   impressed	   with	   trade	  opportunities	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  took	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  the	  silk	  making	  its	   way	   from	   Kabul	   and	   Balkh,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   coal	   mines	   in	   Kohat.185	  The	  fracturing	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  region	  had	  subdivided	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  perversely	  created	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  market	  opportunities	  for	  traders.	  Demand	  for	  British	  and	  Indian	  goods	  was	  therefore	  on	  the	  rise.	   In	  addition,	  the	   higher	   transit	   taxes	   in	   Ranjit	   Singh’s	   Sikh	   Kingdom	   had	   altered	   the	  merchant	  routes	  in	  the	  region.	  Rather	  than	  reaching	  the	  northern	  Punjab	  via	  Attock	  from	  the	  east,	  the	  more	  circuitous	  route	  through	  Kabul	  was	  preferred.	  Accordingly,	  merchants	  wishing	  to	  reach	  markets	  in	  Peshawar	  and	  elsewhere	  in	   the	  northern	  Punjab,	   crossed	   into	  Afghanistan	  via	  passes	   to	   the	   south	  of	  the	  Khyber,	  travelling	  via	  Ghazni	  and	  Kabul,	  and	  reaching	  Peshawar	  from	  the	  west,	   therefore	   pushing	   up	   customs	   receipts	   in	   Kabul.186	  	   These	   changes	  indicated	  opportunities	  for	  trade	  that	  Burnes	  was	  keen	  to	  exploit.	  	  	  CONCLUSION	  	  Burnes’	   account	   serves	   to	   update	   Elphinstone’s	   1809	   work,	   which	   was	   in	  many	  ways	  out	  of	  date	  before	  it	  was	  even	  written,	  and	  certainly	  before	  it	  was	  first	   published	   in	   1815.	   The	   significant	   point	   is	   that	   despite	   the	   seismic	  changes	  that	  the	  Afghan	  state	  had	  undergone	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐year	  interregnum,	  Burnes	   was	   reluctant	   to	   move	   beyond	   Elphinstone’s	   conceptual	   model.	  	  Burnes	   remained	   wedded	   to	   viewing	   Afghanistan’s	   political	   development	  through	   the	   lens	   of	   royal	   authority,	   however	   circumscribed	   that	   authority	  now	  was,	  and	  however	  indifferent	  –	  if	  not	  violently	  opposed	  –	  to	  that	  rule	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  A	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  South	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  10,000.	  184	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rest	  of	  the	  country	  was.	  In	  effect,	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  as	  Elphinstone	  viewed	  it	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  such,	  resembling	  rather	  a	  federation	  of	  variously	  allied	  fiefdoms.	   As	   such,	   there	   is	   a	   tension	   in	   Burnes’	   work	   between	   the	   slavish	  adherence	   to	   the	   ‘Elphinstonian	   episteme’	   and	   the	   acknowledgement	   that	  much	   of	   what	   went	   before	   was	   now	   irrelevant	   in	   terms	   of	   understanding.	  Whereas	   Elphinstone	   provides	   the	   framework,	   therefore,	   Burnes	   provides	  the	  more	  contemporary	  context.	  	  Given	   the	   impetus	   behind	   Burnes’	   mission	   his	   account	   clearly	   has	   a	   more	  policy-­‐centred	  narrative.	  Whereas	   Elphinstone’s	   account	   is	  wide-­‐ranging	   in	  its	   scope,	  and	  more	   ‘scientific’	   in	   its	  analysis,	  Burnes	  ventured	  a	  number	  of	  opinions	   that	   could	   easily	   be	   interpreted	   in	   policy	   terms.	   It	   is	   clear	   he	  preferred	  engagement	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  whose	  governing	  style	  he	  saw	  as	  suited	  to	  the	  political	  conditions	  at	  the	  time,	  not	  least	  due	  the	  fact	  that	  he	   enjoyed	   a	   reputation	   for	   competence,	   and	   possessed	   a	   strong	   military.	  However,	  Burnes	  still	  left	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  alliance	  with	  Shah	  Shuja,	  with	  whom	  he	  met	  at	  Ludhiana	  as	  he	  prepared	  for	  his	  Kabul	  venture.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  at	   this	  meeting	   that	  Shuja	   first	  proposed	  an	  alliance	  with	   the	  British	  saying	  ‘[h]ad	  I	  but	  my	  kingdom,	  how	  glad	  I	  should	  be	  to	  see	  an	  Englishman	  at	  Cabool.’187	  Burnes	   was	   apparently	   not	   impressed	   however:	   ‘The	   fitness	   of	  Shooja	  ool	  Moolk	   for	   the	   station	  of	   sovereign’,	   he	   said,	   ‘seems	  ever	   to	  have	  been	   doubtful.	   His	   manners	   and	   address	   are	   highly	   polished;	   but	   his	  judgement	  does	  not	  rise	  above	  mediocrity.	  Had	  the	  case	  been	  otherwise,	  we	  should	  not	  now	  see	  him	  an	  exile	  from	  his	  country	  and	  his	  throne,	  without	  a	  hope	  of	  regaining	  them,	  after	  an	  absence	  of	  twenty	  years;	  and	  before	  he	  has	  attained	  the	  fiftieth	  year	  of	  his	  age.’188	  	  On	  regional	  strategy,	  Burnes	  offered	  his	  policy	  views	  too,	  being	  clear	  that	  he	  preferred	  an	  alliance	  with	  Kabul	  over	  an	  alliance	  with	  Persia.	  Indeed	  that	  the	  opportunity	  for	  this	  existed	  at	  all	  was	  in	  part	  down	  to	  the	  peaceful	  retreat	  of	  Elphinstone’s	   earlier	   mission	   which	   according	   to	   Burnes	   ‘left	   impressions	  most	  favourable	  to	  our	  disinterestedness.’	  As	  such,	  he	  recorded:	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   ‘[i]n	  Cabool	  …	   it	  would	  not	  be	  difficult	   to	   form	  a	   connexion;	   and	   the	  chief	   is	  certainly	  worthy	  of	  notice,	  since	  his	  country	   lies	  on	  the	  great	  road	  by	  which	   the	  manufactures	   of	   Britain	   are	   imported,	   and	  which	  have	  of	  late	  been	  considerably	  increased	  	  …	  It	  would	  require	  no	  great	  expenditure	  of	  the	  public	  funds	  to	  conciliate	  this	  chief,	  and	  it	  is	  to	  be	  remembered	  that	  he	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  most	  important	  position	  in	  Asia,	   as	   regards	   the	   protection	   of	   British	   India.	   Had	   circumstances	  brought	   us	   into	   an	   alliance	  with	   Cabool,	   instead	   of	   Persia,	  we	  might	  have	  now	  possessed	  more	  trusty	  and	  useful	  allies,	  nearer	  home,	  than	  we	  can	  boast	  of	  in	  that	  country.’189	  	  	  The	   translation	   of	   colonial	   knowledge	   into	   policy	   advice	   therefore	   was	  already	   becoming	   apparent	   in	   Burnes	   early	   work,	   and	   this	   would	   become	  increasingly	  apparent	  in	  his	   later	  official	  dispatches	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  show.	  	  Finally,	  and	  as	  the	  last	  quote	  suggests,	  Burnes	  remained	  attached	  to	  trade	  as	  a	  panacea	  to	  the	  Afghanistan	  problem.	  Partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  earlier	  mission	  on	   the	   Indus,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   networks	   of	   movement	   he	  exploited	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   Afghanistan,	   Burnes	   was	   convinced	   that	  expanding	  the	  East	  India	  Company’s	  trade	  reach	  would	  allow	  greater	  political	  influence	   for	   the	  British,	  and	  would	   take	   the	  pressure	  off	   the	  King	   in	  Kabul	  who	  could	  use	  increased	  trade	  as	  a	  source	  of	  revenue.	  He	  saw	  the	  trade	  fairs	  in	  Bokhara	  to	  the	  north	  as	  diverting	  merchants	  away	  from	  Kabul	  despite	  the	  fact	   that	  this	  meant	  they	  had	  further	  to	  go.	   	  For	  Burnes,	  opening	  up	  a	  trade	  corridor	   from	   Kabul	   to	   Karachi	   and	   India	   was	   not	   only	   an	   opportunity	  waiting	   to	   be	   exploited,	   but	   one	   that	   would	   ‘counteract	   the	   intrigues	   and	  designs	  of	  the	  great	  power’,	  namely	  Russia.190	  But	  to	  finish	  on	  this	  point,	  the	  absence	   of	   Russia	   from	   this	   account	   is	   striking.	   The	   narrative	   of	   Russian	  threat	  is	  almost	  non-­‐existent,	  at	  most	  a	  background	  consideration	  manifested	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  trade	  rivalry.	  What	  mattered	  more	  for	  Burnes	  was	  the	  fluidity	  in	  alliances	   that	   is	  emerging	  out	  of	   the	  weakened	  authority	  of	   the	  Dost	  and	  the	  resulting	  fragmented	  state	  of	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  273-­‐4.	  190	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  336.	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Charles	  Masson	  	  Masson	  presents	  a	  remarkable	  character	  and	  equally	  remarkable	  story.	  After	  five	  years	  of	  service	  in	  the	  Bengal	  Artillery	  from	  1822,	  he	  deserted	  his	  post	  in	  1827191	  and	  with	  fellow	  soldier	  Richard	  Potter	  headed	  towards	  Central	  Asia.	  Desertions	   from	   the	   Indian	   services	   during	   this	   period	   were	   surprisingly	  common	  and	  the	  Bengal	  Army	  suffered	  a	  particularly	  high	  number	  after	  the	  siege	  of	  Bhurtpore	  in	  1826,	  shortly	  before	  Masson	  and	  Potter	  absconded.192	  	  The	   long	  period	  of	  service	  perhaps	  had	  a	  part	   to	  play	   in	  this.	  Recruits	  were	  technically	   enlisted	   for	   life	   although	   most	   were	   discharged	   after	   21	   years	  service,	   subject	   to	   satisfactory	   progress	   after	   15	   years. 193 	  Masson	   was	  therefore	   on	   the	   run	   from	   the	   authorities	   (his	   real	   name	  was	   James	  Lewis;	  Charles	   Masson	   was	   a	   pseudonym),	   yet	   his	   pursuit	   of	   adventure	   and	  knowledge	  was	  drawing	  him	  to	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world	  that	  was	  soon	  to	  become	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  political	  classes	  in	  Calcutta	  and	  London.	  	  	  Not	   much	   is	   known	   of	   Masson’s	   life	   before	   he	   joined	   the	   Bengal	   Army.	   In	  sustaining	   his	   cover,	   his	   published	   works	   are	   deliberately	   vague	   and	  occasionally	  deliberately	  misleading	  on	  certain	  details,	  including	  the	  dates	  of	  his	   initial	   journey	   and	   his	   background.194	  A	   recent	   discovery	   of	   an	   original	  copy	   of	   his	   1842	  memoirs	   revealed	   in	   an	   attached	   correspondence	   that	   he	  was	  educated	  in	  Walthamstow	  in	  London	  and	  worked	  as	  a	  clerk	  in	  a	  silk	  and	  insurance	  brokers	  before	  enlisting	  with	  the	  EIC	  following	  a	  dispute	  with	  his	  father.195	  It	  is	  likely	  he	  studied	  Latin,	  and	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  a	  good	  grasp	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  In	  order	  to	  cover	  his	  tracks,	  Masson	  was	  apparently	  deliberately	  misleading	  on	  this	  point,	  claiming	  he	  arrived	  in	  the	  Punjab	  in	  1826.	  The	  Bengal	  Muster	  Rolls	  give	  clarity	  on	  this	  point.	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  13,	  16.	  	  192	  In	  1792	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  up	  to	  1500	  Europeans	  were	  serving	  with	  European	  state	  armies	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  deserters	  from	  the	  French	  or	  English	  armies.	  When	  the	  Indian	  partisan	  chief	  Yusuf	  Khan	  was	  captured	  by	  the	  British	  his	  army	  was	  found	  to	  have	  a	  sizable	  contingent	  of	  200	  European	  –	  largely	  British	  -­‐	  deserters.	  Grey,	  C	  and	  H.	  L.	  O.	  Garrett,	  
European	  Adventurers	  of	  North	  India	  1785-­1849	  (Delhi:	  Asian	  Educational	  Services,	  1993),	  211-­‐12.	  193	  Grey	  and	  Garrett,	  European	  Adventurers	  of	  North	  India,	  212.	  194	  For	  example,	  Masson	  never	  mentions	  his	  travelling	  partner	  as	  far	  as	  Lahore,	  fellow	  desertee	  Richard	  Potter.	  	  195	  Omrani,	  ‘Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan’,	  201.	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French.196	  He	  also	  exhibited	  a	  classicist	  background	  which	  appeared	  to	  draw	  him	  to	  the	  lands	  of	  Alexander	  the	  Great.	  Having	  journeyed	  across	  Rajasthan	  and	  reaching	  Bahawalpur,	  Masson	  took	  the	  now-­‐familiar	  route	  up	  the	  Indus	  to	   Peshawar.	  He	   journeyed	   through	  Kabul,	   but	   instead	   of	   heading	   north	   as	  Burnes	  did,	  he	  headed	  south	  through	  the	  cities	  of	  Ghazni,	  (where	  he	  met	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan),	  and	  Kandahar,	  before	  striking	  off	  down	  to	  Quetta.	  	  	  Masson’s	  first	  excursion	  to	  the	  region	  ended	  in	  1830,	  leaving	  via	  Hyderabad	  to	  spend	  time	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  as	  well	  as	  Bushire	  and	  Tabriz	  in	  Persia.	  During	  this	  excursion	   he	   cultivated	   a	   formidable	   network	   of	   British	   officials	   working	  across	   the	   region.	  He	   spent	   time	  with	   the	  British	  Residents	   at	   Bushire	   and	  Tabriz,	   and	  met	   the	   British	   envoy	   to	   Tehran,	   John	  McNeill,	   at	   the	   latter.197	  This	  coincided	  with	  a	  period	  of	  study	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  findings	  from	  his	  first	   venture.	   These	  were	   forwarded	   to	   interested	   official	   parties,	   including	  the	  Governor	  of	  Bombay,	  and	  Henry	  Pottinger	  who	  had	  headed	  an	  embassy	  to	  Herat	  shortly	  before	  Elphinstone’s	  embassy	  to	  Kabul.	  Pottinger	  was	  now	  at	  Hyderabad	  in	  charge	  of	  intelligence-­‐gathering	  in	  the	  Indus	  states.	  In	  1830	  his	  assistant	   in	   this	   role	   was	   Alexander	   Burnes	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Burnes	  familiarized	  himself	  with	  Masson’s	  early	  work.198	  	  	  Masson	  returned	  to	  Afghanistan,	  via	  Karachi	  and	  the	  Punjab,	  in	  1831.	  On	  this	  second	  venture	  he	  overlapped	  with	  Burnes’	   first	  mission	  on	   the	   Indus,	   and	  upon	  his	  arrival	  received	  word	  of	  Burnes’	  difficulties	  in	  being	  granted	  access	  to	   the	   region.199	  Masson	   now	   enjoyed	   financial	   backing	   for	   his	   scholarly	  pursuits,	   derived	   from	   his	   new	   official	   contacts,	   and	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   these	  officials	  saw	  a	  future	  political	  benefit	  for	  his	  work.	  As	  a	  deserter,	  however,	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Masson	  was	  occasionally	  mistaken	  for	  a	  Frenchman	  on	  his	  travels,	  indeed	  the	  French	  
Dictionnaire	  Biographique	  mistakenly	  listed	  him	  as	  French	  for	  many	  years.	  Omrani,	  ‘Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan’,	  201.	  197	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  56-­‐9.	  198	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  56-­‐7;	  MSS	  Eur	  E	  161/6-­‐7	  [microfilm],	  11a,	  Burnes	  to	  Masson,	  9	  March	  1836.	  In	  this	  letter	  Burnes	  informed	  Masson	  that	  Pottinger	  had	  given	  him	  access	  to	  Masson’s	  letters	  to	  him,	  and	  that	  Sir	  John	  Campbell,	  the	  Resident	  at	  Tabriz,	  had	  shown	  him	  his	  early	  papers.	  Masson’s	  papers	  were	  also	  received	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  in	  London	  through	  the	  British	  Resident	  at	  Bushire,	  David	  Wilson.	  Burnes	  was	  advised	  to	  view	  his	  work	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  EIC	  Board	  of	  Control,	  Charles	  Grant.	  199	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  7.	  Burdened	  by	  his	  official	  status	  Burnes	  had	  been	  refused	  entry	  by	  the	  Sindh	  Amirs.	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was	   vulnerable,	   and	   by	   1834	   his	   past	   began	   to	   catch	   up	  with	   him.	   Captain	  Claude	  Wade,	  the	  British	  political	  officer	  at	  Ludhiana	  had	  taken	  an	  interest	  in	  his	   scholarly	  work.	  Acting	  on	   a	   tip-­‐off	   from	  an	  American	  mercenary,	   Josiah	  Harlan,	   whom	  Masson	   had	  met	   on	   his	   original	   trip	   through	   the	   Punjab,200	  Wade	   had	   also	   uncovered	   his	   true	   identity.	   Fortunately	   for	   Masson	   the	  quality	   of	   his	   contacts	   in	   Afghanistan	   made	   him	   an	   attractive	   information	  source	  for	  British	  officials	  and	  Wade	  arranged	  for	  him	  to	  be	  pardoned	  for	  his	  desertion	  in	  return	  for	  his	  agreement	  to	  work	  as	  a	  newswriter	  in	  Kabul.	  	  Masson’s	   status	   as	   a	   newswriter	   has	   often	   been	  misleadingly	   described	   in	  terms	  of	  his	  acting	  as	  a	  ‘spy’.	  Whilst	  this	  is	  technically	  true,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	   was	   gathering	   ‘intelligence’,	   the	   newswriter	   system	   was	   a	   little	   more	  above-­‐board	   than	   this,	  more	  akin	   to	  a	  system	  of	   ‘tolerated	  espionage’.201	  As	  an	  indigenous	  system	  of	  information	  gathering,	  the	  presence	  of	  newswriters	  in	   courts	  was	   ‘more	   than	   simply	   having	   access	   to	   a	   flow	   of	   information.	   It	  implied	  that	  rulers	  had	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  in	  each	  others’	  policies	  and	  had	  established	  a	  degree	  of	  mutual	  trust’.202	  This	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  reciprocal	  agreement	  and	   thus	   the	  number	  of	  newswriters	   in	  a	  given	  court	   could	  also	  serve	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  relative	  sovereign	  authority	  –	  the	  more	  newswriters,	  the	   more	   sovereignty	   was	   effectively	   conceded.203	  The	   British	   system	   was	  built	  on	  the	  back	  of	  this	  understanding,	  though	  it	  was	  increasingly	  staffed	  by	  non-­‐native	   informants,	   who	   due	   to	   the	   engrained	   prejudice	   of	   the	   British	  were	  seen	  as	  more	  reliable	  –	  Masson	  was	  an	  example	  of	  this.204	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Josiah	  Harlan	  was	  an	  interesting	  character	  in	  his	  own	  right.	  He	  gave	  up	  his	  job	  as	  a	  surgeon	  to	  seek	  service	  with	  Ranjit	  Singh.	  He	  ran	  in	  to	  Masson	  in	  Ahmedpur	  by	  which	  time	  Harlan	  had	  gathered	  around	  him	  a	  small	  army,	  recruited	  along	  the	  way,	  perhaps	  attracted	  to	  Harlan’s	  peculiar	  penchant	  for	  carrying	  aloft	  the	  stars	  and	  stripes	  wherever	  he	  roamed.	  Bijan	  Omrani,	  ‘Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan:	  Deserter,	  Scholar,	  Spy’,	  Asian	  Affairs,	  39/2,	  (2008),	  204.	  201	  Bayly,	  Information	  and	  Empire,	  70.	  202	  Bayly,	  Information	  and	  Empire,	  71.	  203	  Bayly,	  Information	  and	  Empire,	  71.	  204	  Masson’s	  predecessor	  in	  the	  role,	  the	  Indian	  Muslim	  Saiyad	  Keramat	  Ali	  –	  who	  had	  previously	  travelled	  with	  Conolly	  –	  was	  moved	  on	  from	  the	  position	  after	  suspicions	  were	  raised	  over	  his	  implication	  in	  local	  ‘intrigue’.	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  105-­‐7.	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MASSON’S	  LOCAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  	  Masson’s	   travels	   in	   Afghanistan	   can	   be	   roughly	   broken	   down	   into	   three	  periods	   beginning	   with	   his	   first	   trip	   as	   a	   deserter;	   his	   second	   trip	   as	   an	  archaeologist;	   and	   a	   later	   third	  period	   as	   an	   archaeologist	   and	  newswriter.	  His	  three-­‐volume	  account	  can	  be	  read	  as	  reflecting	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  research	  during	   these	   three	   periods,	   and	   as	   a	   product	   of	   the	   characters	   he	   engaged	  with	  during	  each.	  His	  initial	  forays	  were	  largely	  conducted	  on	  his	  own	  and	  he	  therefore	   operated	   very	  much	  with	   the	   support	   of	   local	   collaborators.	   As	   a	  result	  his	  initial	  accounts	  betray	  more	  of	  an	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  perspective.	  His	  tendency	   to	   attach	   himself	   to	   travelling	   religious	   figures,	   traders,	   and	  occasionally	  members	  of	  the	  governing	  classes	  makes	  for	  an	  eclectic	  account	  that	  includes	  local	  histories	  and	  oral	  testimonies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  more	  familiar	  survey-­‐based	  data	  on	  populations	  and	  military	  strength.205	  	  	  Travelling	  slightly	  prior	  to	  Burnes’	   first	   trip,	  many	  of	  Masson’s	  views	  chime	  with	   those	   of	   Burnes.	   He	   too	   admired	   the	   independence	   with	   which	   the	  ‘poorer	  classes’	  were	  free	  to	  live	  their	  lives,	  ‘little	  affected	  by	  the	  struggles	  for	  political	  ascendency	  amongst	  the	  chiefs.’206	  Yet,	  the	  divisions	  that	  had	  opened	  up	  amongst	  various	  political	  communities	  were	  also	  abundantly	  clear	  to	  him.	  As	  he	  passed	  through	  Kohat	  he	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  Peshawar	  sirdars’	  plans	  to	  topple	  the	  Dost	  in	  alliance	  with	  the	  Kandahar	  sirdars.	  The	  planned	  strategy	  was	   a	   pincer	  movement,	  with	   the	   Peshawar	   troops	   taking	   Jalalabad,	  whilst	  the	   Kandahar	   chiefs	   moved	   up	   through	   Ghazni	   and	   on	   to	   Kabul.	   In	  anticipation	   of	   this	   movement,	   the	   youngest	   of	   the	   Peshawar	   chiefs	   Pir	  Muhammad	  Khan	  was	  moving	  on	  Kohat	  as	  Masson	  was	  passing	  through.	  The	  gain	  of	  Kohat	  and	  nearby	  Hangu	  had	  expanded	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Peshawar	  
sirdars	   but	   Masson	   remained	   unimpressed	   with	   their	   standard	   of	  government.	  Praising	   the	  Afghan	  population	  of	   the	  Durrani,	  Mohmand	   sub-­‐tribe	  who	   lived	   in	   the	   district,	   he	   submitted	   that	   they	  were	   ‘deserving	   [of]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  This	  form	  of	  data	  tends	  to	  come	  in	  the	  later	  accounts	  that	  record	  Masson’s	  travels	  after	  his	  time	  spent	  with	  officials	  in	  Persia	  and	  the	  Gulf,	  suggesting	  that	  Masson	  had	  become	  more	  acquainted	  with	  official	  procedures.	  	  206	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  282.	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better	   rulers	   than	   they	   had.’207	  For	   all	   of	   their	   pretensions	   to	   the	   throne	  however,	   the	   Peshawar	   sirdars,	  Masson	   noted,	  were	   inescapably	   under	   the	  yoke	   of	   their	   Sikh	   overlords.	   Peshawar	   was	   thus	   at	   this	   time	   rather	   like	  Herat:	  nominally	  an	  Afghan	  territory,	  but	  in	  effect	  under	  foreign	  rule.208	  After	  passing	  through	  the	  Khyber,	  and	  reaching	  Jalalabad	  Masson	  was	  surprised	  to	  find	   that	   the	   chief	   there,	   Nawab	   Jabbar	   Khan,	  was	   also	   aligned	   against	   the	  Afghan	  ruler	  in	  Kabul,	  and	  apparently	  in	  league	  with	  the	  Peshawar	  sirdars.209	  	  	  Masson’s	   more	   local	   perspective	   also	   opened	   up	   insight	   into	   the	   variance	  within	  the	  Afghan	  political	  community.	  For	  example,	  he	  recorded	  in	  detail	  the	  political	  role	  of	  the	  Ghilzai	  population	  to	  the	  east	  and	  south	  of	  Kabul,	  noting	  that	  they	  were	  the	  most	  numerous	  of	  the	  Afghan	  tribes,	  and	  ‘if	  united	  under	  a	  capable	   chief’	   they	   might	   ‘become	   the	   most	   powerful’.210	  He	   also	   recorded	  much	  on	  the	  Hazara	  territories	  of	  Bisut	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Kabul,	  noting	  that	  Shi’a	  populations	  escaping	  sectarian	  tensions	  in	  Kabul	  had	  settled	  there	  and	  now	  presented	   a	   subversive	   influence	   over	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   Sunni	   dominated	  Barakzai.211	  	  	  Much	  of	  Masson’s	  work	   exposes	   a	  more	   local	   account	   of	   the	   fragmentation	  and	   breakdown	   of	   authority	   that	   Burnes	   noted.	   His	   account	   of	   Kalat212	  for	  instance,	   provides	   a	   case	   study	   in	   the	   instabilities	   caused	   by	   the	   fall	   of	   the	  Durrani	  Empire,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  power	  was	  being	  negotiated	  through	   a	   system	   of	   fluid	   alliances,	   buttressed	   by	   occasional	   military	  ventures	   often	   resulting	   in	   negotiated	   treaty	   settlements.	   The	   regional	  divisions	   of	   power	  meant	   that	   Kalat	   -­‐	  which	  was	   caught	   between	   the	   twin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  132.	  208	  Burnes	  had	  noted	  this	  status	  too.	  As	  a	  Peshawar	  chief	  had	  quipped	  in	  response	  to	  a	  Persian	  remark	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  Persia	  from	  Russia,	  ‘their	  independence	  was	  something	  like	  his	  own	  with	  the	  Seiks,	  unable	  to	  resist,	  and	  glad	  to	  compromise.’	  Burnes,	  
Travels,	  I,	  99.	  209	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  173.	  210	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  204.	  For	  the	  Ghilzai	  more	  generally	  see	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  204-­‐10.	  211	  Although	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  reputed	  Shi’a	  descent	  reportedly	  strengthened	  his	  capacity	  to	  bridge	  this	  sectarian	  divide.	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  298.	  212	  Kalat	  is	  now	  well	  within	  modern	  day	  Pakistani	  territory,	  in	  Balochistan	  province,	  yet	  during	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Afghan	  diaspora	  from	  the	  north,	  it	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  under	  the	  sway	  of	  Afghan	  rulers.	  See	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  97-­‐109.	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threats	   of	   the	   Kandahar	   sirdars	   and	   the	   Sikh	   Kingdom	   -­‐	   looked	   beyond	   its	  borders	   for	   support,	   at	   one	  point	   courting	  Herat,	   showing	  how	   instabilities	  and	  security	  dilemmas	  were	  driving	  rulers	  to	  unlikely	  alliances	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	   self-­‐preservation.	   The	   impression	   given	   is	   that	   ‘intrigues’,	   as	   the	   British	  put	  it,	  were	  internally	  and	  regionally	  driven,	  not	  externally	  encouraged.	  	  	  Other	   communities	   such	   as	   the	   aforementioned	   Ghilzai	   were	   recorded	   as	  even	   further	  disassociated	   from	  the	  rulership	   in	  Kabul.	  As	  one	  Ghilzai	  ruler	  asked	   Masson,	   since	   ‘his	   ancestors	   never	   acknowledged	   the	   authority	   of	  Ahmed	   Shah	   …	   why	   should	   he	   respect	   that	   of	   traitors	   and	   Ahmed	   Shah’s	  slaves?’213 	  Meanwhile	   smaller	   peripheral	   groups	   such	   as	   those	   between	  Kunduz	  and	  Kabul	  in	  the	  north	  were	  recorded	  as	  essentially	  hedging	  between	  the	   competing	   political	   forces	   to	   the	   north	   and	   south	   of	   them.214 	  This	  instability	  was	  apparently	   impacting	  on	  revenue	  collection	  and	  trade	  too	  as	  rulers	   of	   Kalat,	   Kandahar,	   and	   Kalat-­‐i-­‐Ghilzai	   imposed	   their	   own	   high	   tax	  burdens.215	  	  Masson	  got	  his	  chance	  to	  meet	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  at	  Ghazni,	  where,	  upon	  the	  battlefield,	  he	  met	  the	  Afghan	  King	  in	  a	  small	  tent.	  Despite	  the	  brevity	  of	  his	   meeting,	   Masson	   was	   much	   impressed	   with	   the	   form	   of	   rule	   he	   had	  established	   at	   Kabul,	   and	   in	   the	   general	   impression	   he	   gained	   of	   his	  popularity.	  Masson	  asserted	  that	  the	  Dost	  had	  brought	  calm	  to	  Kabul	  and	  was	  just	   in	   his	   dealings	   with	   the	   people:	   ‘He	   is	   beloved	   by	   all	   classes	   of	   his	  subjects	  …	  He	  administers	  justice	  with	  impartiality,	  and	  has	  proved	  that	  the	  lawless	   habits	   of	   the	   Afghan	   are	   to	   be	   controlled.’216	  The	   Dost	   was	   also	  admired	   for	  his	   skills	   as	   a	  military	   commander,	   yet	  one	  who	   ‘only	  employs	  the	  sword	  when	  other	  means	  fail.’217	  His	  skills	  as	  a	  politician	  extended	  to	  the	  realm	   of	   religious	   expression	   too.	   As	   the	   son	   of	   a	   Shi’a	   mother	   he	   was	  nonetheless	   able	   to	   publically	   claim	   his	   adherence	   to	   the	   Sunna	   whilst	  ‘possibly	   allowing	   the	   Shi’a	   part	   of	   the	   community	   to	   indulge	   in	   a	   belief	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  210.	  214	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  306.	  215	  See	  respectively	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  166-­‐9,	  187,	  199.	  216	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  252.	  217	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  252.	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flattering	   to	   them.’ 218 	  On	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   King,	   Masson’s	   account	   is	  reflective	  of	  Burnes’	  sentiments.	  It	  seemed	  impossible	  for	  these	  men	  to	  resist	  the	   talents	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   as	   a	   ruler.	   As	   with	   Burnes	   too,	   the	  manner	  of	  his	  government	  offers	  further	  hints	  at	  a	  shifting	  basis	  of	  legitimacy	  within	  Afghanistan	  at	  this	  time.	  	  	  The	  status	  of	  Kandahar	  offers	  a	  telling	  contrast	  to	  the	  governing	  of	  Kabul	  in	  Masson’s	  account.	  The	  eldest	  brother	  and	  chief,	  Fur	  Dil	  Khan	  seemed	  wedded	  to	   a	   more	   tyrannical	   style	   of	   rule	   guilty	   of	   ‘extravagant	   opposition’	   and	  pushing	   taxes	   ‘as	   far	   as	   possible’.219	  The	   people,	   Masson	   relates,	   ‘heartily	  execrate	  him,	  and	  pronounce	  him	  to	  be	  “bissiar	  sakht,”	  or	  very	  hard.’220	  The	  province	  was	  being	  run,	   in	  effect,	  as	  an	   independent	  state	  at	   this	  time,	  with	  Fur	  Dil	  Khan	  taking	  on	  the	  Persian	  honourific,	  Padshah	  meaning	  ‘King’,	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  other	  states.221	  	  	  Masson’s	  second	  volume,	  which	  encompasses	  the	  period	  of	  his	  second	  trip	  in	  the	   early	   1830s,	   is	   more	   informative	   on	   the	   competition	   that	   described	  Afghanistan’s	   political	   community	   at	   this	   time.	   For	   example,	   his	   time	   spent	  surveying	  the	  areas	  around	  Bamiyan,	  including	  the	  famous	  Buddhist	  statues,	  brought	   him	   into	   close	   contact	   with	   the	   governor	   of	   the	   Bisut	   territories	  between	  Kabul	   and	  Bamiyan,	  Haji	  Khan,	   a	   collaborator	  with,	   and	   sometime	  competitor	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan. 222 	  This	   particular	   excursion	  highlighted	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   governors	   such	   as	   Haji	   Khan	   were	   semi-­‐autonomous	   rulers	   with	   their	   own	   local	   political	   coalitions,	   who	   would	  advise	  the	  ruler	   in	  Kabul	  on	  his	  best	  ruling	  alliances.	   In	  this	  case,	  Haji	  Khan	  attempted	  to	  encourage	  the	  Dost	  to	  cut	  his	  ties	  with	  his	  brothers	  at	  Kandahar.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  254.	  219	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  284.	  As	  with	  the	  Burnes	  account,	  Masson	  also	  notes	  that	  revenue	  collection	  seemed	  to	  fall	  hardest	  on	  the	  Hindu	  population.	  On	  his	  journey	  through	  Kohat	  he	  remarked	  on	  how	  the	  Hindu	  settlers	  were	  fleeing	  the	  oncoming	  army,	  fearful	  that	  they	  would	  be	  taxed	  for	  the	  second	  time	  that	  year	  as	  a	  new	  authority	  passed	  through.	  At	  Kandahar	  he	  witnesses	  the	  rounding	  up	  of	  ‘fifty	  to	  one	  hundred’	  Hindus	  ‘some	  of	  them,	  no	  doubt,	  men	  of	  respectability,	  and	  all	  merchants	  or	  traders,	  who	  had	  been	  seized	  in	  their	  houses	  or	  shops	  and	  dragged	  along	  the	  streets	  to	  the	  darbar	  [court],	  the	  sirdars	  needing	  money	  and	  calling	  upon	  them	  to	  furnish	  it.’	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  110,	  287.	  220	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  284.	  221	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  283.	  222	  See	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  305-­‐45,	  360-­‐1,	  371-­‐5,	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  CONCLUSION:	  MASSON	  THE	  OUTSIDER?	  	  Following	  his	  recruitment	  as	  a	  newswriter	  in	  1834	  till	  he	  left	  the	  country	  in	  1838,	   Masson	   would	   produce	   numerous	   reports	   on	   the	   situation	   in	  Afghanistan	   from	  Kabul.	  His	   published	  narrative	  did	  not	   emerge	  until	   after	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  in	  1842,	  yet	  Masson	  drew	  upon	  his	  official	  reporting	  in	  order	   to	  complete	   this	  work.	   In	   this	  account	  however	  he	  wasted	  no	   time	   in	  excoriating	   those	   responsible	   for	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   British	  went	   to	  war	   in	  1838.	  Explaining	   the	  genesis	  of	  his	  work	  he	  described	   its	  use	   in	   the	  government	   offices	   of	   India	   and	   England	   as	  much	   to	   his	   regret,	   ‘under	   the	  apprehension	   that	   they	   may	   have	   been	   made	   to	   subserve	   the	   interested	  schemes	   of	   artful	   and	   designing	  men	   –	   a	   purpose	   for	  which	  most	   certainly	  they	   were	   never	   written.’223	  Turning	   his	   sights	   on	   Alexander	   Burnes,	   he	  accused	  him	  of	  ‘wild	  projects’,	  that	  he	  claimed	  he	  was	  ‘mainly	  instrumental	  in	  forcing	  the	  government	  to	  attempt’.224	  He	  also	  accused	  Burnes	  of	  withholding	  important	   information	   on	   an	   opportunity	   to	   reconcile	  with	   Kabul	   over	   the	  arrival	   of	   a	   Russian	   envoy,	   forcing	   Masson	   to	   support	   a	   termination	   of	  relations	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  Afghan	  intransigence.	  	  But	  it	  was	  the	  militarisation	  of	   the	   policy	   that	   Masson	   had	   the	   biggest	   problem	   with.	   The	   Afghans,	   he	  believed,	  would	  have	  accepted	  Shah	  Shuja	  as	  their	  ruler	  without	  the	  need	  for	  overwhelming	   military	   force,	   in	   part	   because	   despite	   Dost	   Muhammad’s	  ruling	   competence,	   he	   had	   failed	   to	   unite	   the	   Afghan	   population	   under	   his	  new	  form	  of	  regal	  authority.	  As	  he	  put	  it,	  ‘[t]he	  Afghans	  had	  no	  objections	  to	  the	  match,	   they	   disliked	   the	  manner	   of	  wooing.’225	  Despite	   his	  warnings	   to	  this	  effect	   in	  the	  briefing	  notes	  he	  was	  sending	  at	   the	  time,	  Masson	  claimed	  these	  went	  unheeded	  because,	  ‘there	  was	  no	  illusion	  to	  the	  designs	  of	  Russia	  and	  Persia	  therein’.226	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  v.	  224	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  vi.	  225	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  viii.	  226	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  I,	  ix.	  This	  mirrors	  an	  argument	  made	  by	  Hopkins	  that	  officials	  ignored	  dispatches	  from	  figures	  such	  as	  Masson	  that	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  familiar	  ‘threat	  conceptualization’	  of	  Russia.	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	  	  
	   112	  
This	   apparent	   outsider	   status,	   one	   in	  which	  he	  was	  beyond	   the	   confines	   of	  official	   strictures,	  was	  partially	  a	   self-­‐representation.	  Masson’s	  early	  official	  dispatches	  betrayed	  a	  far	  more	  imperialistic	  character.	  In	  a	  September	  1834	  dispatch	   to	   Claude	   Wade	   he	   advocated	   a	   more	   involved	   British	   policy	  towards	   Afghanistan.	   Having	   outlined	   the	   possibility	   of	   supporting	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  against	  his	  political	  competitors,	  he	  suggested	  that	  ‘a	  more	  effectual	  and	  magnificent	  plan	  for	  the	  British	  Government	  to	  adopt	  under	  the	  present	  political	   circumstances	  of	   these	  countries,	  would	  be	   the	  permanent	  occupation	  by	   conquest	  or	   treaty	  of	  Kabul	   and	   its	  dependencies	  …	  No	   time	  can	  be	  more	  fitting	  than	  the	  present	  for	  a	  grand	  political	  coup	  when	  the	  chief	  of	  Kabul	   is	  about	   to	  enter	   into	  a	  conflict	  with	  a	  powerful	  enemy	  [the	  Sikhs]	  and	  when	   the	   country	   is	   agitated	   by	   factions’.227	  Echoing	   a	   distinction	   that	  Burnes	  made	  in	  his	  account,	  Masson	  also	  delineated	  the	  political	  community	  between	   the	   ruling	   Barakzai	   and	   disenfranchised	   Saddozai,	   claiming	   the	  rulers	   of	   Afghanistan	   can	   ‘depend	   only	   on	   the	   support	   and	   fidelity	   of	   their	  own	  particular	  tribe	  (the	  Barekzie)	  while	  the	  other	  great	  Duranee	  leaders	  not	  only	   own	   no	   obedience	   to	   them;	   but	   are	   ready	   to	   league	   together	   in	   any	  attempt	   that	   holds	   out	   a	   prospect	   of	   overthrowing	   the	   Barekzie	  ascendancy’.228	  	  Yet	   this	   dualism	   between	   the	   Saddozai	   and	  Barakzai	   factions	  masked	   a	   far	  more	  complicated	  political	  history	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  his	  account,	  and	  to	  an	   extent	   in	   the	   works	   of	   other	   contemporary	   travelers.	   Masson’s	   work	  demonstrates	  the	  sheer	  fluidity	  in	  alliances	  that	  persisted	  at	  this	  time,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  frequent	  British	  interpretation	  of	  interminable	  fractiousness,	  and	  ‘intrigue’.	   Masson’s	   later	   role	   as	   a	   newswriter	   amplified	   this	   aspect	   of	   his	  reporting,	   embedded	   as	   he	   was	   in	   court	   politics.	   The	   situation	   buttresses	  Thomas	  Barfield’s	  observation	  that	  rulership	  was	  the	  preserve	  of	  a	  clique	  of	  professional	  rulers.229	  In	  this	  case,	  largely	  the	  offspring	  of	  Sirafraz	  Khan,	  who	  had	  displaced	  the	  ruling	  Saddozai	  elite.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  NAI,	  Foreign	  Department,	  Political	  Consultations,	  ‘Afghanistan:	  Masson	  (Mr)	  report	  on	  the	  political	  state	  and	  resources	  of’,	  No.46,	  30	  September	  1834,	  p.153.	  228	  NAI,	  Foreign	  Department,	  Political	  Consultations,	  ‘Afghanistan:	  Masson	  (Mr)	  report	  on	  the	  political	  state	  and	  resources	  of’,	  No.45,	  21	  November	  1834,	  p.130.	  229	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan.	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  In	  the	  accounts	  the	  narrative	  behind	  this	  rise	  to	  power	  of	  the	  Barakzai	  elite	  is	  traced	   back	   to	   the	   murder	   of	   Fitih	   Khan,	   and	   the	   Barakzai	   outrage	   that	   it	  prompted.	   Yet,	   the	  more	   detailed	   travel	   account	   of	  Masson	   shows	   that	   the	  various	  competitors	   for	  power	  were	  not	  averse	  to	  buying	   into	  the	  Saddozai	  franchise	  if	  it	  gave	  their	  claim	  to	  sovereignty	  the	  veneer	  of	  royal	  authority.230	  Equally,	   although	   outside	   incursions	   by	   the	   British	   and	   other	   later	   powers	  would,	   as	   Barfield	   notes,	   draw	   in	   previously	   ostracised	   competing	   groups,	  even	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  status	  as	  a	  polity	  such	  groups	  were	  courted	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	   basis.	   In	   some	   cases,	   as	   with	   the	   Kohistanis,	   the	  Yusufzai,	   and	   the	   Ghilzai,	   these	   groups	  were	   regularly	   courted.	   Indeed,	   the	  Hazaras	  too	  were	  not	  uninvolved	  in	  dynastic	  quarrels.	  	  This	  presents	  a	  more	  nuanced	  view	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  ecology	  at	  this	  time,	  a	  view	  that	  the	  essentialized	  concept	  of	  Barakzai-­‐Saddozai	  conflict	  was	  unable	  to	   capture.	   It	   also	   hints	   at	   the	   deeper	   structural	   forces	   that	   inclined	   the	  British	  to	  become	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  would	  later	  become	  partially	  instrumentalized	  by	  these	  disenfranchised	  actors.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  for	  example	  in	  the	  collaboration	  between	  Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan	  (the	  half	  brother	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan),	  and	  the	  exiled	  Shah	  Shuja	  in	  Azim	  Khan’s	  attempt	  to	  dethrone	  the	  Saddozai	  King,	  Shah	  Mahmud,	  prior	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  ascent	  to	  power.	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  44;	  Dalrymple,	  Return	  of	  a	  King,	  45.	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Conclusion:	   Contextualizing	   Early	   European	   Explorers	   and	   the	   Afghanistan	  
‘Knowledge	  Community’	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   sought	   to	   recover	   the	   story	   of	   a	   very	   specific	   colonial	  ‘knowledge	   community’	   that	   began	   to	   emerge	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	  made	   up	   of	   soldiers,	   scholars,	   and	   adventurers,	   with	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	  Afghanistan	   and	  Central	  Asia.	   These	  men	  were	   the	   leading	   edge	  of	   colonial	  expansion	   in	   this	   region.	  As	  with	   the	   frontiers	  of	  British	   control	   elsewhere,	  their	   activities	   are	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   uneven,	   unpredictable,	   and	   often	  unofficial	  manner	  of	   this	  process	  of	  expansion,	  one	   that	  began	   in	  almost	  all	  cases	   with	   the	   accumulation	   of	   knowledge.	   This	   provides	   an	   important	  counter-­‐narrative	  to	  many	  existing	  histories	  of	  these	  figures.	  	  There	   is,	   in	   parts	   of	   the	   literature,	   a	   preoccupation	   with	   the	   espionage	  activities	   of	   the	   likes	   of	   Masson,	   Burnes,	   and	   Pottinger	   in	   particular.	   The	  impression	   given	   in	   such	   interpretations	   is	   that	   the	   only	   aspect	   of	   these	  journeys	  worth	  considering	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  informed	  a	  wider	  geo-­‐strategic	   pattern	   –	   dominated	   by	   the	   considerations	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations.	   The	   events	   unfolding	   within	   Afghanistan	   itself,	   the	   political,	  economic,	   and	   social	   changes	   to	   which	   that	   country	   was	   subject	   are	   often	  overlooked.	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   particularly	   the	   case	   with	   the	   diplomatic	  histories	   that	   often	   inform	   debates	   within	   IR.	   It	   is	   often	   as	   though	  Afghanistan	  is	  not	  granted	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  own	  history	  when	  considering	  imperial	   rivalries	   in	   this	   region.	   The	   Afghanistan	   context	   is	   neglected.231	  More	  specifically,	  for	  our	  purposes	  here,	  such	  perspectives	  obscure	  the	  wider	  cultural	   milieu	   in	   which	   such	   individuals	   were	   operating.	   Ironically,	   this	  ‘epistemic	   imperialism’,	   this	   quest	   for	   knowledge,	   this	   drive	   for	   ever-­‐more	  detail,	   legibility,	  and	  familiarity	  provides	  a	  wealth	  of	  detail	  on	  precisely	  this	  ‘Afghanistan	  context’	  that	  the	  more	  sensationalist	  readings	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  –	  albeit	  heavily	  filtered	  by	  the	  prejudices	  of	  the	  time.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War;	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan.	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To	  be	  strictly	  historicist,	  the	  individuals	  who	  traversed,	  and	  travelled	  through	  Central	  Asia	  during	   the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  not	   lionized	  at	   the	   time	  as	  dashing	  intelligence	  operatives.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  spy	  as	  a	  'heroic	  figure'	  was	  an	  Edwardian	  innovation	  in	  terms	  of	  cultural	  signifiers	  -­‐	  one	  particularly	  associated	  with	  the	  derring-­‐do	  of	  those	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War.232	  In	  the	  South	  Asian	  context	  this	  figure	  admittedly	  arrived	  a	  little	  earlier	  with	  the	  publication	   in	  1901	  of	  Rudyard	  Kipling’s	  Kim,	   the	   literary	  progenitor	  of	  the	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘great	   game’	   with	   it’s	   eponymous	   hero	   Kimball	   O’Hara	  providing	  the	  youthful	  model	  of	  intrepid,	  espionage-­‐driven	  adventurism.	  Yet	  this	  figure	  has	  been	  projected	  back	  in	  time	  for	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  'great	  game'	   era,	   bestowing	   such	   individuals	   with	   a	   romantic	   air	   that	   was	   never	  their	  projection.	  These	   individuals,	  Burnes	   in	  particular,	  were	  celebrated	   in	  England	  for	  their	  adventurism,	  and	  for	  their	  scholarship,	  not	  their	  cloak	  and	  dagger.	  	  	  This	   travel-­‐based	   ‘investigative	  modality’233	  had	   a	   powerful	   allure.	   Pushing	  forth	   into	   as-­‐yet	   unknown	   territory	  was	   in	   this	  way	   an	   opportunity	   for	   an	  inquisitive	  empire,	  coming	  to	   terms	  with	   its	  newly-­‐acquired	  global	  reach	  to	  project	  and	  reaffirm	  its	  identity	  on	  canvasses	  new:	  a	  co-­‐constitutive	  moment	  of	   cultural	   reaffirmation;	   the	   essence	   of	   imperial	   arrogance.	   These	   works	  then,	  provide	  a	  reminder	  that	  ‘empires	  create	  in	  the	  imperial	  center	  of	  power	  an	   obsessive	   need	   to	   present	   and	   re-­‐present	   its	   peripheries	   and	   its	   others	  continually	  to	  itself.’	  Empire	  thus	  ‘becomes	  dependent	  on	  its	  others	  to	  know	  itself.’234	  The	   details	   that	   these	   travelers	   brought	   back	   were	   not	   simply	  written	  off	  as	  strategic	  context,	  or	  background	  detail	  in	  an	  otherwise	  enemy-­‐centric	   terrain;	   they	   were	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   the	   colonial	   endeavour.	   It	  remains	   a	   supreme	   irony	   that	   the	   story	   of	   the	   great	   game	   encourages	   the	  kind	   of	   sanctioned	   ignorance	   that	   is	   so	   often	   associated	   with	   the	   imperial	  mentality.	  Dealing	  with	  this	  colonial	  literature	  requires	  then,	  an	  appreciation	  of	   its	   cultural	   significance	   as	  much	   as	   its	   informational	   significance,	   and	   in	  particular,	   an	   understanding	   that	   very	   often,	   these	   two	   ostensibly	   separate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Satia,	  Spies	  in	  Arabia.	  	  233	  Cohn,	  Colonialism	  and	  Its	  Forms	  of	  Knowledge.	  234	  Pratt,	  Imperial	  Eyes,	  4.	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realms	   of	   knowing	   were	   in	   fact	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin;	   mutually	  constitutive,	  and	  reflexively	  creating	   the	  conditions	  and	  possibilities	   for	   the	  other.	  	  	  This	  alternative	  historical	  perspective	  that	  identifies	  colonial	  knowledge	  as	  a	  key	   site	   of	   study,	   also	   offers	   new	   insights	   into	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  Afghanistan	  was	   entering	   the	   collective	   colonial	   consciousness	   at	   this	   time.	  As	   this	   chapter	   has	   shown,	   there	  was	   an	   intellectual	   history	  behind	  British	  understandings	  of	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century;	  one	  that	  was	  more	  than	  the	  story	  of	  geopolitical	  threat.	  The	  ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  built	  on	  the	  corpus	  of	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  the	  individuals	  surveyed	  in	  this	  chapter	  –	   in	  particular,	   the	  works	  of	  Elphinstone,	  Burnes,	  and	  Masson.	  This	  was	   fundamentally	   a	   meaning-­‐making	   enterprise	   that	   drew	   upon	   an	  atmosphere	  of	  European	  ideas	  that	  were	  carried	  into	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  space	  by	  European	  explorers,	  functioning	  very	  much	  as	  transnational	  actors.	  But	   these	   explorers	   were	   equally	   dependent	   on	   the	   communities	   amongst	  whom	   they	   moved,	   and	   upon	   whom	   they	   often	   relied	   for	   knowledge,	  information,	  transport,	  and	  protection.	  As	  such	  this	  was	  partly	  an	  exchange,	  an	  interaction,	  a	  dialogue;	  an	  unequal	  one,	  but	  an	  exchange	  nonetheless.	  This	  moment	   of	   transference	   was	   imperfect,	   and	   about	   to	   become	   more	   so	   as	  colonial	  knowledge	  on	  Afghanistan	  underwent	  a	  further	  transformation	  from	  knowledge	  to	  policy	  advice.	  This	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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  Chapter	  Three	  	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  Policy	  Problem:	  Towards	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  	  	  	  Following	  the	  initial	  explorations	  of	  Elphinstone,	  Masson,	  Burnes,	  and	  others	  during	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Afghanistan	  fell	  under	  an	  increasingly	  penetrative	  imperial	  gaze	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1830s	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  This	  chapter	  assesses	  how	  an	  emergent	  ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan,	   initiated	   in	   part	   by	   European	   explorers,	   intersected	   and	  overlapped	  with	  the	  policy	  agenda	  at	  this	  time.	  This	  study	  is	  instructive	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  tells	  us	  of	  the	  imperial	  policy-­‐making	  process	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  a	  case	  study	  in	  colonial	  knowledge	  and	  its	  instrumentalization.	  In	   a	   sense,	   this	   was	   a	   process	   of	   regionalizing	   and	   internationalizing	   local	  knowledge	  –	  feeding	  it	  into	  a	  wider	  geopolitical	  information	  order.	  Contrary	  to	   received	  wisdom,	   the	   policies	   that	   resulted	   from	   this,	   though	   ultimately	  leading	  to	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  were	  fiercely	  contested	  by	  many	  who	  were	   most	   familiar	   with	   the	   region	   and	   its	   politics.	   Nonetheless,	   these	  decisions	   and	   the	   events	   that	   resulted	   would	   irrevocably	   change	   British	  perceptions	   of	   the	   problem	   they	   faced	   in	   Afghanistan.	   In	   many	   ways,	   the	  region	  was	  becoming	  socialized	  into	  a	  new	  cognitive	  universe,	  closing	  down	  the	   scope	   for	   latitude	   in	   interpretation	   of	   the	   problems	   they	   faced	   and	  leading	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  Afghanistan	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  Four	   key	   areas	   of	   contestation	   are	   worthy	   of	   particular	   attention.	   Firstly,	  there	   was	   the	   key	   concern	   of	   what	   exactly	   was	   the	   threat	   presented	   by	  Afghanistan.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   there	   was	   the	   disputed	   threat	   of	   Russian	  encroachment,	   thought	   to	   be	   operating	   through	   Persian	   proxies.	   The	   exact	  nature	  of	  this	  expansion	  was	  uncertain	  and	  this	  occasionally	  manifested	  itself	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in	   ‘information	   panics’ 1 	  in	   which	   certain	   types	   of	   information	   were	  prioritized	   out	   of	   a	   fear	   of	   a	   deficit	   in	   understanding.	   Indeed	   in	   certain	  quarters	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	   long	   ‘information	  panic’	   over	   the	   very	  possibility	   of	   this	   incursion.	   But	  this	  was	   far	   from	   the	   only,	   or	   indeed	   the	  most	   significant	   story.2	  Adding	   to	  these	   fears	   were	   concerns	   over	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	   relations.	   Forward-­‐thinking	  British	  officials	  were	  beginning	   to	   imagine	   the	  regional	   landscape	   following	  the	  death	  of	   the	  aging	  Sikh	  ruler	  Ranjit	  Singh.	  Aggrieved	  by	   their	   territorial	  losses	  to	  the	  Sikhs	  during	  the	  turbulence	  of	  the	  Afghan	  civil	  wars	  of	  the	  1830s,	  any	   succession	   struggle	   in	   the	   Punjab	   could	   potentially	   embolden	   the	  Afghans	  in	  attempting	  to	  reclaim	  their	  lost	  territorial	  possessions.	  It	  was	  the	  uncertainty	   over	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   instability	   that	   further	   contributed	   to	  British	  fears.	  	  A	  second	  area	  of	  contestation	  concerned	  the	  means	  of	  British	  intervention	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  dispute	  boiled	  down	  to	  whether	  commercial	  and	  pecuniary	  measures	  would	  suffice,	  or	  whether	  military	  options	  should	  be	  prepared.	  The	  debate	  brought	   in	  wider	  contextual	   factors	  relating	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  at	  this	  time.	  But	  it	  also	  tied	  in	  with	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  commerce	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  expansion	  and	  control,	  versus	  the	  utility	  of	  force	  as	  a	  method	  of	  signalling	  the	  British	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  staking	  out	  territorial	   boundaries	   before	   the	   initiative	   was	   lost.	   This	   debate	   was	   not	  simply	  over	  efficacy	  however.	  It	  also	  concerned	  normative	  questions	  over	  the	  propriety	   of	   intervention	   too.	   In	   some	   quarters	   commerce	   was	   seen	   as	   a	  veneer	   for	   aggressive	   measures.	   Those	   advocating	   a	   pacific	   response	  disputed	  the	  wisdom	  of	  commercial	  moves	  feeling	  it	  would	  lead	  inevitably	  to	  military	  measures.	  But	  non-­‐intervention	  took	  on	  many	  hues.	  For	   those	  who	  did	   advocate	   commercial	   exploration,	   non-­‐intervention	   concerned	   the	  avoidance	   of	   becoming	   entangled	   in	   political,	   and	   sometimes	   territorial,	  disputes.	   These	   disputes	   were	   in	   part	   a	   function	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   ongoing	  successionist	  struggles,	  but	  the	  reasons	  behind	  them	  were	  poorly	  understood	  by	  the	  British	  at	  this	  time.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information.	  2	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan;	  Hopkins,	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Game”.	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  Thirdly,	  and	  related	  to	  the	  above	  point,	  there	  was	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  Afghanistan	  could	  likely	  function	  as	  a	  consolidated	  polity,	  or	  whether	  a	  more	  fragmented	   collection	   of	   chiefships	  was	  more	   likely.	   In	   this	   area	   of	   dispute	  the	  British	  were	   importing	   their	  experiences	   from	  elsewhere	   in	  South	  Asia.	  Whilst	   divide	   and	   rule	  had	  a	   seductive	   appeal,	   a	   unified	  polity	  was	   seen	  as	  more	  appropriate	  not	  only	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  normative	  agendas	  of	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  governance,	  but	  also	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ends	  that	  they	  hoped	   the	   Afghan	   territory	   would	   serve	   as	   a	   ‘buffer’	   between	   Persia	   and	  Russia.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   more	   granular	   perspective	   of	   how	   this	   would	  actually	  work,	  however,	  the	  British	  were	  apt	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  familiar	  criteria.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  imputation	  of	  a	  historiography	  proposing	  that	  Afghan	  ‘anarchy’	  was	   a	   problem	   of	   faded	   Saddozai	   glory;	   a	   direct	   legacy	   of	   the	  historiographical	   investigative	   modality	   that	   characterised	   elements	   of	  Elphinstone’s	  and	  Burnes’	  works,	  alongside	  others.	  	  To	   this	   end,	   the	   fourth	   area	  of	   dispute	   concerned	  whom	   the	  British	   should	  back.	   Driving	   this	   debate	   were	   perceptions	   of	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  his	  various	  brothers	  who	  were	  competing	   for	  his	   throne,	  and	   the	   deposed	   ruler	   Shah	   Shuja,	   a	  man	  with	  whom	   the	   British	   had	   long	  been	  acquainted.	  This	   area	  of	   contestation	  was	  also	   shaped	  by	  Afghan-­‐Sikh	  relations	  since	  resolving	  these	  would	  be	  determined	  by	  who	  sat	  in	  Kabul.	  	  These	   areas	   of	   contestation	   provide	   a	   useful	   thematic	   framework	   for	  understanding	   the	   policy	   debate,	   and	   they	   demonstrate	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  preconceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  provided	  the	  epistemic	  criteria	  for	  the	  policies	  emerging	  at	  this	  time.	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  always	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  manner.	  As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  showed,	  evolving	  at	  this	  time	  was	  an	   unrefined	   ‘idea	   of	   Afghanistan’,	   weaving	   together	   multiple	   strands	   of	  British	  imaginings.	  This	  was	  an	  emergent	  Afghanistan	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  as	  yet,	  there	  was	  not	  one	  single	  idea.	  The	  outcomes	  of	  these	  contestations	  provided	  the	  reasoning	  by	  which	  policy-­‐makers	  could	  ‘frame’	  Afghanistan	  policy,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  recognised	  that	  these	  were	  not	  the	  only	  interpretations	  that	  could	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have	   been	   drawn.	   Whilst	   this	   framing	   was	   beholden	   to	   rational	   policy	  calculation	   they	   were	   circumscribed	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   was	   reasonably	  possible	  by	  the	  knowledge	  order	  that	  had	  been	  established	  and	  developed	  by	  the	   knowledge	   entrepreneurs	   of	   Elphinstone,	   Burnes,	   Masson	   et	   al.	   This	  provided	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   debate.	   Understanding	   why	   events	   were	  ‘historically	   so	   and	   not	   otherwise’	   requires	   attention	   to	   the	   concepts	   they	  established.	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   contested	   themes,	   it	   should	  be	   acknowledged	   that	   this	  ‘epistemic	   imperialism’	   was	   not	   solely	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   imperial	   mind.	  There	   were	   elements	   of	   hybridity	   in	   the	   understandings	   that	   the	   British	  developed	  at	   this	   times:	  both	   the	  blending	  of	   ‘local’	  knowledge	  with	  British	  understandings;	   the	   grafting	   of	   South	   Asian	   practices	   on	   to	   the	   Afghan	  context;	   and	   the	   incorporation	   of	   regional	   political	   norms	   –	   particularly	   in	  the	  concept	  of	  territorial	  possessions	  and	  their	  links	  to	  treaty	  stipulations.	  As	  such,	  this	  was	  not	  just	  the	  story	  of	  conquest,	  but	  rather	  a	  casting	  around	  for	  an	  appropriate	  blend	  of	  normatively	  sanctioned	  policy	  prescriptions.	  	  	  That	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  take	  the	  argument	  too	  far.	  The	  practicalities	  of	  achieving	  British	  interests,	  which	  were	  themselves	  a	  construction	  of	  threat	  based	  partly	  on	  the	  importation	  of	  European	  notions	  of	  ontological	  security,3	  closed	  down	  a	  more	  ‘discursively	  competent’	  policy	  response.	  British	  policy-­‐makers	  were	  ultimately	  forced	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  familiar	  understandings.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  common	  refrain	  that	  the	  British	  ‘knew	  nothing’	  about	  Afghanistan	  needs	  amendment.	  The	  British	  knew	  ‘something’,	  they	  just	  didn’t	  ‘know’	  what	  they	   might	   have,	   had	   the	   circumstances	   been	   more	   conducive	   to	  incrementalism	  in	  policy	  prescriptions.	  The	  British	  failed	  partly	  due	  to	  their	  misperceptions	  of	  the	  Afghan	  polity,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  necessarily	  fail	  for	  lack	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ontological	  security	  proposes	  that	  states	  seek	  not	  just	  physical	  security,	  but	  security	  of	  the	  self	  (ontological	  security)	  in	  the	  form	  of	  their	  own	  identity,	  and	  as	  such	  seek	  to	  define	  themselves	  against	  other	  states	  and	  their	  respective	  identities.	  Jennifer	  Mitzen,	  ‘Ontological	  Security	  in	  World	  Politics:	  State	  Identity	  and	  the	  Security	  Dilemma’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Relations,	  12/3	  (2006),	  341-­‐70;	  Jennifer	  Mitzen,	  ‘Anchoring	  Europe’s	  civilizing	  identity:	  habits,	  capabilities	  and	  ontological	  security’,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  13/2	  (2006),	  270-­‐85;	  Brent	  J.	  Steele,	  ‘Ontological	  security	  and	  the	  power	  of	  self-­‐identity:	  British	  neutrality	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War’,	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  31	  (2005),	  519-­‐40.	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of	   knowledge	   and	   information,	   this	   was	   in	   large	   part	   a	   failure	   of	   strategic	  imagination	  brought	  on	  by	  a	  demand	  for	  agreement	  over	  the	  best	  course	  to	  pursue.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   failure	   was	   one	   of	   ‘closure’.	   Ironically	   the	  intelligence	  failures	  that	  followed	  were	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  these	  policies	  as	   the	   British	   lost	   their	   ability	   to	   operate	   in	   any	   meaningful	   sense	   in	   the	  Afghan	  territories.	  It	  was	  following	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	  that	  the	   discourses	   more	   familiar	   to	   proponents	   of	   orientalism	   really	   began	   to	  take	  hold.	  	  An	   important	   aspect	   of	   explaining	   this	   imagination	   failure	   rests	   on	   paying	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘politicals’.	  Adding	  to	  their	  works,	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  events	  of	   1838-­‐1842,	   Burnes	   and	   Masson	   provided	   the	   bulk	   of	   information	  emanating	  from	  Kabul	  as	  agents	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐General.	  Masson	  filled	  this	  role	   officially	   from	   1835-­‐1838,	   with	   Burnes	   joining	   him	   as	   his	   immediate	  superior	   in	   1837.	   They	   both	   left	   following	   the	   failure	   of	   negotiations	   with	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  in	  1838.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  during	  his	  second	  commercial	  mission	  of	  1836,	  Burnes	  and	  his	  collaborators	  provided	  numerous	  dispatches	  and	  extensive	  reports	  on	  developments	  in	  the	  region.	  These	  reports,	  sent	  to	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐General,	  represent	  a	  key	  information	  chain	  and	  a	   telling	   catalogue	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  British	  understandings	  were	  being	  shaped	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	  To	   the	   names	   of	   Burnes	   and	   Masson	   we	   can	   also	   add	   those	   who	   took	   up	  positions	   within	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   British	   Government	   and	   East	   India	  Company.	   Captain	   Claude	   Wade	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   intelligence	   collation	   at	  Ludhiana,4	  a	  role	  that	  allowed	  him	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  power	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  that	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  Lord	  Auckland.	  Similarly,	   Auckland’s	   two	   secretaries,	   John	   Colvin	   and	   William	   Hay	  Macnaghten	   had	   the	   ear	   of	   the	   Lord	   Auckland	   and	   oversaw	   the	   reports	  crossing	  his	  desk.	  Outside	  of	  India,	  the	  British	  envoy	  at	  Tehran	  William	  Ellis	  and	   his	   successor	   John	  McNeill	   both	   held	   influential	   positions	   due	   to	   their	  ease	  of	  communication	  with	  London	  and,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  McNeill,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Now	  in	  the	  modern	  Indian	  state	  of	  Punjab,	  near	  the	  border	  with	  Pakistan.	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in	  their	  reporting	  of	  Persian	  and	  Russian	  activities	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  Herat.	   McNeill’s	   deputy	   Charles	   Stoddart,	   played	   a	   role	   in	   reporting	   back	  from	   Herat	   during	   the	   Persian	   siege	   of	   that	   city	   from	   November	   1837	   to	  September	  1838.	   In	  Herat	   itself,	   and	  reporting	   to	  McNeill	   via	  Stoddart,	  was	  Lieutenant	  Eldred	  Pottinger,	  who	  had	  found	  himself	  stranded	  in	  the	  city	  after	  having	  taken	  leave	  from	  the	  Indian	  Army	  to	  travel	  through	  Afghanistan.	  	  Whilst	   the	   earlier	   works	   of	   Elphinstone,	   Burnes,	   and	   Masson	   had	  encompassed	  a	  broad	  sweep	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  historical,	  political,	  and	  societal	  constitution,	   this	   knowledge	   was	   now	   being	   filtered	   by	   an	   increasingly	  overbearing	  policy	  programme.	  This	  was	  a	  programme	  that	  favoured	  certain	  types	   of	   information	   over	   others,	   and	   contained	   built-­‐in	   assumptions	   as	   to	  the	   connections	   between	   such	   information.	   These	   filters	   operated	   in	   a	  slightly	   different	   fashion	   depending	   on	   which	   location	   one	   considered.	  Whereas	   London	   prioritised	   the	   grand	   strategic	   picture,	   Calcutta	   remained	  more	   cognisant	   of	   regional	   complexities	   and	   imperatives,	   meanwhile	   the	  political	  agents	  at	  Ludhiana	  and	  Kabul,	  with	  their	  highly	  granular	  perspective,	  were	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  nuance	  in	  particular	  policy	  prescriptions.	  Therefore,	  just	   as	   Ulrike	   Hilleman	   has	   demonstrated	   with	   respect	   to	   British	   Imperial	  relations	   with	   China,	   British	   imaginings	   were	   becoming	   distinguished	   by	  ‘contact	  zones’	  –	  geographically	  separated,	  yet	  interconnected	  sites	  at	  which	  imaginings	  of	  Afghanistan	  encountered	  emergent	  policy	  imperatives.5	  It	  was	  at	  these	  sites	  that	  war	  with	  Afghanistan	  became	  imaginable	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  process	  unfolded,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  policy-­‐making	  system	  worked.	  	  
	  
Anatomy	  of	  a	  Policy	  Making	  Process:	  The	  Institutional	  Context	  	  The	  policy-­‐making	  apparatus	   in	   India	  during	   the	  1830s	  was	   in	  a	  process	  of	  transition	   in	   a	   number	   of	   important	  ways.	   Firstly,	   the	   East	   India	   Company	  (EIC)	  was	  reaching	  the	  twilight	  years	  of	  its	  role	  in	  running	  British	  territorial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Hillemann,	  Asian	  Empire	  and	  British	  Knowledge.	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concerns	  in	  India.	  Having	  acted	  as	  a	  more	  autonomous	  agent	  throughout	  the	  eighteenth	   century	   it	   became	   increasingly	   subordinate	   to	   the	   British	  Government.	  In	  1773	  the	  Regulating	  Act	  had	  brought	  shared	  control	  of	  Indian	  Affairs	   between	   the	   Government	   in	   London	   and	   the	   EIC.	   The	   India	   Act	   of	  1784	   then	   effectively	   rendered	   the	   Company	   subordinate	   to	   the	   Crown,	  establishing	  a	  Board	  of	  Control	  comprising	  six	  privy	  councillors,	  including	  at	  least	  two	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Crown,	  and	  possessing	  the	  right	  to	  issue	  orders	  to	  the	  Company’s	  servants	  in	  India.6	  In	  1813	  the	  Company	  lost	  its	  monopoly	  of	  trade	   in	   India,	   and	   in	   1834	   it	   also	   lost	   its	   trade	  monopoly	  with	   China.	   The	  previous	  year’s	   charter	   renewal	   in	  1833	  had	   further	  eroded	   the	  Company’s	  political	   power	   with	   clause	   39	   stipulating	   ‘that	   the	   superintendence,	  direction,	  and	  control	  of	  whole	  civil	  and	  military	  government	  of	  all	   the	  said	  territories	  and	  revenues	  in	  India	  shall	  be	  and	  is	  hereby	  vested	  in	  a	  Governor-­‐general	   and	   counsellors,	   to	   be	   styled	   “The	   Governor-­‐general	   of	   India	   in	  Council’.7	  	  At	  the	  time	  this	  was	  a	  position	  filled	  by	  Lord	  William	  Bentinck,	  the	  progenitor	  of	  the	  ‘Age	  of	  Reform’	  that	  served	  to	  cut	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  army	  and	  the	  Indian	  civil	   service,	   thus	   turning	   the	   Company’s	   troubled	   finances	   back	   into	   the	  black.	   Between	  1829	   and	  1835	   the	   budget	   deficit	   of	   one	   and	   a	   half	  million	  pounds	  sterling	  was	   turned	   into	  a	  budget	  surplus	  of	  half	  a	  million	  pounds.8	  Although	  Pitt’s	  1784	  India	  Act	  had	  vested	  the	  Court	  of	  Directors	  of	   the	  East	  India	  Company	  with	  power	   to	  nominate	   the	  positions	  of	  Governor-­‐General,	  the	  Governorships	  of	  the	  Presidencies,	  and	  the	  chiefs	  of	  the	  Army	  Commands,	  these	  nominations	  were	  usually	  made	  by	   the	  Ministry,	   and	  were	   subject	   to	  the	   approbation	   of	   the	   Crown.	   In	   reality	   therefore,	   the	   legal	   powers	   of	   the	  Court	   of	   Directors	   over	   the	   nomination	   effectively	   amounted	   to	   a	   right	   of	  veto.9	  By	   1833	   even	   this	   circumscribed	   authority	   had	   been	   eroded	   as	   the	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  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  5-­‐6.	  7	  Phillip	  Lawson,	  The	  East	  India	  Company:	  A	  History,	  (Harlow,	  Essex:	  Longman,	  1993),	  159.	  8	  Christopher	  A.	  Bayly,	  Indian	  Society	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  1988),	  121.	  9	  Peter	  J.	  N.	  Tuck	  (ed.),	  The	  East	  India	  Company	  1600-­1858	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  14.	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Ministry	  ignored	  the	  Court	  by	  sending	  Lord	  Auckland	  to	  succeed	  Bentinck.10	  The	  government	  was	  beginning	  to	  exert	  its	  authority.	  	  The	   Governor-­‐General	   at	   this	   time	   was	   also	   beginning	   to	   enjoy	   a	   more	  exalted	  position	   in	   the	  British	  colonial	  policy-­‐making	  hierarchy.	  Despite	   the	  appearance	  of	  metropolitan	  centralism,	  British	  India	  was	  beginning	  to	  craft	  a	  distinct	  foreign	  policy	  for	  itself,	  one	  that	  would	  be	  more	  cognizant	  of	  regional	  realities,	   rather	   than	  as	  a	   tool	  of	  balancing	  what	  were	  essentially	  European	  geopolitical	   concerns.	   In	   part,	   this	   shift	   was	   a	   recognition	   of	   the	   need	   for	  British	   India	   to	   take	   its	   frontier	   security	   more	   seriously.	   The	   growing	  intellectual	   climate	   of	   ‘Russophobia’	   in	   London	   was	   contributing	   to	   a	  metropolitan	  concern	  with	  India’s	  north-­‐west.	  As	  early	  as	  16	  December	  1829,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  Lord	  Ellenborough	  had	  proposed	  to	  the	  then	   Prime	   Minister	   Wellington	   that	   ‘the	   Indian	   Government	   should	   be	  authorized	   to	   act	   as	   an	   Asiatic	   power,	   ignoring	   the	   effect	   of	   its	   actions	   on	  Britain	  and	  Europe,	  if	  the	  Russians	  moved	  towards	  Kabul.’11	  In	  practice,	  this	  left	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   in	   something	   of	   a	   halfway	   house.	   Although	   the	  authority	   to	   wage	   war	   was	   not	   conferred	   on	   the	   Governor-­‐General,	  Wellington	   went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   allow	   him	   more	   autonomy	   in	   making	   those	  expenditures	  necessary	  to	  meet	  the	  threat.	  	  With	   a	   growing	   interest	   in	   the	  north-­‐west,	   the	   importance	  of	   ‘politicals’	   on	  the	  frontier	  was	  beginning	  to	  grow.	  Shortly	  before	  his	  conversation	  with	  the	  Prime	   Minister,	   Ellenborough	   had	   written	   to	   the	   Governor	   of	   Bombay,	   Sir	  John	   Malcolm,	   and	   expressed	   his	   opinion	   over	   where	   the	   shortfall	   lay	   in	  appraising	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   north-­‐west:	   ‘What	   we	   ought	   to	   have	   is	  
Information’,	   he	   insisted.	   	   ‘The	   first,	   the	   second,	   and	   the	   third	   thing	   a	  government	  ought	  always	   to	  have	   is	   Information’.12	  To	   this	   end,	   in	  1831	  an	  ‘able	   and	   discreet	   officer’	   in	   the	   form	   of	   Alexander	   Burnes	  was	   selected	   to	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  Tuck,	  The	  East	  India	  Company	  1600-­1858,	  297.	  This	  was	  after	  the	  Directors	  had	  already	  been	  ignored	  once	  on	  their	  choice	  of	  Sir	  Charles	  Metcalfe	  for	  the	  position.	  The	  	  Ministry	  appointed	  instead,	  ‘the	  almost	  unknown	  Lord	  Heytesbury’.	  Tuck,	  The	  East	  India	  Company	  
1600-­1858,	  197.	  11	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  31.	  12	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  18.	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escort	  horses	  to	  Runjit	  Singh,	  a	  mission	  that	  would	  serve	  to	  satiate	  this	  thirst	  for	   knowledge	   of	   territories	   of	   the	   Indus	   and	   beyond.13	  Meanwhile	   Colonel	  Henry	  Pottinger	  was	  put	  in	  charge	  of	  satisfying	  the	  commercial	  ambitions	  of	  Ellenborough	  as	  well	  as	  his	  intelligence	  needs.	  	  Three	  sites	  of	  information	  and	  knowledge	  exchange	  were	  thus	  central	  to	  the	  picture	   that	   the	   British	   were	   beginning	   to	   build	   up.	   Firstly,	   London,	   the	  Cabinet,	  and	   the	  Court	  of	  Directors;	   secondly	  Calcutta,	  and	   the	  Office	  of	   the	  Governor-­‐General;	  and	  thirdly	  the	  Punjab,	  with	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  ‘politicals’	  making	   their	   way	   northwards,	   and	   reporting	   back	   to	   Pottinger,	   and	   later	  Claude	  Wade,	  who	  became	  the	  Political	  Agent	  at	  Ludhiana,	  reporting	  directly	  to	  the	  Governor-­‐General.	  This	  arrangement	  is	  significant	  not	  only	  for	  what	  it	  tells	   us	   of	   the	   channels	   through	   which	   information,	   knowledge,	   and	  instructions	   were	   passed,	   but	   for	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   demonstrated	   the	  constant	   negotiation	   of	   centre-­‐periphery	   understandings	   of	   the	   precise	  problems	   that	   the	   British	   believed	   they	   faced	   in	   this	   region.	   Each	   of	   these	  sites	  of	  exchange	  differed	  in	  their	  definitions	  of	  the	  salient	  topics.	  	  	  
The	  Narrative	  Form	  of	  the	  Russian	  Menace	  	  A	   key	   aspect	   of	   the	   policy	   contestations	   that	   defined	   British	   thinking	   on	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  1830s	  concerned	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  threat	  presented	  by	  regional	  actors.	  In	  numerous	  histories	  of	  both	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  wars,	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  Russian	  threat	  as	  a	  motive	  for	  British	  actions	  looms	  large.	  In	  essence,	  this	  is	  not	  surprising,	  but	  it	  is	  potentially	  misleading.	  Disputing	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   Russian	   threat	   as	   an	   explanation	   for	   the	   First	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	  mission,	  the	  first	  of	  two	  that	  Burnes	  would	  carry	  out	  during	  the	  1830s,	  would	  result	  in	  the	  publication	  of	  Burnes’	  Travels	  into	  Bokhara.	  The	  Afghanistan	  leg	  of	  this	  journey	  was	  not	  originally	  intended	  as	  part	  of	  the	  trip,	  rather	  Burnes	  lobbied	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  for	  an	  extension	  to	  this	  trip.	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Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   a	   novel	   proposal.14	  But	   this	   begs	   the	  question	  as	  to	  why	  it	  is	  such	  a	  constant	  feature	  in	  the	  literature?	  	  	  The	   focus	   on	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   is	   in	   part	   a	   post-­‐hoc	   rationalization.	  Later	  references	  to	  the	  ‘great	  game’	  have	  induced	  many	  writers	  to	  look	  upon	  the	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   these	   rivalries.	   Arguably,	   the	  contemporary	  setting	  provided	  a	  further	  rationalization	  as	  the	  Cold	  War	  gave	  the	  impression	  of	  an	  enduring	  Russian	  sense	  of	  historic	  destiny	  to	  dominate	  global	  politics.15	  However,	  narrative	  forms	  exist	  in	  a	  textual	  sense	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  cognitive	  sense	  as	  ‘instruments	  of	  the	  mind’,16	  and	  the	  permanence	  of	  the	  Russian	   threat	   narrative	   is	   in	   part	   a	   reflection	   of	   its	   prominence	   in	   certain	  public	   debates	   at	   the	   time.	   In	   turn,	   these	   found	   a	   home	   in	   the	   archives	  documenting	  high-­‐level	  policy	  debates.17	  	  	  The	  intellectual	  and	  policy	  climate	  in	  Britain	  during	  the	  1820s	  and	  1830s	  was	  certainly	   favourable	   to	   ‘Russophobia’.	   In	   1828	   President	   of	   the	   Board	   of	  Control,	  Lord	  Ellenborough	  opined	  that	   ‘Russia	  will	  attempt,	  by	  conquest	  or	  by	  influence,	  to	  secure	  Persia	  as	  a	  road	  to	  the	  Indus,	  I	  have	  the	  most	  intimate	  conviction.’	   Colonel	   De	   Lacy	   Evans’	   1828	   work	   On	   the	   Designs	   of	   Russia	  captured	  a	  public	  mood	  wary	  of	  Russian	  moves	  against	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  Following	   the	   treaty	   of	   Adrianople	   which	   ended	   that	   war	   in	   1829,	  Wellington’s	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Lord	  Aberdeen	  warned	  that	  ‘Russia	  holds	  the	  keys’	  in	  Asia	  Minor.	  Meanwhile	  De	  Lacy	  Evans	  released	  in	  the	  same	  year	  his	  follow	  up	  work,	  the	  provocatively	  titled	  Practicability	  of	  an	  Invasion	  of	  British	  
India.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Council,	  Lord	  Ellenborough	  sent	  copies	  to	  the	  British	  representatives	  in	  Persia	  and	  Bombay.18	  Conolly’s	  1834	  release	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Among	  those	  who	  have	  pointed	  out	  a	  more	  local	  explanation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Anglo-­‐Sikh	  relations	  for	  example,	  see	  Bayly,	  Indian	  Society	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  126;	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	  15	  Peter	  the	  Great	  died	  in	  1725,	  but	  as	  the	  doyenne	  of	  the	  great	  game	  narrative,	  Peter	  Hopkirk	  points	  out	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  The	  Great	  Game,	  his	  instructions	  to	  his	  heirs	  and	  successors	  on	  his	  death	  bed	  that	  Russia	  must	  achieve	  its	  historical	  destiny	  to	  dominate	  the	  world	  have	  long	  exerted	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  ambition.	  The	  ‘twin	  keys’	  to	  this	  world	  domination,	  according	  to	  Peter	  the	  Great,	  were	  possession	  of	  Constantinople	  and	  India.	  Hopkirk,	  The	  Great	  Game,	  20.	  16	  Jerome	  Bruner,	  ‘The	  Narrative	  Construction	  of	  Reality’,	  Critical	  Enquiry,	  18/1	  (1991),	  6.	  17	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	  18	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  30.	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his	  Journey	  to	  the	  North	  of	  India	  also	  provided	  material	  for	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  portray	  an	  imminent	  threat,	  including	  the	  noted	  Russophobe	  and	  alarmist	  David	   Urquart	   in	   his	   popular	   volume	   England,	   France,	   Russia	   and	   Turkey,	  which	  soon	  ran	  to	  five	  editions.19	  	  Despite	  this	  apparently	  fevered	  atmosphere,	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  was	  founded	  on	   paranoia	   stemming	   from	   an	   absence	   of	   accurate	   information	   to	   the	  contrary.	  The	  British	  envoy	  to	  Persia,	  Sir	  John	  Macdonald,	  perhaps	  indicated	  this	   prevailing	   sense	   of	   ignorance,	   when	   he	   wrote	   to	   his	   colleague	   in	  Constantinople	  that	  the	  Russians	  would	  easily	  conquer	  Transcaspia,	  and	  once	  they	  had	  Bokhara	  ‘the	  way	  is	  short	  and	  easy	  from	  the	  Oxus	  to	  the	  Indus.	  The	  Russians	   would	   be	   astonished	   at	   the	   facility	   of	   their	   conquests’.20	  As	   the	  rudimentary	   cartography	   in	   Elphinstone’s	   Account	   had	   already	   shown,	   the	  Hindu	   Kush	   was	   likely	   to	   provide	   a	   significant	   hurdle.	   In	   addition,	   any	  military	   force	   would	   have	   to	   contend	   with	   vast	   deserts,	   scarce	   water,	   and	  very	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  food	  sources,	  all	  of	  which	  would	  put	  a	  heavy	  demand	  on	   supply	   trains	   that	   would	   need	   to	   be	   heavily	   guarded.	   The	   supposed	  Russian	  threat	  was	  a	  convenient	  excuse	  for	  an	  expansionist	  policy	  on	  India’s	  north-­‐east,	  but	  at	  the	  time	  this	  was	  envisaged	  as	  an	  expansion	  of	  information	  systems	  and	  trade,	  not	  of	  military	  intervention.	  	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  grand	  strategic	  picture	  at	  the	  metropole	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  inevitable.	  ‘The	  Russian	  army	  might	  not	  come	  at	  last’,	  wrote	  Kaye,	  ‘but	  it	   was	   clearly	   the	   duty	   of	   an	   Indian	   statesman	   to	   know	   how	   it	   would	  endeavour	   to	   come.’21	  Faced	   with	   this	   responsibility,	   the	   familiar	   threat	   of	  Russia	  provided	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  a	  form	  of	  ontological	  security	  in	  the	  face	  of	  scarce	   information	  and	  knowledge	   from	  elsewhere;	   it	  was	  a	   familiar	   ‘threat	  conceptualization’22	  that	  most	   in	   the	  metropole	   could	   agree	   on.	   Put	   within	  the	  context	  of	  Ellenborough’s	  demand	  for	  Britain	  to	  begin	  to	  act	  as	  an	  ‘Asiatic	  Power’	   this	   takes	   on	   an	   additional	   significance.	   Although	   this	   shift	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  G.	  J.	  Adler,	  ‘The	  Key	  to	  India?:	  Britain	  and	  the	  Herat	  Problem	  1830-­‐1863	  –	  Part	  1’,	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies,	  10/2	  (1974),	  188-­‐9.	  20	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  18.	  21	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol.	  I,	  170.	  22	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	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geopolitical	   purpose	   was	   ostensibly	   one	   of	   practicality,	   it	   was	   a	   shift	   that	  carried	   with	   it	   representations	   that	   remained	   resonant	   with	   European	  geopolitical	   concerns.	  British	  policy	  makers	  were	   increasingly	  given	   licence	  to	   connect	   representations	   of	   Russia	   in	   Europe	   to	   the	   Asiatic	   operating	  theatre.	  Russian	  moves	  in	  Persia	  and	  Afghanistan	  became	  part	  of	  the	  ‘Eastern	  Question’,	  and	  this	  remained	  connected	   in	  part	   to	  European	  considerations.	  This	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  Russians,	  who	  ‘could	  bring	  pressure	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  British	   in	   Europe	   by	  making	   their	   flesh	   creep	   in	   India’.23	  Exactly	   how	   they	  would	   choose	   to	   do	   this	   though,	   is	   the	   important	   consideration	   here,	   and	  brings	  understandings	  of	  Afghanistan	  back	  into	  the	  fray	  as	  a	  central	  concern.	  	  Whilst	  the	  British	  had	  decided	  at	  one	  level	  that	  Russia	  provided	  some	  form	  of	  threat,	   it	  was	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   threat	   that	   determined	   the	   initial	   response.	  	  The	   military	   danger	   presented	   by	   Russia	   was	   easily	   dismissed	   as	   mere	  speculation	   through	  much	   of	   the	   1830s,	   but	   it	  was	   the	   influence	   of	   Russia,	  and	  particularly	  the	  manifestations	  of	  this	  in	  forms	  of	  rumour	  that	  posed	  the	  more	  worrying	   challenge.	   The	   British	   had	   for	   some	   time	   been	   comfortable	  with	   the	   view	   that	   their	   position	   in	   India	   owed	   much	   to	   widely	   held	  perceptions	   of	   their	   superior	   military	   power.	   As	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   of	  Madras,	  Sir	  Charles	  Metcalfe	  put	  it,	  ‘[s]ome	  say	  that	  our	  Empire	  in	  India	  rests	  on	  opinion,	  others	  on	  main	  force.	  It	  in	  fact	  depends	  on	  both.	  …	  Our	  force	  does	  not	   operate	   so	   much	   by	   its	   actual	   strength	   as	   by	   the	   impression	   which	   it	  produces,	  and	  that	  impression	  is	  the	  opinion	  by	  which	  we	  hold	  India.’24	  	  	  The	  impressions	  held	  by	  the	  populace	  were	  thus	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  the	  British,	  and	  partly	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  exclusion	  from	  Indian	  society,	  the	  British	  worried	  constantly	  about	  this	  image.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Russian	  threat,	  the	  British	  feared	  the	  rumour	  of	  encroaching	  Russian	  forces	  and	  the	  destabilizing	  effect	   this	   could	   have	   on	   their	   fragile	   edifice	   of	   power.	   This	  was	   felt	   to	   be	  particularly	   acute	   at	   the	   fringes	   of	   British	   Indian	   territory.	   As	   Lord	  Ellenborough,	   one	   of	   the	  more	   paranoid	   policy	  makers	   noted	   in	   1830:	   ‘We	  dread	  …	   not	   so	  much	   actual	   invasion	   by	   Russia,	   as	   the	  moral	   effect	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  16.	  24	  Demetrius,	  C.	  Boulger,	  Lord	  William	  Bentinck	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1897),	  175.	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would	  be	  produced	  amongst	  our	  own	  subjects	  and	  among	   the	  Princes	  with	  whom	  we	   are	   allied,	   by	   the	   continued	   apprehension	   of	   that	   event.’25	  As	   he	  also	  pointed	  out,	   this	  had	   financial	   implications	   since	  military	  preparations	  against	  outside	  threats	  would	  require	  efforts	  to	  counter	   internal	  unrest	  too.	  To	   prepare	   for	   this	   would	   require	   a	   diplomatic	   presence,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  accurate	  and	  efficient	  information	  system,	  hence	  the	  need	  to	  send	  ‘politicals’	  to	   Afghanistan.	   Needless	   to	   say,	   the	   policy	   environment	   provided	   a	   fertile	  arena	  for	  rumour	  and	  panic	  to	  take	  hold.	  	  The	  difficulty	  for	  Masson	  and	  Burnes	  (who	  joined	  Masson	  in	  1837)	  was	  that	  although	   Kabul	   was	   by	   now	   functioning	   as	   a	   forward	   political	   agency,	   the	  intelligence	   that	   was	  most	   ardently	   required	   in	   London	   related	   to	   Russian	  activities,	   and	   therefore	   concerned	   events	   that	   were	   taking	   place	   several	  hundred	   miles	   away,	   a	   weakness	   acknowledged	   in	   one	   of	   Burnes’	   initial	  dispatches	  having	  arrived	  in	  Kabul	  when	  he	  expressed	  ‘some	  small	  doubt’	  as	  to	   the	   ‘entire	   correctness’	   of	   his	   reports	   on	   Russia. 26 	  Despite	   these	  shortcomings	  Burnes	  was	  able	  to	  surmise	  that	  Russian	  commercial	  influence	  had	  met	  with	  mixed	  progress.	  	  In	  1835	  the	  Russians	  had	  established	  a	  military	  post	  on	  the	  eastern	  shore	  of	  the	   Caspian	   at	   Mungusluck,	   causing	   offence	   to	   the	   Chief	   of	   Khiva	   and	  prompting	  him	  to	  solicit	  the	  King	  of	  Bokhara	  and	  the	  Khan	  of	  Kokan	  for	  aid	  against	   the	   Russians,	   which	   was	   not	   forthcoming.	   In	   July	   1836	   Emperor	  Nicholas	   addressed	   a	   commerical	   fair	   in	   Nejnei	   Novogorod,	   and	   conferred	  with	   the	  merchants	   looking	   for	  ways	   to	   promote	   their	   interests.	   But	   at	   the	  same	   time	  he	  detained	   forty	   six	  merchants	   from	  Orgunge,	   sending	   them	   to	  Moscow.	   Once	   again	   the	   Khan	   of	   Khiva	   requested	   aid	   from	   Bokhara	   and	  Kokan.	  This	  time	  the	  King	  of	  Bokhara	  agreed	  to	  send	  an	  agent	  to	  the	  emperor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Quoted	  in	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  31.	  Demonstating	  the	  longevity	  of	  this	  concept,	  it	  was	  later	  repeated	  in	  an	  1836	  dispatch	  by	  George	  Trevelyan,	  at	  the	  time	  the	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  India.	  Cited	  in	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  36.	  26	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  ‘Views	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Russia	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  Particularly	  Towards	  Khiva	  and	  Herat’,	  No.5,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  dated	  20	  October	  1837,	  p.23.	  Burnes	  indicated	  that	  these	  reports	  were	  based	  on	  the	  ‘good	  authority’	  of	  merchant	  traders	  travelling	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Turkistan.	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to	   negotiate	   for	   their	   release.	   Burnes	   reported	   that	   a	   caravan	   had	   recently	  arrived	  with	  intelligence	  that	  the	  request	  for	  the	  merchants’	  release	  had	  been	  rejected	  and	  they	  had	  been	  marched	  to	  Siberia,	  adding,	  ‘[t]his	  intelligence	  has	  been	   received	  with	   great	   dissatisfaction	   in	   Toorkistan,	   and	   for	   the	   present	  will	   lead	  to	  a	  suspension	  of	  all	   trade	  between	  that	  country,	  and	  Russia.	   It	   is	  even	  stated	  that	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Kokan,	  Bokhara	  and	  Khiva	  will	  league	  together,	  and	  take	  measures	  to	  capture	  Russians	  and	  their	  property’.27	  	  Burnes	   noted	   that	   should	   Russia	   decide	   to	   punish	   Khiva,	   Persian	   interests	  would	  be	   aligned	  with	   such	   a	  move	   since	  Persia	   had	   thousands	  of	   subjects	  enslaved	  there,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  likely	  scenario.	  Indeed,	  Burnes	  was	  keen	  to	  downplay	  the	  Russian	  threat,	  explaining	  their	  interests	  in	  Persia	  in	   commercial	   terms:	   ‘To	   a	   country	  wanting	  money,	   and	   abounding	   in	   raw	  materials	  as	  Russia,	  any	  new	  outlet	   to	  her	  commerce	  must	  be	  as	  dear	  as	   to	  Great	  Britain.	  We	  shall	  thus	  find	  a	  strong	  motive	  for	  the	  attention	  directed	  by	  her	   to	   this	   quarter,	   without	   believing	   that	   she	   contemplates	   the	   gigantic	  enterprise	  of	  invading	  either	  Cabool,	  or	  India.’28	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  opacity	  of	  this	  ‘distant	  threat’,	  British	  agents	  were	  stymied	  by	   the	   Russian	   tendency	   to	   operate	   through	  what	   were	   in	   effect	   freelance	  intelligence	   operatives.	   Indeed	   Henry	  Willock,	   the	   former	   British	   envoy	   to	  Persia	  sent	  a	  blistering	  –	  if	  somewhat	  belated	  –	  letter	  to	  Lord	  Palmerston,	  the	  Foreign	   Secretary	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   Army	   of	   the	   Indus	   into	  Afghanistan	   pointing	   out	   that	   ‘[m]uch	   more	   will	   always	   be	   attributed	   to	  Russia	  than	  she	  really	  designs,	  and	  to	  this	  she	  has	  no	  objection,	  so	  long	  as	  her	  direct	   agency	   cannot	   be	   discovered;	   and	   when	   it	   is	   laid	   open,	   she	   has	   no	  hesitation	   in	   sacrificing	   her	  maladroit	   agents.’29	  Intelligence	   reports	   linking	  individuals	  to	  Russia	  were	  often	  based	  on	  nothing	  more	  than	  conjecture.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  ‘Views	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Russia	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  Particularly	  Towards	  Khiva	  and	  Herat’,	  No.5,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  dated	  20	  October	  1837,	  p.25.	  28	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  ‘Views	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Russia	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  Particularly	  Towards	  Khiva	  and	  Herat’,	  No.5,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  dated	  20	  October	  1837,	  p.26.	  29	  Mss	  Eur	  F88,	  p.104-­‐111,	  Henry	  Willock	  to	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  The	  Lord	  Viscount	  Palmerston,	  1	  December	  1838.	  The	  correspondence	  was	  forwarded	  to	  Elphinstone	  in	  a	  letter	  dated	  7	  December	  1838.	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  most	  notorious	  of	  the	  Russian	  Agents	  to	  be	  spotted	  in	  Kabul,	  Lieutenant	  Vitkevitch,	  was	  found	  dead	  in	  his	  room	  shortly	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  To	   sum	   up	   therefore,	   Russian	   moves	   provided	   a	   useful	   framing	   of	   the	  overarching	  reasons	  for	  an	  increasing	  presence	  in	  west	  of	  the	  Indus,	  but	  this	  was	   a	   flimsy	   framing	   of	   regional	   politics	   based	   more	   on	   paranoia	   that	  evidence.	   There	   was	   a	   quasi-­‐causal	   representation	   here	   of	   incremental	  growth	  in	  Russian	  influence	  through	  Persia,	  Herat,	  Kandahar,	  Kabul	  and	  then	  India.	  This	  made	  sense	   to	   the	  grand	  strategists	   in	  London	  but	   it	  was	  barely	  perceptible	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  Calcutta,	  the	  panic	  was	  far	  less	  palpable;	  as	  late	  as	  9	  April	  1837	  Auckland	  casually	  noted	  to	  Hobhouse	  that	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  ‘[i]n	  his	  pressing	  need	  …	  has	  courted	  Persia	  and	  he	  has	  courted	  Russia,	  and	  he	  has	  courted	  us’.31	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  did	  not	  prompt	  immediate	  concern	  in	   India	   is	   telling.	   Indeed,	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	   taking	  actions	  on	  such	  evidence	   was	   that	   this	   would	   simply	   be	   to	   fall	   into	   Russia’s	   trap.	   The	  aforementioned	  Henry	  Willock	   pointed	   this	   out	   in	   his	   letter	   to	   Palmerston,	  noting	   that	   Russia	   had	   observed	   from	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   British	   that	   in	  response	  to	   ‘the	  presence	  of	  her	  Envoy	  and	  a	  few	  of	  her	  Engineers	  with	  the	  Persian	  Army	  at	  Herat	  …	  	  something	  like	  a	  panic	  has	  occasioned	  the	  whole	  of	  the	   disposable	   force	   of	   India	   to	   be	   placed	   in	   motion,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  effecting	   projects	   of	   which	   the	   expence	   [sic]	   incalculable,	   the	   policy	  questionable,	  and	  the	  result	  at	  best	  uncertain.	  She	  has	  …	  learnt	  the	  mode	  of	  embarrassing	  our	   finances	  without	  putting	  a	  single	  battalion	   into	  motion.’32	  The	  fear	  that	  Russia	  was	  deliberately	   instigating	  acts	  of	  subversion	  was	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  after	  he	  returned	  to	  Russia.	  His	  death	  remains	  a	  mystery	  but	  he	  had	  apparently	  committed	  suicide.	  He	  is	  often	  erroneously	  credited	  with	  having	  driven	  the	  British	  to	  war	  with	  the	  Afghans	  over	  fears	  of	  Russian	  involvement.	  In	  fact,	  his	  treatment	  in	  Kabul	  was	  far	  from	  friendly,	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  barely	  registering	  his	  presence	  at	  least	  until	  the	  failure	  of	  negotiations	  with	  Burnes	  over	  the	  status	  of	  Peshawar.	  30	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  alleged	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Persian	  Government	  and	  Kambar	  Ali	  Khan,	  the	  Persian	  envoy	  to	  Kabul.	  The	  letter	  purported	  to	  show	  that	  the	  Persians	  were	  attempting	  to	  gather	  intelligence	  and	  win	  over	  the	  Afghan	  ‘chiefs’	  to	  their	  own	  interests.	  The	  suspicion	  Burnes	  raised	  of	  this,	  linking	  it	  to	  the	  Russians,	  seemed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  feeling	  that	  the	  Persians	  were	  not	  intelligent	  enough	  to	  come	  up	  with	  such	  a	  plan.	  As	  Burnes	  put	  it:	  ‘I	  have	  always	  considered	  the	  Persians	  to	  be	  [the]	  sharpest	  nation	  in	  Asia,	  but	  the	  intelligence	  there	  exhibited,	  is	  even	  beyond	  my	  standard	  of	  them.	  Is	  it	  not	  a	  Russian	  paper	  entirely?’	  MSS.	  Eur.	  E.	  161,	  Correspondence	  III,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeill,	  Enclosure	  No.	  4,	  No.	  3,	  633,	  ‘From	  Capt.	  Alexander	  Burnes’.	  The	  correspondence	  to	  which	  Burnes	  refers	  was	  also	  relayed	  to	  Masson	  by	  Burnes	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Enclosure	  No.	  3,	  ‘John	  McNeill	  to	  A.	  Burnes,	  Tehran,	  March	  13th	  1837’,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  translations	  contained	  therein	  of	  the	  Shah	  of	  Persia’s	  communications,	  marked	  No.9,	  ‘From	  Persian	  Govt	  to	  Kumber	  Ali	  Khan,	  envoy	  to	  Kabul.’	  	  	  31	  Broughton	  Papers,	  Add	  Ms	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  9	  April	  1837,	  p.120.	  32	  Mss	  Eur	  F88,	  Henry	  Willock	  to	  Elphinstone,	  7	  December	  1838,	  p.108.	  
	   132	  
only	  lacking	  in	  empirical	  evidence,	  it	  was	  a	  classic	  case	  of	  projection.	  In	  1838	  the	  Russian	  Foreign	  Minister	   sent	  a	  dispatch	   to	   the	  Russian	  Ambassador	   in	  London	  decrying	  the	  ‘indefatigable	  activity	  displayed	  by	  English	  travelers	  to	  spread	  disquiet	  among	  the	  people	  of	  Central	  Asia,	  and	  to	  carry	  agitation	  even	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  countries	  bordering	  on	  our	  frontier’.33	  	  Dealing	  with	  rumour	  required	  a	  much	  more	  delicate	  touch	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  1830s.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  constant	  demand	  emanating	  from	  London	  for	  information	   on	   Russia	   began	   to	  warp	   the	   intelligence	   picture,	   generating	   a	  misleading	  picture	  of	  the	  casus	  belli	  for	  historians,	  and	  shaping	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  British	  were	  facing.	  	  	  
A	  Strategy	  of	  Influence:	  Trade	  and	  Commerce	  	  Whilst	   the	   information	  system	  began	  to	  acquire	  an	  element	  of	   theory-­‐laden	  observation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Russian	  threat	  at	  the	  metropole,	  the	  discussion	  from	  Calcutta	  remained	  very	  much	  one	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  a	  political,	  or	  a	  military	  sense.	  Instead	  the	  manner	  of	  influence	  rested	  explicitly	  on	  trade	  and	  commerce.	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  1830s	  non-­‐intervention	  was	  a	  dominant	  theme	  with	  respect	  to	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations.	  Company	  officials	  were	  repeatedly	  warned	  off	  any	  relations	  of	  a	  political	  nature,	  and	  any	  British	   interference	  was	  deliberately	  low-­‐key.	   This	   did	   not	   negate	   interference	   by	   proxy	   however.	   In	   1831	   and	  again	  in	  1834,	  Shah	  Shuja,	  the	  exiled	  leader	  in	  Ludhiana	  mounted	  expeditions	  with	  the	  tacit	  support	  of	  the	  British	  and	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  the	  EIC.	  The	  rationale	   behind	   this	   was	   that	   Shuja	   would	   find	   the	   means	   to	   mount	   his	  expedition	   regardless	   of	   British	   involvement,	   and	   that	   by	   advancing	   his	  pension	  –	  which	  was	   the	  extent	  of	  British	   financial	   support	  –	   they	   could	  at	  least	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  developments	   in	  this	  quarter.	  The	  indication	  of	  British	  interest	   was	   strictly	   guarded	   against	   however.	   In	   December	   1831	   Prinsep	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Quoted	  in	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan,	  32.	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wrote	   to	   Wade	   informing	   him	   that	   ‘the	   Governor-­‐general	   approves	   your	  keeping	  him	  informed	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  [negotiations	  with	  Shah	  Shuja	  over	  his	   finances]	   but	   does	   not	   deem	   it	   necessary	   that	   you	   should	   in	   any	   way	  interfere	   with	   advice	   or	   otherwise	   with	   either	   party.’34	  In	   1833,	   ahead	   of	  Shuja’s	  second	  attempt	  this	  position	  was	  reiterated,	  this	  time	  by	  Macnaghten	  who	  expressed	  the	  Governor-­‐general’s	  opinion	  ‘that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  take	  any	  interest	   in	   the	   plans	   connected	   with	   the	   route	   of	   Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk,	   and	  should	  an	  impression	  exist	   in	  any	  quarter	  that	  the	  British	  Government	  feels	  otherwise	  than	  indifferent	  as	  to	  the	  movements	  of	  the	  Shah,	  you	  will	  do	  your	  utmost	   to	   remove	   it.’35	  The	   British	   were	   also	   keen	   to	   express	   their	   non-­‐intervention	   to	   the	   Sikh	   ruler	   Ranjit	   Singh,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   Shah	   Shuja’s	  venture.36	  This	   attitude	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   would	   extend	   to	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	  relations	  too.37	  	  The	   attitude	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   did	   not	   extend	   to	   trade	   however,	   indeed	  commerce	   was	   the	   preferred	   mode	   of	   influencing	   the	   Afghan	   state	   in	   the	  early	   stages	   of	   British	   involvement.	   This	   mission	   was	   in	   line	   with	  explorations	  being	  carried	  out	  elsewhere	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  EIC,	  including	  Colonel	  Francis	  Rawdon	  Chesney,	  who	  between	  1835	  and	  1837	  was	  engaged	  in	   the	  exploration	  of	   the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers,	   in	  order	   to	  assess	   the	  prospects	   of	   their	   navigability.38	  The	   British	   had	   through	   their	   own	   travels	  constructed	   an	   image	  of	  Afghanistan	   as	   a	   trading	   corridor,	   a	   perception	  no	  doubt	   heightened	  by	   the	   tendency	   of	   some	  of	   the	   early	   travellers	   to	   attach	  themselves	  to	  itinerant	  traders,	  kafillas,	  and	  lohani	  merchants.39	  As	  discussed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.	  2,	  H.T.	  Prinsep	  Esq	  to	  Captain	  Wade,	  4	  December	  1831,	  p.	  4.	  35	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.	  24,	  Macnaghten	  to	  Wade,	  5	  March	  1833,	  p.	  15.	  36	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.	  27,	  Bentinck	  to	  Runjit	  Singh,	  30	  April	  1833,	  p.	  16.	  Bentinck	  wrote,	  ‘[t]his	  is	  a	  matter	  with	  which	  the	  British	  Government	  has	  no	  concern,	  and	  it	  has	  therefore	  taken	  no	  pains	  to	  inquire	  into	  it.	  The	  Shah’s	  success	  or	  otherwise	  depends	  upon	  the	  will	  of	  Providence,	  and	  the	  favourable	  disposition	  towards	  him	  or	  otherwise	  of	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  that	  quarter’.	  37	  IOR/F/4/1680/67026,	  Burnes	  to	  Wade,	  3	  August	  1837,	  p.	  228.	  Referring	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  involvement	  in	  arbitrating	  the	  Afghan-­‐Sikh	  dispute	  Burnes	  wrote	  ‘acting	  up	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  instructions	  of	  Government	  conveyed	  to	  me	  on	  the	  15th	  May	  last.	  I	  feel	  bound	  to	  counsel	  the	  Chief	  of	  Kabul	  to	  make	  terms	  for	  himself,	  rather	  than	  through	  our	  agency	  or	  intervention’	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  38	  See	  Broughton	  Papers,	  IOR	  MSS.Eur.	  F.213.	  39	  Burnes	  frequently	  mentions	  the	  Lohani	  merchants	  in	  his	  Travels…	  Vol	  III.	  See	  for	  example	  p.	  332-­‐7	  when	  Burnes	  advises	  British	  engagment	  with	  the	  Lohanis	  for	  commercial	  purposes.	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in	   chapter	   two,	   Masson	   frequently	   embedded	   himself	   in	   the	   kafillas	  (caravans)	  of	  regional	   tradesmen,	  an	  experience	  that	  not	  only	   increased	  his	  insight	  into	  local	  tax-­‐collecting	  practices,	  but	  also	  indicated	  how	  revenue	  was	  a	   tool	  by	  which	   local	   chiefs	   could	   influence	   their	  populations,	  and	  maintain	  their	   standing.	   On	   his	   second	   trip	   to	   Kabul,	   Burnes	   remarked	   on	   the	  commercial	  advantages	  that	  the	  city	  derived	  from	  its	  geographical	  location	  at	  the	  confluence	  of	  various	  market	   routes.	  For	   the	  British	   this	   served	   further	  benefits	   as	   Burnes	   also	   noted:	   ‘Its	   political	   advantages	   though	   in	   a	   degree	  inferior	  to	  its	  commercial	  ones,	  are	  enhanced	  by	  them,	  since	  Cabool	  has	  rapid	  and	   regular	   communication	  with	   the	   countries	   adjacent,	   and	   is	   supplied,	   at	  the	  same	  time,	  with	  accurate	  information	  of	  what	  passes	  in	  them’.40	  	  	  To	   British	   policy-­‐makers,	   trade	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   local	   form	   of	   power	  management,	  but	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  order	  they	  propounded.	  Governor-­‐General	  Lord	  Auckland	  was	  keen	  to	  impress	  this	  on	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  in	  his	   initial	   communications	   with	   him.	   Writing	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   arrival	   of	  Burnes	  in	  May	  1837,	  he	  insisted	  that	  ‘to	  your	  enlightened	  mind	  it	  cannot	  fail	  to	  be	  obvious	  that	  commerce	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  natural	  prosperity	  and	  that	  it	  is	  commerce	  alone	  which	  enables	  the	  people	  of	  one	  country	  to	  exchange	  its	  superfluous	  commodities	   for	   those	  of	  another,	   to	  accumulate	  wealth	  and	   to	  enjoy	   all	   the	   comforts	   and	  blessings	   of	   civilized	   life.’	   The	  diffusion	   of	   these	  ‘blessings	   and	   comforts’	   was,	   he	   claimed,	   ‘the	   grand	   object	   of	   the	   British	  Government’.41	  On	  his	  way	  up	  the	  Indus	  for	  a	  second	  time	  Burnes’	  activities	  were	   clearly	   circumscribed	   in	   commercial	   terms.42	  Joining	   him	   on	   this	   trip	  were	   his	   colleagues	   Dr	   Lord,	   and	   Lt	   Leech.	   The	   Burnes	   mission	   was	  ostensibly	   a	   surveying	   mission	   in	   the	   best	   traditions	   of	   the	   empiricist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  IOR/V/27/270,	  No.IV,	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  14.	  41	  IOR/F/4/1680/67026,	  Letter	  from	  Lord	  Auckland	  to	  The	  Ameer	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan,	  p.	  147-­‐8.	  42	  As	  Captain	  Wade	  described	  it,	  ‘[t]he	  mission	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  strictly	  of	  a	  commercial	  character,	  and	  the	  object	  of	  it	  is	  to	  collect	  commercial	  information,	  and	  to	  make	  known	  to	  the	  merchants	  residing	  beyond	  the	  Indus	  the	  measures	  which	  have	  been	  adopted	  with	  a	  view	  to	  re-­‐establishing	  the	  trade	  by	  that	  river.’	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  405-­‐6.	  Citing	  a	  letter	  from	  Wade	  to	  Masson	  dated	  30th	  September	  1836,	  copies	  of	  which	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Masson	  Papers,	  MSS.	  Eur.	  E.	  161,	  Correspondence	  II.	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methods	   of	   the	   enlightenment.	   Therefore,	   the	   data	   contained	   within	   these	  reports	  was	  of	  a	  highly	  categorical,	  and	  often	  quantitative	  nature.43	  	  The	  plan	  for	  the	  mission	  was	  to	  explore	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  establishing	  of	  a	  convenient	  position	  on	  the	  Indus	  for	  a	  trade	  ‘entrepôt’	  and	  ‘annual	  fair’.44	  It	   was	   envisaged,	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   such	   a	   trading	   post	   would	   emanate	  along	  the	  networks	  of	  trade	  that	  worked	  their	  way	  up	  the	  Indus,	  through	  the	  Bolan	  and	  Khyber	  passes,	  to	  Kabul	  and	  beyond.	  This	  was	  a	  project	  that	  would	  not	   only	   serve	   to	   increase	   British	   influence	   in	   the	   region,	   but	   would	   draw	  trade	  away	  from	  similar	  Russian	  trade	  fairs	  in	  the	  Khanates	  of	  the	  north.	  The	  tone	   of	   the	   political,	   geographical,	   and	   commercial	   sections	   of	   the	   Burnes	  mission	   reports	   were	   therefore	   infused	   with	   the	   ‘language	   of	   trade’.	   As	  Hopkins	   puts	   it,	   this	   language	   ‘served	   as	   more	   than	   simply	   a	   medium	   of	  political	  rhetoric.	  	  Instead,	  trade	  was	  the	  idiom	  of	  British	  governmentality	  for	  this	   generation.	   	   British	   philosophies	   of	   governance	   considered	   trade,	   or	  rather	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  environment	  conducive	  to	  free	  trade,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  areas	  of	  sovereign	  competence.’45	  	  This	   language	   shaped	   the	   observations	   that	   the	   British	   made	   of	   the	   space	  they	   encountered.	   Burnes	   provides	   a	   perfect	   example	   in	   his	   description	   of	  Kabul:	  	   As	   a	   city,	   Cabool	   owes	   more	   importance	   to	   its	   position,	   which	   is	  centrical	   for	   commerce,	   than	  being	   the	   seat	   of	   a	  Government,	   and	   it	  has	   therefore	   stemmed	   with	   success	   the	   various	   revolutions	   which	  have	  disturbed	   the	  general	  peace	  of	   this	  country.	   Invigorated	  as	   it	   is	  by	   this	   independence,	   there	   are	   few	   positions	   in	   the	   East	   better	  adapted	  for	  a	  metropolis.	   Its	  political	  advantages,	  though	  in	  a	  degree	  inferior	   to	   its	   commercial	   ones,	   are	   enhanced	  by	   them,	   since	  Cabool	  has	   a	   rapid	   and	   regular	   communication	  with	   the	   countries	   adjacent,	  and	   is	  supplied,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  with	  accurate	   information	  of	  what	  passes	  in	  them,	  and	  with	  the	  abundant	  resources	  of	  foreign	  lands.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  As	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  India	  Office	  Library,	  the	  records	  of	  the	  Burnes	  mission	  are	  divided	  into	  three	  sections:	  Political,	  Geographical,	  and	  Commercial.	  See	  IOR/V/27/270.	  44	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  405.	  45	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  38.	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The	  British	  were	  beginning	  to	  see	  the	  regional	  trade	  routes	  as	  a	  new	  political	  geography,	  a	  projection	  of	  their	  commercial	  ambitions	  that	  drowned	  out	  the	  ground	   realities	   of	   competing	   chiefships	   and	   a	   region	   that	  was	   continually	  beset	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  raiding	  Sikh	  forces.	  Trade	  was	  a	  ‘grand	  panacea’46	  not	  only	  to	  this	  instability,	  but	  cognitively	  provided	  a	  more	  comfortable	  language	  for	   colonial	   officials	   bewildered	   by	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   Indus	   and	   the	  states	  to	  the	  west	  of	  it.	  The	  emergence	  of	  this	  political	  geography	  was	  based	  in	   part	   on	   the	   data	   that	   the	   commercial	  mission	   spurned.	   The	   demand	   for	  information	   on	   which	   the	   viability	   of	   the	   commercial	   mission	   depended	  prompted	  the	  collection	  of	  a	  wealth	  of	  information	  that	  betrayed	  an	  illusion	  of	   understanding.	   As	   they	   travelled	   up	   the	   Indus,	   Burnes,	   Lord,	   and	   Leech	  fastidiously	  recorded	  population	  figures,	  chiefship	  structures,	  revenue	  yields,	  geographical	   features	   (including	   water	   supplies),	   crossing	   points,	   and	  distance	   charts.	   They	   also	   charted	   the	   course	   of	   the	   river,	   noting	   the	  navigable	   channels	   at	   shallow	   parts,	   and	   providing	   detailed	   sketches	   of	  improvised	  crossing	  points.	  They	  also	  noted	  the	  land	  routes	  into	  Afghanistan.	  	  The	   nature	   of	   this	   information	   has	   led	   many	   to	   speculate	   that	   the	   Burnes	  mission	  was	  a	  military	  intelligence	  gathering	  exercise	  all	  along.	  Metcalfe	  had	  already	   objected	   to	   the	   first	   commercial	  mission	   undertaken	   by	   Burnes	   on	  the	  grounds	  that	   it	  was	  unduly	  provocative.47	  The	  second	  mission	  appeared	  to	  confirm	  this.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  feared	  in	  some	  quarters	  that	  such	  a	  mission	  would	   inevitably	   lead	   to	   a	   political	   mission,	   and	   therefore	   undermine	   the	  concept	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   that	   persisted	   particularly	   amongst	   East	   India	  Company	  officials.48	  Masson	  was	  unequivocal	   in	  his	  opinion	  after	   the	  event,	  writing	  of	  the	  commercial	  mission	  in	  derisory	  terms.	  ‘The	  main	  and	  great	  aim	  of	  government,	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  to	  open	  the	  Indus.	  Was	  the	  Indus	  ever	  closed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  The	  words	  of	  Richard	  Cobden,	  the	  British	  Libertarian	  and	  politician.	  Norris,	  The	  First	  
Afghan	  War,	  38.	  47‘It	  is	  a	  trick,	  in	  my	  opinion’,	  he	  wrote,	  ‘unworthy	  of	  our	  government,	  which	  cannot	  fail,	  when	  detected,	  as	  most	  probably	  it	  will	  be,	  to	  excite	  the	  jealousy	  and	  indignation	  of	  the	  powers	  on	  whom	  we	  play	  it	  …	  It	  is	  not	  impossible	  that	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  war.’	  Norris,	  The	  First	  
Afghan	  War,	  45.	  48	  Henry	  St	  George	  Tucker,	  who	  was	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Company	  Board	  at	  the	  time,	  shared	  this	  view.	  He	  declined	  to	  support	  the	  appointment	  of	  Burnes	  ‘feeling	  perfectly	  assured	  that	  it	  must	  soon	  degenerate	  into	  a	  political	  agency,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  as	  a	  necessary	  consequence	  be	  involved	  in	  all	  the	  entanglement	  of	  Afghan	  politics.’	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  
Afghanistan,	  Vol.	  I,	  181.	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or	   further	   closed	   than	   by	   its	   dangerous	   entrances	   and	   shallow	   depth	   of	  water?’49	  Masson	  further	  mocked	  the	  ‘absurdity’	  of	  commercial	  treaties	  with	  states	  whose	  history	  was	  built	  on	  trade.50	  	  Given	  the	  more	  pressing	  matter	  at	  this	  time	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Sikh	  army,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  Burnes’	  mission	  has	  not	  been	  more	  readily	  interpreted	  as	  an	   information	   gathering	   exercise	   on	   Ranjit	   Singh,	   rather	   than	   a	   spying	  mission	   to	   Afghanistan.51	  In	   addition,	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   was	   a	   military	  intelligence	  mission	  from	  the	  outset	  seem	  hard	  to	  square	  with	  the	  impression	  Burnes	  had	  himself	  of	   the	  purpose	  of	  his	  mission,52	  not	   least	   the	  reluctance	  that	  met	   his	   suggestion	   that	   he	   should	   pursue	   political	   purposes	   alongside	  his	   commercial	   investigations.	  At	  most	  Burnes	  was	   given	   tacit	   approval	   for	  broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  mission.	  When	  he	  reached	  Kabul	  he	  was	  vocal	  to	  Masson	   and	   later	   Elphinstone	   in	   his	   fears	   that	   his	   mission	   was	   unduly	  restricted	  to	  purely	  commercial	  matters.	  Burnes	  felt	  that	  an	  opportunity	  was	  being	  missed	   for	   political	   influence.	   In	   fact,	   ‘political’	   influence	  was	   at	   this	  time	   granted	   in	   his	   instructions	   to	   explore	   the	   possibility	   of	   reaching	   an	  Afghan-­‐Sikh	  agreement	  over	  Peshawar	  (this	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  detail	  later),	  but	  it	  was	  circumscribed	  beyond	  this	  role.	  The	  most	  we	  can	  say	  for	  the	  political	  intelligence	  that	  he	  provided	  at	  this	  time	  therefore,	  was	  that	  it	  was	  useful	  for	  an	  as-­‐yet	  undefined	  policy	  course.	  It	  is	  certainly	  convenient	  that	  much	  of	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  these	  men	  would	  be	  useful	   for	  military	  purposes,	  but	   it	   is	  information	   that	  would	  need	   to	  have	  been	  obtained	   if	  either	  commercial	  or	  military	  endeavours	  were	  to	  be	  pursued.	  	  The	   important	   fact	   remains,	   however,	   that	   as	   an	   information	   form,	  commercial	  data	  fuelled	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  British	  were	  gaining	  knowledge	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Masson	  Narrative,	  III,	  432.	  50	  As	  he	  put	  it,	  ‘[f]rom	  ancient	  and	  prescribed	  usage,	  moderate	  and	  fixed	  duties	  are	  levied;	  trade	  is	  perfectly	  free;	  no	  goods	  are	  prohibited;	  and	  the	  more	  extensive	  the	  commerce	  carried	  on	  the	  greater	  advantage	  to	  the	  state.	  Where,	  then,	  the	  benefit	  of	  commercial	  treaties?’	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  432.	  51	  Add	  Ms	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  26	  August	  1836,	  p.80.	  Writing	  to	  Hobhouse	  of	  his	  plans	  to	  send	  Burnes	  up	  the	  Indus	  Auckland	  wrote	  ‘I	  am	  not	  sorry	  to	  have	  an	  opportunity	  of	  letting	  Runjeet	  Singh	  know	  that	  we	  are	  alive	  to	  all	  his	  movements.	  He	  is	  very	  much	  disposed	  to	  be	  active	  and	  warlike	  against	  every	  neighbor	  [sic]	  except	  British	  India	  and	  has	  much	  extended	  his	  territories	  towards	  Cabul	  and	  is	  threatening	  to	  do	  the	  same	  towards	  Sinde’.	  	  52	  MSS.	  Eur.	  E.	  161	  Correspondence,	  III,	  3,	  ff.	  23,	  Enclosure	  4,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeil,	  6	  June	  1837.	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the	   region.	   It	  was	   in	  many	  ways	   a	  precursor	   to	   the	   later	   genealogical	   trees	  and	   tribal	   leader	  matrices	   that	  would	   guide	   the	   understandings	   of	   frontier	  officers	   in	   the	   late	  nineteenth	  century.	   Such	  data	  provided	   information,	  but	  not	  knowledge.	  The	  more	  important	  contextual	  factors	  pertaining	  to	  the	  style	  of	   rule,	   or	   the	   significance	   of	   tribute,	   for	   example,	   were	   elided	   by	   this	  empiricist	   quest.	   It	   was	   yet	   another	   dimension	   in	   which	   Afghanistan	   was	  becoming	  rendered	  intelligible	  to	  the	  British,	  and	  therefore	  manageable	  as	  a	  policy	  problem.	  	  
	  
Prelude	  to	  an	  Intervention:	  Shah	  Shuja	  and	  the	  1834	  Expedition	  
	  The	  British	  decision	  to	  launch	  a	  military	  intervention	  into	  Afghanistan	  was	  in	  essence	   a	   policy	   of	   regime	   change.	   Accordingly,	   a	   key	   plank	   of	   this	   policy	  rested	  on	  deciding	  whom	   to	  back.	  The	   stark	   choice	  was	   continuing	   to	  back	  Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan,	   or	   choosing	   instead	   to	   return	   Shah	   Shuja	   to	   his	  throne.	  As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  showed,	  the	  British	  were	  far	  from	  unfamiliar	  with	   Shah	   Shuja,	   who	   had	   received	   Elphinstone’s	   embassy	   in	   1809	   and	  following	   his	   fall	   from	   power	   had	   spent	  much	   of	   his	   time	   in	   exile	   under	   a	  British	  pension.	  But	  as	  Afghanistan	  became	  a	  higher	  priority	  throughout	  the	  1830s,	  Shah	  Shuja	  was	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  a	  propitious	  moment	  to	  re-­‐stake	  his	  claim	  to	  the	  rulership.	  During	  this	  time	  British	  policy	  makers	  were	  able	  to	  familiarize	  themselves	  once	  more	  with	  Shuja	  as	  a	  potential	  monarch.	  As	   he	   pressed	   his	   claim	   successfully,	   Shuja	  would	   carry	   out	   a	   campaign	   to	  reclaim	   Kandahar,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   using	   it	   as	   a	   springboard	   to	   Kabul.	   The	  response	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  would	  give	  the	  British	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  political	   and	  military	   power	   of	   their	  Afghan	  neighbour.	   As	   such,	   this	  was	   a	  formative	  experience	  for	  the	  British.	  	  	  Shah	  Shuja’s	   exile	  had	  begun	   in	  1809	  with	  his	  defeat	   at	   the	  hands	  of	   Fittih	  Khan,	  who	  installed	  Mahmud	  Shah	  on	  the	  throne	  in	  his	  stead.	  What	  followed	  was	  a	  humiliating	  period	  of	  exile	  for	  Shuja,	  who	  had	  lost	  his	  crown,	  his	  Vizier,	  and	   a	   majority	   of	   his	   kingly	   jewels	   in	   the	   hasty	   retreat	   from	   the	   battle	   of	  
	   139	  
Nimla.53	  Having	  fled	  through	  the	  Khyber	  Pass,	  and	  an	  unsuccessful	  retaliatory	  campaign	  via	  Kandahar54	  he	  headed	  to	  Kashmir	  where	  he	  was	  imprisoned	  by	  Ata	  Mahommed	  Khan,	  the	  son	  of	  his	  former	  Vizier.	  He	  was	  then	  imprisoned	  in	  a	  jail	  in	  Attock	  where	  his	  captors	  attempted	  to	  extract	  information	  relating	  to	  the	   famous	  Koh-­i-­noor	   (mountain	   of	   light)	   diamond	   that	   he	   had	   previously	  owned.	  Escaping	  from	  Attock,	  Shuja	  and	  his	  family	  then	  fell	  under	  the	  capture	  of	  Runjit	  Singh	  who	  took	  on	  the	  quest	  for	  the	  diamond,	  which	  was	  eventually	  traded	   by	   Shah	   Shuja’s	   wife	   for	   his	   release.55	  Shuja	   had	   a	   brief	   role	   in	  Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan’s	  own	  campaign	  to	  take	  the	  throne	  in	  1819	  but	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1830s	  that	  his	  efforts	  met	  with	  any	  level	  of	  success.	  Accordingly,	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  sympathy	  for	  the	  monarch	  amongst	  British	  observers.	  	  In	   late	   1831,	   the	   Secretary	   to	   Governor-­‐General	   Bentinck	   heard	   through	  Political	  Agent	  Captain	  Wade	  of	  a	  plan	  being	  hatched	  by	  Shuja	  to	  reclaim	  his	  throne.	   In	   May	   of	   1832	   further	   details	   emerged:	   Shuja	   was	   seeking	   the	  backing	   of	   ‘friends’	   in	   his	   expedition	   claiming	   that	   ‘the	   people,	   not	   only	   of	  Affghanistan,	   but	  Khorassan	   and	  Toorkistan,	   are	   in	   his	   favour’.56	  In	   a	   letter	  written	   to	   Shuja’s	   Agent	  with	   Claude	  Wade,	   the	   former	   king	   played	   on	   the	  partial	   ignorance	  of	   the	  British	  announcing:	   ‘The	  conquest	  of	  my	  country	   is	  an	   affair	   of	   easy	   attainment.	   To	   make	   a	   movement,	   however,	   pecuniary	  means,	   both	   for	   present	   and	   future	   use,	   are	   absolutely	   necessary’.57	  Shuja	  hoped	   to	  combine	   the	  backing	  of	   the	  Sind	  Amirs	  with	   that	  of	   the	  British.	   In	  order	  to	  pay	  his	   followers	  and	  to	   justify	  his	  request	  he	  claimed	  support	  not	  just	  within	  Afghanistan	  but	  in	  the	  surrounding	  region	  as	  well:	  ‘The	  people	  of	  Sinde,	  Belochistan,	  and	  Seistan	  to	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  ocean	  are	  well	  inclined	  towards	  me’,	  he	  said.	  ‘They	  wear	  the	  symbol	  of	  submission,	  and	  their	  country	  is	   mine.’58	  Internally,	   the	   Barakzais,	   he	   suggested,	   were	   ‘not	   the	   people	  around	  whom	  the	  Affghans	  will	  rally’.	  ‘Even	  now’,	  he	  claimed,	  ‘they	  consider	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Nimla	  is	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Jalalabad.	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  236.	  54	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  236.	  55	  Burnes,	  Travels,	  III,	  243-­‐5;	  Dupree,	  Afghanistan,	  368.	  56	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3,	  Wade	  to	  Macnaghten,	  Simla,	  11	  May	  1832,	  p.	  4.	  57	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3,	  Shah-­‐Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk	  to	  Kazee	  Moolah	  Mahomed	  Hossein,	  p.	  5.	  58	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3,	  Shah-­‐Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk	  to	  Kazee	  Moolah	  Mahomed	  Hossein,	  p.	  5.	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the	  preservation	  of	   their	  authority	  within	  the	  streets	  and	  bazaars	  of	  Cabool	  and	  Candahar,	  a	  blessing.’59	  	  In	  order	   to	  make	  his	   case,	   Shuja	  drew	  on	  a	   rumour	   that	   the	  Persian	  Prince	  Abbas	  Mirza	  was	  seeking	  to	  expand	  his	  rule	  ‘throughout	  Khorassan’	  and	  that	  an	  envoy	  of	  his	  had	  arrived	  at	  Kandahar.	  But	  Bentinck	   remained	  unruffled.	  Wade	  was	  instructed	  to	  inform	  Shuja’s	  agent	  that	  ‘he	  must	  keep	  himself	  clear	  from	  all	  connexion	  [sic]	  either	  ostensible	  or	  real,	  with	  the	  different	  political	  parties	   which	   exist	   in	   this	   country,	   confining	   his	   attention	   strictly	   to	  communicating	  to	  you	  the	  news	  of	  passing	  events.60	  Concerning	  the	  reported	  threat	   of	   Abbas	  Mirza	   he	   replied	   directly	   to	   Shah	   Shuja,	   noting	   that	   ‘’[t]he	  conflicting	   nature	   of	   the	   reports	   circulated	   by	   individuals	   regarding	   the	  politics	   of	   Kharassan	   [sic],	   as	   connected	  with	   the	  movement	   of	   the	   Persian	  army,	   must	   convince	   your	   Majesty	   that	   no	   reliance	   can	   be	   placed	   on	   the	  accuracy	  of	  rumours	  proceeding	  from	  sources	  such	  as	  those	  from	  which	  your	  information	  has	  apparently	  been	  derived.’61	  	  	  The	   subtext	   to	   this	  message	   hints	   at	   a	   general	   aversion	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  British	   towards	   ‘native’	   informants,	   whom	   they	   considered	   inherently	  inferior	   as	   information	   sources.	   But	   a	   wider	   concern,	   particularly	   for	  Bentinck	  was	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  non-­‐interventionist	  policy	  with	  respect	  to	  Afghan	  affairs.	  Despite	  the	  high	  moral	  tone	  exhibited	  by	  the	  British	  over	  non-­‐interference,	  the	  advance	  that	  Shah	  Shuja	  had	  requested	  on	  his	  ‘pension’	  was	  eventually	   granted.	   In	   1833,	   Shah	   Shuja	   struck	   out	   for	   the	   Bolan	   Pass,	   and	  Kandahar,	   from	  which	  he	  planned	  to	   launch	  his	  assult	  on	  Kabul.	  For	  Claude	  Wade,	  at	  least,	  Shuja	  was	  certainly	  a	  contender	  for	  power,	  ‘[t]he	  Barukzyes	  of	  Candahar	  are	  the	  weakest,	  and	  least	  enterprising	  members	  of	  their	  family	  in	  possession	  of	  power;	  the	  Shah	  seems	  sanguine	  of	  success’,	  he	  wrote.62	  Whilst	  the	  British	  stuck	  to	  their	  ostensibly	  non-­‐interventionist	  policy,	  and	  projected	  this	  stance	  to	  Ranjit	  Singh,	  they	  had	  also	  sent	  an	  army	  officer,	  Major	  Faithful,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3,	  Shah-­‐Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk	  to	  Kazee	  Moolah	  Mahomed	  Hossein,	  p.	  5.	  60	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3,	  Macnaghten	  to	  Wade,	  Simla,	  16	  May	  1832,	  p.	  5-­‐6.	  61	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.9,	  Lord	  William	  Bentinck	  to	  Shah	  Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk,	  p.	  8.	  62	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.11,	  Wade	  to	  Macnaghten,	  11	  November	  1832,	  p.	  9.	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to	   report	   on	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   expedition.	   It	   is	   unclear	   for	   how	   long	   the	  Major	   stayed	  with	   the	   party	   but	   the	   progress	   of	   the	  mission	   provides	   and	  interesting	  case	  study	  in	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  British	  information	  system	  at	  this	  time.	  	  The	   British	   kept	   a	   close	   eye	   on	   Shuja’s	   campaign.	   In	   June	   1833,	   Wade	  reported	   on	   information	   received	   from	   Ranjit	   Singh’s	   newswriter	   in	   Kabul	  that	   suggested	   that	   ‘Shah	   Shooja’s	   approach	   had	   raised	   the	   people	   in	   that	  part	  of	  the	  country	  in	  his	  favour,	  and	  that	  several	  of	  the	  neighbouring	  chiefs	  had	   already	   thrown	   off	   their	   allegiance	   to	   Dost	   Mahomed	   Khan’.63	  These	  ‘neighbouring	   chiefs’	   included	   his	   representative	   in	   Bamiyan,	   Haji	   Khan,	  whose	   relationship	   with	   Dost	   Muhammad	   was	   already	   beset	   by	   mutual	  mistrust	   following	   Haji	   Khan’s	   efforts	   to	   undermine	   his	   authority	   through	  engaging	  with	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  in	  Kabul.	  Haji	  Khan	  had	  also	  engaged	  with	  Mir	  Yezdanbaksh,	  ruler	  of	  the	  Bisut	  territory	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Kabul,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  Dost’s	  principal	  rivals.64	  	  By	  February	  1834,	  Shuja	  had	  only	  made	  it	  as	  far	  as	   Shikarpur,	   where	   he	   had	   reneged	   on	   an	   agreement	   to	   rendezvous	   with	  Sindian	   troops	   who	   were	   to	   support	   his	   march	   on	   Kandahar,	   and	   instead	  opted	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  the	  city	  and	  seek	  to	  extort	  further	  financial	  backing	  from	  the	  Sind	  Amirs.65	  Meanwhile	  in	  Kabul	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  opted	  not	  to	  meet	  Shuja’s	  advance	  in	  Kandahar,	  and	  instead	  marched	  his	  troops	  to	  Jalalabad	   to	   shore	   up	   his	   vulnerable	   eastern	   territories.	   Noting	   that	   the	  winter	   snows	  had	  now	  cut	  Dost	  Muhammad	  off	   from	  communications	  with	  Kandahar,	  Wade	  watched	  these	  events	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  optimism,	  predicting	  that	  ‘[i]n	  the	  event	  of	  a	  reverse	  of	  fortune	  befalling	  the	  Sirdar	  of	  Cabool,	  the	  probability	  is,	  that	  he	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  retain	  his	  authority	  in	  that	  city.’66	  By	  May,	   rumours	   were	   already	   circling	   suggesting	   that	   Shuja	   had	   captured	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/28,	  Wade	  to	  Macnaghten,	  9	  June	  1833,	  p.	  17.	  64	  Masson	  documents	  the	  course	  of	  this	  particular	  political	  struggle	  in	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  300-­‐18.	  His	  suggestion	  that	  Haji	  Khan	  was	  positioning	  himself	  for	  an	  alliance	  with	  Shah	  Shuja	  comes	  on	  p.	  322.	  This	  suspicion	  arose	  in	  part	  from	  a	  trip	  that	  Masson	  took	  with	  Haji	  Khan	  to	  the	  Bamiyan	  idols,	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  374-­‐5.	  65	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/35,	  Wade	  to	  Macnaghten,	  1	  February	  1834.	  66	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/35,	  Wade	  to	  Macnaghten,	  1	  February	  1834.	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Kandahar	  and	  that	  the	  Barakzai	  Sirdars	  were	  making	  ‘overtures’	  through	  the	  mother	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.67	  	  In	  the	  background	  to	  these	  military	  ventures	  lay	  a	  growing	  structure	  of	  treaty	  agreement	   overseen	   by	   the	   British.	   Prior	   to	   setting	   off	   for	   Kandahar,	   Shah	  Shuja	  had	  reached	  an	  agreement	  with	  Ranjit	  Singh,	  in	  advance	  of	  his	  expected	  victory	   over	   the	   Barakzais.	   This	  was	   a	   negotiation	   that	   continued	   as	   Shuja	  carried	  out	  his	  campaign,	  but	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  draft	  treaty	  are	  instructive.	  The	  treaty	   imposed	   hefty	   restrictions	   on	   the	   territorial	   claims	   that	   would	   be	  accorded	   to	   Shah	   Shuja,	   stipulating	   ‘That	   the	   Shah	   shall	   disclaim,	   both	   for	  himself,	  his	  successors,	  and	  all	  the	  tribe	  of	  Suddozye,	  every	  right	  and	  title	  to	  the	  countries	  which	  have	  been	  acquired	  by	  his	  Highness,	  his	  dependents,	  and	  tributaries	   of	   every	   kind’,	   this	   included	   Peshawar,	   and	   the	   revenues	   that	  derived	   from	   these	   territories.68 	  The	   treaty	   also	   bound	   the	   two	   parties	  together	  in	  terms	  of	  tribute	  from	  Shah	  Shuja	  to	  Ranjit	  Singh,69	  and	  formalised	  the	  Barakzai-­‐Saddozai	  feud	  by	  stipulating	  that	  ‘whatever	  property	  in	  money,	  jewels,	   or	   cannon,	   be	   taken	   from	   the	   Barukzyes	   in	   Cabool,	   Peshawur,	   and	  Jelalabad,	   shall	  be	  divided	  equally	  by	  his	  Highness	  and	   the	  Shah’,	   an	  article	  that	  was	  described	  as	  ‘right	  and	  proper’	  by	  Shuja	  himself.70	  	  The	  significance	  of	   the	   treaty	  negotiation	  was	  not	   lost	  on	  Wade,	  who	  noted	  the	   ‘greatest	  benefit’	   to	  be	  derived	   from	  the	   treaty	   itself	   in	   terms	  of	  British	  interests	  was	  Shah	  Shuja	  ‘having	  formally	  renounced,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  himself,	  his	  heirs,	   successors,	  and	   the	  whole	  race	  of	  Suddozyes,	  all	   right	  and	   title	   to	  such	  tracts	  of	  country,	  lying	  on	  both	  banks	  of	  the	  Indus,	  as	  have	  been	  wrested	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/43,	  Mackeson	  to	  Wade,	  Mitthunkote,	  28	  May,	  1834,	  p.	  24.	  68	  The	  full	  list	  of	  territories	  is	  as	  follows:	  ‘Cohaut,	  Heshtrugheo,	  Isezie,	  Khyber,	  Cashmere,	  Mooltan,	  Menkera,	  Kolebagh,	  Bootchee,	  Serai,	  Tenouls,	  territories	  farmed	  by	  Bahawulpore,	  the	  two	  Ketchees	  north	  of	  the	  Sutledge,	  Tonk,	  Sengher,	  Gerang,	  Fort	  of	  Rolien,	  Gooldhurree,	  Akora,	  territory	  of	  Khittek,	  the	  seat	  of	  Preadah	  Khan’s	  family;	  Derhend,	  Tebelah,	  and	  Preadah	  Khan’s	  places	  of	  abode.’	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/2,	  ‘Propositions	  of	  the	  Maharajah	  Runjit	  Singh…’,	  p.	  2.	  69	  The	  treaty	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  Maharajah’s	  passion	  for	  horses	  is	  well	  known,	  and	  the	  Shah	  shall	  send	  him	  102	  horses	  of	  the	  finest	  description,	  every	  year,	  25	  Persian	  mules,	  11	  Persian	  swords,	  and	  200	  maunds	  of	  fruit…’,	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/2,	  ‘Propositions	  of	  the	  Maharajah	  Runjit	  Singh…’,	  p.	  2.	  70	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/2,	  ‘Propositions	  of	  the	  Maharajah	  Runjit	  Singh…’,	  2;	  No.3/3,	  ‘Note	  of	  Kazee	  Mahomed	  Hossein	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Shah’,	  3.	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by	   the	   Sikhs	   from	   the	   Affghans,	   since	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Kingdom	   of	  Cabool’.	   In	   short,	   the	   treaty	   agreements	   emerging	   from	   Shuja’s	   campaign	  were	  providing	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  Peshawar	  question.	  A	  question	  that	  would	  soon	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  Sikh	  actions.	  	  Despite	   this	   oversight,	   the	   British	   stuck	   to	   their	   self-­‐appointed	   status	   as	  neutral	   observers.	  When	   the	   British	   ‘name’	  was	   utilised	   by	   the	   negotiating	  parties	  over	   the	  status	  of	  Shikarpur,	  Wade	  was	  quick	  to	  advise	  Macnaghten	  that	  he	  felt	  it	  necessary	  to	  point	  out	  ‘to	  both	  parties,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  law	  of	  nations,	  to	  use	  the	  name	  of	  a	  third	  party	  in	  such	  engagements,	  without	   previously	   consulting	   it.’71	  Macnaghten	   swiftly	   followed	   up	   on	   this	  advice.	   This	   quasi-­‐legalistic	   process	   demonstrates	   the	   importance	   that	   the	  British	   bestowed	   upon	   treaty	   negotiations.	   In	   being	   shut	   out	   from	   this	  diplomatic	   exchange,	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   was	   unwittingly	   being	   placed	  beyond	   the	   pale	   of	   diplomatic	   negotiation.	   In	   the	   process	   he	   was	   slowly	  losing	  any	  claim	  he	  might	  have	  harboured	  over	  the	  lost	  territory	  of	  Peshawar.	  	  The	   symbolic	   power	   of	   the	   treaty	   notwithstanding,	   the	   legacy	   of	   this	  agreement	   was	   that	   it	   would	   provide	   the	   grounds	   for	   a	   later	   agreement	  signed	  between	  Shah	  Shuja	  and	  Ranjit	  Singh	  in	  1838.	  The	  reference	  to	  ‘laws	  among	   nations’	   was	   in	   this	   sense	   somewhat	   hypocritical	   coming	   from	   the	  British,	   who	   had	   just	   overseen	   the	   negotiating	   away	   of	   a	   part	   of	   Afghan	  territory	  that	  was	  still	  contested	  between	  the	  primary	  parties.	  	  Ultimately	  however,	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  treaty	  would	  be	  determined	  by	  events	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  British,	  and	  these	  events	  were	  increasingly	  blurred.	  Basing	   their	   information	   primarily	   on	   rumour,	   numerous	   reports	   filtered	  down	   from	   Kandahar	   and	   Kabul	   throughout	   the	   summer	   of	   1834.	   Initially	  these	  favoured	  Shuja	  who	  had	  reportedly	  achieved	  such	  an	  emphatic	  victory	  at	  Kandahar	  that	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  allegedly	  committed	  suicide	  by	  drinking	  poison.	  Although	  this	  was	  subsequently	  rejected	  as	  unlikely,	  reports	  of	  him	  hoarding	  his	   revenues	  and	   fleeing	  were	   taken	  more	   seriously.	  Plans	  for	  a	  negotiation	  between	  the	  Dost	  and	  Shuja	  were	  offered	  as	  an	  explanation	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for	   the	  now	  apparent	   failure	  of	   Shuja	   to	   take	  Kandahar.	  By	   June,	   a	   siege	  of	  that	  city	  was	  underway.72	  	  Faced	  with	  this	  uncertainty	  the	  British	  showed	  a	  tendency	  to	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  who	  they	  knew	  best.	  In	  one	  report	  between	  Wade	  and	  Macnaghten,	  faced	  with	   ambiguity	   as	   to	   the	   exact	   progress	   of	   Shah	   Shuja	   in	   the	   siege	   of	  Kandahar,	  Wade	   reported,	   ‘[t]he	   Simple	  Affghans,	   untutored	   in	   the	  modern	  art	  of	  war,	  considered	  …	  reluctance	  to	  close	  with	  them	  a	  proof	   [of]	   timidity	  and	   weakness,	   while	   those	   who	   can	   appreciate	   the	   subject,	   see	   in	   such	   a	  course	   that	   Shah	   Shooja-­‐ool-­‐Moolk	  has	  not	   been	   an	   inattentive	   observer	   of	  the	   system	   of	   strategy	   that	   prevails	   in	   our	   army,	   and	   that	   as	   far	   as	   his	  imperfect	  means	  will	  allow,	  he	  is	  applying	  it	  with	  perseverance	  in	  his	  present	  contest	  with	  his	  enemies.’73	  	  	  By	   late	   July	   however,	   rumours	   began	   to	   circulate	   over	   the	   defeat	   of	   Shah	  Shuja.	   Confusion,	   it	   appeared,	   reigned	   in	   all	   quarters.	   On	   25	   July	   it	   was	  reported	  that	  the	  astronomers	  of	  Lahore	  had	  been	  directed	  by	  the	  Maharajah	  ‘to	   consult	   the	   stars,	   and	   ascertain	   which	   of	   the	   belligerent	   parties	   in	  Affghanistan	  was	   victorious.’	   This	   too	  was	   inconclusive,	   ‘[t]he	   astronomers	  were	  of	  different	  opinions;	  some	  said	  that	  Shah	  Shooja	  had	  gained	  a	  victory,	  while	   others	   represented	   that	   he	   had	   been	   defeated.’74	  By	   13	   August,	   the	  defeat	  of	  Shuja	  was	  confirmed.	  	  Whilst	  the	  1834	  Shuja	  expedition	  provides	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  opacity	  of	  the	  British	  information	  network	  at	  this	  time,	  it	  also	  serves	  also	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	   impact	   that	   this	   confusion	  had	  on	  perceptions	  of	   the	   internal	  dynamics	  within	   Afghanistan	   at	   the	   time.	   The	   swirling	   currents	   of	   rumour,	   counter-­‐rumour,	   and	   information	   presented	   an	   Afghan	   state	   that	   was	   dangerously	  volatile,	   potentially	   with	   regional	   implications.	   On	   25	   September	   Wade	  reported	  to	  Macnaghten	  the	  following:	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  p.	  25.	  74	  L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.3/51,	  Abstract	  of	  Intelligence	  from	  Lahore,	  from	  25	  to	  31	  July	  1834,	  p.	  36.	  
	   145	  
	   ‘Dost	   Mahomed	   Khan	   is	   said	   to	   be	   making	   great	   exertions.	   He	   has	  raised	   the	  whole	   of	   the	  Mahomedan	   population	   of	   the	   neighbouring	  countries	   to	   join	  him,	  by	  preaching	   a	  holy	  war;	   and	  means	   to	   attack	  the	   Sikhs	   in	   three	   divisions	   ...	   On	   Runjeet	   Sing’s	   part	   great	  preparations	  are	  also	  making	  to	  give	  the	  Affghans	  a	  warm	  reception.	  His	  Highness	  has	  at	  present	  25,000	  men	  at	  and	  near	  Peshawur	  and	  is	  assembling	  the	  whole	  of	  his	  remaining	  disposable	  troops	  ...	  Many	  well-­‐informed	   persons	   are	   of	   [the]	   opinion	   that	   the	   fate	   of	   Affghanistan	  depends	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   approaching	   contest,	  which	  must	   either	  confirm	   or	   destroy	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Sikhs	   in	   that	   country.	   Runjeet	  Sing	   is	   determined	   not	   to	   let	   go	   his	   hold	   on	   Peshawur,	   while	   Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan	  and	   the	  other	  Affghan	  rulers	  are	  equally	   resolved	   to	  stake	  their	  political	  existence	  on	  the	  recapture	  of	  that	  place.’75	  	  As	   this	   passage	   demonstrates,	   the	   motivations	   for	   these	   rumoured	   violent	  outbursts	   was	   multiple.	   It	   was	   unclear	   whether	   the	   Afghan	   political	  communnity	  was	  defending	  itself	  against	  a	  disenfranchised	  former	  monarch	  and	   his	   rag-­‐tag	   gang	   of	   local	   mercenaries,	   or	   whether	   the	   polity	   was	  coalescing	  under	  the	  single	  banner	  of	  Islam	  to	  fight	  a	  seminal	  battle	  asserting	  Afghan	  territory,	  sovereignty	  and	  survival.	  The	  episode	  provides	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  British	  and	  Sikh	  intelligence	  apparatus	  at	  this	  time.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  definitive	  facts,	  the	  British	  were	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  assumptions	  that	  invariably	  led	  to	  panic,	  and	  worst-­‐case-­‐scenario	  prophesies.	  	  	  	  
The	  Ascendency	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  	  Following	   his	   defeat	   in	   the	   field,	   Shuja	   limped	   back	   to	   Ludhiana,	   and	   to	  British	  protection.	  His	  expected	  arrival	  at	  the	  Bombay	  Presidency	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  prompted	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  to	  inquire	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  reception	  to	  be	  accorded	  to	  the	  ex-­‐King.	  The	  reply	  was	  instructive.	  The	  Court	  of	   Directors	   suggested	   ‘that	   he	   should	   be	   treated	   …	   with	   all	   the	   personal	  attention	  which	  was	  due	  to	  an	  unfortunate	  Prince;	  but	  that	  his	  visit	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  distinguished	  by	   any	  public	  mark	  of	   honour,	  which	  might	   lead	   to	   the	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supposition	   that	   his	   recent	   proceedings	   had	   received	   the	   countenance	   and	  support	  of	  the	  British	  Government.’76	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   defeat	   of	   Shah	   Shuja	   boosted	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	   own	  claim	  to	  royal	  authority	  and	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  him	  to	  consolidate	  the	  foundations	  of	  his	  rule.	  On	  his	  rise	  to	  preeminence	  in	  Kabul	  in	  1826	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  made	  no	  formal	  claims	  to	  Royal	  Authority.	  His	  defeat	  over	  Shah	  Shuja,	  however,	  had	  cast	  him	  as	  the	  defender	  of	  the	  new	  Barakzai-­‐led	  political	  order	  in	  Kabul.	  In	  addition,	  having	  dealt	  with	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Shah	  Shuja,	  he	  turned	  his	  attentions	  to	  reclaiming	  the	  land	  lost	  to	  the	  Sikhs	  in	  the	  recent	  skirmishes.	  Seeking	  to	  shift	  the	  foundations	  of	  his	  claims	  to	  Royal	  Authority	   away	   from	   lineage	   structures,	   and	   Saddozai	   descent,	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	   sought	   to	   raise	   support	   for	   this	   clash	   through	   the	  motivating	  call	  of	  Islam.	  	  	  In	  1835,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  assumed	  the	  title	  of	  amir	  al-­mu’minin,	  ‘commander	  of	   the	   faithful’,	   thereby	  providing	   the	   justification	   for	  a	   call	   to	   Jihad	   against	  the	   ‘infidel’	   Sikhs,	   and	   complying	   with	   Islamic	   doctrine	   which	   stated	   that	  martyrdom	  could	  only	  be	  attained	  under	  a	  lawful	  king.	  Christine	  Noelle	  notes	  two	   further	   significant	   features	   of	   the	   coronation.	   Firstly,	   there	   was	   the	  choice	  of	  the	  title	  ‘Amir’	  which	  gave	  royal	  authority	  and	  religious	  legitimacy	  to	   his	   reign.	   The	   coronation	   included	   the	   ‘typical	   expressions	   of	   royal	  authority’:	   the	   striking	   of	   coins	   and	   reading	   of	   the	   khutba	   in	   his	   name	   -­‐	   a	  marker	   of	   royal	   authority	   as	   described	  by	  Elphinstone.	  Meanwhile	   the	   title	  ‘Amir’	  distinguished	  him	  from	  the	  previous	  Saddozai	  rulers	  who	  adopted	  the	  Persian	  title	  ‘Shah’.	  Secondly,	  Noelle	  notes	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  Dost’s	  coronation	  and	  that	  of	   the	   first	  Durrani	  Padshah	  Ahmad	  Shah.	  Although	  the	  coronation	   itself	   was	   a	   muted	   affair,	   the	   ceremonial	   placing	   of	   a	   blade	   of	  grass	   in	  the	  turban	  of	  the	  newly	  crowned	  Amir	   in	  homage	  to	  Ahmad	  Shah’s	  coronation	  was	  re-­‐enacted	  later	  on	  amongst	  a	  council	  of	  relatives	  and	  tribal	  chiefs.	   As	   Noelle	   argues,	   ‘[b]y	   modelling	   his	   coronation	   on	   Ahmad	   Shah’s	  nomination	  Dost	  Muhammad	  attempted	  to	  refocus	  public	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  from	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recent	  demise	  of	  Saddozai	  rule	  to	  the	  beginnings	  of	  Afghan	  statehood	  when	  all	  Pashtun	  leaders	  had	  operated	  on	  an	  equal	  footing.’77	  	  This	  symbolic	  leadership	  role	  was	  matched	  by	  a	  more	  consolidated	  system	  of	  government	  through	  his	  own	  progeny	  which	  was	  bolstered	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  revenue.	   This	   consolidation	  was	   in	   part	   the	   result	   of	   the	  way	   the	  Dost	   had	  responded	   to	   Shah	   Shuja’s	   campaign.	   On	   hearing	   of	   Shuja’s	   approach	   in	  September	  1833,	  Meher	  Dil	  Khan,	  one	  of	  the	  Kandahar	  chiefs	  arrived	  in	  Kabul	  requesting	   military	   assistance	   to	   avert	   the	   threat,	   but	   Dost	   Muhammad	  suspected	  a	  plot	  to	  entice	  him	  away	  from	  Kabul	  and	  thus	  allow	  the	  chiefs	  of	  Peshawar	   and	   Jalalabad	   to	   take	   advantage.	   Rather	   than	   sending	   troops	  straight	   to	   Kandahar	   he	   sent	   them	   eastward	   forcing	   the	   submission	   of	  Jagdalak.	   Meanwhile,	   his	   sons	   Muhammad	   Akbar	   Khan	   and	   Muhammad	  Akram	  Khan	  were	  sent	  to	  take	  Jalalabad.	  	  	  Through	  this	  pre-­‐emptive	  move	  Dost	  Muhammad	  had	  thereby	  gained	  control	  of	  the	  key	  province	  of	  Jalalabad,	  the	  revenue	  from	  which	  now	  increased	  from	  400,000	   to	   465,000	   rupees.78 	  By	   1837,	   Dost	   Muhammad	   held	   much	   of	  eastern	   Afghanistan	   through	   his	   sons:	   Muhammad	   Afzal	   Khan	   in	   Zurmat	  district	   east	   of	   Ghazni;	  Muhammad	  Akbar	   Khan	   in	   Jalalabad	   and	   Laghman;	  Azam	  Khan	  in	  Bamiyan	  and	  Bisut;	  Ghulam	  Haidar	  Khan	  in	  Ghazni;	  and	  Shams	  al-­‐Din	   Khan	   in	   Kohistan	   north	   of	   Kabul.	   Having	   extracted	   only	   500,000	  rupees	   from	  Kabul	   and	  Kohistan	  during	   the	  early	  years	  of	  his	   reign,	  by	   the	  late	   1830s	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan’s	   revenue	   was	   estimated	   at	   between	  2,400,000-­‐2,600,000	  rupees.79	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  Jagdalak	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  the	  west	  to	  the	  town	  of	  Dakka	  in	  Mohmand	  territory	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Tajik	  villages	  of	  Laghman.	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  37.	  79	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  38.	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British	  Perceptions	  	  The	  impact	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad’s	  rulership	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  British.	  When	  Burnes	  arrived	  in	  Kabul	  in	  1837	  his	  reports	  on	   the	   government	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   emphasized	   the	   improvements	   he	  had	  made	  in	  consolidating	  his	  rule,	  but	  Burnes	  warned	  that	  this	  had	  come	  at	  an	  ‘expensive	  price’	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  share	  in	  the	  good	  will	  of	  his	  subjects,	  and	  of	   the	   merchant	   classes.80	  In	   Burnes’	   eyes,	   the	   Dost	   was	   risking	   the	   fiscal	  stability	   of	   his	   state	   through	   the	   costs	   of	   his	   bloated	   military,	   which	   had	  forced	  an	  increase	  in	  taxes	  and	  revenues,	  the	  seizure	  of	  lands,	  and	  a	  lapse	  in	  the	  jagirs	  of	  key	  allies	  including	  Haji	  Khan.81	  In	  addition,	  arbitrary	  loans	  and	  fines,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  allowances	  afforded	  to	  his	  court	  members	  put	   a	   potential	   strain	   on	   his	   authority.82	  Despite	   such	   imbalances	   Burnes	  conceded	   that	   this	   more	   predatory	   form	   of	   centralized	   authority	   had	   only	  been	   possible	   through	   a	   greater	   oversight	   of	   his	   administrative	   structures.	  This	  included	  the	  customs	  house	  in	  Kabul	  which	  were	  no	  longer	  ‘farmed’,	  and	  now	  came	  under	  the	  direct	  management	  of	  the	  Chief.	  Meanwhile,	  instabilities	  in	  Kandahar	  and	  Herat	  were	  funneling	  trade	  through	  Kabul	  helping	  to	  push	  up	  the	  revenue.83	  	  These	   observations	  were	   to	   an	   extent	   determined	   by	   the	   task	   that	   Burnes	  had	  been	  set	  of	  exploring	  commercial	  prospects,	  yet	  his	  analysis	  went	  beyond	  topics	   of	   trade.	   In	   his	   discussion	   of	   the	   ‘factions	   of	   the	   state’	   we	   also	   see	  Burnes	  deploying	  an	  ardently	  Elphinstonian	  concept	   to	   the	  Afghan	  political	  scene.	  ‘The	  system	  of	  government	  among	  the	  Affghans’	  he	  wrote,	  ‘is	  too	  well	  known	   to	   require	   a	   recapitulation	   from	   me.	   The	   republican	   genius	   which	  marks	   it,	   is	   unchanged,	   and	   whatever	   power	   a	   Sudozye	   or	   Barukzye	   may	  acquire,	   its	  preservation	  can	  only	  be	  ensured	  by	  not	   infringing	  the	  rights	  of	  the	   tribes’.	   The	   Dost,	   he	   argued,	   had	   followed	   this	   tradition	   of	   non-­‐intervention	  in	  tribal	  affairs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  18.	  81	  A	  key	  ally	  of	  Dot	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  who	  had	  overseen	  the	  consolidation	  of	  territories	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Kabul,	  and	  whom	  Masson	  travelled	  to	  Bamiyan	  with	  during	  his	  time	  in	  Kabul.	  82	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  18.	  83	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  20.	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  But	   Burnes	   also	   took	   the	   Elphinstone	   episteme	   further	   in	   two	   significant	  ways.	  Firstly,	  he	  ascribed	  to	  them	  the	  aura	  of	  ruling	   legitimacy	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  Barakzai	  ‘though	  inferior	  in	  rank	  to	  [the	  Saddozai]	  …	  is	  yet	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinguished	  of	  the	  Dooranee	  tribes’.	  Noting	  that	  in	  the	  time	  of	  Ahmed	  Shah,	   the	   Zirak	   tribe	   from	  which	   the	  Barakzai	   descended	   had	   been	   split	   in	  two	   for	   fear	   of	   their	   influence,	   Burnes	   added	   ‘[t]hey	   cannot	   therefore	   be	  viewed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  tribe	  suddenly	  raised,	  since,	  in	  power	  and	  rank,	  they	  have	  long	  been	  of	  importance	  in	  the	  country.’84	  He	  further	  noted	  the	  killing	  of	  Wazir	   Fittih	   Khan,	   in	   the	   traditional	   heroic	   fashion	   as	   related	   to	   Masson,	  thereby	  bolstering	  the	  Barakzai	  claim	  to	  honourable	  vengeance	  for	  the	  killing	  of	  their	   ‘brother	  …	  who	  had	  never	   injured	  the	  man	  who	  caused	  his	  murder,	  but	  devoted	  himself	  to	  the	  consolidation	  of	  his	  power’.85	  By	  giving	  the	  history	  and	   lineage	   of	   the	   Barakzai	   clan,	   Burnes	   was	   engaging	   in	   his	   own	   private	  historicism,	  lending	  them	  credibility	  as	  rulers	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  his	  readers,	  and	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Afghans.	  	  	  	  Secondly,	   Burnes	   converted	   Elphinstone’s	   tribal	   taxonomy	   into	   an	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  ecology	  of	  Afghanistan.	  The	  Barakzai	  were	  thus	  contrasted	   with	   the	   Ghilzai	   who	   at	   the	   time	   occupied	   the	   space	   from	  Kandahar	   to	  Gandamak	  and	  half	  way	   to	  Peshawar.	  Having	   failed	   to	   reclaim	  power	   since	   their	   ejection	   by	   Nadir	   Shah,	   the	   Ghilzai	  were	   now	   subsumed	  under	  the	  Barakzai,	  in	  part	  by	  intermarriage,	  with	  both	  Dost	  Muhammad	  and	  his	   son	   Muhammad	   Akbar	   Khan	   having	   married	   into	   the	   tribe	   as	   well.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  western	  tribes	  were	  parceled	  under	  the	  affairs	  of	  Kandahar.	  As	  such,	  Burnes	  created	  the	   impression	  that	  units	  comprising	  Elphinstone’s	  tribal	   taxonomy	   could	   be	   compared	   to	   competing	   city-­‐states.	   This	  conceptualization	  neglected	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  co-­‐dependence	  and	  dispute	  resolution	   that	   Elphinstone	   referred	   to	   elsewhere	   in	   his	   work,	   and	   was	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  ‘tribalization’	  of	  the	  Afghan	  political	  community.86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  20-­‐1.	  85	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  26	  November	  1837,	  p.	  21.	  86	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	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Policy	  and	  Territory:	  Imagining	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  Territorial	  Unit	  	  As	   the	   previous	   chapter	   showed,	   the	   ‘where’	   question	   over	   Afghanistan’s	  identity	  as	  a	   territorial	  unit	  had	   long	  occupied	  observers.	  As	  policy	  options	  became	  more	  closely	  considered,	  the	  success	  of	  British	  strategy	  increasingly	  relied	   on	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   of	   how	   Afghanistan	  was	   formed,	   and	  this	   required	   an	   agreed-­‐upon	   definition	   of	   its	   territorial	   status.	   The	  Arrowsmith	   Map	   which	   appeared	   in	   Burnes’	   account	   is	   instructive	   in	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  British	  policy	  makers	  territorially	  dissected	  the	  region	  at	  this	  time	  (see	  Appendix	  6).	  	  	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  British	  were	  being	  forced	  to	  imagine	  an	  Afghan	  territorial	  entity	  before	  it	  could	  be	  said	  to	  meaningfully	  exist.	  At	  the	  metropole	  this	  was	  a	   function	  of	  policy.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  Lord	  Ellenborough,	  Chair	  of	   the	  Secret	  Committee,	  to	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  in	  1835:	   ‘It	  is	  our	  political	  interest	  that	  the	   Indus	   and	   its	   tributary	   streams	   should	   not	   belong	   to	   one	   state.	   The	  division	  of	  power	  on	  the	  Indus	  between	  the	  Scindians,	  the	  Affghans,	  and	  the	  Sikhs	   is	   probably	   the	   arrangement	   most	   calculated	   to	   secure	   us	   against	  hostile	  use	  of	  that	  river,	  while	  it	  will	  not	  probably	  oppose	  any	  real	  obstacles	  to	   the	   navigation	   of	   that	   river	   for	   commercial	   purposes,	   which	   should	   be	  secured	   by	   treaty’.	   To	   this	   end,	   a	   united	   Afghan	   state	   would	   serve	   British	  interests,	   for	   ‘valuing	   and	   capable	   of	  maintaining	   its	   independence,	   having	  more	   to	   fear	   than	   to	  hope	   from	   foreign	   aid,	   it	  would	   serve	  our	  purpose	  by	  making	   Affghanistan	   an	   impassable	   obstacle	   to	   any	   power	   advancing	   from	  the	  West’.87	  	  	  This	  was	  a	  clear	  elaboration	  of	  the	  buffer-­‐state	  concept,	   familiar	  to	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  great	  game.	  But	  what	  this	  meant	  for	  British	  knowledge	  acquisition	  was	  equally	  important,	  as	  Ellenborough	  went	  on	  to	  demonstrate,	  ‘[i]t	  must,	  therefore,	  at	  all	  times,	  be	  a	  subject	  of	  much	  moment	  to	  us	  to	  have	  an	  accurate	  knowledge	  of	  all	  that	  passes	  in	  Affghanistan,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  71.	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taking	   promptly	   such	   measures	   as	   may	   seem,	   from	   time	   to	   time,	   to	   be	  dictated	   by	   our	   interests’	   .	   Whilst	   ‘all	   that	   passes	   in	   Affghanistan’,	   was	  presumed	   to	   have	  meant	   Russian	   intrigue	   -­‐	   and	   to	   an	   extent	   this	   was	   the	  focus	   in	   London	   -­‐	   this	   overlooks	   the	   archival	  material	   on	   internal	   political	  dynamics,	   and	   the	   changing	   fortunes	   of	  Afghanistan’s	   rulers	   that	  were	   also	  recounted	  at	  this	  time.	  This	  aspect	  of	  the	  knowledge	  imperative	  receives	  less	  attention,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   was	   also	   sent	   directly	   to	   the	   Governor-­‐General.	  	  In	  India,	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  political	  community	  took	  on	  a	  far	  more	  fragmented	   character,	   partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	  more	   granular	   perspective.	  The	  problem	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  India	  and	  particularly	  the	  ‘politicals’	  on	  the	  ground	  was	  that	  Afghanistan’s	  territorial	  form	  was	  wrapped	  in	  ambiguity.	  A	  key	   distinction	   in	   British	   thinking	   on	   this	   topic	   was	   accordingly	   whether	  Afghanistan	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  unitary	  polity,	  or	  more	  accurately	  as	  a	  collection	   of	   independent	   chiefships.	   Whilst	   Elphinstone	   had	   hinted	   at	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  unified	  territorial	  concept,	  loosely	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Saddozai	  dynasty,	  his	  successors	  looked	  in	  vain	  for	  the	  legacy	  of	  this	  coherent	  entity.	   Faced	   instead	   with	   territorial	   ambiguity,	   an	   accepted	   method	   of	  creating	  a	  degree	  of	  legibility	  for	  the	  British	  was	  to	  view	  the	  country	  in	  terms	  of	   its	   major	   population	   centres,	   namely	   Kabul,	   Peshawar,	   Kandahar,	   and	  Herat.	  As	  military	  operations	  became	  increasingly	  likely	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1838,	  Herat	  became	  the	  linchpin	  of	  this	  city-­‐based	  lexicon.	  	  	  	  HERAT	  	  In	   late	   1837,	   Shah	  Mahmoud,	   the	   Persian	   ruler,	   marched	   on	   Herat	   for	   the	  second	  time	  that	  year,	  besieging	  the	  city	  and	  alarming	  the	  British.88	  With	  the	  British	   envoy	   at	   Tehran,	   John	   McNeill,	   an	   ardent	   Russophobe,	   the	   only	  information	  source	  that	  the	  British	  felt	  they	  could	  rely	  on	  for	  news	  from	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  The	  first	  attempt	  had	  ended	  before	  troops	  had	  reached	  Herat	  apparently	  due	  to	  insufficient	  funds,	  although	  McNeill	  had	  indicated	  British	  disapproval	  of	  the	  scheme	  to	  the	  Shah.	  See	  MSS.	  Eur.	  E.	  161	  Correspondence,	  III,	  3,	  ff.	  23,	  Enclosure	  1,	  Macnaghten	  to	  McNeill,	  10	  April	  1837.	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part	   of	   the	   region	   was	   warped	   towards	   the	   playing	   up	   of	   this	   particular	  threat	   narrative.	   This	   narrative	   had	   a	   precedent	   as	   well.	   McNeill’s	  predecessor,	  Henry	  Ellis	  had	  warned	  London	  back	  in	  November	  1835	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  ‘very	  extended	  schemes	  of	  conquest	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Afghanistan’,89	  a	  warning	  that	  was	  backed	  up	  only	  two	  months	  later	  by	  a	  memo	  referring	  to	  Russia.	   Palmerston	   and	   Bentinck,	   the	   then	   Governor-­‐General,	   shared	   such	  fears	  and	  both	  had	  pondered	  the	  military	  utility	  of	  Herat	  as	  a	  staging	  post	  for	  Russian	  military	  moves.90	  	  	  The	  Russophobic	  view	  was	  certainly	  more	  popular	  in	  London	  than	  Calcutta,	  a	  reflection	   perhaps	   of	   the	   direct	   line	   of	   communication	   from	   Tehran	   to	  London	  through	  Constantinople.	  Whilst	   in	  post,	  McNeill	  reported	  directly	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  and	  the	  President	  of	   the	  Board	  of	  Control.	   In	  Calcutta	  however,	   Auckland’s	   view	   had	   been	   more	   measured.	   Reporting	   on	   Ellis’s	  dispatches	  in	  1836	  he	  reported	  ‘Mr	  Ellis	  is	  far	  more	  apprehensive	  than	  I	  am	  of	  Persian	  invasions	  of	  Herat	  and	  of	  Russian	  influence	  in	  that	  quarter.	  Sure	  I	  am	  that	  nothing	  but	   the	  offence	  and	   jealousy	  of	  other	  powers	  would	  be	   the	  result	  of	  an	  ostensible	  alliance	  with	  Dost	  Mahomed’.91	  ‘In	  direct	  aggression’,	  he	  wrote	  elsewhere,	  ‘I	  hold	  [Persia]	  to	  be	  actually	  powerless,	  and	  in	  indirect	  [aggression]	  she	  can	  only	  become	  formidable	  under	  an	  exaggerated	  opinion	  of	  her	  power.	  In	  the	  meantime	  I	  look	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  British	  power	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Indus	  much	  more	  to	  our	  merchants	  than	  our	  soldiers’.92	  Viewed	  from	  Calcutta,	  the	  Sikhs	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  far	  more	  pressing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  79.	  90	  See	  Bentinck’s	  ‘‘Minute	  by	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  and	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief,	  March	  13th,	  1835’,	  quoted	  in	  full	  in	  Boulger,	  Demetrius,	  C.	  –	  Lord	  William	  Bentinck	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1897),	  177;	  ‘Memoir	  on	  the	  means	  of	  attack	  by	  Russia	  on	  British	  India	  and	  of	  the	  defence	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  it’,	  Broughton	  Papers	  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89.	  This	  second	  memo	  was	  drafted	  by	  Lt.	  General	  Samuel	  Ford	  Whittingham	  in	  1834	  and	  sent	  to	  McNeill,	  Palmerston,	  Bentinck,	  and	  eventually	  Hobhouse.	  It	  outlined	  the	  possibility	  of	  Russian	  forces	  mounting	  a	  two-­‐stage	  campaign	  first	  by	  taking	  Herat,	  then	  using	  Afghan	  and	  Sikh	  levies	  as	  proxies	  to	  move	  on	  India.	  Perhaps	  reflecting	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  memo	  on	  his	  own	  thinking,	  Bentinck’s	  minute	  projected	  a	  similar	  campaign	  by	  the	  Russians.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  both	  works	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  large	  part	  as	  a	  call	  for	  greater	  resources	  for	  the	  Indian	  Army.	  This	  aspect	  of	  reasons	  behind	  threat	  inflation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Russia	  is	  often	  neglected.	  91	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  28	  May	  1836,	  p.54.	  92	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  83.	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threat	   in	   terms	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   integrity. 93 	  In	   addition,	   there	   was	   an	  underlying	   ambiguity	   as	   to	   whether	   Herat	   should	   be	   considered	   part	   of	  Afghan	   ‘territory’	   at	   all.	   The	   Afghan-­‐Persian	   border	   had	   been	   a	   site	   of	  contestation	   between	   the	   two	   monarchies	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  nineteenth	   century	   with	   Persian	   Qajar	   territorial	   claims	   bolstered	   by	  linguistic	   and	   confessional	   commonalities,	   namely	   Shi’ism.94	  This	   was	   an	  ambiguity	  that	  seeped	  into	  British	  consciousness.	  Conolly’s	  account	  suggests	  that	   Herat	   was	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   part	   of	   ‘Persian	   Khorassaun’,	   and	   the	  antipathy	   between	   Heratis	   and	   Kandaharis	   (‘Afghans’)	   was	   clear.95	  As	   the	  former	  envoy	   to	  Tehran,	  Henry	  Willock	  pointed	  out	   to	  Lord	  Palmerston	  on	  the	   eve	   of	   the	   First	   Afghan	   War,	   the	   ‘earnestness’	   with	   which	   Persia	   was	  attempting	   the	   ‘seduction’	   of	   Herat	   was	   not	   to	   be	   mistaken	   for	   Persia’s	  disposal	  towards	  Russian	  interests	  as	  the	  Kings	  of	  Persia	  had	  long	  seen	  Herat	  as	  ‘an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Persian	  Empire’.96	  	  There	  was	   a	   normative	   dimension	   to	   the	   perception	   of	   Persian	   designs	   on	  Herat	  as	  well.	  Observers,	  and	  Burnes	  in	  particular,	  often	  alluded	  to	  the	  more	  coherent	  structure	  of	  Persia’s	  system	  of	  rule.97	  Whilst	  ultimately	  this	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  strong	  enough	  to	  resist	  Russian	  encroachments,	  it	  did	  provide	  a	  more	  stable	   state	   that	   stood	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   perceived	   anarchy	   of	   the	   Afghan	  political	   community. 98 	  In	   addition,	   the	   perceived	   superiority	   of	   Persian	  culture,	   history,	   language,	   and	   even	   intelligence,	   encouraged	   the	   view	   that	  Persia	   was	   a	   more	   civilized	   nation	   than	   the	   ‘rude’	   Afghans,	   and	   therefore	  entitled	  to	  push	  her	  authority	  eastwards.	  By	  1837	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  diplomatic	  intercourse	   was	   thus	   far	   more	   developed, 99 	  and	   considered	   in	   a	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  In	  Auckland’s	  words:	  ‘Runjeet	  Singh	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  Cabul	  long	  before	  the	  Shah	  of	  Persia’.	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  9	  August	  1836,	  p.85-­‐6.	  94	  Firoozeh	  Kashani-­‐Sabet,	  Frontier	  Fictions:	  Shaping	  the	  Iranian	  Nation	  1804-­1946,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  See	  also	  Hopkins	  and	  Marsden,	  Fragments	  of	  
the	  Afghan	  Frontier,	  30-­‐33.	  95	  Conolly,	  Journey	  to	  the	  North	  of	  India.	  	  96	  MSS	  Eur	  F88/105,	  Willock	  to	  Palmerston,	  1	  December	  1838,	  p.106.	  97	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.II,	  ‘On	  the	  Persian	  Faction	  in	  Cabool’,	  p.8,	  and	  No.IV,	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  p.17.	  98	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘state’	  advisedly	  here.	  Whilst	  the	  Afghan	  ‘state’	  is	  rarely	  referred	  to,	  the	  Persian	  state	  and	  the	  states	  of	  the	  Indus,	  are	  features	  of	  British	  diplomatic	  language,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  treaties	  signed	  with	  these	  powers.	  99	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  diplomacy	  included	  a	  detachment	  of	  English	  Officers	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  train	  and	  organize	  the	  Persian	  Army.	  This	  detachment	  included	  a	  number	  of	  individuals	  who	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favourable	   light	   than	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations.	   Indeed,	   the	   1809	   and	   1814	  treaties	  between	  Britain	  and	  Persia	  each	  carried	  an	  article	  prohibiting	  British	  intervention	  in	  any	  war	  between	  Persia	  and	  Afghanistan.100	  	  By	   the	   second	   attempt	   of	   the	   Shah	   on	   Herat	   in	   1837	   however,	   Auckland’s	  position	  on	  Persian	  non-­‐intervention	  was	  beginning	   to	  shift.	  Swayed	  by	   the	  Russophobic	   views	  of	  McNeill	   and	   two	  of	   his	   closest	   advisers	   -­‐	   John	  Colvin	  and	  William	  McNaghten	  -­‐	  Auckland	  began	  to	  take	  a	  more	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  Persian	  victory	  at	  Herat,	  and	   increasingly	   favoured	  the	  view	  of	  Russian	  involvement.	  At	  this	  point	  the	  1814	  treaty,	  and	  particularly	  the	   article	   on	   non-­‐British	   involvement	   in	   Persian-­‐Afghan	   conflicts,	   became	  considerably	  more	   important	  as	  Herat	  was	  becoming	  the	   linchpin	  on	  which	  wider	  British	  policy	  on	  Afghanistan	  rested.	  	  	  A	   major	   reason	   for	   increased	   concern	   derived	   from	   the	   simple	   lack	   of	  information	  that	  was	  being	  received	  in	  Simla	  about	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  siege.	  If	   information	   from	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  scarce	  commodity	  at	   this	   time,	  news	  from	  Herat	  was	  practically	  non-­‐existent.	  The	  British	  had	  two	  contacts	  on	  the	  scene,	   Lieutenant	   Eldred	   Pottinger	  who	   found	   himself	   stranded	  within	   the	  city	   having	   being	   struck	   down	  with	   an	   illness	  whilst	   embarking	   on	   travels	  towards	   Central	   Asia;	   and	   also	   Colonel	   Charles	   Stoddart,	   who	   had	   been	  deputed	  to	  the	  Shah’s	  camp	  by	  McNeill	  in	  Tehran.	  McNeill	  and	  Pottinger	  were	  in	  communication	  but	  the	  dispatches	  of	  the	  latter	  were	  infrequent,	  and	  in	  one	  instance	  were	  even	  intercepted	  by	  a	  Russian	  advisor	  embedded	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  camp,	  who	  passed	  the	  correspondence	  to	  the	  Shah.	  Meanwhile,	  Auckland	  was	  faced	   with	   two-­‐month	   periods	   in	   which	   he	   received	   no	   official	  correspondence	  on	  Herat	  whatsoever.101	  In	  his	  words	  he	  was	  ‘playing	  a	  game	  requiring	  a	  clear	  sighted	  vision	  in	  the	  dark	  and	  with	  [his]	  hands	  tied’.102	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  would	  later	  figure	  prominently	  in	  British	  diplomacy	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  Sir	  Justin	  Sheil,	  who	  later	  became	  envoy	  in	  Tehran;	  Colonel	  Farrant,	  who	  became	  Charge	  d’Affaires	  also	  at	  Tehran;	  Major	  D’Arcy	  Todd,	  who	  served	  as	  envoy	  to	  Herat	  during	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War;	  and	  Sir	  Henry	  Rawlinson.	  Ferrier,	  Caravan	  Journeys,	  v.	  100	  IOL/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.1	  ‘Preliminary	  Treaty	  with	  Persia’,	  12	  March	  1809,	  p.3-­‐4.	  The	  wording	  is	  taken	  from	  Article	  IV	  in	  the	  1809	  treaty	  (reiterated	  as	  Article	  IX	  in	  1814).	  101	  IOR	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  p.243,	  253,	  262.	  102	  IOR	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  3	  June	  1838,	  p.253.	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irony	  was	  that	  it	  was	  at	  this	  time	  quicker,	  and	  more	  reliable	  to	  get	  news	  from	  Tehran	  to	  London	  through	  Constantinople,	   than	   it	  was	   from	  Herat	   to	  Simla,	  despite	  the	  latter	  journey	  being	  half	  the	  distance.	  Although	  Burnes	  (in	  Kabul)	  and	  Leech	  (in	  Kandahar)	  were	   in	   ‘constant	  communication’	  with	  McNeill,103	  the	   difficulty	   of	   traversing	   the	   Afghan	   geography,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   British	  distrust	   of	   local	   information	   networks,	   appears	   to	   have	   slowed	  communication	  with	  the	  Governor-­‐General’s	  summer	  headquarters	   in	  Simla	  to	  a	  snail’s	  pace.104	  The	  blackout	  naturally	  cut	  both	  ways.	  McNeill	  professed	  to	  be	  in	  ‘utter	  ignorance	  of	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Afghanistan’	  during	  his	  time	  in	   the	   Shah’s	   Camp,	   indeed	   it	   transpired	   that	   none	   of	   the	   cossids	  (messengers)	   had	   reached	   him	   in	   the	   camp	   after	   the	   first	   was	   dispatched	  from	  Afghanistan	  –	  a	  period	  covering	  six	  months.105	  	  Throughout	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   of	   1838,	   Auckland	   therefore	   became	  increasingly	   concerned	   at	   events	   unfolding	   on	   what	   the	   British	   were	   now	  considering	   to	   be	   the	   first	   line	   of	   defence	   for	   their	   Indian	   territories.	  Meanwhile	  Herat	  provided	  for	  the	  Russophobes	  a	  good	  opportunity	  to	  make	  their	  points.	  Russian	  military	  advisors	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  camp	  were	  easily	  painted	  as	   agents	   provocateurs	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   many	   of	   them	   were	   either	  deserters	   from	   the	   Russian	   forces,	   mercenaries,	   or	   long-­‐time	   collaborators	  with	   the	   Persian	   monarchy,	   one	   which	   had	   long	   been	   under	   the	   joint	  supervision	  of	  both	  England	  and	  Russian	  diplomatic	  missions.	  	  	  In	  early	  May,	  in	  an	  early	  example	  of	  Palmerston’s	  favoured	  policy	  of	  ‘gunboat	  diplomacy’,	  a	  troop	  contingent	  was	  dispatched	  to	  occupy	  the	  island	  of	  Kharg	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  in	  order	  to	  pressure	  the	  Persian	  Shah	  to	  compromise	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Durand,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War	  and	  its	  Causes,	  53.	  104	  In	  one	  instance	  Burnes	  explained	  the	  delay	  of	  his	  correspondence	  with	  McNeill	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  he	  did	  not	  trust	  the	  couriers	  so	  had	  sent	  his	  letters	  via	  the	  Postmaster	  General	  in	  Bombay.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  paranoia,	  the	  route	  between	  Kandahar	  and	  Herat	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  particularly	  treacherous.	  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/68,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeill,	  20	  November	  1837;	  Add	  MS	  36473,Todd,	  23	  June	  1838,	  p.306.	  105	  The	  news	  was	  relayed	  by	  Major	  D’Arcy	  Todd,	  who	  was	  dispatched	  from	  Herat	  by	  McNeil	  charged	  with	  messages	  for	  the	  Governor-­‐General,	  who	  was	  at	  the	  time	  in	  Simla.	  He	  noted	  that	  the	  ‘disturbed	  and	  disorganized	  state	  of	  the	  country	  nominally	  under	  Kamran’s	  rule’	  had	  slowed	  his	  progress.	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Todd,	  23	  June	  1838,	  p.306-­‐7.	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the	  siege.	  Both	  in	  London	  and	  Calcutta,	  all	  eyes	  were	  now	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  siege.	  	  	  KANDAHAR	  	  The	  position	  of	  Kandahar	  on	  the	  route	  from	  Herat	  increased	  the	  anxiety	  over	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  siege.	  On	  Burnes’	  arrival	  in	  Kabul	  in	  1837	  he	  had	  deputed	  one	  of	  his	  party,	  Lieutenant	  Robert	  Leech	  to	  report	  on	  the	  Barakzai	  brothers’	  government	   in	   Kandahar.	   The	   reports	   of	   Leech	   cemented	   the	   long-­‐held	  British	  view	  of	  the	  Kandahar	  ‘Sirdars’	  as	  incompetent	  and	  despotic	  rulers.106	  ‘Possessing	  no	  right	  to	  rule	  than	  that	  of	  fortune	  and	  the	  sword,	  they	  have	  no	  affection	   for	   their	   country	   or	   subjects’,	  wrote	   Leech.	   ‘Their	   ambition	   is	   the	  ambition	   of	   robbers,	   and	   their	   law	   the	   law	   of	   caprice’,	   he	   added,	   and	  speculated	   as	   to	   why	   they	   had	   not	   already	   been	   assassinated.107	  Of	   graver	  concern	  however	  were	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  Barakzai	  Kandahar	  Sirdars	  and	   Shah	   Kamran	   of	   Herat.	   British	   observers	   had	   noted	   the	   long-­‐running	  tensions	   between	   these	   two	   chiefships	   and	   were	   inclined	   to	   view	   the	  resulting	   political	   situation	   as	   fragile.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Shah	   Kamran’s	  repeated	   incursions	   forced	  the	  Kandahar	  rulers	  to	   look	  for	  outside	  support,	  potentially	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Persia.108	  The	   agents	   of	   this	   correspondence	  were	  often	   connected	  with	  wider	  Russian	   intrigue.109	  But	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  this	   feud	   weakened	   Kamran’s	   standing	   at	   Herat	   –	   Conolly,	   in	   particular,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  See	  for	  example,	  Conolly,	  Journey	  to	  the	  North	  of	  India,	  45.	  107	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.	  X,	  ‘Notice	  on	  the	  Affairs	  of	  Candahar…’,	  p.	  53.	  This	  was	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  London.	  For	  example,	  Palmerston	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘wretched	  creatures	  of	  Candahar’.	  Mss	  Eur	  Add	  46915,	  Palmerston	  to	  Hobhouse,	  27	  August	  1838,	  p.	  109.	  108	  Ellis	  and	  then	  Burnes	  both	  flagged	  this	  fear.	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  87;	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.IV,	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  State	  of	  Cabool’,	  p.	  16.	  109	  Burnes	  reported	  as	  early	  as	  September	  1837	  that	  the	  Kandahar-­‐Russian	  intercourse	  was	  to	  be	  traced	  to	  Abbas	  Khan	  who	  was	  previously	  affiliated	  with	  Shah	  Kamran’s	  court	  and	  had	  fled	  from	  Herat	  to	  Tehran	  in	  1835	  where	  he	  fell	  into	  employment	  with	  the	  Russian	  Ambassador.	  His	  messenger,	  Mir	  Muhammad,	  who	  was	  sent	  to	  Kandahar	  to	  relay	  an	  offer	  of	  opening	  diplomatic	  talks	  was	  also	  described	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  Russia.	  The	  envoy	  sent	  by	  Persia,	  Taj	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  was	  also	  accused	  of	  carrying	  gifts	  to	  the	  Kandahar	  Sirdars,	  provided	  by	  the	  Russian	  Ambassador	  at	  Tehran.	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.VII,	  ‘Views	  and	  Prospects	  of	  Russia	  and	  Persia	  Towards	  Kandahar’,	  p.	  33-­‐4;	  Mss	  Eur	  E.161,	  633,	  Enclosure	  3,	  3,	  ff.	  23.,	  Enclosure	  3,	  John	  McNeill	  to	  A.	  Burnes,	  13	  March	  1837.	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pointed	  out	   that	   the	  Heratis	  were	  beginning	   to	  view	   these	   incursions	  as	  an	  attempt	  by	  Kamran	  to	  extort	  further	  taxes	  from	  the	  local	  population.110	  	  	  To	  the	  east,	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  Kandahar	  rulers	  to	  their	  Barakzai	  brother	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	   in	  Kabul	  was	   equally	   strained.	  Although	   communications	  between	   Kandahar	   and	   Kabul	   were	   regular,	   and	   during	   the	   siege	   of	   Herat	  Kandahar	   had	   pledged	   allegiance	   to	   Kabul,	   Burnes	  was	   not	   convinced	   that	  their	   loyalty	  would	  survive	   the	   fall	  of	  Herat.	  During	  his	   time	  at	   the	  court	  of	  the	  Amir,	  Burnes	  took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  advise	  the	  Kandahar	  Sirdars	  against	  corresponding	  with	   the	  Persians	  and	  on	  at	   least	  one	  occasion	  advised	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  against	  marching	  on	  Kandahar	  himself.111	  From	  McNeill’s	  perspective,	   the	   chief	   of	   Kandahar,	   Kohendil	   Khan	   was	   playing	   a	   ‘double	  game’,	  professing	  allegiance	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  authority	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  in	  Kabul,	  whilst	  strengthening	  himself	  against	  Kabul	  and	  Herat	  through	  an	   alliance	   with	   Persia	   and	   Russia.112	  	   As	   the	   siege	   progressed	   during	   late	  1837,	  Burnes	  increasingly	  came	  to	  a	  similar	  view.113	  	  	  KABUL	  AND	  PESHAWAR	  	  With	  Herat	  apparently	  on	  the	  precipice,	  and	  Kandahar’s	  status	  being	  seen	  as	  strung	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Tehran,	  Burnes’	  position	  in	  Kabul	  throughout	  the	  winter	   of	   1837-­‐38	   gave	   him	   a	   front	   row	   seat	   as	   the	   British	   crafted	   a	   new	  political	  geography.	  Given	  the	  fragility	  of	  affairs	  at	  Kandahar	  and	  Herat	  -­‐	  both	  previously	  within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   Saddozai	   dynasty	   -­‐	   a	   key	   question	  facing	  Burnes	  was	   on	   the	   ability	   of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	   to	   exert	   control	  over	  the	  affairs	  of	  these	  two	  cities.	  In	  short,	  whilst	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  Burnes	  that	  Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   could	   govern,	   the	   question	   was	   whether	   or	   not	   he	  could	  rule.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Conolly,	  Journey	  to	  the	  North	  of	  India,	  51	  111	  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/68,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeill,	  20	  November	  1837,	  p.	  1.	  112	  MSS	  Eur	  E.161,	  Correspondence	  III,	  633,	  3,	  ff.23,	  Enclosure	  3.,	  McNeill	  to	  Burnes,	  13	  March	  1837.	  113	  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/68,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeill,	  20	  November	  1837,	  p.	  1.	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Since	  the	  attempt	  by	  Shah	  Shuja	  to	  reclaim	  his	  throne,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  sought	  the	  recovery	  of	  Peshawar.	  As	  Burnes	  and	  his	  coterie	  were	  making	  their	  way	   up	   the	   Indus	   in	   early	   1837,	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	   relations	   had	   reached	   a	  new	   low.	   Fearing	   a	   Sikh	   attempt	   on	   Kabul,	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   had	  dispatched	   his	   son	   Akbar	   Khan	   to	   occupy	   the	   passes	   of	   the	   Khyber.	   The	  operation	   led	   to	   the	   storming	   of	   Sikh	   positions	   at	   Jamrud,	   and	   although	  ending	   in	   defeat	   for	   the	   Afghans,	   the	   Sikh	   positions	   were	   sufficiently	  destroyed	   for	   the	   Afghans	   to	   declare	   a	   moral	   victory.	   The	   operation	   also	  resulted	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Hari	  Singh,	  the	  son	  of	  Runjit	  Singh	  who	  had	  led	  the	  original	  assault	  on	  Peshawar.114	  	  	  The	  renewal	  of	  hostilities	  presented	  both	  a	  challenge	  and	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  British.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  Calcutta,	   continued	  Afghan-­‐Sikh	  rivalry	  would	   render	   any	   commercial	   use	   of	   the	   Indus	   unworkable.	  Whilst	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  external	  ‘infidel’	  threat,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Sikhs	  provided	   the	   opportunity	   for	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   to	   shore	   up	   his	  legitimacy	   in	  Kabul	   and	   the	   immediate	   environs	   (especially	   in	   the	  highland	  areas),	   it	   was	   coming	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   British	   interests	   elsewhere.	  Furthermore,	   for	   the	  British,	   the	   increasingly	   religious	  overtones	   that	  were	  infusing	   the	   rivalry	   were	   naturally	   anathema	   to	   their	   perceptions	   of	   what	  stability	   looked	   like	   in	   the	  region.	  Aside	   from	  the	   local	   ramifications,	   it	  was	  feared	   that	   the	   need	   for	   military	   and	   financial	   support	   was	   driving	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	   to	   seek	  Persian	  and	  Russian	  help.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  British	  were	  helpless	  to	  counter	  this	  with	  their	  own	  support	  as	  this	  would	  damage	  their	  much	  more	  important	  and	  long-­‐standing	  alliance	  with	  Ranjit	  Singh.	  	  	  The	   opportunity	   presented	   itself	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   possible	   negotiated	  settlement.	   Burnes’	   Indus	   survey	   was	   highlighting	   the	   sheer	   limits	   of	   Sikh	  power	  on	  the	  west	  bank	  of	  the	  river.	  In	  general,	  Sikh	  rule	  was	  largely	  nominal	  and	  only	  enforceable	  through	  a	  military	  presence	  that	  was	  ever	  vulnerable	  to	  attack.	   Local	   uprisings	   against	   Sikh	   outposts	   were	   not	   infrequent	   and	  revenue	   collection	   by	   the	   Sikhs,	  where	   possible,	  was	   carried	   out	   by	   armed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  For	  an	  account	  of	  this	  battle	  see	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  384-­‐8.	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units.115	  Indeed,	  so	  limited	  was	  Sikh	  authority	  in	  these	  areas	  that	  Burnes	  was	  forced	   to	   negotiate	  with	   local	   leaders	   to	   secure	   his	   safe	   passage.	   Peshawar	  was	  a	   case	   in	  point,	  described	  by	   the	  political	  dispatches	  as	   ‘a	  drain	  on	   the	  finances	   of	   the	   Lahore	   State,	   with	   the	   additional	   disadvantage	   of	   being	   so	  situated	   as	   to	   lead	   the	   Sikhs	   into	   constant	   collision	   with	   desperate	  enemies’.116	  	  	  Such	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  encouraged	  the	  British	  in	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Afghans	  and	  Sikhs	  might	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  town,	  a	  view	  supported	  by	  previous	  overtures	  made	  by	  both	  Ranjit	  Singh	  and	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  to	  the	  British	  to	  mediate	  the	  dispute.117	  Following	  the	  Battle	  of	  Jamrud,	  Wade	  deputed	   Lieutenant	   Mackeson	   to	   Peshawar,	   from	   his	   position	   as	   political	  agent	  at	  Ranjit	  Singh’s	  court	  in	  Lahore.	  With	  Burnes	  making	  his	  way	  to	  Kabul	  it	  was	  anticipated	  that	  this	  arrangement	  would	  allow	  both	  parties	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  through	  the	  British.118	  	  It	  was	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  Auckland	  admitted	  in	  a	  dispatch	  to	  London	  in	  late	  September	  that	  more	  of	  a	  ‘political	  character’	  had	  been	  given	  to	  Burnes’	  mission.119	  However,	  the	  negotiation	  process	  suffered	  from	   a	   lack	   of	   direction	   from	   the	   outset.	   Auckland	   remained	   dubious	   of	  providing	  favourable	  terms	  to	  the	  Amir	  at	  risk	  of	  offending	  Ranjit	  Singh,	  and	  therefore	  refused	  to	  accept	  any	  suggestion	  of	  returning	  Peshawar	  to	  Afghan	  control.	  In	  addition,	  Claude	  Wade,	  who	  provided	  a	  via	  media	  in	  Ludhiana	  for	  intelligence	  coming	   from	  Kabul	   constantly	  downgraded	   the	  positive	  picture	  that	   Burnes	   presented	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   reaching	   an	  agreement	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.	  This	  important	  factor	  was,	  it	  seems,	  partly	   a	   result	   of	  Wade’s	   jealousy	  of	  Burnes,	   but	   also	  his	   closeness	   to	   Shah	  Shuja’s	  court	  in	  exile	  in	  Ludhiana.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  IOR/F/4/1680/67026,	  Vol	  V,	  Burnes,	  p.251;	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.	  I,	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  Power	  of	  the	  Sikhs	  Beyond	  the	  Indus’,	  p.	  1-­‐7.	  116	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.	  I,	  ‘On	  the	  Political	  Power	  of	  the	  Sikhs	  Beyond	  the	  Indus’,	  p.3.	  These	  ‘collisions’	  are	  regularly	  reported	  in	  issues	  of	  the	  Loodianah	  Ukhbar	  translated	  into	  English	  in	  The	  Delhi	  Gazette.	  IOR	  SM	  52.	  117	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan,	  58.	  118	  The	  course	  of	  this	  discussion	  –	  and	  the	  clashing	  of	  (British)	  egos	  which	  it	  entailed	  -­‐	  can	  be	  followed	  at	  IOR/F/4/1680/67026,	  p.318-­‐39.	  119	  Add	  MSS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  8	  September	  1837,	  p.	  191.	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Lacking	   clear	   guidance	   from	   London	   or	   Simla,	   Burnes	   pursued	   a	   more	  conciliatory	   line	   towards	   the	   Amir,	   hinting	   at	   the	   possibility	   of	   sharing	  sovereignty	  over	  Peshawar	  between	   the	  Sikhs	  and	   the	  Afghans.	   Indeed	   two	  options	   presented	   themselves.	   The	   first,	   favoured	   by	  Masson,	   involved	   the	  full	   reinstating	   of	   Sultan	   Muhammad	   Khan	   as	   ruler	   of	   Peshawar,	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  Sikh	   forces,	  and	   the	  giving	  of	   tribute	   to	  Ranjit	  Singh.	  Masson	  believed	   this	   a	   likely	   prospect	   since	   it	   allowed	   the	   Sikh	   ruler	   to	   save	   face	  (provided	  it	  was	  suggested	  by	  the	  British),	  and	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  withdraw	  his	   troops	  with	   honour	   –	  which	   due	   to	   the	   challenges	   he	  was	   facing	   there,	  was	   a	   course	   he	  was	   likely	   to	   favour.	   Although	  Masson	   didn’t	   expect	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  to	  be	  pleased	  with	  the	  outcome,	  he	  thought	  it	  likely	  that	  he	  would	  accept	  it	  begrudgingly.	  The	  second	  option,	  suggested	  by	  a	  group	  of	  the	  Amir’s	   secretaries	   including	   Mirza	   Sami	   Khan	   and	   Mirza	   Imam	   Verdi,	  proposed	   that	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   return	   of	   Peshawar	   to	  Kabul,	   one	   of	   the	  Amir’s	  son’s	  could	  reside	  at	  Lahore	  –	  effectively	  as	  a	  hostage	  –	  guaranteeing	  Afghan	  ‘good	  behaviour’.120	  	  	  Neither	  of	  these	  opportunities	  were	  put	  to	  Ranjit	  Singh,	   in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  Wade’s	   influence	   over	   the	   negotiation	   process	   in	   the	   Punjab. 121 	  In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   activities	   of	   Burnes	   in	   Kabul	   earned	   him	   a	   rebuke	   from	   the	  Governor-­‐General	   who	   also	   wrote	   to	   the	   Amir	   to	   strongly	   urge	   him	   to	  ‘relinquish	   the	   idea	   of	   gaining	   the	   government	   of	   that	   territory’.	   Auckland	  reminded	  him	  that	   the	   ‘good	  offices’	  of	   the	  British	  Government	  had	  already	  saved	  him	  from	  a	  ‘ruinous	  war’	  with	  the	  Sikhs,	  and	  would	  be	  withdrawn	  if	  he	  should	   form	   any	   connection	  with	   other	   powers.122	  This	   firm	   line	   surprised	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	   it	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	   the	  growing	  antipathy	  held	  by	  Auckland	  towards	  the	  ruler.	  	  	  The	   ‘Peshawar	   Question’	   was	   a	   significant	   stumbling	   block	   in	   achieving	  greater	  Afghan-­‐Sikh	  stability.	  For	   the	  British,	   resolving	   this	  dispute	  was	   the	  key	  to	  unlocking	  the	  region	  to	  greater	  commercial	  exploitation.	  Furthermore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Witteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan	  (2002),	  145.	  	  121	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan	  (2002),	  151.	  122	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  141	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it	   offered	   to	   reduce	   the	  Amir’s	   expenditure	   on	   ruinous	  military	   campaigns,	  thereby	   stabilizing	   his	   courtly	   revenue,	   as	   well	   as	   temper	   his	   recourse	   to	  religious	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  pillar	  of	  his	  authority.	  However,	  by	  early	  1838,	  and	  in	  large	  part	   due	   to	   the	   inefficiency	   and	   ineptitude	  of	  British	   information	   and	  diplomacy,	  negotiations	  had	  in	  effect	  reached	  an	  impasse.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  within	  Kabul,	  Burnes	  was	  being	  courted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  would-­‐be	  agitators.	   Some	  of	   these	  discussions	  were	   reported	  back	   to	  Macnaghten.	  Of	  particular	   interest	  were	   the	  Qizilbash,	   or	   ‘Persian	  Faction’.	  Burnes	  noted	  that	  this	  community	  had	  become	  disenfranchised	  under	  the	  rulership	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  and	  had	  begun	  to	  ghettoize	  themselves	  within	  Kabul.	  Not	  only	  did	  this	  raise	  the	  prospect	  of	  sectarian	  unrest	  (the	  Persians	  being	  of	  the	  Shi’a	   sect,	   the	   Afghans	   largely	   Sunnis),	   it	   also	   encouraged	   political	  agitation.123	  They	  were,	  Burnes	  claimed,	  ‘intently	  bent	  on	  adding	  to	  their	  own	  strength	  by	  intrigues	  around	  them’.124	  Aside	  from	  the	  military	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Qizilbash,	   the	  position	  of	   the	  Persian	  community	  as	   the	  secretarial	  class	  under	  the	  Saddozai	  regime	  meant	  that	  they	  also	  held	  an	   influential	  political	  position.	  As	  Burnes	  pointed	  out:	  ‘since	  every	  man	  of	  rank	  has	  Persians	  for	  his	  Secretaries,	   and	  all	   the	  home	  and	   foreign	  correspondence	   is	   in	   their	  hands	  …	  their	   influence	   ramifies	   in	   every	   direction.’125 	  The	   approach	   made	   by	   a	  representative	   of	   the	   Qizilbash	   to	   Burnes	   merited	   its	   own	   dispatch	   partly	  because	   it	   confirmed	   a	   British	   belief	   that	   this	   community	   had	   political	  ambitions,	  but	  also	  because	  their	  Persian	  heritage	  naturally	  allied	  them	  -­‐	   in	  the	  British	  understanding	  -­‐	  to	  Persian	  ‘intrigue’	  elsewhere.	  Should	  the	  Herat	  siege	   prove	   successful,	   it	   was	   feared,	   the	  Qizilbash	  would	   provide	   a	   ready	  proxy	  for	  Persian	  influence	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Kabul	  political	  community.	   It	  was	   not	   out	   of	   the	   question	   that	   the	   Qizilbash	   could	   win	   over	   Dost	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  The	  fear	  of	  sectarianism	  had	  historical	  precedent,	  an	  1809	  riot	  for	  instance,	  was	  attributed	  by	  the	  British	  to	  Sunni/Shi’a	  rivalry	  although	  Noelle	  points	  out	  its	  routes	  lay	  more	  in	  local	  rival	  political	  elites	  fanning	  sectarian	  identities	  (Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  26-­‐7;	  see	  also	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  II,	  297).	  	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  Auckland	  feared	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  Herat	  to	  the	  Persians	  would	  exacerbate	  these	  tensions	  (see	  IOR	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  3	  May	  1838,	  p.	  245).	  124	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.II,	  ‘On	  the	  Persian	  Faction	  in	  Cabool’,	  p.	  8.	  125	  IOR/V/27/270/7,	  No.II,	  ‘On	  the	  Persian	  Faction	  in	  Cabool’,	  p.	  8.	  Emphasis	  in	  the	  original.	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Muhammad	  Khan	  to	  their	  ends;	  it	  was	  likely	  however	  that	  they	  would	  favour	  an	  alliance	  with	  Shah	  Shuja,	  should	  he	  be	  supported	  in	  reclaiming	  the	  throne.	  	  The	   irresolution	   of	   the	   Herat	   question	   provided	   an	   ongoing	   ‘information	  panic’	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   an	   increasingly	   elaborate	   picture	   of	   intrigue	   being	  woven	  by	  the	  British.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  engaging	  with	  the	  problem,	  the	  harder	  they	  looked,	  the	  less	  they	  seemed	  to	  understand.	  It	  was,	  as	  Auckland	  put	  it,	  ‘a	  fine	  embroglio	  [sic]	  of	  diplomacy	  and	  intrigue’,126	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  opacity	  of	   the	   information	   made	   available	   at	   Simla	   and	   London.	   The	   city-­‐based	  lexicon	   that	   divided	   the	   picture	   up	   between	   events	   at	   Herat,	   Kandahar,	  Peshawar,	   and	   Kabul	   provided	   a	   degree	   of	   legibility	   for	   the	   British.	   This	  picture	  was	  overlaid	  with	  their	  basic	  grasp	  of	  regional	  political	  communities,	  but	   the	  ambiguity	   that	   this	  picture	  presented	  was	  made	  dangerous	  by	  their	  obsession	  with	   the	   ‘intrigues’	   of	   Persia	   and	  Russia.	  Meanwhile	   the	   impasse	  over	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	   reconciliation	   at	   Peshawar	   tended	   to	   favour	   the	   Sikh	  alliance,	   and	   for	   Auckland	   at	   least,	   presented	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   as	  willfully	  intransigent.	  The	  failure	  of	  these	  negotiations	  further	  narrowed	  the	  policy	   options	   for	   the	   British,	   and	   forced	   a	   process	   of	   closure	   on	   the	   only	  question	  now	  remaining,	  namely	  what	  path	  to	  take.	  	  This	   section	   began	   with	   consideration	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   British	  envisaged	  a	  unitary	  polity	  beyond	  the	  Punjab,	  a	  key	  policy	  question	  for	  them	  in	   terms	   of	   their	   frontier	   security.	   As	   the	   discussion	   above	   suggests	   the	  fragmented	   polity	   concept	   dominated	   the	   discourse.	   In	   September	   1837,	  Auckland	   was	   referring	   to	   the	   ‘triple	   power’	   of	   Afghanistan	   –	   Kabul,	  Kandahar,	   and	  Herat.127	  By	   early	   1838	   the	   picture	  was	   further	   complicated	  by	   the	   insecurities	   brought	   about	   by	   Persian-­‐Herati	   and	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	  relations,	  as	  discussed.	  But	  this	  city-­‐based	  lexicon	  was	  not	  the	  only	  ambiguity.	  Uncertainty	   also	   surrounded	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   unitary	   Afghan	   ‘nation’.	   This	  ambiguity	  was	  perhaps	  best	  captured	  in	  a	  dispatch	  from	  Burnes	  to	  McNeil	  in	  mid-­‐1837.	  Referring	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  treaty	  article	  which	  stipulated	  non-­‐intervention	   by	   the	   British	   in	   the	   case	   of	   an	   Afghan-­‐Persian	   war,	   Burnes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  IOR	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  6	  January,	  1838,	  p.	  219.	  127	  IOR	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  8	  September	  1837,	  p.188.	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asked	  ‘in	  the	  first	  place,	  who	  are	  the	  Afghans[?]	  There	  are	  three	  Chiefships	  at	  present	   which	   may	   be	   classed	   under	   that	   head	   and	   two	   of	   them	   certainly	  have	  interests	  at	  variance	  with	  each	  other.’128	  Burnes	  was	  unwittingly	  hinting	  at	  the	  path	  that	  would	  be	  taken,	  namely	  to	  reinstate	  Shah	  Shuja,	  and	  thereby	  to	  unify	  the	  Afghan	  polity.	  	  	  As	   the	   above	   sections	   have	   also	   shown,	   the	   history	   of	   British	   engagement	  with	  Afghanistan	  did	  not	  begin	  with	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  but	  rather	  preceded	   it,	   albeit	   in	   a	   patchy	   and	   spasmodic	   manner.	   This	   engagement	  sprung	   forth	   a	   number	   of	   policy	   contestations	   relating	   to	   the	  nature	   of	   the	  threat;	  the	  means	  of	   intervention;	  the	  question	  over	  whom	  to	  back;	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  establishing	  either	  a	  unitary	  or	  fragmented	  polity.	  Each	  of	  these	  contestations	  manifested	  themselves	  in	  varying	  ways	  in	  the	  contact	  zones	  of	  the	  periphery	  (the	  domain	  of	   the	  political	  officers);	   in	  Calcutta	   (and	  Simla);	  and	  in	  London.	  In	  conclusion,	  this	  chapter	  will	  now	  consider	  the	  final	  element	  of	   this	   conversion	   of	   knowledge	   into	   policy	   in	   a	   process	   of	   closure	   around	  these	  contested	  policy	  debates,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  Simla	  contact	  zone.	  	  	  
Policy	  Closure	  at	  Simla:	  The	  Policy	  Instantiation	  of	  the	  ‘Idea’	  of	  Afghanistan	  	  In	  October	  1837,	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  and	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  tour	  of	  the	  northern	  provinces	  of	  the	  Company’s	  rule.	  He	  travelled	  by	  river	  as	   far	  as	  Benares	  (Varanasi),	  before	  heading	  across	   land	  to	  Cawnpur	  where	  he	  was	  advised	  to	  turn	  back	  on	  account	  of	  the	  famine	  that	  was	  raging	  at	  the	  time.	  Instead	  he	  journeyed	  on	  to	  Simla	  for	  the	  summer	  months,	  the	  ‘pleasant	  hill	   sanitarium’	   described	   by	   Kaye	   as	   ‘the	   cradle	   of	   more	   political	   insanity	  than	  any	  place	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  Hindostan’.129	  Much	  has	  been	  made	  of	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Burnes	  was	  here	  referring	  to	  Kabul,	  Kandahar	  and	  Herat.	  The	  interests	  at	  variance	  were	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Kandahar.	  The	  chiefs	  at	  Kandahar	  had	  threatened	  to	  back	  Persian	  moves	  on	  Herat.	  MSS.	  Eur.	  E.	  161	  Correspondence	  III,	  No.9,	  Enclosure	  4,	  Burnes	  to	  McNeil,	  6th	  June	  1837.	  129	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol.	  I,	  312.	  This	  trip	  is	  detailed	  in	  the	  published	  diaries	  of	  Lord	  Auckland’s	  sister:	  Emily	  Eden,	  Up	  the	  Country	  (London:	  Richard	  Bentley,	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move	   and	   the	   impact	   it	   had	   on	   the	   Governor-­‐General’s	   decision-­‐making	  circle.130	  Whilst	  his	  wider	  council	  of	  advisors	  were	  left	  at	  Calcutta,	  Auckland	  was	   forced	   to	   rely	   on	   an	   inside	   group	   of	   largely	   ‘Russophobic’	   advisors,	  including	   William	   Macnaghten,	   Henry	   Torrens,	   and	   John	   Colvin. 131 	  The	  decisions	  made	  at	  Simla,	  it	  is	  frequently	  asserted,	  were	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  advisers,	  and	  to	  an	  extent	  (though	  this	  is	  itself	  contested),	  the	  prevaricating	  tendencies	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  himself.132	  This	  debate	  matters	   as	   it	   suggests	   that	   it	   may	   be	   possible	   to	   ascertain	   blame	   for	   the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  with	  one	  particular	  individual	  or	  group	  of	   individuals.	  This	  is	  a	  debate	  that	  remains	  unresolved.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  climate	  of	  opinion	   in	   which	   the	   decision	   was	   taken	   was	  more	   than	   the	   result	   of	   one	  particular	  group.	  	  	  It	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  London,	  perhaps	  by	  force	  of	  circumstance,	  was	  satisfied	  that	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  should	  make	  the	  decision	  as	  he	  saw	  fit.	  ‘[I]t	  would	  be	  inexpedient’,	  noted	  Palmerston,	   ‘to	  send	  Auckland	  precise	  …	  instructions	  founded	  upon	  a	  state	  of	  things	  which	  must	  necessarily	  be	  six	  or	  eight	  months	  anterior	   to	   the	   time	  when	   he	   receives	   them,	   and	  which	  may	   have	   become	  inappropriate	   to	   the	   position	   of	   affairs.’	   He	   continued	   therefore,	   ‘Auckland	  and	  those	  advisers	  of	  his	  who	  are	  with	  him	  and	  on	  the	  spot	  must	  be	  the	  best	  judges	   of	   the	   measures	   which	   varying	   circumstances	   may	   render	   most	  expedient;	   and	   we	   ought	   certainly	   to	   leave	   them	   a	   free	   discretion	   to	   act	  according	  to	  the	  best	   judgment	  they	  can	  form’.133	  Norris	  argues	  that	  despite	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  correspondence,	  the	  information	  flow	  between	  London	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1867).	  Trotter	  points	  out	  that	  had	  Auckland	  followed	  the	  advice	  and	  returned	  to	  Calcutta,	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  may	  never	  have	  happened,	  J.	  L.	  Trotter,	  The	  Earl	  of	  Auckland,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1893),	  48-­‐9.	  130	  Whitteridge,	  Charles	  Masson	  of	  Afghanistan	  (2002),	  159.	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  this	  group	  see	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan	  Vol.	  I,	  312-­‐16.	  131	  Macnaghten	  has	  come	  under	  particular	  scrutiny	  in	  this	  capacity	  (Trotter,	  The	  Earl	  of	  
Auckland,	  46;	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  42;	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains,	  9),	  and	  also	  Colvin	  and	  Torrens	  (Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol.	  I,	  151-­‐2;	  Trotter,	  The	  Earl	  of	  
Auckland,	  46).	  	  132	  They	  possessed,	  according	  to	  Kaye,	  ‘dangerous	  kind	  of	  cleverness’	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  
War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol	  I,	  315.	  The	  argument	  on	  Auckland’s	  weakness	  is	  disputed	  by	  Norris	  who	  presents	  him	  in	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  light.	  133	  MSS	  Eur	  Add.	  46915,	  Palmerston	  to	  Hobhouse,	  26	  September	  1838,	  p.119-­‐20;	  See	  also	  Palmerston	  to	  Hobhouse,	  4	  October	  1838,	  	  p.128.	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Simla	  led	  to	  the	  same	  decisions	  being	  reached	  in	  both	  locations.134	  Whilst	  this	  may	  have	  been	  true	  at	  the	  superficial	  level,	  the	  leeway	  given	  to	  Auckland	  left	  very	   little	   alternative	   but	   for	   him	   to	   act	   according	   to	   his	   best	   intuitions	   as	  officials	   in	  London	  found	  themselves	  bound	  to	   the	  decisions	  taken	  at	  Simla.	  More	  to	   the	  point,	   the	  rationale	  behind	  those	  common	  conclusions	  differed.	  Therefore,	  Kaye’s	  argument	  that	   the	  grand	  strategic	  view,	  which	  dominated	  at	   the	  higher	   level,	   pushed	  Auckland	   into	   ‘defensive	  measures	  of	   a	  dubious	  character’,	   requires	   some	   nuance. 135 	  Clearly	   this	   view	   factored	   into	  Auckland’s	   decision-­‐making,	   but	   absent	   clear	   and	   timely	   directions	   from	  London,	   the	   Simla	   council	   were	   forced	   to	   rely	   more	   on	   intuition	   than	  instruction.	   The	   traditional	   top-­‐down	   view	   of	   strategic	   decision-­‐making	   in	  this	   case	   is	   somewhat	   inaccurate	   since	   communication	   was	   simply	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  in	  a	  fast-­‐changing	  environment.	  A	  key	  element	  of	  the	  intuitive	  mode	  relied	  on	  the	  knowledge	  that	  had	  been	  built	  up	  of	  the	  country	  –	   to	   return	   to	   the	  point,	   the	  grand	  strategic	  perspective	  may	  have	  given	  an	  overarching	  rationale,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  explain	  the	  manner	  of	  intervention.	  	  	  On	  26	  April	  1838,	   facing	   the	   failure	  of	  his	  mission	   to	  Kabul,	  Burnes	   left	   the	  city	  with	  a	  reluctant	  Masson	  in	  tow.	  The	  decision	  by	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  to	   publicly	   invite	   an	   audience	  with	   the	  Russian	   officer	   Vitkevitch	   has	   often	  been	   cited	   as	   the	   last	   straw	   for	   the	   British	   mission	   but	   more	   detailed	  attention	  shows	  the	  indifferent	  reception	  that	  the	  Russian	  officer	  received	  in	  both	  Kandahar	  and	  Kabul	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  Amir	  believed	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  British	  to	  be	  more	  likely.	  Masson	  had	  continued	  to	  communicate	  with	  Mirza	  Sami,	  of	  the	  Amir’s	  court	  even	  after	  Burnes	  had	  been	  shunned	  by	  the	  Afghan	  ruler,	  and	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  negotiations	  might	  continue	  through	  Masson	  but	   this	   came	   to	   nothing.	   The	   day	   after	   their	   departure	   the	   Mirza	   had	  approached	   their	   camp	   asking	   if	   negotiations	   might	   be	   reopened,	   a	  suggestion	  declined	  by	  Burnes.	   Indeed,	   as	   late	   as	  12	   July,	  Major	  Todd,	  who	  was	  making	  his	  way	  from	  Herat	  to	  Simla	  communicated	  the	  ‘anxious’	  wishes	  of	   the	  Kabul	  ruler	   to	  enter	   into	  an	  alliance	  with	   the	  British,	  and	  saying	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Kaye,	  History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol	  I,	  317;	  Norris,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War,	  137.	  135	  Stewart	  also	  makes	  this	  argument,	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains,	  29.	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Burnes’	  return	  to	  Kabul	  was	  ‘devoutly	  wished	  for	  by	  the	  chiefs	  and	  people’.136	  The	  courting	  of	  Vitkevitch	  can	  thus	  be	  read	  as	  a	  negotiation	  tactic	  to	  bring	  the	  British	  back	  to	  the	  table	  with	  a	  more	  favourable	  offer.	  By	  this	  point	  however,	  it	  was	  too	  late.	  	  Auckland	   immediately	   interpreted	   the	  end	  of	   the	  mission	  as	   a	   signal	  of	   the	  Amir’s	  shifted	  loyalties	  and	  communicated	  as	  much	  in	  a	  minute	  to	  the	  Secret	  Committee	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company.	  In	  this	  minute	  on	  the	  ‘crisis	  in	  Afghan	  affairs’,	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  ‘ambitious	  temper’	  of	  the	  Amir	   had	   ‘disappointed	   the	   expectations’	   of	   the	   British	   in	   their	   hopes	   for	  peaceful	   solution.	   Any	   further	   offers	   from	   the	   Amir,	   he	   claimed,	   would	   be	  ‘hollow	  and	   insincere’	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  options	  of	  settling	  affairs	  would	  now	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  outside	  of	  working	  through	  Kabul.137	  He	  added,	  ‘[t]he	  distracted	  condition	  of	  Afghanistan,	  from	  the	  open	  and	  acrimonious	  contests	  between	  the	  Sikhs	  and	  the	  Chief	  of	  Cabool	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  between	  the	  Rulers	  of	  Candahar	  and	  Herat	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  from	  the	  total	  absence	  of	  any	  feeling	  of	  harmony	  and	  mutual	   confidence	  among	   the	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  Barukzye	  family,	  had	  been	  the	  immediate	  cause	  of	  proffers	  of	  submission	  to	   Tehran,	   and	   of	   the	   invitation	   to	   Persian	   and	   Russian	   influence	   into	   the	  country.’138	  The	  purpose	  in	  presenting	  this	  disordered	  state	  of	  Afghan	  affairs	  was	  to	  bolster	  the	  view	  that	  an	  alliance	  with	  Ranjit	  Singh	  was	  now	  the	  only	  way	   forward.	   Although	   military	   options	   were	   not	   discussed,	   the	   minute	  proposed	   that	   if	   Herat	   fell,	   intervention	   of	   some	   form	  would	   be	   necessary.	  Crucially,	  even	  if	  Herat	  survived,	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  argued,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Barakzai	  ruler	  would	  still	  require	  a	  resolution.	  ‘[He]	  has	  shown	  himself	  to	  be	  so	  disaffected’,	  Auckland	  claimed,	  ‘that	  with	  him,	  at	  least,	  we	  could	  form	  no	  satisfactory	  connection.’139	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Todd	  to	  Burnes,	  23	  June	  1838,	  p.	  307.	  137	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.4,	  Enclosure	  1,	  No.	  1,	  ‘Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General’,	  12	  May	  1838,	  p.4-­‐5.	  138	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.	  4,	  Enclosure	  1,	  No.	  1,	  ‘Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General’,	  12	  May	  1838,	  	  p.4.	  139	  IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO1/15,	  No.4,	  Enclosure	  1,	  No.	  1,	  ‘Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General’,	  12	  May	  1838,	  	  p.5.	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At	   the	   time	   of	   this	   dispatch,	  Macnaghten	  was	  making	   his	  way	   to	   Lahore	   to	  discuss	   with	   Ranjit	   Singh,	   the	   options	   for	   countering	   what	   was	   now	   being	  seen	  as	  the	  primary	  problem.	  To	  aid	  this	  discussion,	  on	  23	  May,	  Macnaghten	  sent	  requests	  to	  Wade,	  Mackeson,	  Burnes	  and	  Masson,	  asking	  for	  ‘the	  opinion	  of	   the	  best-­‐informed	  men’	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   ‘means	  of	   counteraction	   to	  the	  policy	  of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan’.140	  Macnaghten	  explicitly	  requested	  advice	  on	   two	   points	   in	   particular:	   firstly,	   whether	   the	   Sikhs	   could	   establish	  themselves	  in	  Kabul,	  and	  secondly	  whether	  any	  ‘instrument	  of	  Afghan	  agency’	  (and	  if	  so	  what),	  would	  be	  required.141	  The	  responses	  came	  from	  Burnes	  and	  Masson	   in	   short	   order.	   Burnes	   rejected	   the	   possibility	   of	   establishing	   Sikh	  authority	   in	   Kabul	   as	   ‘a	   mere	   visionary	   delusion’,	   citing	   the	   limits	   of	   the	  Maharajah’s	   power	   beyond	   the	   Indus,	   and	   the	   logistical	   challenges	   of	  supplying	  Kabul	  from	  Lahore.	  He	  recommended	  instead,	  that	   ‘British	  power	  should	  appear	  directly’	  in	  any	  plans	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  complete	  success.	  This,	  Burnes	  reasoned,	  would	  avoid	  alienating	  the	  Afghan	  people	  who	  he	  claimed	  were	  ‘cordially	  displaced	  as	  a	  nation	  to	  join	  us’.142	  In	  response	  to	  the	  second	  request	   Burnes	   was	   clear	   that	   Shah	   Shuja	   was	   the	   best	   instrument:	   ‘the	  British	  Government	   have	   only	   to	   send	   him	   to	   Peshawar	  with	   an	   agent	   and	  two	  of	  its	  own	  Regiments	  as	  an	  honorary	  escort	  and	  an	  avowal	  to	  the	  Afghans	  that	   we	   have	   taken	   up	   his	   cause	   to	   ensure	   his	   being	   fixed	   for	   ever	   on	   his	  throne.’143	  Once	   again	   Burnes	   claimed	   that	   British	   support	   would	   ensure	  success.	   In	  the	  plans,	  he	  urged	  that	  the	  British	   ‘must	  appear	  directly	  for	  the	  Afghans	   are	   a	   superstitious	   people	   and	   believe	   Shooja	   to	   have	   no	   fortune	  (bakht)	  but	  our	  name	  will	  invest	  him	  with	  it.’144	  	  Although	   it	  was	  much	  more	  detailed	   than	  Burnes’	  paper,	  Masson’s	  dispatch	  on	   8	   June	   reached	   similar	   conclusions.	   He	   too	   was	   skeptical	   of	   Sikh	  involvement	   in	   Afghan	   affairs,	   writing	   ‘the	   less	   the	   Seiks	   and	   Afghans	   are	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  Mss	  Eur	  E.161,	  Correspondence	  III,	  23.f.1;	  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  488.	  141	  Masson,	  Narrative,.	  III,	  488.	  142	  Mss	  Eur	  F88/105,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  2	  June	  1838,	  p.	  46.	  143	  Mss	  Eur	  F88/105,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  2	  June	  1838,	  p.	  47.	  144	  Mss	  Eur	  F88/105,	  Burnes	  to	  Macnaghten,	  2	  June	  1838,	  p.	  47.	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mixed	   up	   together	   …	   the	   better	   for	   both	   parties’.145	  He	   also	   favoured	   the	  restoration	  of	  Shah	  Shuja,	  arguing	  that	  by	  doing	  so	   ‘the	  British	  Government	  would	  consult	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  Afghan	  nation,	  among	  which	  his	  popularity	  is	   great,	   and	   who	   even	   wonder	   that	   the	   Government	   has	   not	   before	   done	  it’.146	  For	  Masson,	  the	  ruler	  of	  Herat,	  Shah	  Kamran	  -­‐	  as	  a	  Saddozai	  -­‐	  ruled	  by	  right;	  whereas	  the	  Barakzai	  in	  Kabul	  ruled	  by	  usurpation,	  and	  a	  campaign	  to	  reinstate	   Shah	   Shuja	   would	   be	   joined	   by	   all	   of	   those	   discontented	   with	  Barakzai	  rule.	  	  Whilst	   it	   is	   important	  not	   to	  attribute	  too	  much	  to	  these	  papers	   in	   terms	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  crucial	  decision	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  go	  to	  war,	  they	  do	  highlight	  key	  shifts	  in	  British	  thinking	  at	  this	  time,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  support	   the	   claim	   that	   their	   advice	   at	   least	   bolstered,	   and	   arguably	   shaped	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐General.	  Both	  Masson	  and	  Burnes	  had	  favoured	  Shah	  Shuja	  in	  their	  policy	  advice,	  a	  proposal	  that	  had	  already	  been	  floated	  in	  a	  dispatch	   from	  Auckland	   to	  Macnaghten	  on	  3	   June,	  a	  day	  after	  Burnes	  had	  dispatched	   his	   response	   from	   Hassan	   Avdal. 147 	  But	   aside	   from	   this	  supporting	  role,	  the	  value	  placed	  on	  this	  advice	  in	  its	  own	  right	  was	  clear.	  In	  forwarding	  the	  papers	  to	  Hobhouse,	  Auckland	  cited	  Burnes’	  report	  at	  length	  and	  was	  keen	  to	  point	  out	  that	  Burnes’	  professed	  support	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  made	  him	  ‘a	  good	  witness	  on	  this	  occasion’.148	  Of	  Masson’s	  paper,	  Auckland’s	  note	  on	  the	  copy	  forwarded	  to	  Hobhouse	  makes	  it	  clear.	  It	  reads:	   ‘This,	  of	  papers	  sent	   in	  by	  Capt	  Wade,	  Capt	  Burnes,	  Lt	  Mackeson	  and	  Mr	  Masson	  all	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  gives,	  I	  think,	  very	  much	  the	  clearest	  view	  of	  the	  state	  of	  parties	  and	  politics	  in	  Afghanistan.’149	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Masson	  ‘Means	  of	  counteracting	  the	  policy	  of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan’,	  8	  June	  1838,	  p.	  375.	  146	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Masson	  ‘Means	  of	  counteracting	  the	  policy	  of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan’,	  p.	  374.	  147	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  June	  3	  1838,	  p.	  252-­‐3.	  In	  this	  dispatch	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  suggests	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  warming	  Anglo-­‐Sikh	  alliance,	  it	  should	  be	  made	  clear	  to	  the	  Maharajah	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  Herat	  and	  a	  Persian	  march	  to	  Kandahar,	  would	  prompt	  ‘the	  advance	  of	  a	  military	  force	  to	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Indus’.	  Auckland	  further	  suggested	  proposing	  to	  the	  Sikh	  ruler	  ‘whether	  upon	  this	  measure	  may	  not	  also	  be	  grafted	  the	  adoption	  of	  Shah	  Shooja’,	  adding	  that	  ‘his	  claims	  to	  the	  throne	  of	  Cabul	  must	  become	  matter	  for	  future	  discussion	  and	  consideration	  as	  further	  information	  may	  be	  obtained.’	  148	  Add	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  Aside	   from	   the	   question	   over	   whom	   to	   back,	   both	   papers	   provided	   clear	  contributions	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   viability	   of	   a	   unitary	   Afghan	   polity.	  Burnes	   dismissed	   as	   anachronistic	   the	   fears	   of	   some	   over	   establishing	   a	  ‘strong	  Mahomedan	  neighbour’	  and	  urged	  that	  the	  British	  ‘should	  consolidate	  the	  Afghan	  power	  west	  of	  the	  Indus	  and	  have	  a	  King	  and	  not	  a	  collection	  of	  Chiefs.’	  As	  he	  reasoned,	  “Divide	  et	  impera”	  is	  a	  temporising	  creed	  at	  any	  time	  and	  if	  the	  Afghans	  are	  united	  we	  either	  bid	  defiance	  to	  Persia	  and	  instead	  of	  distant	   relations	   we	   have	   every	   thing	   under	   our	   own	   eye	   and	   a	   steadily	  progressing	  influence	  all	  along	  the	  Indus.’150	  The	  clear	  normative	  distinction	  between	   the	   ineffective	   ‘Chief’	   and	   the	   authoritative	   ‘King’	   chimed	  with	   the	  regal	  air	  to	  which	  Shah	  Shuja,	  as	  the	  Saddozai	  heir,	  had	  been	  viewed	  by	  the	  British.	  	  	  Masson,	  however,	  provided	  a	  more	  calibrated	  argument.	  The	  dispatches	  from	  Calcutta	   and	  Simla	  had	  demonstrated	   a	   clear	  preoccupation	  with	   the	  Herat	  question,	  and	  Masson	  accordingly	  shaped	  his	  advice	  in	  line	  with	  this	  concept.	  He	   noted	   that	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   Barakzai	   ruler	   from	   Kabul	   would	  immediately	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  intercourse	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Herat,	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  Shah	  Shuja	  in	  particular	  would	  represent	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  ruler	  whose	  interests	  were	  ‘identical	  with	  those	  of	  Kamran’.151	  	  Should	  the	  siege	  of	  Herat	   prove	   a	   failure,	   it	  would	   only	   be	   a	  matter	   of	   time,	  Masson	   reasoned,	  before	  another	  attempt	  would	  be	  made.	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  he	  noted,	  ‘it	  would	  be	  pitiful	  that	  he	  should	  look	  in	  vain,	  as	  he	  has	  done	  in	  his	  present	  emergency,	  to	  the	  Afghans	  of	  the	  East	  for	  assistance.	  The	  restoration	  of	  Shah	  Sujah	  would	  prevent	  this	  disgraceful	  recurrence’.152	  In	  place	  of	  a	  divided	  polity	  ruled	  by	  an	  ‘antinational’	   clique,	   Afghanistan	   would	   thereby	   be	   constituted	   of	   two	  separate	   Governments,	   one	   in	   Kabul	   and	   Kandahar,	   and	   one	   in	   Herat;	   a	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division	  that	  was	  ‘nearly	  a	  natural	  one’,	  argued	  Masson,	  and	  between	  ‘whose	  equal	  interest	  it	  would	  be	  to	  oppose	  Persia’.153	  	  On	   17	   June,	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   was	   demonstrating	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	  decisiveness	   over	   the	   policy.	   Labelling	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   a	   ‘kuzilbash	  [sic]	   to	   the	  Westward’154	  he	  updated	  Hobhouse	  on	  a	   ‘plan	  of	  action’	   that	  he	  sought	  to	  put	  before	  Ranjit	  Singh:	  ‘That	  Shah	  Shooja	  shall	  advance	  with	  levies	  under	  British	   officers	   and	  with	  British	  money	   upon	  Candahar,	   and	   that	   his	  eldest	  son,	  also	  attended	  by	  British	  officers	  and	  backed	  by	  the	  Sikh	  army,	   if	  necessary,	  shall	  march	  upon	  Cabul.’155	  In	  the	  climate	  of	  growing	  expectation	  of	   military	   action	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   highlighted	   the	   ‘spirit	   of	   mischief’	  that	  manifested	  itself	  in	  rumour,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  network	  of	  newswriters	  based	  throughout	  India.	  These	  reports,	  often	  passed	  through	  Wade,	  and	  some	  of	   which	   appeared	   in	   the	   Loodiana	   Ukhbar	   circulated	   in	   the	   Punjab,	  implicated	  an	  array	  of	  regional	  states	  including	  Nepal,	  Burma,	  Jaipur,	  Jodhpur,	  Persia,	  Russia,	  and	  even	  China	   in	  varying	  degrees	  of	   subversion	  against	   the	  British.	   Generally	   these	   were	   dismissed,	   although	   as	   one	   Colonel	   Skinner	  offered	  darkly,	   ‘I	  know	  from	  my	  experience	  of	  India	  that	  there	  is	  something	  stirring.’156	  	  Burnes	  followed	  up	  his	  June	  advice	  with	  a	  paper	  to	  John	  Colvin	  in	  July	  on	  ‘the	  most	   judicious	   means	   of	   agitating	   for	   Shah	   Shooja’s	   restoration’,	   clearly	  instrumentalizing	   the	   ethnographic	   and	   political	   information	   that	   he	   had	  accumulated	   during	   his	   recent	   travels	   in	   region.157	  In	   particular,	   Burnes	  sought	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   tricky	   problem	   of	   marching	   a	   Sikh	   army	   through	  Peshawar,	   a	   territory	   known	   to	   be	   hostile	   to	   Sikh	   presence.	   Plans	   were	  moving	  forward	  quickly.	  By	  August,	  the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  British	  forces	  in	   India,	   Sir	   Henry	   Fane	   –	   who	   had	   been	   at	   Simla	   and	   at	   the	   ear	   of	   the	  Governor-­‐General	  throughout	  July	  –	  warned	  the	  regiments	  he	  had	  selected	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Masson	  ‘Means	  of	  counteracting	  the	  policy	  of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan’,	  8	  June	  1838,	  375.	  154	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  17	  June	  1838,	  262.	  155	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Auckland	  to	  Hobhouse,	  17	  June	  1838,	  263.	  156	  Add	  MS	  36473,	  Extract	  of	  a	  letter	  from	  Col	  Skinner,	  2	  June	  1838,	  280.	  157	  Mss	  Eur	  F470/2,	  Burnes,	  ‘Notes	  on	  the	  most	  judicious	  means	  of	  agitating	  for	  Shah	  Shooja’s	  restoration’,	  20	  July,	  1838.	  
	   171	  
their	   upcoming	   duty.	   On	   13	   September	   the	   general	   order	   for	   mobilization	  was	  sent	  out.	  	  	  In	   London	  meanwhile,	   opinions	  were	   also	   changing.	   The	   landings	   of	   Kharg	  island	  were	  now	  pressuring	  the	  Shah	  but	  with	  troops	  numbering	  just	  500	  it	  was	   more	   a	   show	   of	   force	   than	   a	   credible	   military	   option.	   Moreover,	  Palmerston	  was	  skeptical	  of	  a	   land	  invasion	  of	  Persia	  fearing	  it	  would	  drive	  Persia	   further	   into	   Russian	   arms,	   and	   prompt	   an	   insurrection	   amongst	   the	  Persian	  people.	  Rather,	  Palmerston	  was	  increasingly	  viewing	  Afghanistan	  as	  ‘the	  quarter	  where	  the	  real	  work	  is	  to	  be	  done’;	  a	  distinct	  area	  of	  operations	  at	   which	   the	   British	   could	   ‘aim	   directly’	   and	   where	   whatever	   was	  accomplished	  could	  be	  afterwards	  maintained.158	  	  On	  1	  October	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  published	  his	  infamous	  Simla	  Manifesto,	  a	  publically	  released	  statement	  that	  amounted	  to	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  and	  the	  Kandahar	  chiefs.	  The	  Simla	  Manifesto	  was	  a	  deliberately	   obfuscatory	   document	   that	   constructed	   the	   reasons	   for	   war	  around	   a	   number	   of	   misleading	   assertions.	   Among	   these,	   it	   presented	   the	  Amir	  as	  an	  aggressor	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  Sikhs,	  and	  British	  India	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	   document	   further	   accused	   the	   Amir	   of	   an	   intransigent	   approach	   to	  British	   attempts	   at	   Afghan-­‐Sikh	   mediation,	   and	   of	   welcoming	   Persian	  influence	  into	  the	  country	  –	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  siege	  at	  Herat.	  The	  Kandahar	  chiefs	  were	  further	  accused	  of	  having	  ‘avowed	  their	  adherence’	  to	   the	   Persians.	   The	   presentation	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   fractured	   and	   now	  threatening	   polity	   was	   clear:	   ‘It	   had	   been	   clearly	   ascertained,	   from	   the	  information	   furnished	  by	   the	  various	  officers	  who	  have	  visited	  Afghanistan,	  that	  the	  Barukzye	  chiefs,	  from	  their	  disunion	  and	  unpopularity,	  were	  ill	  fitted,	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  to	  be	  useful	  allies	  to	  the	  British	  Government,	  and	  to	  aid	  us	  in	  our	  just	  and	  necessary	  measures	  of	  national	  defence.’	  In	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  events	  the	  manifesto	  argued	  a	  new	  policy	  was	  now	  required;	  one	  that	  provided	   on	   the	   ‘western	   frontier	   an	   ally	   who	   is	   interested	   in	   resisting	  aggression,	   and	   establishing	   tranquility,	   in	   the	   place	   of	   chiefs	   ranging	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themselves	   in	   subservience	   to	   a	   hostile	   power,	   and	   seeking	   to	   promote	  schemes	   of	   conquest	   and	   aggrandisement.’159	  The	   unifying	   figure	   of	   Shah	  Shuja	  was	  thereby	  presented	  as	  allowing	  for	  the	  ‘independence	  and	  integrity’	  of	   Afghanistan,	   and	   restoring	   the	   ‘union	   and	   prosperity	   of	   the	   Afghan	  people’.160	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  ongoing	  siege	  of	  Herat	  continued	  to	  provide	  a	  justification	  for	  ongoing	  military	  plans.	  However,	  in	  September	  the	  picture	   began	   to	   change.	   The	   arrival	   of	   Major	   Todd’s	   dispatch	   in	   July	   had	  supported	   the	   view	   that	   the	   stationing	   of	   a	   British	   troop	   contingent	   in	   the	  Persian	   Gulf	   would	   be	   sufficient	   to	   alter	   Persian	   calculations,	   and	   the	  communiqué	  reported	  that	  the	  defence	  of	  Herat	  was	  ‘gallantly	  maintained’.161	  With	   troops	   now	   present	   on	   the	   island	   of	   Kharg,	   the	   prediction	   proved	  correct.	  Durand	  dates	   the	   lifting	  of	   the	   siege	  of	  Herat	  on	  9	  September,	   four	  days	   before	   Fane’s	   general	   order	   for	   mobilization	   was	   issued,	   however,	  rumours	   of	   this	   did	   not	   reach	   Simla	   till	   13	   October.162	  By	   this	   point	   the	  Governor-­‐General	   had	   already	   published	   the	   Simla	  Manifesto,	   however	   the	  message	  did	  reach	  Simla,	  in	  theory,	  in	  time	  for	  the	  troops	  to	  have	  stood	  down.	  	  But	  despite	  the	  pretext	  having	  been	  lifted,	  the	  campaign	  went	  ahead.163	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  on	  15	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  (Durand,	  The	  First	  Afghan	  War	  and	  its	  Causes,	  79).	  Ironically,	  despite	  the	  distance,	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  of	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  fact	  reached	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  in	  London	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  days	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  First	  Afghan	  War,	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  163	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  pretext	  had	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  was	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  Henry	  Willock,	  former	  British	  envoy	  to	  Tehran,	  who	  wrote	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  in	  early	  December	  1838	  (F88/105,	  Willock	  to	  Palmerston,	  1	  December	  1838,	  p.109).	  It	  is	  also	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  Kaye,	  
History	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Vol.	  I,	  383;	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains,	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  Masson,	  Narrative,	  III,	  490.	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Conclusion:	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  Policy	  Problem	  	  The	  continuation	  of	  British	  plans	  to	  invade	  Afghanistan	  despite	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  siege	  of	  Herat	  has	  added	  weight	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  inherent	  belligerence	  and	  imperialist	  urges	  of	  British	  India,	  fearful	  of	  Russian	  ingress	  and	  driven	  by	  ignorance	  and	  hubris.	  But	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  note	  that	  Russia	  and	  Britain	  were	  ostensibly	  on	  friendly	  terms	  at	  this	  point.	  London	  was	  happy	  to	  let	  Auckland	  make	  his	  mind	  up,	  and	  he	  was	  keen	  to	  avoid	  the	  implication	  of	  Russia	  in	  the	  decision	   to	   go	   to	  war	   to	   prevent	   a	   conflagration	   in	   relations	   that	  might	   be	  played	  out	  in	  Europe.	  This	  has	  encouraged	  the	  view	  that	  there	  was	  a	  wider,	  unspoken,	  British	  fear	  of	  Russian	  expansion;	  a	  paranoia	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  in	   the	  archives.	  This	   fear	   cannot	  be	  avoided	   in	   the	  explanation	  but	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient	   explanation.	   Just	   as	   important	  were	   the	   regional	   aspects,	   notably	  the	  priority	  placed	  by	  the	  British,	  on	  their	  alliance	  with	  the	  Sikh	  Kingdom.	  	  	  This	   chapter	  has	   sought	   to	  add	  more	  depth	   to	   this	  analysis	  by	  drawing	  out	  the	   policy	   debates	   behind	   the	   decision	   to	   invade.	   The	   foundations	   of	   the	  reasoning	  over	  why	  the	  British	  felt	  the	  opportunity	  was	  ripe	  to	  achieve	  their	  ends	   are	   to	   be	   found	   in	   how	   they	   began	   to	   view	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   future	  Afghanistan	  under	  British	  influence;	  how	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  unitary	  polity	  was	  imagined.	  When	  we	  consider	  these	  images	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  that,	  contrary	  to	  almost	   all	   histories	   of	   this	   period,	   the	   decision	   to	   invade	   Afghanistan	   had	  much	  more	   to	   do	  with	   Afghanistan	   itself,	   and	   British	   understandings	   of	   it,	  than	  wider	  grand-­‐strategic	  narratives.	  	  	  The	  chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  identify	  how	  these	  understandings	  were	  shaped	  by	  colonial	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  in	  turn	  how	  they	  began	  to	  shape	  that	  knowledge	   itself.	   What	   mattered	   to	   the	   British	   was	   stability	   first	   and	  foremost,	  an	  independent	  Afghanistan,	  and	  a	  pro-­‐British	  ruler	  if	  possible.	  In	  their	  own	  imagined	  view	  of	  Saddozai	  authority,	  based	  on	  their	  understanding	  of	   Afghanistan’s	   history,	   and	   the	   policy	   advice	   of	   informed	   experts,	   the	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British	  saw	  in	  Shah	  Shuja,	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  all	  three.	  This	  was	  the	  Afghanistan	  context	  into	  which	  their	  wider	  strategic	  ambitions	  were	  nested;	  it	  was	   in	   this	   sense	   that	   the	   partial,	   spasmodic,	   and	   tendentious	   history	   of	  British	   engagement	  with	   Afghanistan	   could	   be	   said	   to	   have	  made	   the	   First	  Afghan	   War	   imaginable	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   In	   particular,	   the	   British	   had	  constructed	  a	  powerful	  perception	  that	  there	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  unified	  state	   under	   Shah	   Shuja	   relying	   on	   the	   Barakzai/Saddozai	   concept	   of	   the	  Afghan	  polity,	  a	  perspective	  that	  had	  been	  supported	  by	  the	  policy	  advice	  of	  Burnes	  and	  Masson	  in	  particular.	  Guided	  by	  this	  image,	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  siege	  of	  Herat	  did	  not	  remove	  the	  need	  for	  British	  intervention,	  arguably	  in	  fact,	  it	  made	  a	  unified	  state	  more	   likely	   to	  succeed	  with	   the	  anticipated	  alliance	  of	  Kamran	  in	  Herat	  and	  Shuja	  in	  Kabul.	  	  	  In	  essence,	  this	  was	  the	  story	  of	  the	  conversion	  of	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  into	  a	  policy	  science	  for	  the	  powerful;	  a	  quest	  for	  legibility	  combining	  with	  a	  demand	  for	  closure	  emanating	  from	  Simla	  and	  London.	  Over	  a	  year	   into	  his	  new	  post	   in	  Kabul,	   on	  4	   July	   1840,	  Alexander	  Burnes	  wrote	   to	   his	   political	  masters	   a	   memo	   titled	   ‘observations	   on	   the	   restored	   government	   of	   Shah	  Shooja’.	   In	   it	   he	   alluded	   to	   the	   recent	   resurgence	   of	   Afghanistan	   to	   the	  forefront	  of	  British	  imperial	  concerns,	  a	  country	  he	  described	  ‘which	  hitherto	  seemed	   as	   it	   were	   not’.164	  The	   British	  were	   beginning	   to	   believe	   that	   their	  predictions	   would	   prove	   correct.	   They	   were	   about	   to	   have	   this	   illusion	  shattered.	  The	  legacy	  of	  this	  realization	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  Burnes	  ‘Observations	  on	  the	  restored	  Government	  of	  Shah	  Shooja’,	  4	  July	  1840.	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  Chapter	  Four	  	  	  The	  Era	  of	  Exception:	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  Relations	  After	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  	  	  	  The	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  had	  a	  lasting	  impact	  on	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations.	  This	  chapter	  tracks	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ‘idea’	  of	  Afghanistan	  following	  the	  disasters	  of	  this	  war,	  beginning	  with	  the	  immediate	  aftermath,	  during	  which	  time	  Afghanistan	  became	  cast	  as	  a	  ‘violent	  geography’,	  a	  representation	  that	  sustained	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  non-­‐intervention.	  This	  period	   is	   frequently	  portrayed	  as	  one	   in	  which	  growing	  concerns	  of	  Russian	   imperial	  expansion	  eventually	  overcame	  these	   fears	  and	   forced	  an	  aggressive	   forward	  move	  by	  the	   British.	   The	   debates	   surrounding	   this	   are	   typically	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	  imperial	   rivalry	   and	   the	   schism	   between	   ‘forward	   policy’	   adherents	   who	  favoured	  a	  British	  military	  position	  within	  Afghanistan,	  versus	  ‘close	  border’	  adherents	  who	  favoured	  a	  position	  on	  the	  Indus.	  This	  chapter	  questions	  this	  simplistic	   narrative.	   Whilst	   British	   fears	   of	   Russian	   expansion	   cannot	   be	  discounted,	   the	   genesis	   of	   those	   fears	   is	   deserving	   of	   closer	   attention.	  Similarly,	   the	   frontier	   debates	   of	   this	   era	   should	  be	   located	   in	   the	  political,	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  shifts	  that	  were	  impacting	  upon	  the	  colonial	  state	  at	  this	  time.	  	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  a	  perspective	  that	  favours	  a	  simple	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  rivalry	  overlooks	   the	  patterns	  of	  cooperation	   that	  were	  apparent	  between	  London,	  Calcutta	   and	   St	   Petersburg	   in	   a	   number	   of	   areas.	   In	   particular,	   a	   more	  complete	   analysis	   should	   acknowledge	   the	   presence	   of	   shared	   imperial	  outlooks	   on	   the	   duties	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   great	   powers	   vis-­à-­vis	  ‘uncivilized’,	  even	  ‘barbarous’,	  states.	  Such	  an	  approach	  provides	  insight	  into	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the	   way	   in	   which	   both	   powers	   sought	   to	   legitimize	   their	   actions,	   and	  routinize	   their	   relations	   with	   each	   other,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   Central	   Asian	  polities.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  policy	  debates	  in	  India	  and	  London	  concerning	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  demand	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  nuance	   than	   the	   forward	  policy/close	  border	  policy	  schism	  suggests.	  These	  debates	  were	  about	  more	  than	  military	  strategy,	  encompassing	  political	  measures	  too,	  and	  were	  as	  much	  about	  the	  ‘character’	  of	  British	  imperialism,	  as	  they	  were	  about	  its	  administration.	  The	  conduct	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   was	   therefore	   subject	   to	   a	   multitude	   of	  voices.	   These	   debates	   often	   said	   more	   about	   the	   conduct	   of	   Indian	   affairs	  than	   they	   did	   about	   Afghanistan	   itself,	   but	   sustaining	   this	  was	   a	   prevailing	  view	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  polity,	  sustained	  by	  events	  unfolding	  within	  the	  region	  at	  this	  time.	  Perhaps	  most	  impactful	  were	  the	  instabilities	  brought	   by	   the	   death	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   in	   1863,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  apparent	  growing	  role	  for	  Islam	  in	  the	  authority	  structures	  of	  Afghan	  rule	  –	  a	  change	  that	  the	  British	  were	  apt	  to	  view	  as	  indicative	  of	  ‘fanaticism’,	  placing	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  beyond	  the	  pale	  of	  civilized	  diplomatic	  discourse,	  indeed	  as	  inimical	   to	   it.	   This	   perception	   was	   one	   of	   the	   key	   areas	   in	   which	   British	  presence	  on	  the	  north-­‐west	  frontier	  influenced	  the	  conduct	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  at	  this	  time.	  	  The	  period	  from	  1858	  onwards	  witnessed	  a	  drift	  away	  from	  the	  specificities	  that	   had	   attended	   colonial	   knowledge	   during	   the	   era	   preceding	   the	   First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  as	  knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  became	  swept	  up	   in	  wider	  imperial	   visions	   of	   global	   order.	   Whilst	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   war	   had	  witnessed	   its	   representation	   as	   a	   violent	   geography	   of	   conflict	   and	  lawlessness,	   wider	   diplomatic	   imperatives	   forced	   a	   degree	   of	   détente	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Calcutta.	  Meanwhile,	  new	  ‘imaginative	  spheres’1	  began	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  these	  relations	  and	  draw	  upon	  these	  ‘free-­‐floating’	  imaginative	   tropes.	   A	   key	   driver	   in	   this	   sense	   related	   to	   a	   debate	   over	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  Duncan	  Bell,	  ‘Victorian	  visions	  of	  global	  order:	  An	  introduction’	  in	  Duncan	  Bell	  (ed.),	  
Victorian	  Visions	  of	  Global	  Order	  (Cambridge:	  CUP),	  9.	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international	   legal	   jurisprudence	  between	   ‘positivists’	   and	   ‘naturalists’.	   It	   is	  worth	  summarizing	  this	  debate	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  its	  relevance.	  	  For	   those	   favouring	   the	   ‘natural	   law’	   perspective,	   sovereign	   rulers	   were	  bound	   in	   their	   actions	   by	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   extra-­‐legal	   structure,	   based	   on	  religion,	  contractarian	  principles,	  or	  convention	  -­‐	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  these.	  International	  law	  consisted	  therefore	  of	  a	  set	  of	  ‘transcendental	  principles’	  of	  justice	  and	  an	  overarching	  sense	  of	  morality	  that	  could	  be	  accessed	  by	  reason	  and	   was	   applicable	   to	   all.2	  During	   the	   mid	   to	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   this	  position	   was	   challenged	   by	   a	   more	   ‘scientific’	   positivist	   conception,3	  given	  credence	   by	   a	   professionalising	   legal	   class,	  which	   viewed	   international	   law	  rather	  as	  the	  product	  of	  sovereign	  will.	  Positivist	  international	  law	  consisted	  of	   ‘those	   rules	   that	   had	   been	   agreed	   upon	   by	   sovereign	   states,	   either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  as	  regulating	  relations	  between	  them.’4	  Identifying	  the	  rationale	   upon	  which	   this	   positivist	   law	   should	   be	   built	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   key	  distinction	   between	   ‘civilized’	   (in	   effect,	   European)	   states,	   who	   were	   the	  creators	   and	   insurers	  of	   these	   agreed	  principles;	   and	   ‘uncivilized’	   states,	   to	  whom	  this	  European	  ‘law	  of	  nations’	  did	  not,	  or	  could	  not,	  apply	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	   societal,	   political,	   and	   cultural	   nature.5	  Of	   central	   importance	   to	   this	  legally	  enshrined	  prejudice	  was	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘the	  capacity	   for	   reciprocity’.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Anghie,	  ‘Finding	  the	  Peripheries’,	  9-­‐10.	  3	  As	  Casper	  Sylvest	  has	  shown,	  this	  simple	  narrative	  of	  a	  nineteenth	  century	  transition	  from	  natural	  law	  to	  positive	  legal	  jurisprudence	  is	  misleading,	  but	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  identify	  this	  as	  a	  broad	  trend.	  See:	  Casper	  Sylvest,	  ‘The	  foundations	  of	  Victorian	  international	  law’	  in	  Duncan	  Bell	  (ed.),	  Victorian	  Visions	  of	  Global	  
Order	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2007).	  4	  Anghie,	  ‘Finding	  the	  Peripheries’,	  11.	  5	  As	  Gerrit	  Gong	  shows,	  this	  ‘civilized’	  standard	  was	  more	  of	  a	  concept	  than	  a	  list	  of	  requirements.	  This	  concept	  was	  always	  vague,	  and	  frequently	  inconsistent.	  Nonetheless	  he	  identifies	  the	  following	  assumptions	  describing	  a	  ‘civilized	  state’:	  	  1.	  ‘guarantees	  basic	  rights,	  i.e.	  life,	  dignity,	  and	  property;	  freedom	  of	  travel,	  commerce,	  and	  religion,	  especially	  that	  of	  foreign	  nationals’.	  2.	  ‘exists	  as	  an	  organized	  political	  bureaucracy	  with	  some	  efficiency	  in	  running	  the	  state	  machinery,	  and	  some	  capacity	  to	  organize	  for	  self-­‐defence’.	  3.	  ‘adheres	  to	  generally	  accepted	  international	  law,	  including	  the	  laws	  of	  war	  …	  maintains	  a	  domestic	  system	  of	  courts,	  codes,	  and	  published	  laws	  which	  guarantee	  legal	  justice	  for	  all	  within	  its	  jurisdiction,	  foreigners	  and	  native	  citizens	  alike’.	  4.	  ‘fulfils	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  international	  system	  by	  maintaining	  adequate	  and	  permanent	  avenues	  for	  diplomatic	  interchange	  and	  communication.’	  5.	  ‘by	  and	  large	  conforms	  to	  the	  accepted	  norms	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  ‘civilized’	  international	  society,	  e.g.	  suttee	  [sati],	  polygamy,	  and	  slavery	  were	  considered	  ‘uncivilized’,	  and	  therefore	  unacceptable’.	  Gong,	  The	  Standard	  of	  ‘Civilization’	  in	  International	  Society’,	  14-­‐5.	  6	  Pitts,	  ‘Boundaries	  of	  Victorian	  International	  Law’,	  67.	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‘Uncivilized	   states’	   were	   viewed	   by	   jurists	   as	   being	   incapable	   of	   reciprocal	  diplomatic	   exchange	   due	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   including	   civilizational	  backwardness;	   a	   lack	   of	   sufficiently	   abstract	   notions	   of	   justice;	   and	  (particularly	   in	   the	   case	   of	   certain	   Asian	   states)	   the	   hostility	   of	   Islam	   to	  ‘infidels’.7	  	   Positivism,	   as	   a	   legal	   theory	   (and	   indeed	   as	   an	   epistemological	  standpoint),	   was	   believed	   to	   rest	   upon	   an	   objective	   reality	   observable	   by	  reference	   to	   ‘facts’.	   Accordingly,	   the	   criteria	   by	  which	   an	   ‘uncivilized’	   state	  was	   judged,	   implicitly	   rested	   upon	   pre-­‐existing	   understandings	   of	   such	  polities	   and	   states.	   Colonial	   knowledge	   therefore	   came	   to	   sustain	   and	  legitimize	   the	   representation	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   ‘uncivilized’	   state.	   By	  extension,	  states	  viewed	  as	  uncivilized	  were	  placed	  in	  a	  separate	  ‘normative	  universe’	   by	   the	   great	   powers.	   As	   such,	   exceptional	   measures	   could	   be	  justified,	   and	   a	   general	   derogation	   from	   the	   established	   practices	   of	  interstate	  conduct,	  directed	  towards	  ‘uncivilized	  states’	  by	  European	  powers,	  was	   normatively	   sanctioned.	   This	   shift	   in	   international	   legal	   theory	   is	  important	   in	   reaching	   a	   more	   complete	   understanding	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  at	  this	  time.	  	  The	  vagaries	  of	   the	  standard	  of	   ‘civilization’	  prompted	  frequent	  debate,	  and	  though	  it	  was	  assumed	  by	  most	  positivist	  jurors	  that	  non-­‐European	  states	  lay	  outside	  of	  the	  confines	  of	  ‘civilization’,	  there	  were	  clearly	  nuances	  within	  this	  designation. 8 	  As	   descriptive	   terms,	   ‘civilized’	   and	   ‘uncivilized’	   therefore	  exhibited	   gradations	   in	   definition.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Liberal	   zeal	   that	  accompanied	  British	  imperial	  thought,	  particularly	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  carried	  with	  it	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  ‘civilizing	  influence’,	  brought	   by	   Europeans	   to	   their	   subject	   populations.9	  This	   powerful	   idea	  would	   have	   a	   clear	   impact	   on	   both	   British	   and	   Russian	   framings	   of	   their	  actions	  in	  Central	  Asia.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Pitts,	  ‘Boundaries	  of	  Victorian	  International	  Law’,	  68.	  8	  Pitts,	  ‘Boundaries	  of	  Victorian	  International	  Law’;	  Gong,	  The	  Standard	  of	  ‘Civilization’	  in	  
International	  Society.	  9	  Jennifer	  Pitts,	  A	  Turn	  to	  Empire:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Imperial	  Liberalism	  in	  Britain	  and	  France	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  Especially	  Chapter	  5.	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During	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   Afghanistan	   was	   sitting	  uneasily	  in	  British	  perceptions	  as	  both	  a	  violent,	  exceptional	  space	  and	  yet	  a	  domain	  of	  possibility.	  It	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  recipient	  of	  the	  ‘civilising	  effect’	  of	  British	  imperialism	  –	  including	  commercial	  expansion10	  -­‐	  and	  also	  a	  territory	   that	   should	  be	  managed	  out	  of	   consideration	  of	  wider	  geopolitical	  interests.	   These	   visions	   of	   empire	   often	   clashed,	   and	   provoked	   prolonged	  debate,	   prompted	   in	   part	   by	   new	   technologies,	   as	   well	   as	   concomitant	  intellectual	   perspectives	   on	   the	   potential	   reach	   and	   forms	   of	   imperial	  power. 11 	  Improvements	   in	   communications	   technology,	   particularly	   the	  electric	   telegraph;	   the	   growth	   of	   railway	   transport,	   and	   steam	   powered	  shipping,	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Suez	   Canal,	   allowed	   for	   a	  more	  global	  perspective	  in	  imperial	  defence	  and	  security.	  Accordingly,	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  increasingly	  mobile	  experts	  could	  think	  globally	  about	  the	  pressing	  policy	   issues	   of	   the	   time.	   Meanwhile,	   a	   more	   centralized	   bureaucracy	  encouraged	   a	   generic,	   ordered,	   and	   ‘scientific’	   approach	   to	   public	   policy	  concerning	  civil	   and	  military	  affairs.	  This	  would	  have	  a	   clear	   impact	  on	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  Afghanistan	  was	  discussed	  amongst	  certain	  communities	  of	  policy-­‐makers.	  Once	  more,	  Afghanistan	  was	  being	  subjected	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  ‘academic’	  and	  ‘imaginative’	  knowledge.	  	  This	   chapter	   can	  be	  divided	   chronologically	   into	   two	  parts.	  The	   first	   tracks	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   during	   Amir	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan’s	   second	   reign.	  The	  second	  considers	  the	  period	  following	  his	  death	  in	  1863.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Suhash	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus:	  A	  Study	  in	  Imperial	  Expansion	  (New	  Delhi:	  Orient	  Longman,	  1976).	  11	  Bell,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Greater	  Britain.	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Part	   One	   -­	   Anglo-­Afghan	   Relations	   During	   the	   Second	   Reign	   of	   Dost	  
Muhammad	  Khan	  	  
The	  First	  Anglo-­Afghan	  War	  and	  its	  Aftermath	  	  In	  early	  November	  1838,	  the	  largest	  army	  ever	  to	  have	  assembled	  under	  the	  Raj	  gathered	  at	  Ferozepore	  in	  the	  Punjab.	  Roughly	  1,000	  Europeans,	  14,000	  East	  India	  Company	  Sepoys,	  6,000	  irregulars	  hired	  by	  Shah	  Shuja,	  and	  38,000	  Indian	  camp	  followers	  formed	  the	  ‘Army	  of	  the	  Indus’.12	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  army	  left	   for	  the	  Bolan	  Pass	  via	  Sind	  in	  December	  1838,	  taking	  Kandahar	  in	  April	  1839	   with	   little	   resistance	   following	   the	   flight	   of	   the	   Kandahar	   sirdars	   to	  Herat.	  A	  second,	  smaller	  contingent	  headed	  via	  the	  Khyber	  pass.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	   split	   the	   Amir’s	   defensive	   forces.	   Three	  months	   later,	   Ghazni	   fell	   to	   the	  British	   and	   on	   6	   August	   Shah	   Shuja	   entered	   Kabul	   after	   Dost	   Muhammad	  Khan’s	   military	   support	   deserted	   him	   and	   he	   fled	   north	   towards	   Bokhara.	  Amongst	   the	   defectors	   to	   the	   British	   side	   was	   Haji	   Khan	   who	   had	   hosted	  Masson	   and	   was	   selected	   by	   the	   British	   as	   a	   guide	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  although	  he	  allegedly	  led	  them	  astray.13	  Following	  a	  brief	  attempt	   to	   regain	   his	   throne	   the	   following	   year	   through	   the	   agency	   of	  northern	   constituencies	   in	   Turkistan,	   Hazarajat,	   and	   Kohistan,	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	   eventually	   surrendered	   to	   a	   pension	   arrangement	   in	  Ludhiana.	  He	  would	  soon	  return.	  	  The	   British	   established	   fortifications	   at	   Kandahar,	   Kalat-­‐i-­‐Ghilzai,	   Ghazni,	  Kabul,	   and	   Jalalabad,	   and	   forward	   cantonments	   in	   Charikar	   to	   the	   north	   of	  Kabul,	   and	   at	   Bamiyan	   to	   the	   west.	   They	   also	   occupied	   Quetta	   south	   of	  Kandahar,	  and	  Ali	  Masjid	  in	  the	  Khyber	  Pass	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  supply	  lines.14	  By	  October	  1839,	  Alexander	  Burnes,	  having	  reopened	  a	  correspondence	  with	  Mountstuart	   Elphinstone	   that	   had	   been	   disrupted	   by	   the	   war,	   expressed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Dalrymple,	  Return	  of	  A	  King,	  152.	  13	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  54.	  14	  Dupree,	  Afghanistan,	  381.	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cautious	  optimism	  in	  his	  new	  role	  as	  deputy	  British	  envoy	  in	  Kabul,	  writing	  ‘we	  will	  withdraw	   our	   Army	   –	   embed	   the	   Afghans	   under	   British	  Officers	   –	  Leave	   the	   King	   to	   govern	  without	   our	   appearing	   to	   interfere	   and	   give	   him	  money	  to	  pay	  some	  of	  his	  troops	  till	  he	  can	  by	  acquiring	  Balkh	  and	  Peshawar	  pay	  them	  himself	  –	  I	  think	  we	  shall	  have	  a	  good	  footing	  in	  this	  country’.15	  By	  the	  following	  year	  the	  British	  presence	  had	  taken	  on	  more	  expansive	  aims.	  As	  Burnes	  reflected	  in	  a	  memorandum:	  	  	   ‘The	   ruling	   policy	   …	   as	   it	   appears	   to	   me,	   should	   be	   to	   gain	   the	  friendship	  and	  confidence	  of	   the	  people	  of	   the	  country,	   to	   revise	   the	  assessments	  on	  land,	  to	  heal	  past	  difference,	  to	  overawe	  or	  conciliate	  the	  lawless,	  to	  protect	  the	  roads,	  to	  ensure,	  on	  them,	  not	  merely	  safety	  but	   light	   duties,	   to	   encourage	   commerce.	   The	   King	   we	   have	   placed	  over	  them	  ought	  to	  shew	  [sic],	  by	  the	  benefits	  of	  his	  rule,	  by	  attention	  to	  the	  declining	  national	   institutions,	  by	  the	  mildness	  yet	  firmness	  of	  his	   way,	   the	   justice	   of	   his	   administration,	   the	   vigour	   of	   his	   councils	  and	   the	   equity	  of	  his	  proceedings	   that	  his	   rule	   surpasses	   that	  which	  has	  been	  superseded	  and	  is	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  nation.’16	  
	  The	   first	   signs	   of	   resistance	   came	   in	   May	   1840	   with	   a	   Ghilzai	   attack	   on	   a	  column	   moving	   between	   Ghazni	   and	   Kabul. 17 	  However,	   following	   the	  suppression	   by	   the	   Shah’s	   troops	   of	   repeated	   uprisings	   in	   Kandahar	   in	  August	   1841,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   earlier	   failure	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan’s	  attempts	   in	   the	   north,	   many	   British	   officials	   hoped	   that	   Shah	   Shuja’s	  authority	  had	  been	  accepted.	  The	  situation	  rapidly	  deteriorated	  in	  late	  1841.	  	  	  In	   September	   in	   a	   cost-­‐saving	   measure,	   the	   British	   envoy,	   William	  Macnaghten,	   cut	   subsidies	   to	   the	   Ghilzai	   tribes	   sparking	   a	   rebellion	   in	   the	  Khyber	  Pass	  regions	   that	  closed	  off	   communications	  between	   Jalalabad	  and	  Kabul.	  Meanwhile,	  an	  uprising	  in	  Kohistan	  claimed	  the	  Charikar	  outpost,	  with	  Major	  Eldred	  Pottinger	  escaping	  to	  report	  its	  collapse.	  On	  2	  November	  a	  riot	  in	   Kabul,	   apparently	   led	   by	   disenfranchised	   Barakzai	   court	   nobles	   and	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  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F88/111,	  Burnes	  to	  Elphinstone,	  24	  October	  1839,	  p.	  82.	  16	  IOR	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  Alexander	  Burnes,	  ‘Observations	  on	  the	  restored	  government	  of	  Shah	  Shooja’,	  4	  July	  1840.	  17	  Resistance	  to	  British	  administration	  along	  this	  route	  began	  as	  early	  as	  1839.	  Aside	  from	  the	  rebellions	  prompted	  by	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khans	  activities	  in	  the	  north,	  elsewhere,	  Sayyid	  Hashim	  of	  Kunar	  declared	  independence.	  There	  were	  also	  minor	  rebellions	  in	  Bajaur,	  Jalalabad,	  and	  Kandahar.	  See	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe	  in	  Nineteenth-­Century	  Afghanistan,	  45-­‐9.	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members	  of	  the	  ulema	  unattached	  to	  Shah	  Shuja’s	  court,	  stormed	  the	  house	  of	  Burnes	  and	  killed	  him.	  The	  subsequent	  killing	  of	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  Captain	   Johnson,	   suggested	   a	   monetary	   motive	   to	   the	   uprising,	   and	   the	  damage	   to	   the	   prestige	   of	   certain	   elite	   communities	   threatened	   by	   British	  redistributions	   appeared	   to	   have	   been	   a	   key	   factor. 18 	  Yet	   numerous	  grievances,	   including	  the	  lewd	  behaviour	  of	  British	  troops	  and	  officials	  with	  Afghan	  women,	  have	  also	  been	   identified	   as	   a	  driver	  of	   the	  violence.19	  Two	  days	   later	   the	   British	   Commissariat	   fort	   housing	   almost	   the	   entirety	   of	   the	  army’s	   provisions	  was	   besieged,	   falling	   to	   the	   rebels	   a	   few	   days	   later.	   The	  army	  was	   soon	   ‘on	   the	   verge	  of	   starvation’20	  and	   faced	   a	   growing	   rebellion	  that	   was	   showing	   greater	   signs	   of	   cohesion. 21 	  The	   British	   attempted	   a	  negotiated	  withdrawal	   that	  ended	   in	  a	   failed	  effort	  by	  William	  Macnaghten,	  the	  British	   envoy	   and	   chief	   negotiator,	   to	   split	   the	   insurgents	   –	   an	   attempt	  that	   cost	   him	   his	   life.22	  The	   army	   faced	   no	   option	   but	   to	   retreat	   to	   the	  Jalalabad	   garrison,	   and	  on	  6	   January	  1842,	   the	   remaining	   troops	   and	   camp	  followers	  made	   their	  way	  back	   through	   the	  Khyber	  Pass.	  The	  vast	  majority	  were	   either	   captured	   or	   killed	   by	   Ghilzai	   tribesmen.23	  Only	   a	   handful	   of	  survivors	   returned.24	  In	   retribution	   for	   the	   destruction	   of	   this	   retreating	  column,	   a	   second	   army	   returned	   in	   the	   autumn	   of	   1842,	   exacting	   brutal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  63-­‐4.	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  50.	  19	  Dalrymple,	  Return	  of	  A	  King.	  20	  Fraser-­‐Tytler,	  Afghanistan,	  116;	  Patrick	  Macrory,	  Signal	  Catastrophe	  (London:	  The	  History	  Book	  Club	  Ltd.,	  1967),	  162-­‐4.	  21	  Johnson	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  arrival	  in	  Kabul	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  favourite	  son,	  Muhammad	  Akbar	  Khan,	  whose	  family	  connections	  (including	  through	  his	  marriage	  alliance	  with	  Muhammad	  Shah	  Khan	  of	  the	  eastern	  Ghilzais)	  assured	  a	  greater	  overarching	  authority.	  However,	  the	  nominal	  leader	  of	  the	  insurrection	  was	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  nephew	  Nawab	  Muhammad	  Zaman	  Khan,	  with	  Aminullah	  Khan	  Logari	  as	  his	  wazir	  (minister)	  and	  Abdullah	  Khan	  Achakzai	  the	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief.	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  65;	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  51.	  22	  The	  nominal	  Afghan	  military	  commander	  of	  the	  rebellion,	  Akbar	  Khan,	  sensing	  that	  Macnaghten	  was	  attempting	  to	  engineer	  a	  more	  favourable	  solution	  tricked	  the	  envoy	  into	  signing	  an	  agreement	  that	  would	  effectively	  split	  the	  insurgents,	  which	  he	  then	  showed	  to	  the	  other	  rebel	  leaders.	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  71-­‐2.	  23	  The	  retreating	  column	  consisted	  of	  around	  4,500	  troops	  (690	  Europeans,	  2,840	  Indian	  Sepoy	  infantry,	  970	  Sepoy	  cavalry),	  and	  over	  12,000	  camp	  followers.	  Dupree,	  ‘The	  Retreat	  of	  the	  British	  Army	  from	  Kabul	  to	  Jalalabad	  in	  1842’,	  53.	  24	  Contrary	  to	  popular	  belief	  Dr	  William	  Brydon	  was	  not	  the	  sole	  survivor,	  around	  150	  soldiers	  and	  camp	  followers	  were	  taken	  captive	  and	  later	  released	  following	  the	  return	  of	  the	  British	  force	  in	  1842.	  Brydon’s	  own	  account	  lists	  a	  number	  of	  survivors	  who	  arrived	  in	  the	  days	  and	  weeks	  following	  his	  own	  return.	  Linda	  Colley,	  Captives:	  Britain,	  Empire,	  and	  the	  
World,	  1600-­1850	  (New	  York:	  Anchor	  Books,	  2004),	  350.	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revenge	  on	  the	  Afghan	  population,	  and	  on	  Kabul.	  This	  time	  there	  would	  be	  no	  occupation	  and	  the	  army	  retreated	  once	  more.	  	  	  The	   failures	   of	   the	   British	   occupation	   of	   Afghanistan	   have	   been	   detailed	   in	  numerous	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  works.	  Earlier	  accounts	  have	  tended	  to	   emphasize	   the	   administrative	   and	   strategic	   failures	   of	   the	   EIC	   and	  government	  officials.	  More	  recent	  accounts	  have	  turned	  the	  spotlight	  instead	  on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   Afghan	   resistance	   and	   its	   deeper	   origins.25	  As	   Rob	  Johnson	   has	   noted,	   ‘despite	   the	   presence	   of	   the	  British	   forces,	   the	   conflicts	  that	   occurred	   between	   1839	   and	   1842	   were	   really	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	  dynastic	   struggle	   and	   civil	   war	   that	   had	   begun	   in	   1803,	   or	   perhaps	   even	  earlier’. 26 	  These	   more	   recent	   works	   have	   also	   shown	   how	   the	   British	  intervention	   affected	   the	   political	   dynamic	   within	   Afghanistan,	   mobilizing,	  empowering,	  and	  dividing	   in	  different	  ways,	   the	  diverse	  social	  and	  political	  fabric	   of	   the	  Afghan	  polity.	  Moreover,	   as	   Johnson’s	  work	  demonstrates,	   the	  resistance	   to	   British	   occupation	   was	   far	   from	   unified	   or	   geographically	  spread	   across	   the	   country,	   but	   rather	   fragmented	   and	   localized.27	  In	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  British	  intervention,	  the	  fleeting	  moments	  of	  rebel	  cohesion	  dwindled	   once	   more	   as	   Kabuli	   politics	   was	   fractured	   by	   competing	  communities	   whose	   claims	   to	   authority	   had	   been	   disturbed	   by	   the	  administrative	   and	   political	   legacies	   of	   the	   British-­‐backed	   Shuja	   regime.	  Although	  the	   Islamic	  call	   to	   faith	  presented	  a	  veneer	  of	  common	  purpose,	  a	  more	   nuanced	   reading	   of	   the	   situation,	   as	   recent	   scholarship	   has	   shown,	  demonstrates	   a	   far	   more	   pragmatic	   approach	   to	   both	   the	   formation	   and	  dissolution	  of	  political	  alliances,	  and	  the	  military	  tactics	  adopted	  by	  the	  rebel	  groups.	  	  One	   of	   the	   striking	   features	   of	   the	   British	   archival	   accounts	   at	   this	   time	  concerns	   the	   growth	   in	   local	   knowledge	   resulting	   from	   the	   role	   of	   political	  officers	   stationed	   in	   various	  British	  outposts.	  The	   findings	  of	   these	  officials	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  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe	  in	  Nineteenth-­Century	  Afghanistan	  (see	  pages	  38-­‐59	  for	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War);	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War.	  26	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  53.	  27	  Johnson,	  The	  Afghan	  Way	  of	  War,	  Chapter	  2.	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are	   telling.	  A	   young	  Lieutenant	  Henry	  Rawlinson	   submitted	   a	   paper	   on	   the	  ‘Dooranee	  Tribes’	  of	  Kandahar,	  providing	  survey	  data	  on	   land	  use,	  revenue,	  and	   tenure,	   as	   well	   as	   taxation	   systems,	   military	   divisions	   (based	   on	   land	  rights),	   and	   the	   history	   of	   the	   treatment	   of	   Durrani	   groups	   by	   successive	  Afghan	  rulers.28	  Rawlinson	  found	  that	  the	  instabilities	  in	  the	  south	  were	  the	  result	   of	   engrained	   historical	   grievances	   within	   the	   Durrani	   tribal	  confederacy,	   and	   that	   although	   there	   was	   optimism	   at	   the	   return	   of	   the	  Saddozai	  era,	   the	  golden	  age	  of	  sirdars	  and	  khans	  had	  been	  displaced	  under	  the	   Barakzai	   dynasty,	   reducing	   the	   chiefs	   of	   the	   Kandahar	   tribes	   to	   ‘little	  better	   than	   mere	   plodding	   farmers’.29	  He	   argued	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   Shah	  Shuja’s	   regime	   to	   reform	   the	   exactions	   of	   the	   Barakzai	   era	   land	   revenue	  collection	   systems	   led	   to	   a	   renewal	   of	   disillusionment	   and	   an	   ‘abundant	  repining	   and	   disgust	   among	   these	   …	   farmers	   and	   their	   agricultural	  dependents	  that	  a	  brighter	  field	  was	  not	  suddenly	  opened	  to	  them’.30	  	  Elsewhere,	   Major	   Lynch,	   stationed	   in	   the	   regions	   surrounding	   Peshawar	  provided	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   Turan	  Ghilzai,	   a	   report	   that	  was	   largely	  informed	   by	   oriental	   stereotyping,	   but	   also	   recorded	   population	   data	   and	  genealogical	   information,	   as	   well	   as	   geology	   and	   ‘antiquities’. 31 	  Lynch’s	  report	   further	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   British	   were	   developing	   a	   greater	  familiarity	   with	   elements	   of	   the	   Afghan	   population,	   albeit	   often	   through	   a	  heavily	   prejudicial	   Orientalist	   lens.	   However,	   the	   position	   of	   those	   such	   as	  Lynch	   became	   increasingly	   precarious	   as	   they	   became	   embroiled	   in	   local	  disputes	  and	  as	  political	  decisions	  higher	  up	  the	  chain	  of	  command	  prompted	  blowback	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Lynch,	  his	  own	  policy	  of	  advocating	  the	  removal	  of	  certain	  tribal	  leaders	  to	  ‘establish	  tranquillity’,32	  as	  well	  as	  the	  imprisonment	   of	   other	   local	   elites	   by	   the	   British	   elsewhere,	   appeared	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  28	  L/PS/18/A2	  ‘Report	  by	  Lieutenant	  (now	  Sir)	  Henry	  C.	  Rawlinson,	  on	  the	  Dooranee	  Tribes’,	  19	  April	  1841.	  It	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  paper	  that	  it	  was	  still	  appearing	  in	  the	  
Gazetteer	  of	  Afghanistan,	  a	  handbook	  for	  officers	  stationed	  on	  the	  frontier,	  as	  late	  as	  1910.	  Anderson,	  ‘Poetics	  and	  Politics	  in	  Ethnographic	  Texts’.	  29	  L/PS/18/A2,	  ‘Report	  …	  on	  the	  Dooranee	  Tribes’,	  p.	  93.	  30	  L/PS/18/A2,	  ‘Report	  …	  on	  the	  Dooranee	  Tribes’,	  p.	  93.	  For	  further	  detail	  see	  Martin,	  A	  
Brief	  History	  of	  Helmand.	  31	  L/PS/3/11/Part	  4,	  p.	  729-­‐75.	  32	  L/PS/3/11/Part	  4,	  ‘Report	  on	  the	  Tooran	  Guljies	  by	  Major	  Lynch’,	  p.	  764.	  Here	  Lynch	  referred	  specifically	  to	  Samud	  Khan,	  a	  Takhi	  elder	  appointed	  by	  the	  Shah.	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render	   his	   position	   increasingly	   tenuous.	   Moreover,	   such	   policies	   invited	  accusations	  of	  double-­‐standards,	  as	  Lynch	  noted:	  when	  the	  Afghans	  ‘are	  told	  that	   [Shah	   Shuja]	   is	   King	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	   supported	   only	   by	   the	   British	  Government	   …	   they	   conceive	   it	   [a]	   rather	   curious	   fact	   that	   Shah	   Shujah	  should	  be	  King	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  have	  his	  state	  prison	  in	  India	  or	  London’.33	  	  	  Such	   reports	  were	   the	  natural	   continuation	  of	   a	   project	   initiated	  by	   earlier	  European	  explorers.	  Indeed	  Rawlinson’s	  report	  was	  just	  one	  early	  example	  of	  a	   career	   that	   would	   see	   him	   become	   one	   of	   a	   new	   breed	   of	   colonial	  Afghanistan	   ‘experts’	   –	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  a	   role	   in	   the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.34	  These	  accounts	  were	  also	  inflected	  by	  the	  colonial	  knowledge	  of	  these	  forebears,	   as	  well	   as	   by	   the	   preconceptions	   of	   Afghan	   political	   history	   that	  earlier	  works	  carried	  –	  as	  with	  the	  Saddozai/Barakzai	  schism	  highlighted	  in	  Rawlinson’s	  report.	  But	   this	   local	  perspective	  was	  subsumed	  by	  an	  ongoing	  historical	  revisionism.	  Alexander	  Burnes	  was	  exemplary	  in	  this	  respect.	  In	  a	  July	  1840	  report	  he	  evoked	  the	  ‘boundless	  ambition	  of	  Russia’	  that	  prompted	  the	  British	  to	  action	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Ignoring	  the	  policy	  contestations	  that	  he	  had	  been	  a	  part	  of,	  he	  confidently	  declared	  that	  the	  ‘told	  steps	  of	  supplanting	  the	   existing	   order	   of	   things	   in	   Afghanistan	   having	   once	   been	   determined	  upon,	  was,	   as	   anticipated,	   followed	   by	   complete	   success	  …	  To	   anyone	  who	  had	   in	   the	   least	   attended	   to	   the	   history	   of	   Afghanistan,	   since	   its	  dismemberment,	   its	   division	   into	   Chiefs,	   its	   feuds,	   in	   fact	   its	   almost	   entire	  extinction	  as	  a	  nation,	  this	  result	  must	  have	  been	  foreseen.35	  Such	  accounting	  gave	   the	   impression	   that	   the	   British	  were	   restoring	   a	   ‘social	   compact’,	   but	  this	  vision	  of	  unity	  was	  largely	  of	  their	  own	  making.	  	  	  Elsewhere,	   prominent	   military	   figures	   reprised	   their	   earlier	   Russophobia,	  lauding	  the	  initial	  military	  successes	  in	  Afghanistan	  to	  further	  buttress	  their	  claim	   for	   greater	   expenditure	   on	   the	   Indian	   Army.	   General	  Whittingham,	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  L/PS/3/11/Part	  4,	  ‘Report	  on	  the	  Tooran	  Guljies…’,	  p.	  774-­‐5.	  34	  The	  link	  between	  those	  who	  fought	  in	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  and	  later	  served	  in	  posts	  on	  the	  north	  west	  frontier	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  Charles	  Allen,	  Soldier	  Sahibs:	  The	  Men	  Who	  
Made	  the	  North-­West	  Frontier	  (London:	  Abacus,	  2001).	  Rawlinson’s	  later	  scholarly	  activities	  relating	  to	  Afghanistan	  includied	  assistance	  in	  editing	  J.P.	  Ferrier’s	  travel	  volume,	  Caravan	  
Journeys	  and	  Wanderings	  in	  Persia,	  Afghanistan,	  Turkistan,	  and	  Beloochistan.	  35	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  4	  July	  1840,	  ‘Observations	  on	  the	  restored	  Government	  of	  Shah	  Shooja’.	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long	   time	   lobbyist	   at	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   the	   British	   Government,	   urged	   a	  more	  prolonged	  occupation,	  noting	  approvingly	  that	  ‘[w]e	  have	  by	  our	  recent	  successes	   not	   only	   become	   fully	   acquainted	   with	   Affghanistan,	   its	   strong	  Passes,	  and	  its	  means	  of	  defence,	  but	  we	  have	  these	  strong	  holds	  [sic]	  in	  our	  keeping;	   it	   will	   therefore	   be	   our	   own	   fault	   if	   Russia	   ever	   attacks	   us	   at	   a	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  East’.36	  Whittingham	  laid	  out	  what	  would	  later	  become	  a	  familiar	  argument,	  to	  support	  his	  call	  for	  greater	  military	  expansion,	  claiming	  that	   any	   paucity	   of	   numbers	  would	   ‘doubly	   increase	   its	   danger	   by	   inviting	  attack’.	   Retreat,	   he	   argued,	  would	   demonstrate	  weakness:	   ‘the	   option	   is	   no	  longer	  open	  to	  us’,	  he	  declared.37	  	  As	  events	  turned	  against	  the	  British,	  however,	  a	  new	  form	  of	  organizational	  politics	   also	   began	   to	   warp	   the	   historical	   record	   as	   officials	   sought	   to	  exonerate	  themselves	  from	  their	  share	  of	  the	  blame,	  and	  from	  their	  share	  of	  the	  consequences.	  Aside	  from	  the	  political	  furore	  in	  London	  that	  met	  news	  of	  the	  1842	  retreat,	  a	  dispute	  erupted	  between	  the	  Court	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  East	  India	   Company	   and	   the	   Government	   of	   India	   concerning	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  had	  been	  made	  on	  grounds	  of	   ‘European	  objects’	   (i.e.	   Russian	   moves),	   or	   whether	   it	   constituted	   a	   purely	   ‘Asiatic	  question’	   and	   therefore	   concerned	   the	   interests	   of	   only	   the	   East	   India	  Company.	   The	   answer	   to	   this	   would	   determine	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  Company	  could	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  financial	  indemnities.	  This	  was	  a	  pertinent	  question.	   The	   UK	   budget	   surplus	   had	   been	   at	   £3,000,000	   in	   1836,	   but	  following	   the	   Afghan	   war	   it	   now	   stood	   at	   a	   deficit	   of	   £2,430,000.38	  This	  situation	   had	   been	   exacerbated	   by	   abortive	   attempts	   to	   introduce	   British	  Indian	   currency	   in	  Kabul	   and	  Kandahar,	   the	   failure	  of	  which	   imperilled	   the	  financial	   stability	   of	   the	   entire	   Company,	   its	   relations	   with	   bankers	   across	  India,	   and	   in	   turn,	   the	   fiscal	   stability	   of	   the	   British	   Government	   in	   India.39	  Members	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Directors	   therefore	   demanded	   full	   disclosure	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  General	  Whittingham,	  ‘Confidential:	  Letter	  and	  Memoir	  on	  the	  means	  of	  attack	  by	  Russia	  on	  British	  India…’.	  37	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  General	  Whittingham,	  ‘Confidential:	  Letter	  and	  Memoir	  on	  the	  means	  of	  attack	  by	  Russia	  on	  British	  India…’.	  38	  L/PS/3/12,	  W.	  H.	  Sykes,	  21	  June	  1842,	  p.	  553.	  39	  Hanifi,	  ‘Impoverishing	  a	  colonial	  frontier’,	  206-­‐7.	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Government	   correspondence	   on	   the	   matter	   and	   deliberately	   highlighted	  those	  aspects	  demonstrating	   that	   fears	  of	  Russia	   lay	  behind	   the	  decision.	   It	  was	  generally	  perceived,	  by	  the	  Court	  that	  these	  fears	  were	  exaggerated,	  but	  this	  mattered	  less	  than	  proving	  their	  relevance	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  	  These	  debates	  together	  subsumed	  the	  local	  perspectives	  that	  highlighted	  the	  superficial	   and	   tendentious	   understandings	   of	   the	   Afghan	   polity	   that	   had	  attended	  the	  policy	  debates	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  the	  campaign.	  Meanwhile	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  Russian	  aspect,	  either	  to	  sustain	  further	  military	  investment,	  or	  to	  buttress	  claims	  over	  financial	  liabilities	  for	  the	  disaster,	  provided	  ample	  material	   for	   future	   historians	  who	   advocated	   great	   game	   narratives,	   at	   the	  cost	  of	  these	  local	  perspectives.	  	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Violent	  Geography	  	  The	   catastrophe	   of	   1842	   had	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   British	   perceptions	   of	  Afghanistan	  itself	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  particular	  rendering	  of	  the	  country	  as	   a	   ‘violent	   geography’. 40 	  This	   representation	   had	   multiple	   sources.	  Demonstrating	  the	  power	  of	  local	  information	  systems	  once	  more,	  officials	  in	  India	   first	   heard	   of	   the	   disasters	   through	   Hindu	   bankers	   in	   the	   bazaars	   of	  Delhi.41	  By	  the	  time	  the	  message	  had	  reached	  London,	  a	  powerful	  narrative	  of	  Afghan	   subterfuge	  had	   taken	  hold.	   Communicating	   the	   ‘fearful’	   intelligence,	  the	  President	  of	   the	  Board	  of	  Control	   informed	  the	   fledgling	  Queen	  Victoria	  that	  a	   ‘very	  great’	  number	  of	   	   ‘valuable	  officers’	  had	   fallen,	   ‘the	  victims	  of	  a	  widespread	   conspiracy	   which	   seems	   to	   have	   embraced	   within	   its	  confederation,	   the	   most	   warlike	   tribes	   of	   the	   Affghan	   nation’. 42 	  The	  Governor-­‐General,	  making	  a	  public	  declaration	  on	  the	  disaster	  in	  the	  London	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Gregory	  and	  Pred	  (eds.),	  Violent	  Geographies.	  41	  This	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  result	  of	  the	  desperate	  attempts	  by	  the	  British	  to	  secure	  cash	  advances	  in	  order	  to	  bribe	  the	  Ghilzai	  tribes	  into	  allowing	  the	  British	  safe	  passage	  from	  the	  country.	  This	  banking	  network	  that	  reached	  from	  Kabul	  to	  Delhi	  and	  across	  north	  India	  would	  be	  later	  put	  to	  use	  by	  the	  British	  to	  negotiate	  a	  ransom	  for	  a	  group	  of	  prisoners	  held	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Hanifi,	  ‘Impoverishing	  a	  colonial	  frontier’,	  206-­‐7;	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information,	  140.	  42	  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  3,	  Fitzgerald	  to	  Queen	  Victoria,	  8	  February	  1842,	  p.	  559.	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Gazette,	   reported	   a	   ‘faithless	   enemy,	   stained	   by	   the	   foul	   crime	   of	  assassination’	  and	  driven	  by	  ‘consummate	  treachery’.43	  This	  perceived	  united	  effort	  prompted	  defiance	  in	  many.	  Major	  Lynch,	  who	  had	  been	  discredited	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  warn	  of	  the	  crisis	  was	  particularly	  vitriolic:	  	  ‘Half	  measures	  will	  not	  do	  for	  the	  Afghans’,	  he	  declared,	   ‘the	  more	  vigorous	  they	  are	  the	  sooner	  will	   affairs	   improve	   and	   as	   in	   all	   probability	   every	   chief	   of	   a	   tribe	   in	   the	  country	   has	   committed	   himself	   and	   proved	   a	   traitor	   …	   they	   should	   on	  evidence	   of	   their	   guilt	   be	   blown	   away	   from	   a	   gun	   or	   hung	   on	   being	  apprehended.	  The	  peasants	  are	  harmless	  without	   these	   treacherous	   rascals	  to	  head	  them’.44	  	  	  Motivating	   such	  discussions	  over	   the	  possible	   response	   to	   the	  disaster	  was	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  damage	  to	  British	  prestige,	  driven	  in	  turn	  by	  the	  ever-­‐present	  paranoia	   of	   rumour	   and	   subversion,	   now	   at	   heightened	   levels	   as	   some	  observers	   sensed	   a	   wider	   ‘alienation	   and	   disaffection’. 45 	  Typically	   this	  manifested	   itself	   in	   fears	   of	   a	   pan-­‐Islamic	   conspiracy.	   The	   Times	  correspondent	   in	   Constantinople	   reported	   its	   spreading	   impact	   on	  Muslim	  opinion	   noting	   that	   ‘it	   has	   been	   asserted	   on	   more	   than	   one	   occasion	   by	  Turkish	  authorities	   that	   the	   late	   reverses	  of	  England	  had	  suddenly	   reduced	  her	   to	   the	   place	   of	   a	   third-­‐rate	   power.’46	  Yet,	   the	   myth	   of	   a	   united	   front	  opposing	  the	  British	  was	  also	  used	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  the	  sending	  forth	  of	   an	   ‘Army	   of	   Retribution’.	   As	   one	   advisor	   to	   the	   EIC	   warned,	   the	   British	  would	  only	  leave	  once	  more	  ‘redefeated	  and	  rehumiliated’:	   ‘Disunited	  tribes	  were	   combined	  against	  us	  when	   the	  name	  of	  England	  was	  encircled	  with	  a	  halo	  of	  uninterrupted	  success.	  The	  spell	  of	  our	  invincibility	  has	  been	  broken	  and	   great	   catastrophes	   have	   been	   brought	   upon	   us	   by	   no	   equal	   foe.’47	  This	  perception	  of	  a	  wider	  conspiracy	  also	  led	  to	  questions	  over	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	   ‘Afghan’	  regiments	  recruited	   into	  the	  Indian	  services	   from	  the	  diasporic	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  IOR/PS/3/12,	  London	  Gazette,	  5	  April	  1842,	  p.	  644.	  44	  IOR/L/PS/3/13,	  ‘Minute	  on	  the	  policy	  which	  should	  now	  be	  pursued	  in	  Afghanistan’,	  p.	  627.	  	  45	  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  3,	  George	  Tucker,	  ‘Notes	  on	  Affghanistan	  Affairs’,	  18	  March	  1842,	  p.	  650.	  46	  Stewart,	  On	  Afghanistan’s	  Plains,	  92.	  47	  IOR//PS/3/12,	  David	  Ross	  of	  Bloomsbury	  to	  Lord	  Fitzgerald,	  2	  May	  1842,	  p.	  713	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communities	   in	   north	   India,	   including	   the	   ‘Rohilla	   Pathans’. 48 	  The	  government	   was	   advised	   accordingly	   that	   any	   future	   force	   sent	   to	  Afghanistan	   ‘must	   be	   upon	   a	   scale	   of	   great	   magnitude,	   and	   …	   a	   large	  proportion	   must	   consist	   of	   Europeans,	   more	   incurred	   to	   a	   cold	   climate’.49	  Added	  to	  this	  was	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  impenetrability	  describing	  the	  geography	  of	  Afghanistan;	  ‘a	  rugged,	  barren,	  and	  unhospitable	  [sic]	  country’,50	  locked	  away	  behind	  the	  gauntlets	  of	  the	  mountain	  passes,	  its	  snows	  ‘dyed’	  by	  the	  blood	  of	  British	   subjects	   ‘to	   which	   it	   is	   to	   be	   feared	   new	   victims	   have	   been	   added	  which	  has	  left	  their	  unburied	  bodies	  to	  decompose	  and	  add	  pestilence	  to	  the	  mountain	  difficulties	  opposed	  to	  our	  advancing	  columns’.51	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	  ability	   to	  exact	  retribution	  on	  the	  man	  who	  was	  blamed	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  Macnaghten,	  Akbar	  Khan,	  was	  questioned.	  As	  George	  Tucker,	  the	   President	   of	   the	   Board	   of	   Control	  who	   opposed	   a	   further	   intervention,	  warned:	   ‘A	  Nation	   cannot	  wage	  war	  against	   an	   Individual;	  nor	   can	  a	  whole	  people	   be	   made	   liable	   for	   individual	   crimes.	   We	   have	   not	   in	   this	   case	   a	  civilized	   Government	   to	   deal	   with	   which	   would,	   no	   doubt,	   be	   justly	  responsible	   for	   political	   offenses	   [sic]	   and	   for	   wrongs	   and	   outrages	  committed	   against	   unoffending	   parties	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   public	   law.’52	  In	  emphasizing	  the	  impossibility	  of	  legal	  reciprocity	  with	  an	  ‘uncivilized’	  power,	  Tucker	  was	  drawing	  upon	   a	   key	   trope	   in	   the	   representation	   of	  what	  Gerry	  Simpson	   has	   called	   an	   ‘outlaw	   state’:	   ‘the	   idea	   that	   states	   can	   be	  differentiated	   in	   law	   according	   to	   their	   moral	   nature,	   material	   and	  intellectual	  power,	  ideological	  disposition	  or	  cultural	  attributes’.53	  By	  casting	  the	   Afghan	   ‘state’	   beyond	   the	   pale	   of	   civilized	   legal	   provisions,	   exceptional	  measures	   could	  be	   justified	   that	   relinquished	   the	   intervening	  power	  of	   any	  responsibility	   for	   the	   recognition	  of	   those	   legal	  norms	   that	  would	  normally	  apply	  to	  ‘civilized’	  states.	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  Part	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  on	  Affghanistan	  Affairs’,	  18	  March	  1842,	  p.	  638-­‐9.	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  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  3,	  George	  Tucker,	  ‘Notes	  on	  Affghanistan	  Affairs’,	  18	  March	  1842,	  p.	  639.	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  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  3,	  George	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  ‘Notes	  on	  Affghanistan	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  18	  March	  1842,	  p.	  641.	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  W.	  H.	  Sykes,	  21	  June	  1842,	  p.	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  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  3,	  George	  Tucker,	  ‘Notes	  on	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  Affairs’,	  18	  March	  1842,	  661-­‐2.	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  Simpson,	  Great	  Powers	  and	  Outlaw	  States.	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  This	  state	  of	  legal	  exception	  was	  often	  a	  post-­‐hoc	  rationalisation	  for	  brutality,	  and	   the	   status	   of	   ‘uncivilized’	   was	   generally	   presumed	   in	   the	   South	   Asian	  setting,	   but	   the	   rationale	   was	   now	   more	   explicit.	   As	   Tucker	   declared:	   ‘An	  outrage	   has	   been	   committed	  which,	   under	   the	   laws	   and	   usages	   of	   civilized	  nations,	  would	  call	  for	  full	  reparation,	  and	  in	  the	  last	  resort,	  justify	  an	  appeal	  to	   Arms.	   But	  we	   have	   placed	   ourselves	   among	   a	   semi-­‐barbarous	   people	  …	  and	  they	  have	  avenged	  themselves	  in	  their	  own	  way,	  by	  acts	  of	  great	  atrocity.	  But	  how	  are	  they	  to	  be	  punished?’54	  The	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘punishment’	  was	  to	   be	   determined,	   yet	   the	   projection	   of	   uncivilized	   and	   violent	  representations	   onto	   the	  Afghan	   space	  would	  have	  profound	   consequences	  for	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  British	  would	  engage	  with	  Afghanistan	  over	  the	  coming	   decades,	   and	   would	   determine	   Afghanistan’s	   legal	   status	   within	  wider	  notions	  of	  global	  order	  as	  defined	  by	  imperial	  powers	  at	  this	  time.	  The	  concept	   of	   a	   violent	   geography	   was	   therefore	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	  elaboration	  of	  a	  particular	  legal	  status	  afforded	  to	  the	  Afghan	  polity.	  	  	  
Great	  Power	  Management	  and	  Regional	  Diplomacy	  	  Beyond	  actions	  in	  Afghanistan,	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  had	  wider	   implications	   for	   regional	   diplomacy,	   with	   the	   new	   reach	   of	   British	  military	  power	  presenting	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  crafting	  of	  a	  new	  sovereign	  order	  in	  the	  region.	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  diplomacy	  at	  this	  time	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  British	  lost	  little	  time	  in	  taking	  advantage	  of	  this	  opportunity.	  Prior	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan,	  the	  British	  had	  demanded	  Persian	  withdrawal	  from	  Herat	  and	  Ghorian	  to	  the	  west.	  On	  3	  July	  1841,	  with	  both	  demands	  met,	  the	  Foreign	   Secretary,	   Lord	   Palmerston,	   announced	   that	   diplomatic	   relations	  were	   to	  be	  normalised	  and	   the	  British	  envoy,	   John	  McNeill,	  was	  ordered	   to	  return	  to	  Tehran	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  new	  commercial	  treaty.	  The	  Persian	  Gulf	  island	   of	   Kharg,	   which	   had	   been	   occupied	   by	   British	   troops	   as	   a	   coercive	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measure,	   was	   to	   be	   evacuated	   upon	   the	   signing	   of	   this	   new	   treaty.55	  The	  British	  were	  attempting	  to	  establish	  Herat	  as	  a	  new	  diplomatic	  thoroughfare	  between	   India	   and	   Tehran,	  with	   the	   new	   treaty	   to	   confer	   the	   right	   for	   the	  British	  to	  appoint	  a	  consul	  at	  Tehran	  who	  would	  be	  enabled	  to	  communicate	  with	   EIC	   agents	   to	   be	   established	   at	   Khiva,	   Kokan,	   and	   Bokhara.56	  Herat	  would	   accordingly	   resemble	   a	   forward	  operating	  base	   for	  Company	  power.	  This	  made	  strategic	  sense,	  placating	  British	  fears	  of	  a	  Russian	  armed	  advance	  through	  what	  was	   viewed	   as	   the	  most	   likely	   route	   into	   Afghanistan.	   But	   it	  also	   made	   commercial	   sense,	   with	   Herat	   representing	   a	   key	   node	   in	   the	  merchant	   networks	   extending	   north	   towards	   markets	   in	   Central	   Asia.57	  As	  such	  Herat	  was	  envisaged	  as	  a	  new	  Ludhiana.	  	  	  Through	  these	  diplomatic	  efforts	  the	  British	  were	  also	  attempting	  to	  impose	  a	  new	  spatial	  order	  on	  the	  region.	  The	  Perso-­‐Afghan	  border	  had	  long	  been	  a	  site	  of	  sovereign	  contestation,	  a	  status	  rendered	  in	  part	  by	  the	  close	  religious	  and	   cultural	   affinities	   between	   Persian	   communities	   and	   those	   of	   Herat	   –	  notably	   through	   a	   shared	   adherence	   to	   the	   Shi’a	   sect	   of	   Islam.58	  But	   the	  British	  occupation	  was	  also	  driving	  Shah	  Kamran	  and	  Yar	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  the	  rulers	  of	  Herat,	  to	  seek	  Persian	  support.	  In	  early	  1841	  the	  Sadr-­e-­Azam59	  of	   Persia,	  Haji	  Mirza	  Aghasi	   had	   called	   upon	  Palmerston	   and	   the	  British	   to	  follow	  their	  own	  ‘liberal	  and	  enlightened	  policy’	  and	  recognize	  the	  allegiance	  of	   the	  Afghans	  to	  Persia	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	  Shah	  over	  Afghanistan’s	  territory.60	  In	   response	   Palmerston	   instructed	   his	   envoy	   to	   inform	   Aghasi	  that	   Afghanistan	   ‘shall	   remain	   separate	   and	   distinct	   from	   Persia’. 61 	  His	  successor,	   Lord	   Aberdeen,	   followed	   suite,	   advising	   Sheill	   to	   avoid	   any	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  Adler,	  ‘The	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  Prime	  Minister	  (roughly)	  60	  Haji	  Mirza	  Aghasi	  referred	  to	  documents	  send	  by	  Sher	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  the	  former	  Sirdar	  of	  Peshawar,	  to	  support	  this,	  claiming	  that	  they	  showed	  ‘the	  Affghans	  themselves	  confessedly	  avow	  that	  the	  whole	  of	  Affghanistan	  and	  its	  territorial	  dependencies,	  with	  all	  the	  tribes	  wandering	  therein,	  do	  exclusively	  belong	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Persia,	  and	  are	  the	  subjects	  of	  his	  present	  Majesty	  the	  Shah’.	  IOR/PS/3/10,	  p.	  228-­‐9.	  61	  IOR/PS/3/10,	  Palmerston	  to	  Sheil,	  15	  June	  1841,	  p.	  151.	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communication	   ‘on	   the	   subject	   of	   our	   relations	   with	   the	   various	   Affghan	  Chiefs,	   and	   especially	  with	  Kamran	   Shah	   [sic];	   and	   to	   endeavour	   to	   inspire	  the	   latter	  with	  confidence	   in	  our	  disposition	   to	  be	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  him,	  and	  thus	  lead	  him	  to	  abstain	  from	  looking	  for	  foreign	  support’.62In	  truth,	  the	  British	  were	  at	  least	  partially	  aware	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  Herat’s	  status	  at	  this	  time.	  Successive	  British	  explorers	  had	  averred	  to	  Persian	  claims	  to	  western	  Afghanistan,	   including	  Arthur	   Conolly	  who	   had,	   in	   his	   1834	   travel	   account,	  suggested	   that	   the	   city	   constituted	   part	   of	   Persian	   Khorasan.63	  In	   driving	   a	  wedge	  between	  Persia	  and	  Afghanistan,	  and	  setting	  up	  Herat	  as	  a	  nominally	  ‘independent	  state’,	  the	  British	  were	  therefore	  knowingly	  establishing	  a	  more	  fixed	  sovereign	  order	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  Yet	  the	  British	  were	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  illusion	  of	  control	  that	  their	  presence	  in	   Herat	   carried.	   Whilst	   cities	   across	   the	   region,	   and	   to	   an	   extent	   the	  commercial	   routes	   in	   between,	   were	   seen	   as	   limited	   domains	   of	   order,	  Aberdeen	  was	  explicit	   in	  his	  doubt	  that	  a	  British	  occupation	   in	  Herat	   ‘could	  by	  the	  mere	  influence	  of	  its	  presence	  in	  that	  place,	  reduce	  to	  order	  the	  unruly	  bands	  whom	  natural	   feeling,	   religious	  bigotry,	   and	   long	   cherished	  habits	  of	  rapine	  would	   prompt	   to	   resist	   the	   invader,	   and	   to	   endeavour	   to	   expel	   him	  from	  their	  country’.64	  But	  there	  was	  also	  concern	  that	  such	  a	  presence	  would	  provide	  a	  pretext	  for	  the	  stationing	  of	  Russian	  troops	  in	  the	  states	  of	  Central	  Asia,	  including	  Khiva.	  In	  combination	  with	  the	  ‘unruly	  tribes’	  of	  Herat,	  it	  was	  feared	  this	  would	  leave	  the	  British	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  position	  should	  Russia	  ‘be	  so	   disposed,	   to	   incite	   the	   various	   tribes	   of	   Central	   Asia	   to	   make	   common	  cause	   against	   British	   influence	   and	   power.’65	  The	   violent	   geography	   was	  accordingly	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  strategic	  threat,	  and	  connected	  with	  wider	  paranoia	  relating	  to	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  Muslim	  populations	  across	  the	  region.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  1,	  Aberdeen	  to	  McNeill,	  18	  October	  1841,	  p.	  96.	  63	  The	  cartographer	  John	  Cary	  (1801)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  travellers	  John	  MacDonald	  Kinneir	  (1815)	  and	  James	  Baillie	  Fraser	  (1834)	  all	  expressed	  this	  view.	  Kashani-­‐Sabet,	  Frontier	  
Fictions,	  30-­‐1;	  Conolly,	  Journey,	  Vol.	  II,	  3.	  64	  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  1,	  Aberdeen	  to	  McNeill,	  18	  October	  1841,	  p.	  97.	  65	  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  1,	  Aberdeen	  to	  McNeill,	  18	  October	  1841,	  p.	  96.	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This	   fear	   of	   Russian	   influence	   has	   tended	   to	   encourage	   the	   perception	   of	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   competition	   in	   the	   region,	   but	   this	   obscures	   the	   surprising	  levels	   of	   cooperation	   between	   the	   two	   imperial	   powers	   that	   was	   evident	  during	   this	   period,	   particularly	   concerning	   Persia.	   Amongst	   the	   topics	   of	  discussion	  in	  St	  Petersburg	  at	  this	  time	  between	  the	  British	  Ambassador	  and	  the	   Russian	   Foreign	  Minister,	   Count	   Nesselrode,	   were	   the	   status	   of	   British	  forces	  on	  Kharg;	  the	  nature	  of	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  relations	  with	  respect	  to	  Herat;	  as	  well	  as	   the	   formulation	  of	   the	  new	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  commercial	   treaty.66	  In	  addition	   to	   a	   non-­‐intervention	   agreement,	   this	   draft	   Anglo-­‐Persian	   treaty	  included	   a	   stipulation	   in	  which	  Persia	   and	  Britain	  would	   commit	   to	   use	   all	  influence	   against	   Shah	  Kamran,	   and	   Shah	   Shuja	   to	   discourage	   ‘intrigues’	   or	  ‘other	  hostile	  acts’.67	  Throughout	  these	  events,	  the	  Russian	  government	  was	  kept	   informed	   through	   diplomatic	   correspondence	   with	   the	   British	   in	   St	  Petersburg.	  The	  Emperor	  even	  warned	  the	  British	  Minister	  and	  the	  Russian	  Minister	  in	  Tehran,	  General	  Duhamel,	  over	  their	  trust	  in	  diplomatic	  measures,	  describing	   the	  Persian	  government	  as	   'the	  most	  perfidious	   if	  not	  one	  of	   the	  weakest	  under	  the	  sun'.68	  	  The	   management	   of	   Persian	   territory	   and	   space	   was	   an	   endeavour	   that	  Britain	  and	  Russia	  had	  a	  shared	  interest	  in,	  indeed	  both	  powers	  had	  recently	  engaged	  in	  military	  confrontations	  with	  Persia,	  and	  both	  viewed	  the	  frontiers	  of	  the	  former	  Persian	  Empire	  as	  within	  their	  purview	  of	  imperial	  authority.69	  This	   did	   not	   remove	   the	   competitive	   element.	   Partly	   in	   response	   to	   the	  British	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   in	   1839,	   Russian	   troops	   moved	   into	   Khiva	  shortly	   afterwards	   only	   to	   suffer	   heavy	   losses	   as	   troops	   fell	   victim	   to	   the	  winter	   weather.	   But	   the	   narrative	   behind	   this	   venture	   exhibited	   a	   shared	  imperialist	   outlook	   with	   Britain.	   The	   Emperor,	   it	   was	   claimed	   in	   a	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  IOR/PS/3/10,	  Bloomfield	  to	  Palmerston,	  6	  September	  1841,	  p.	  383-­‐5;	  PS/3/11,	  Part	  1,	  p.	  179-­‐215;	  p.	  217-­‐21.	  67	  Articles	  VI	  and	  VII,	  which	  stipulate	  for	  each	  power	  to	  use	  influence	  on	  respective	  parties	  ‘pour	  le	  forcer	  a	  renoncer	  a	  toute	  espece	  d’intrigues	  ou	  a	  d’autre	  actes	  d’hostilité’.	  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  1,	  p.	  218-­‐9.	  68	  IOR/PS/3/11,	  Part	  2,	  de	  Rothsay	  to	  Aberdeen,	  17	  January	  1842,	  p.	  283.	  69	  Russia	  and	  Persia	  had	  been	  engaged	  in	  intermittent	  conflict	  over	  the	  Caucasus	  between	  1804-­‐1813,	  ending	  with	  the	  British-­‐mediated	  Treaty	  of	  Gulistan	  in	  1813.	  In	  the	  second	  Perso-­‐Russian	  war	  of	  1826-­‐8	  the	  Persians	  briefly	  reclaimed	  the	  territories	  ceded	  to	  Russia	  in	  this	  treaty,	  only	  to	  be	  pushed	  back	  and	  sue	  for	  peace	  after	  the	  Russians	  took	  Tabriz.	  The	  conflict	  ended	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Turkmanchai	  in	  1828.	  
	   194	  
manifesto,	  had	  acted	  to	  ‘put	  an	  end	  to	  robbery	  and	  exaction,	  to	  deliver	  those	  Russians	   who	   are	   detained	   in	   slavery,	   to	   make	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   Khiva	  esteem	  and	  respect	  the	  Russian	  name,	  and	  finally,	  to	  strengthen	  in	  that	  part	  of	  Asia	  the	  lawful	  influence	  to	  which	  Russia	  has	  a	  right’.70	  This	  was	  more	  than	  mere	   window-­‐dressing.	   The	   British	   and	   the	   Russians	   did	   not	   simply	   view	  these	  domains	  as	  possessing	   strategic	   value,	  but	   afforded	  a	  moral	   virtue	   to	  their	   actions	   in	   annexing	   such	   territories	   as	   resembling	   the	   spreading	   of	  commerce,	  law,	  and	  civilization.	  	  	  This	  was	  a	  powerful	  image,	  one	  that	  had	  already	  been	  evoked	  in	  some	  of	  the	  travel	   narratives	   that	   were	   now	   in	   high	   demand	   in	   Britain	   and	   elsewhere.	  Godfrey	  Vigne	  was	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  more	  evangelical	  in	  his	  expression	  of	  this	  motive.	   Although	   he	  was	   not	   optimistic	   of	   Russian	   chances	   amidst	   the	  ‘wild	   children’	   of	   the	   desert,	   and	   their	   co-­‐religionists	   in	   Bokhara,71	  and	   he	  was	  certainly	  not	  naïve	  as	  to	  the	  strategic	  motives	  behind	  such	  moves,	  Vigne	  nonetheless	   viewed	   this	   growing	   Russian	   influence	   positively.	   He	   saw	   the	  Khiva	   campaign	   as	   inflicting	   ‘the	   penalty	   of	   adopting	   the	   semblance	   of	  humanity’	   on	   the	   ‘savage	   plunderers	   and	   bigots	   of	   the	   Asiatic	   deserts’,	  thereby	  doing	   the	   ‘civilized	  world’	   a	   favour.72	  Vigne	  was	   not	   alone	   in	   these	  views.	  Arthur	  Conolly,	  who	  has	  repeatedly	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  term	  ‘great	  game’	  shared	  this	  evangelizing	  worldview.	  	  As	  Gerald	  Morgan	  points	   out:	   ‘In	   his	   view	   the	   great	   game	   was	   a	   spiritual	   and	   anti	   slavery	  crusade’.73	  Conolly	  proposed	  that	  Britain	   ‘should	  help	  Russia	  cordially	   to	  all	  that	  she	  has	  a	  right	  to	  expect	  –	  unify	  Afghanistan,	  shake	  hands	  with	  Persia	  …	  [and]	   civilize	   and	   christianize	   [sic]	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   region.’74	  These	   civilizing	  narratives	   describing	   Russian	   activities	   prompted	   a	   flicker	   of	   recognition	  from	  the	  British	  perspective,	  lending	  an	  air	  of	  familiarity	  to	  the	  Russian	  cause,	  and	  describing	  their	  actions	  in	  terms	  that	  the	  British	  could	  relate	  to,	  viewing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Dupree,	  Afghanistan,	  380.	  71	  Referring	  to	  Alexander	  Burnes’	  work	  he	  noted	  that	  Bokhara	  was	  ‘the	  centre	  of	  Islam’,	  and	  whilst	  the	  Turkomen	  were	  less	  zealous,	  and	  the	  Khirghiz	  had	  ‘but	  a	  confused	  idea	  of	  the	  religion	  of	  the	  Prophet’,	  they	  would	  nonetheless	  combine	  against	  ‘infidel’	  Russians.	  Vigne,	  A	  
Personal	  Narrative,	  450-­‐2.	  72	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  Narrative,	  469.	  73	  Morgan,	  ‘Myth	  and	  Reality	  in	  the	  Great	  Game’,	  55.	  74	  Morgan,	  ‘Myth	  and	  Reality	  in	  the	  Great	  Game’,	  55.	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as	  they	  did,	  their	  own	  activities	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  on	  frontiers	  elsewhere	  as	  motivated	  by	  similar	  imperatives.	  In	  Vigne	  and	  Conolly’s	  more	  pacific	  vision	  the	  conquest	  of	   the	   frontier	   states	  of	  Russia	  and	  British	   India	  presented	  an	  opportunity	   to	   once	   and	   for	   all	   bring	   the	   region	   back	   from	   the	   despair	   of	  anarchy,	  despotism	  and	  violence,	  and	   into	   the	   fray	  of	  modernity.	  Fratricide,	  plunder,	   and	   rapine	   could	   be	   suppressed	   through	   trade,	   and	   with	   it,	   the	  tyrannies	   of	   a	   violent	   disposition	   would	   give	   way	   to	   commerce	   and	   good	  governance	  all	  under	  the	  baleful	  gaze	  of	  great	  power	  paternity.	  The	  frontier	  would	  remain	  an	  ambiguity,	  but	  a	  pacific	  ambiguity,	  tempered	  by	  its	  new	  role	  as	  a	  commercial	  thoroughfare.75	  	  	  From	  the	  British	  perspective,	  one	  reading	  of	  Russia’s	  Central	  Asian	  activities	  was	   to	   view	   them	   as	   a	   proving	   ground	   for	   Russia's	   own	   claims	   to	  ‘civilizational’	   status	   -­‐	   at	   least	   according	   to	   British	   definitions.	   Speaking	   on	  the	  projected	  Russian	  conquest	  of	  Central	  Asia	  in	  1830,	  Lord	  Haytesbury,	  the	  British	   Ambassador	   to	   St	   Petersburg	   had	   declared	   Russia	   to	   be	   ‘too	   far	  behindhand	  in	  civilisation	  …	  to	  allow	  the	  entertainment	  of	  such	  a	  project	  for	  many,	  many	  years	   to	  come’.76	  This	  had	  now	  changed.	  Furthermore,	  Russia’s	  stated	   goals	   of	   exploring	   commercial	   activities,	   as	  well	   as	   rescuing	   Central	  Asian	   peoples	   (including	   Russian	   citizens)	   from	   enslavement	   through	   the	  overthrow	  of	  despotic	  rulers,	  accorded	  well	  with	  British	  views	  on	  the	  duties	  of	   civilized	   powers.	   Indeed	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Russian	   expedition	   on	  Khiva	   the	   British	   representative	   in	   Herat,	   Major	   D’Arcy	   Todd,	   dispatched	  Lieutenant	   Richmond	   Shakespear	   to	   track	   down	   the	   outcome	   of	   an	   earlier	  fact-­‐finding	   mission.	   Shakespear	   used	   this	   opportunity	   to	   negotiate	   the	  release	   of	   a	   group	   of	   Russian	   slaves,	   who	  were	   duly	   delivered	   back	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  In	  the	  closing	  pages	  of	  his	  account	  Vigne,	  whipped	  into	  a	  frenzy	  of	  Alexandrian	  nostalgia,	  concludes	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  commercial	  endeavour	  would	  tame	  the	  acquisitive	  urges	  of	  empires:	  that	  ‘	  the	  good	  faith	  observable	  in	  the	  more	  honourable	  transactions	  of	  private	  life	  be	  introduced	  into	  those	  of	  a	  public	  nature,	  and	  we	  may	  soon	  hope	  to	  see	  the	  time	  when,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  posts,	  steamboats,	  and	  railroads,	  (by	  which	  no	  fox-­‐hunting	  will	  be	  spoiled),	  the	  overland	  journey,	  by	  way	  of	  St.	  Petersburgh	  or	  Warsaw,	  will	  become	  the	  quickest	  and	  most	  approved	  mode	  of	  travel	  between	  London	  and	  Calcutta.’	  Vigne,	  A	  Personal	  
Narrative,	  472.	  76	  Martin	  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia:	  Confrontation	  and	  negotiation,	  
1865-­95	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2010),	  2.	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Russian	   garrison	   to	   the	   north.77	  This	   perception	   of	   a	   shared	   humanitarian	  purpose	   was	   boosted	   with	   high-­‐level	   Russian	   diplomatic	   assistance	   in	   the	  failed	  attempts	  to	  free	  the	  unfortunate	  Captain	  Stoddart,	  a	  British	  officer	  who	  had	   been	   imprisoned,	   along	   with	   Conolly,	   by	   the	   Amir	   of	   Bokhara	   whilst	  exploring	  the	  Central	  Asian	  states	  north	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Kush.78	  The	  assistance	  in	  these	  efforts	  of	  the	  Russian	  explorer	  Colonel	  Bouténieff,	  who	  had	  been	  on	  a	  ‘scientific’	   mission	   to	   Bokhara	   -­‐	   much	   in	   the	   mould	   of	   earlier	   European	  explorations	   of	   Afghanistan	   -­‐	   further	   highlighted	   the	   benefits	   of	   common	  imperial	  endeavours	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  exploration.79	  	  	  With	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Russian	   expedition	   to	   Khiva,	   and	   the	   later	   British	  withdrawal	  from	  Kabul,	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations	  met	  on	  the	  common	  ground	  of	  military	  failure.	  The	  subsequent	  killing	  of	  Conolly	  and	  Stoddart,	  which	  met	  with	   much	   publicity	   in	   England	   further	   cemented	   the	   vague	   vision	   of	  disorder	  and	  violence	  that	  described	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole,	  from	   both	   St	   Petersburg	   and	   Calcutta.	   More	   than	   that,	   the	   British	   and	  Russians	  had	  shared	  views	  on	  the	  inescapable	  logic	  to	  their	  conquest	  of	  these	  spaces.	   The	   British	   failures	   of	   1842	   elicited	   sympathy	   from	   the	   Russian	  Emperor	  who	   remarked	   to	   the	  British	  Ambassador	   ‘I	   perceive	   that	   you	  are	  precisely	   suffering	   under	   the	   same	   embarrassments	   which	   annoy	  me,	   that	  the	  extent	  of	  country	  you	  occupy	  renders	  it	  almost	  necessary	  that	  you	  should	  go	  further,	  and	  that	  you	  find	  it	  equally	  inconvenient	  to	  advance,	  to	  withdraw,	  or	   to	   remain	   in	   your	   present	   position’.80 	  This	   logic	   of	   self-­‐perpetuating	  imperial	   expansion	   had	   certainly	   been	   in	   evidence	   amongst	   some	   of	   the	  military	   commentaries	   on	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   occupation	   of	  Afghanistan,81	  and	   was	   now	   acknowledged	   at	   a	   diplomatic	   level	   to	   be	   a	  dilemma	  of	  great	  power	  expansion	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Johnson,	  Spying	  for	  Empire,	  85.	  78	  IOR/L/PS/3/10,	  Lord	  Stuart	  to	  Aberdeen,	  9	  November	  1841,	  p.	  499;	  IOR/L/PS/3/13,	  Bloomfield	  to	  Aberdeen,	  27	  August	  1842,	  p.	  6-­‐7.	  79	  The	  news	  of	  their	  capture	  was	  communicated	  through	  the	  Colonel,	  IOR/L/PS/3/12,	  p.	  169-­‐71;	  IOR/L/PS/3/10,	  Lord	  Stuart	  to	  Aberdeen,	  9	  November	  1841,	  p.	  499.	  80	  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  2,	  de	  Rothsay	  report,	  22	  February	  1842,	  p.	  396.	  81	  General	  Whittingham’s	  aforementioned	  memo	  provides	  an	  example,	  MSS	  Eur	  F213/89,	  General	  Whittingham,	  ‘Confidential:	  Letter	  and	  Memoir	  on	  the	  means	  of	  attack	  by	  Russia	  on	  British	  India…’.	  See	  also	  IOR/L/PS/3/10,	  Lieut-­‐Colonel	  Jervis,	  ‘Memoir	  on	  the	  Defence	  of	  the	  North-­‐Western	  Frontier	  of	  India	  in	  Consequence	  of	  the	  Later	  Operations	  on	  the	  Indus’,	  p.	  865.	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  This	  additional	  shared	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  imperialist	  outlook	  on	  the	  perils	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  cartography	  between	  their	  territorial	  possessions	  complemented	  the	   established	   views	   on	   the	   duties	   of	   civilized	   powers	   with	   respect	   to	  uncivilized	   states,	   and	  offered	   further	   space	   for	  mutual	   understanding.	  The	  Emperor	  went	  on	  to	  suggest	  ‘some	  general	  system	  of	  occupation	  …	  grounded	  upon	   an	   actual	   state	   of	   possession	   which	   may	   be	   conclusive	   ...	   it	   appears	  convenient	   that	   we	   now	   understand	   our	   relative	   position,	   and	   what	   has	  hitherto	  been	  a	  closed	  subject	  may	  now	  be	  discussed	  openly	  between	  us'.82	  Indeed,	  in	  response	  to	  this	  the	  British	  government	  thanked	  the	  Russians	  for	  the	  ‘friendly	  conduct’	  of	  their	  Ambassador	  at	  Tehran	  who	  had	  intervened	  to	  warn	  Persia	  of	  the	  ‘danger	  of	  interference	  in	  the	  affairs’	  of	  Afghanistan	  during	  the	  1842	  withdrawal.83	  The	  British	  would	  return	  the	   favour	   in	  coordinating	  with	   the	   Russians	   over	   Persian	   activities	   on	   their	   restive	   frontier	   with	  Khiva.84	  	  A	   key	   manifestation	   of	   joint	   endeavours	   at	   this	   time	   also	   includes	   the	  arbitration	   of	   the	   Ottoman-­‐Persian	   frontier,	   which	   was	   overseen	   by	   a	  collaborative	   boundary	   commission	   of	   British	   and	   Russian	   officials	  established	  in	  1840	  at	  the	  invitation	  of	  Persia	  and	  Turkey.85	  The	  commission	  reported	   in	   1843,	  which	   led	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   Erzurum	  Treaty	   in	   1847,	  and	   the	   readjustment	   of	   borders	   in	   1849.	   	   It	   was	   a	   reminder	   that	   the	  management	   of	   frontiers	   was	   considered	   a	   duty	   of	   great	   powers	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  indeed	  into	  the	  twentieth,	  but	  it	  also	  highlighted	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  duty	  that	  these	  powers	  had	  in	  spatially	  constraining	  those	  states	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  unruly.86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  Colonel	  Jervis	  noted:	  ‘We	  have	  abandoned	  the	  eligible	  position	  formerly	  occupied	  as	  a	  north-­‐western	  frontier,	  and	  advanced	  so	  far	  beyond	  it	  that	  we	  cannot	  again	  fall	  back	  and	  rest	  on	  it,	  either	  with	  honour	  or	  safety’.	  	  82	  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  2,	  de	  Rothsay	  report,	  22	  February	  1842,	  p.396-­‐7.	  83	  IOR/L/PS/3/11,	  Part	  2,	  Aberdeen	  to	  McNeill,	  24	  March	  1842,	  p.	  458;	  IOR/L/PS/3/12,	  de	  Rothsay	  to	  Aberdeen,	  22	  March	  1842,	  p.	  20.	  84	  IOR/L/PS/3/12,	  de	  Rothsay	  to	  Aberdeen,	  22	  March	  1842,	  p.	  24;	  IOR/L/PS/3/13,	  Aberdeen	  to	  Fitzgerald,	  26	  October	  1842,	  p.	  217-­‐20.	  85	  Kashani-­‐Sabet,	  Frontier	  Fictions,	  24-­‐8.	  86	  The	  adjudication	  of	  the	  French,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  British	  and	  Russians,	  in	  boundary	  disputes	  added	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  great	  power	  trusteeship	  over	  this	  region.	  Kashani-­‐Sabet,	  Frontier	  
Fictions,	  28.	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  Perhaps	  even	  more	  telling	  was	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  cooperation	  over	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  Shah	  of	  Persia.	  Prior	  to	  his	  death	  the	  British	  had	  reached	  an	  agreement	  with	   the	  Russians	   that	   the	  Prince	  Royal	  would	   accede	   to	   the	   throne	  on	   the	  death	   of	   his	   father,	  with	   the	   young	   Prince	   being	   supported	   by	   a	   Regent	   or	  
vizier87	  also	  agreed	  upon	   in	  advance.	  Two	   individuals	   –	  Rehman	  Mirza,	   and	  Yusuf	  ul	  Dowlah	  –	  were	  considered	  for	  this	  role	  with	  the	  latter	  being	  seen	  as	  more	  favourable	  to	  Russian	  interests.	  Though	  as	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  remarked	  in	  1848	  ‘our	  preference	  …	  is	  not	  so	  strong	  as	  to	  induce	  us	  to	  …	  depart	  from	  the	  understanding	  formerly	  come	  to	  with	  the	  Russian	  Government’88,	  in	  short,	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   came	   first.	   This	   was	   reiterated	   the	   following	   year	  when	   Palmerston	   instructed	   his	   envoy	   to	   communicate	   the	   wish	   to	   the	  Russian	  government	  that	   ‘British	  and	  Russian	  agents	  in	  Persia	  should	  act	   in	  unison’	  and	  that	   ‘H.M.	  Minister	  at	  Tehran	  will	  always	  be	  ready	  to	  enter	   into	  communication	  with	   the	   Russian	  Minister	   at	   Tehran,	   and	   to	   act	   in	   concert	  with	  him’.89	  	  These	  were	   not	   simply	   isolated	   examples	   indicating	   a	   counter-­‐narrative	   to	  the	   prevailing	   view	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   competition.	   Nor	   were	   they	   simply	  cosmetic	   acts	   of	   cooperation	   designed	   to	  mask	  wider	   aggressive	  measures.	  Rather	  the	  pattern	  of	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  engagement	  at	  this	  time	  demonstrates	  a	  wider	   logic	   in	   the	   role	   of	   great	   powers	   concerning	   those	   domains	   they	  considered	   to	   be	   inferior	   and	   even	   'fair	   game'	   for	   expansionist	   policies.	  Meanwhile,	   cooperation	   over	   policies	   in	   Persia	   at	   times	   amounted	   to	   an	  international	   trusteeship	   of	   imperial	   powers	   over	   Persian	   territorial	  sovereignty.	   The	   nature	   of	   this	   cooperation	   did	   not	   just	   demonstrate	   a	  concern	   with	   coordinating	   their	   security	   to	   avoid	   misunderstandings,	   but	  exhibited	   a	   belief	   that	   some	   states	   were	   more	   capable	   of	   what	   they	  considered	   to	   be	   the	   norms	   of	   civilized	   diplomatic	   intercourse.	   This	  was	   a	  status	   that	  more	   'rude',	   'uncivilized',	   even	   'barbarous'	   states	   such	   as	  Khiva,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Roughly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Prime	  Minister.	  88	  IOR/L/PS/3/27,	  Foreign	  Office	  to	  Lt	  Col	  Tarrant,	  24	  October	  1848,	  p.	  180-­‐1.	  	  89	  IOR/L/PS/3/28,	  Palmerston	  to	  Andrew	  Buchanan,	  20	  March	  1849	  p.104;	  Palmerston	  to	  Sheil,	  6	  August	  1849,	  p.269.	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Bokhara,	   Herat,	   and	   Afghanistan	   were	   not	   considered	   to	   have	   reached.	   As	  such,	  sovereignty	  was	  not	  only	  divisible,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  British	  and	  Russian	  reserved	  the	  right	  to	  interfere	  in	  sovereign	  responsibilities	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  states;	   but	   it	   was	   also	   stratified.	   Different	   states	   were	   afforded	   differing	  degrees	  of	  sovereignty,	  based	  partly	  on	  perceptions	  of	  their	  'civilised'	  status.	  The	   impact	   of	   the	   first	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war	   on	   British	   perceptions	   not	   only	  resulted	   in	   a	   firm	   policy	   of	   non-­‐intervention,	   but	   decisively	   placed	  Afghanistan	  beyond	   the	  pale.	  The	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  was	  motivated	  by	  financial	  concerns	  but	  served	  to	  sustain	  this	  projected	  image	  of	  disorder	  and	   violence	   as	  well.	   As	   such	   non-­‐intervention	   and	   the	   representation	   of	   a	  violent	  geography	  were	  mutually	  sustaining,	  feeding	  off	  each	  other.	  	  	  	  
‘Sullen	  quiescence’:	  Anglo-­Afghan	  Relations	  1842-­52	  	  The	   withdrawal	   of	   British	   troops	   in	   1842	   did	   not	   signal	   the	   immediate	  collapse	   of	   Shah	   Shuja’s	   rule.	   In	   a	   further	   demonstration	   of	   the	   fluidity	   in	  alliances	   at	   this	   time,	   the	   nominal	   leader	   of	   the	   insurrection,	   Nawab	  Muhammad	   Zaman	   Khan,	   agreed	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   minister	   under	   Shah	   Shuja	  despite	  his	  own	  claims	  to	  the	  throne	  as	  the	  nephew	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.	  The	  military	  commander,	  Muhammad	  Akbar	  Khan,	  who	  was	  leading	  the	  siege	  of	  Jalalabad	  against	  the	  expelled	  British	  forces	  sought	  to	  mobilize	  the	  ulama	  in	   the	   rural	   areas	   against	   the	   British	   and	   pressured	   Shah	   Shuja	   to	   declare	  
jihad.	  After	  two	  months	  Shuja	  finally	  agreed	  but	  having	  gathered	  his	  troops	  in	  the	  field	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Kabul	  he	  was	  assassinated	  by	  the	  son	  of	  Zaman	  Khan,	  Shuja	  al-­‐Daula	  Khan,	  on	  5	  April	  1842.90	  Kabul	  politics	  was	  once	  more	  in	  a	  process	  of	  flux	  as	  Shah	  Shuja’s	  son	  Fatih	  Jang	  succeeded	  to	  the	  throne,	  but	  his	  political	  power	  was	  soon	  subsumed	  by	  the	  returning	  Muhammad	  Akbar	  Khan	  who	  became	  vizier	  until	  the	  returning	  British	  army	  unseated	  him.	  Fatih	  Jang	   fled	  with	   the	   retreating	  British,	   his	   brother	   Shahpur	  briefly	   taking	   the	  throne	   before	   being	   replaced	   by	   Muhammad	   Akbar	   Khan.	   Within	   a	   few	  months,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  returned	  to	  Kabul,	  having	  been	  liberated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  52.	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from	  his	  pension	  under	  the	  British	  in	  Ludhiana.	  He	  reclaimed	  his	  throne	  from	  his	  son	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1843.	  	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   at	   this	   time	   were,	   perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	   almost	  non-­‐existent.	   The	   humiliation	   of	   the	   British,	   and	   their	   attendant	   fear	   of	  Afghan	  opinion	  towards	  any	  suggestion	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  Afghan	  affairs	  drove	  a	  resilient	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention.	  As	  a	  later	  Governor-­‐General	  Lord	  Dalhousie	  put	  it,	  relations	  during	  the	  1840s	  and	  early	  1850s	  were	  of	   ‘sullen	  quiescence	   on	   either	   side,	   without	   offence,	   but	   without	   good	   will	   or	  intercourse’.91	  In	  their	  need	  for	  up	  to	  date	  information,	  and	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  more	   official	   channels,	   the	   British	   were	   forced	   to	   revert	   to	   an	   improvised	  system	   of	   native	   informants,	   including	   political	   exiles,	   merchants,	   traders,	  and	  various	  passing	  notables,	  as	  well	  as	  akhbarat.92	  These	  offered	  glimpses	  of	  internal	   affairs	   but	  were	   typically	   vague	   on	  details	   and	   tended	   to	   convey	   a	  sense	  of	  impending	  unrest.	  	  	  Emboldened	  by	  the	  greater	  credibility	  he	  now	  enjoyed	  as	  having	  resisted	  the	  British,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  began	  a	  period	  of	  consolidation.	  This	  was	  not	  always	   clear	   to	   the	   British	   however.	   As	   one	   north-­‐west	   frontier	   agent	  reported	  in	  1844,	  '[o]n	  the	  whole	  the	  authority	  of	  Dost	  Mahomed	  Khan	  would	  appear	   to	   have	   in	   some	   degree	   taken	   root	   at	   least	   in	   the	   neighborhood	   of	  Caubul	  and	  in	  the	  larger	  valleys.	  No	  one	  of	  the	  chiefs	  is	  singly	  able	  to	  oppose	  him	  while	  their	  mutual	  jealousies	  prevent	  a	  combination	  against	  him.	  …	  It	  is	  not	   however	   improbable	   that	   the	   advancing	   season	  may	   awaken	   the	   tribes	  from	   their	   present	   torpor	   and	   that	   a	   contest	   may	   take	   place	   for	   the	  possession	  of	  Caubul	  between	  the	  Ghilzyes	  and	  the	  Dooranees.’93	  Somewhat	  ironically,	   the	   British	   intervention	   and	   the	   legacy	   of	   their	   support	   for	   a	  centralised	  government	  under	  Shah	  Shuja	  proved	  partially	  beneficial	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan’s	   authority.	   The	   reduced	   authority	   of	   competing	   Durrani	  tribal	   leaders,	   the	   disciplining	   of	   military	   forces,	   and	   the	   importation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’	  [British	  relations	  with	  since	  1838],	  Adolphous	  Warburton	  Moore,	  Political	  and	  Secret	  Department,	  31	  August	  1878,	  p.	  7.	  92	  News,	  or	  newsletters.	  	  93	  NAI,	  Foreign	  Department	  Proceedings	  1840-­‐49,	  Secret	  Consultations,	  23	  March	  1834,	  p.	  559-­‐61.	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bullion	   all	   proved	   advantageous. 94 	  Nonetheless,	   he	   faced	   a	   significant	  decrease	   in	   his	   territorial	   authority.	   In	   order	   to	   overcome	   this	   Dost	  Muhammad	   began	   his	   second	   period	   of	   rule	   by	   installing	   members	   of	   his	  family	   in	   the	   governorships	   of	   key	   constituencies.	   Kandahar	   reverted	   once	  more	   to	   the	   rule	  of	   the	  Amir’s	  half	   brothers	  Kohendil	  Khan,	  Rahmdil	  Khan,	  and	   Mihrdil	   Khan.	   The	   heir-­‐apparent,	   Muhammad	   Akbar	   Khan,	   became	  governor	  of	  Jalalabad,	  Laghman,	  and	  Hazarajat,	  (replaced	  by	  Ghulam	  Haidar	  Khan	  after	  his	  death	  in	  1847).	  Bamiyan,	  Ghazni,	  Kohistan,	  Khost,	  Kurram,	  and	  Zurmat;	   as	  well	   as	   other	   regions	   surrounding	  Kabul	  were	   also	   allocated	   to	  the	  Amir’s	  sons,	  and	  all	  enjoyed	  significant	  independence	  in	  their	  rule.95	  This	  dynastic	  base	  allowed	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  to	  begin	  a	  campaign	  reclaiming	  his	   influence	   north	   of	   the	   Hindu	   Kush	   in	   what	   the	   British	   referred	   to	   as	  Afghan-­‐Turkestan	  from	  1845	  onwards.96	  	  	  Meanwhile	   the	   British	   were	   consolidating	   their	   rule	   in	   the	   Punjab.	   In	   a	  demonstration	  of	   the	  continued	   fixation	  with	   the	   Indus	  as	  a	   trade	  route,	  an	  army	   led	  by	  General	  Napier	  had,	  against	   the	  wishes	  of	  London,	  overthrown	  the	  Amirs	  of	  Sind	  in	  1843.	  This	  action	  had	  been	  partially	  presaged	  by	  the	  use	  of	   Sind	   as	   a	   thoroughfare	   for	   the	   original	   army	   of	   the	   Indus,	   during	  which	  period	   Anglo-­‐Sindi	   relations	   had	   been	   extremely	   tense.	   Further	   north,	   a	  succession	   crisis	   was	   consuming	   the	   Punjab	   following	   the	   death	   of	   Ranjit	  Singh	   in	   1842.	   In	   the	   midst	   of	   this,	   the	   Sikh	   army	   crossed	   the	   Indus	   and	  invaded	  British	   occupied	   lands	   in	   1845	   sparking	   the	   first	   of	   the	   two	  Anglo	  Sikh	  Wars	  (1845-­‐6	  and	  1848-­‐9).	  By	  1849	  the	  British	  had	  annexed	  the	  Punjab	  and	  established	  six	  districts	  on	  what	  was	  now	  the	   ‘frontier’	  of	  British	  India,	  and	  collectively	  known	  as	  Punjab	  Province:	  Peshawar,	  Kohat,	  Bannu,	  Hazara,	  Dera	   Ismail	   Khan,	   and	   Dera	   Ghazi	   Khan. 97 	  Two	   Commissionerships	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Noelle	  notes	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Durrani	  nobility,	  and	  especially	  the	  Bamizai	  Popalzai,	  in	  the	  Kabul	  uprising	  was	  testament	  to	  the	  power	  they	  stood	  to	  lose	  under	  the	  reforming	  government	  of	  Shah	  Shuja.	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  55.	  95	  Noelle,	  State	  and	  Tribe,	  57-­‐8.	  96	  This	  is	  documented	  in	  IOR/L/PS/18/A5,	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  Afghan-­‐Turkistan’	  by	  J.	  Talboys	  Wheeler,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  to	  Government	  of	  India,	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Department	  (Calcutta,	  Officer	  of	  Superintendent	  of	  Government	  Printing,	  1869).	  97	  Hazara	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  Hazarajat	  in	  the	  Hindu	  Kush	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Kabul.	  Hazara	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  only	  ‘cis-­‐Indus’	  district,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ‘trans-­‐Indus’	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administered	   the	   frontier,	   one	   for	   Peshawar	   and	   one	   for	   the	   Derajat.	   Each	  district	  was	  headed	  by	  a	  Deputy	  Commissioner.	  	  The	   annexation	   of	   the	   Punjab	   had	   profound	   implications	   for	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations.	  On	  a	  practical	   level,	  British	  occupation	  allowed	  a	  conduit	   through	  which	   the	   latest	   information	   on	   Afghan	   affairs	   could	   be	   filtered,	   yet	   their	  reliance	   on	   an	   improvised	   indigenous	   information	   system	   encouraged	   an	  uneasy	  picture	  of	  instability	  that	  blended	  with	  an	  already	  violent	  concept	  of	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  itself.	  The	  fall	  of	  Jalalabad	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  in	  1848	  nearly	  brought	  the	  Afghans	  into	  collision	  with	  the	  British	  once	  more.	  Afghan	  rumours	  that	  Queen	  Victoria	  had	  died	  and	  that	  ‘the	  Angrez	  (English)	  were	  in	  confusion’	   fuelled	   ever-­‐present	   fears	   of	   a	   rumour-­‐driven	   uprising. 98	  Intercepted	   communications	   between	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   and	   the	   Sikh	  resistance	   leader	   Chattar	   Singh,	   in	   which	   Afghan	   support	   for	   Sikh	  countermoves	  was	   to	  be	   traded	   for	  Peshawar,	  added	   to	   these	   fears.	  Shortly	  after	   this,	   the	  brief	  appearance	  of	  Afghan	   forces	   in	   the	  vicinity	  of	  Peshawar	  appeared	  to	  confirm	  a	  wider	  conspiracy,	  despite	  their	  retreat	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  British	  advance.99	  	  The	  newsletter	  system	  in	  particular	  was	  notoriously	  unreliable.	   Judging	   the	  validity	  of	  claims	  contained	  within	  them	  was	  often	  no	  more	  than	  a	  process	  of	  guesswork.	  In	  one	  instance	  Major	  Edwardes,	  who	  was	  at	  the	  time	  attempting	  to	  establish	  a	  base	  near	  Dera	  Ghazi	  Khan,	  was	   forced	  to	  validate	  a	  rumours	  relating	  to	  a	  lashkar	  siege	  of	  a	  nearby	  fort	  by	  comparing	  the	  news	  contained	  within	  two	  consecutive	  newsletters.100	  Despite	  this,	  officials	  were	  instructed	  to	   report	   all	   significant	   information	   up	   the	   chain	   of	   command.	   This	   rather	  holistic	   approach	   to	   intelligence	   gathering,	   combined	  with	   the	   tendency	   to	  fixate	   on	   moments	   of	   crisis,	   promoted	   a	   culture	   of	   fear	   that	   seemed	   to	  manifest	  itself	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  frontier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  districts	  of	  the	  remaining	  five.	  Originally	  Dera	  Ismail	  Khan	  and	  Bannu	  had	  formed	  one	  district.	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  330-­‐1.	  98	  Johnson,	  Spying	  for	  Empire,	  89.	  99	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  332.	  100	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  Edwardes	  to	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  February	  1849,	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In	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  Sikh	  surrender	   in	  1849	  many	  prominent	  British	   frontier	   officials	   assumed	   that	   an	   Afghan	   invasion	   was	   simply	   a	  matter	   of	   time.	   When	   a	   harkara	   correspondence	   between	   the	   Kandahar	  
sirdars	  and	  the	  Nawab	  of	  Bahawulpur,	  appeared	  to	  demonstrate	  plans	   for	  a	  ‘holy	  war’	  against	  the	  British,	  the	  Chief	  Commissioner	  at	  Peshawar	  was	  able	  to	   pass	   it	   off	   as	   an	   attempt	   at	   manipulation,	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   Nawab’s	  protestations	   that	   it	   was	   a	   forgery.101	  Nonetheless,	   Edwardes	   viewed	   such	  sedition	   as	   symptomatic	   of	   a	  wider	   conspiracy.	  Writing	   in	   response	   to	   the	  correspondence	  he	  warned	  'I	  cannot	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  laugh	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  Candahar	  invasion.	  An	  invasion	  by	  Dost	  Mahomed	  was	  considered	  equally	  improbable	   a	   few	  months	   since,	   but	  we	   have	   lived	   to	   see	   it	  …	   I	   consider	   a	  movement	  from	  Candahar	  if	  made	  in	  time,	  not	  only	  credible,	  but	  likely	  to	  be	  one	  greatly	  advantageous	  to	  their	  party.'102	  Meanwhile	  in	  Afghanistan,	  in	  the	  aftermath	   of	   the	   Afghan	   withdrawal	   from	   Peshawar,	   a	   Kabul	   newsletter	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  panic	  and	  division	  as	  businesses	  closed	  and	  Kabulis	  fled	  in	   anticipation	   of	   a	   British	   advance	   through	   the	   Khyber	   Pass.103	  In	   one	  instance,	  a	  dinner	  hosted	  by	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  was	  apparently	  broken	  up	  in	  disarray	  at	  rumours	  of	  British	  troops	  marching	  on	  Jalalabad.104	  	  	  This	   tense	  state	  of	  affairs	  buttressed	  a	  resolute	  practice	  of	  non-­‐engagement	  from	  the	  British	  side	  and	  frontier	  officials	  were	  kept	  on	  a	  short	  leash	  when	  it	  came	   to	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations.	   The	   Governor-­‐General	   had	   instructed	  frontier	   commissioners	   in	   May	   1849	   to	   ‘abstain	   from	   any	   official	  communication	   of	   any	   description	  with	   the	   Affghan	  Monarch	   or	   any	   of	   his	  Chiefs	   without	   reference	   to	   Government.’	   ‘No	   specific	   intimation	   of	   the	  intentions	   of	   the	   Government’	   were	   permitted	   ‘privately	   or	   otherwise.’105	  	  But	   the	   prevailing	   view	   of	   Afghanistan	   as	   an	   originator	   of	   regional	  conspiracies	  meant	   that	   information	   on	   affairs	   at	   Kabul	  was	   demanded	   ‘as	  frequently	   as	   possible’.106 	  	   This	   tension	   between	   a	   will	   to	   know	   yet	   a	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  to	  Elliot,	  9	  March	  1849,	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  Edwardes	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  15	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  Burn	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  25	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reluctance	   to	   engage	   rigidified	   the	   responses	   of	   officials	   and	   confused	   the	  appropriate	   diplomatic	   protocol.	   Therefore	   when	   overtures	   by	   an	   alleged	  messenger	   of	   Dost	   Muhammad	   Khan	   at	   Leia	   were	   made	   in	   late	   1850	  concerning	   the	   reopening	   of	   relations,	   the	   news	   prompted	   a	   series	   of	  correspondence	  between	  officials.	  Colonel	  Taylor,	  whose	  post	  at	  Dera	  Ismail	  Khan	   left	   him	   in	   the	   position	   of	   receiving	   occasional	   dispatches	   from	  Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan	  at	  Kandahar,	  proudly	   confirmed	   that	  he	   'studiously	  avoided	   the	   slightest	   appearance	   of	   a	   too	   great	   willingness	   to	   receive	   the	  communications	  forwarded’,	  but	  he	  admitted	  that	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  had	  criticised	   his	   initial	   responses	   to	   these	   communications	   as	   too	   ‘harshly	  worded’	  and	  for	  treating	  the	  messenger	  as	  a	  ‘common	  cossid’.107	  	  Adding	   to	   the	   confusion	   was	   the	   sheer	   ambiguity	   regarding	   sovereign	  authority	  in	  the	  region.	  Despite	  the	  establishing	  of	  frontier	  posts	  on	  the	  west	  bank	  of	  the	  Indus,	  stretching	  from	  Hazara	  in	  the	  north	  to	  Dera	  Ghazi	  Khan	  in	  the	  south,	  the	  frontier	  did	  not	  end	  in	  a	  line	  of	  control	  but	  rather	  blurred	  into	  obscurity.	  At	  a	  local	  level	  the	  settled	  plains	  of	  the	  Indus	  valley	  were	  the	  only	  areas	   to	   which	   the	   British	   claimed	   any	   degree	   of	   authority.	   The	  ‘mountaineers’	  were	  meanwhile	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  save	  the	  occasional	  punitive	   campaign.	  The	   territory	   in	  between	  was	   essentially	  undefined	  and	  viewed	  by	  the	  British	  as	  subject	  to	  neither	  their	  sovereign	  authority,	  nor	  that	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.	  As	  the	  noted	  British	  historian	  of	  the	  frontier,	  Olaf	  Caroe	   described	   it,	   this	   land	   was	   ‘regarded	   as	   enjoying	   at	   least	   a	   factual	  independence,	  and	  was	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ghairilaqa	  (unadministered	  territory)	  or	  Yaghistan	   (the	   land	  of	   the	  rebels)	  …	  a	  belt	  of	  no-­‐man’s-­‐land	  of	  unknown	   extent	   which	   acknowledged	   neither	   Kabul	   nor	   Calcutta	   as	  suzerain’.108	  	  	  Kabul	  was	  known	  to	  exert	  a	  tenuous	  grip	  over	  the	  principal	  measurable	  form	  of	  authority	  that	  the	  British	  referred	  to	  –	  that	  of	  collecting	  revenue	  –	  yet	  the	  capacity	   to	   do	   so	   did	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	   distance	   from	   the	   capital.	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  Burn	  to	  Elliot,	  10	  October	  1850,	  p.	  149.	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Therefore	   the	  Waziris	   of	   Bannu,	   Khuttuck,	   and	   Khost,	   were	   known	   to	   pay	  tribute	  to	  Kabul	  despite	  being	  more	  remote	  than	  the	  Mohmands	  whose	  chief,	  Sadat	  Khan	  received	  a	  retainer	  from	  Kabul	  for	  ensuring	  the	  ‘coming	  to	  terms’	  of	  his	  people.109	  Indeed,	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  Khyber	  often	  appeared	  to	  the	  British	   as	   vacillatory	   in	   their	   loyalty,	   on	   one	   occasion	   eliciting	   a	   threat	   of	  retribution	  from	  the	  Amir	  should	  they	   ‘from	  motives	  of	  avarice	  and	  worldly	  gain,	  open	  an	   intercourse	  with	   the	  English’.110	  The	  expressions	  of	   loyalty	   to	  the	   Amir	   given	   by	   the	   Adam	   Khail	   Afridis,	   were	   even	   dismissed	   by	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	   as	   being	   driven	   by	   'worldly	   motives',	   ‘the	   acquisition	   of	  wealth',	  and	  as	  merely	  seeking	  an	  allowance	  whilst	  'falsely'	  stating	  that	  they	  were	   fighting	   for	   their	   religion.111	  Sovereign	   authority	   appeared	   to	   operate	  therefore,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   affective	   ties,	   but	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   greater	  familiarity	  with	   the	  Afghan	  population,	   the	  British	  were	   forced	   to	   resort	   to	  more	   indirect	  methods	   in	  measuring	   sovereign	   influence,	   typically	   a	   crude	  recording	  by	  political	  officers	  of	  the	  ‘chief’	  to	  whom	  the	  local	  tribe	  was	  loyal.	  Moreover,	   this	   disaggregated	   sovereign	   authority	   underscored	   the	   British	  view	   of	   frontier	   populations	   as	   essentially	   stateless	   collectives	   who	   were	  neither	   worthy	   of,	   nor	   expectant	   of	   treatment	   under	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  norms	   of	   civilized	   society.	   This	   exceptionalist	   perspective	   was	   frequently	  evoked	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   British	   sought	   to	   evade	   the	   humanitarian	  principles	  they	  claimed	  to	  uphold	  elsewhere.	  	  As	  such,	  this	  sovereign	  ambiguity	  left	  the	  door	  open	  for	  raiding	  campaigns	  at	  a	   moment’s	   notice,	   often	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   collective	   punishment	   in	  response	  to	  acts	  of	  brigandage.	  Such	  raids	  occasionally	  created	  friction	  as	  the	  ill-­‐defined	  military	   influence	  of	   the	  British,	  and	   the	  affective	   ties	   that	  Kabul	  possessed	   over	   the	   tribes,	   overlapped.	   In	   late	   1851	   when	   British	   troops	  moved	  towards	  the	  Khyber	  Pass	  to	  construct	  an	  outpost	  at	  Michini,	  Captain	  Mackeson,	   the	   Commissioner	   at	   Peshawar,	   reported	   that	   Dost	   Muhammad	  Khan	  had	  informed	  his	  court	  that	  such	  a	  move	  by	  the	  British	  would	  be	  akin	  to	  ‘building	  a	  fort	  at	  Kabul,	  Kandahar,	  and	  Herat,	  and	  would	  arm	  all	  the	  Affghan	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tribes	   against	   [them]’.	   He	   called	   upon	   the	   Afridi	   and	   Mohmand	   tribes	   to	  ‘forget	   their	   former	   feuds	   and	   unite	   to	   give	   [the	   British]	   trouble’.112	  Such	  newsletter	   reporting	   continually	   filtered	   through	   the	   rickety	   information	  channels	  of	  the	  frontier	  areas,	  sustaining	  the	  impression	  that	  tribal	  uprisings	  were	   somehow	   linked	   to	   Kabul	   which	   was	   increasingly	   viewed	   as	   at	   the	  epicentre	   of	   regional	   disturbances	   and	   intrigue,	   exhibiting	   a	   nefarious	  influence	  that	  infected	  an	  entire	  region	  prone	  to	  sedition.	  Lieutenant	  General	  Sydney	  Cotton	  reflected	  this	  sentiment	  in	  his	  memoirs	  when	  he	  wrote	  on	  the	  assassination	   of	   the	   former	   Peshawar	   Chief	   Commissioner,	   Frederick	  Mackeson.	  This	  death,	  he	  asserted	  ‘was	  originated	  by	  the	  evil	  machinations	  of	  our	  enemies,	  the	  whole	  border	  of	  our	  territory	  were	  interested	  more	  or	  less	  in	  the	  transaction,	  and	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  deed	  might	  perhaps	  have	  been	  traced	  to	  Cabul	  itself,	  had	  it	  been	  considered	  advisable’.113	  Cotton	  submitted	  that	  he	  ‘scarcely	  ever	  knew	  an	  instance	  in	  which	  it	  could	  not	  have	  been	  discovered	  …	  that	   a	   deep-­‐laid	   plot	   had	   originated	   the	   disaster,	   the	   assassin	   being	   simply	  and	  solely	  the	  instrument	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  it.’114	  	  Such	  rumours	  played	  on	  British	  fears	  of	  administrative	  vulnerability.	  Indeed	  the	  rigidity	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  was	  apparently	  known	  at	  Kabul.	  In	   1853	   newswriters	   reported	   that	   Dost	   Muhammad’s	   Court	   was	   of	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	   British	   had	   not	   'as	   yet	   settled	   the	   border	   tribes'	   in	   part	  because	  they	  'were	  not	  able	  to	  act	  in	  any	  matter	  on	  their	  own	  responsibility	  …	   they	   were	   obliged	   in	   all	   public	   affairs	   to	   report	   the	   circumstances	   to	  Government	   at	   Calcutta,	   and	   to	   abide	   by	   the	   instructions	   they	   thence	  received	  ...	  whether	  these	  orders	  were	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  views	  or	  not'.115	  Despite	  these	  apparent	  vulnerabilities	  however,	  and	  indeed	  partially	  in	   response	   to	   them,	   the	   frontier	   was	   increasingly	   becoming	   the	   site	   of	   a	  peculiar	  form	  of	  bureaucratic	  management	  that	  sought	  to	  tame	  the	  paranoia	  of	  the	  administrative	  bodies	  in	  Calcutta.	  Before	  turning	  to	  this	  discussion,	  it	  is	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necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  period	  of	  mutual	  distrust	  was	  partially	  overcome.	  	  	  
	  
Overcoming	  Exception	  1853-­1857	  	  The	   status	   of	   Herat	   had	   been	   a	   central	   concern	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   the	   First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   war,	   but	   in	   the	   climate	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   cooperation	   in	   the	  1840s,	  especially	  relating	  to	  Persia,	  this	  paranoia	  was	  less	  pronounced.	  This	  was	   also	   partly	   a	   result	   of	   the	   greater	   sense	   of	   security	   that	   derived	   from	  what	   was	   becoming	   a	   permanent	   military	   presence	   on	   the	   frontier.	   Lord	  Palmerston,	  writing	  to	  the	  new	  British	  envoy	  in	  Tehran,	  Colonel	  Sheil,	  noted	  ‘confidentially	  …	   the	  possession	  of	  Scinde,	  of	   the	  Punjaub,	  and	  of	  Peshawur	  by	  Great	  Britain	  has	   in	   some	  degree	  diminished	   the	   importance	  which	  was	  formally	  attached	  to	  the	  question	  of	  Herat	  …	  It	  is	  no	  doubt	  as	  true	  now	  as	  it	  was	   then,	   that	   the	  occupation	  of	  Herat	  by	   the	  Persians	  might	  under	  certain	  circumstances	   open	   the	   road	   to	   Herat	   to	   the	   Russians	   ...	   but	   our	   Indian	  frontier	   is	   now	   far	   stronger	   ...	   and	   we	   are	   therefore	   in	   a	   much	   better	  condition	   to	   wait	   for	   and	   to	   repel	   such	   an	   attack'.116	  British	   actions	   were	  seemingly	   driven	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   remain	   uninvolved	   in	   the	   ongoing	   Perso-­‐Afghan	  rivalry	  over	  the	  city,	  with	  Sheil’s	  instructions	  from	  Palmerston	  ‘not	  to	  make	   any	   specific	   threat	   which	   Her	   Majesty's	   Government	   might	   not	   be	  disposed	  afterwards	  to	  carry	  into	  execution’.117	  Henry	  Rawlinson,	  at	  the	  time	  British	  Consul	   in	  Baghdad,	   shared	   these	  views.	  Should	   the	  Herat	   ruler	  Syed	  Muhammad	   Khan	   acknowledge	   himself	   ‘a	   vassal	   of	   the	   Persian	   Crown’	   or	  even	  admit	  a	  Persian	  garrison,	  he	  claimed,	   ‘the	  effect	   in	  British	  India	  would	  be	   absolutely	   imperceptible’.118	  This	   was	   a	   position	   he	   shared	   with	   the	  President	   of	   the	   Board	   of	   Control.	   Sustaining	   these	   views	   had	   been	   an	  indication	   of	   favourable	   relations	   between	   Kabul	   and	   Herat.	   An	   alliance	  between	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  and	  Yar	  Muhammad	  Khan,	   agreed	   in	  1846	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had	   been	   strengthened	   by	   shared	   endeavours	   to	   quell	   disturbances	   in	  Afghan-­‐Turkestan.119	  	  	  Colonel	   Sheil	   at	   Tehran	   (a	   former	  deputy	   of	  McNeil,	   the	  noted	  Russophobe	  and	  previous	  envoy),	  dissented	  from	  this	  view	  however	  and	  from	  1846	  had	  been	  dispatching	   a	   steady	   stream	  of	  memos	  warning	  of	  Persian	  designs	  on	  Herat	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  Russian	  influence	  that	  this	  carried.120	  When	  a	  further	  Persian	  attempt	  on	  Herat	  emerged	   in	  1852	  Sheil’s	  perspective	   trumped	   the	  more	  relaxed	  attitude	  of	  Rawlinson	  and	  the	  Board	  of	  Control,	  prompting	  the	  Foreign	   Secretary	   (briefly	   under	   the	   Conservative	   tenure	   of	   Lord	  Malmesbury)	   to	   order	   a	   firm	   line	   and	   issue	   a	   vague	   threat,	   noting	   that	   the	  Persian	  government	  would	  be	  aware	  'from	  what	  took	  place	  some	  years	  back	  that	   the	   British	   Government	   can	   easily	   cause	   its	   displeasure	   to	   be	   felt	   by	  Persia	   in	   a	  manner	  which	  may	   sensibly	   affect	   the	  material	   interests	  of	   that	  country’.121	  The	  Persian	  troops	  were	  ordered	  back	  and	  a	  new	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  treaty	  was	  signed	  in	  which	  Persia	  agreed	  to	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  Herat	  unless	  the	  city	  was	  threatened	  from	  Kabul,	  or	  another	  ‘foreign	  territory’.122	  	  However,	   the	   death	   in	   1853	   of	   the	   former	   ruler	   of	   Herat,	   Yar	   Muhammad	  Khan,	   who	   had	   been	   backing	   his	   son	   and	   nominal	   ruler	   Syed	   Muhammad	  Khan,	   signalled	   an	   end	   to	   the	   optimism.	   The	   city	   began	   ‘sinking	   into	  anarchy’,123	  and	  Syed	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  who	  was	  viewed	  in	  British	  accounts	  as	   ‘an	   imbecile	   profligate’,124	  was	   soon	   driven	   out	   by	   the	   apparent	   Persian	  sympathiser	  Muhammad	  Yusuf	  Khan,	  nephew	  of	   the	   former	  Saddozai	  Ruler	  of	   Herat	   Shah	   Kamran.	   The	   Kabul-­‐Herat	   alliance	   collapsed	   as	   Muhammad	  Yusuf	  Khan	  began	  a	  campaign	  of	   intimidation	  against	   the	  nearby	  territories	  of	   Andkho	   and	   Shibargham,	   demanding	   they	   ‘shake	   off’	   their	   allegiance	   to	  Kabul.125	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Meanwhile,	   in	   1854	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   Crimean	   War,	   the	   fragile	  edifice	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   cooperation	   fell	   away.	   When	   rumours	   began	   to	  circulate	  of	  a	  Persian	  attempt	  on	  Turkey	  as	  a	  distraction	  in	  support	  of	  Russia,	  Colonel	  Sheil	  speculated	  that	  British	  troops	  might	  soon	  once	  more	  be	  called	  upon	   to	   occupy	   Kandahar	   as	   a	   bulwark	   against	   Persian	   and	   Russian	  inroads.126	  More	   optimistic	   voices	  moderated	   this	   fear,	   including	  Governor-­‐General	   Lord	   Dalhousie	   who	   referred	   to	   the	   ‘extreme	   improbability’	   of	   an	  attempt	   by	   Russia	   to	   invade	   India	   through	   Afghanistan.127	  Nonetheless,	   the	  ever-­‐present	   fear	   of	   rumour	   destabilising	   the	   perception	   of	   British	  supremacy	  drove	   a	   sense	  of	   a	   need	   to	   overcome	   the	   ‘reciprocal	   oblivion	  of	  past	   grievances’	   with	   Afghanistan.128 	  Events	   in	   Afghanistan	   appeared	   to	  support	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  ties	  with	  Kabul.	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  had	   expanded	   his	   sphere	   of	   authority	   with	   the	   seizing	   of	   Kelat-­‐i-­‐Ghilzai	  between	  Kandahar	  and	  Kabul	  –	  a	  move	  that	  had	  prompted	  a	  letter	  of	  protest	  from	  Persia	   ‘couched	   in	   the	   language	  of	   a	  Paramount	  Power’.	  Moreover,	   an	  insurrection	  in	  Balkh	  was	  driving	  the	  Amir	  to	  seek	  external	  support.129	  	  Overcoming	  the	  prevailing	  sense	  of	  Afghan	  ‘exception’	  was	  eased	  by	  Afghan	  overtures.	  The	  Amir’s	  son,	  Muhammad	  Azim	  Khan	  wrote	  to	  Edwardes	  in	  late	  1854	  requesting	  a	  British	  alliance.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  arrival	  of	  an	  envoy	  on	  23	  October	  in	  Peshawar	  carrying	  letters	  from	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  ‘humble	  in	  …	  tone	  and	  conciliatory	  in	  the	  extreme’,	  permission	  was	  given	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  treaty	  on	  30	  March	  1855	  pledging	  mutual	  non-­‐interference	  and	  including	  the	   commitment	   that	   the	   Afghan	   Government	   would	   be	   the	   ‘friend	   of	   the	  friends	   and	   the	   enemy	   of	   the	   enemies’	   of	   the	   East	   India	   Company.130	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  agreement	  was	  deliberately	  distant.	  The	  British	  sought	  only	  a	  ‘community	  of	  interest’	  with	  Afghanistan.131	  Further	  commitments,	  including	  an	  offensive	  treaty	  had	  been	  ruled	  out	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  such	  terms	  would	  defeat	   the	  British	   object	   to	   ‘abstain	   from	   any	   interference’	   in	   the	   ‘interests	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and	  concerns’	  of	  the	  ‘various	  states’	  beyond	  the	  British	  frontier.132	  Morevover,	  the	   previous	   Anglo-­‐Persian	   treaty	   prevented	   any	   British	   encouragement	   to	  the	   Afghan	   government	   in	   any	   designs	   it	  might	   have	   on	  Herat.	   The	   British	  were	   committed	   to	   the	   regional	   legal	   order	   they	   were	   attempting	   to	  construct	  through	  treaty	  agreements	  with	  the	  various	  states	  they	  saw	  across	  the	  region,	  in	  particular	  those	  agreements	  they	  had	  with	  the	  more	  stable	  and	  (according	   to	  British	  perceptions)	  more	   ‘civilized’	   state	  of	  Persia.	  However,	  political	  realities	  on	  the	  ground	  continued	  to	  thwart	  these	  ambitions.	  	  In	  late	  1855	  the	  British	  began	  to	  receive	  reports	  of	  further	  expansions	  by	  the	  Afghan	  Amir	  into	  Kandahar	  following	  the	  death	  of	  his	  brother	  and	  the	  sirdar	  Kohendil	  Khan.	  The	  newsletter	   report	  described	   this	  move	  as	  being	   invited	  by	   his	   remaining	   sons	   following	   a	   family	   feud	   over	   the	   management	   of	  government	   affairs,	   but	   Edwardes,	   who	   received	   the	   dispatch	   suggested	  instead	   that	   the	  Amir	  had	  been	  motivated	  by	   ‘putting	  an	  end	   to	   the	  danger	  with	  which	  the	  Persian	  intrigues	  of	  his	  Candahar	  relatives	  have	  so	  long	  been	  threatening	  him’.133	  Whilst	  this	  apparent	  further	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Amir’s	  kingdom	  accorded	  well	  with	   longer-­‐term	  British	  hopes	   for	   a	  united	  Afghan	  polity,	   rumours	   of	   a	   further	   Persian	   attempt	   on	   Herat	   threatened	   to	   bring	  Afghan	  and	  Persian	  troops	  into	  a	  collision	  over	  Herat,	  leaving	  the	  British	  with	  potentially	  divided	  loyalties.134	  	  	  Throughout	   1855	   and	   into	   1856,	   amid	   warming	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations,	  news	   of	   these	   renewed	   Persian	   attempts	   were	   now	   being	   passed	   to	   the	  British	   through	   indigenous	   Afghan	   information	   networks,	   notably	   the	   heir	  apparent,	  Ghulam	  Haider	  Khan,	  and	  his	  network	  of	  informants	  at	  Farrah	  and	  Lash	  Jowain,	  south	  of	  Herat.135	  The	  recent	  signing	  of	  a	  treaty	  agreement	  with	  the	  Khan	  of	  Kalat	  also	  instituted	  a	  vakil	  agreement	  through	  which	  the	  British	  could	   be	   kept	   informed	   of	   Persian	   movements. 136 	  Whilst	   these	   reports	  indicated	  a	  clear	  Persian	   influence	   in	   the	  ongoing	  political	   turmoil	   in	  Herat,	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the	   detail	   coming	   via	   the	   indigenous	   newswriters	   demonstrated	   the	   very	  personal	   nature	   of	   this	   ‘intrigue’.	   As	   Edwardes	   noted,	   ‘the	   whole	   account	  reads	  more	  like	  a	  studied	  “Coup	  d’etat”	  than	  a	  successful	  “Coup	  de	  main”’.137	  	  	  With	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  now	  established	  at	  Kandahar	  he	   sought	   treaty	  recognition	   from	   the	   British	   of	   his	   new	   territorial	   reach	   asking	   for	   the	  inclusion	   of	   Kandahar	   in	   the	   previously	   signed	   1855	   treaty,	   and	   further	  signalling	  his	  intentions	  to	  make	  a	  move	  on	  Herat,	  expressing	  his	  wish	  to	  be	  guided	   by	   ‘the	   advice	   of	   the	   English’.138	  Yet	   despite	   the	   clear	   interests	   the	  British	   had	   in	   a	   consolidated	   polity	   of	   Kabul,	   Kandahar,	   and	   Herat	   (as	   the	  Governor-­‐General	   privately	   admitted)139	  the	   Home	   Government	   reiterated	  the	  policy	  of	  only	  recognising	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  as	  the	  de	  facto	  governor	  of	  Kandahar,	  and	  maintaining	  the	  independence	  of	  Herat,	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	   treaty.	   This	   reticence	   reached	   right	   down	   to	   the	   Chief	  Commissioner	   of	   the	   Punjab	   who	   responded	   to	   the	   request	   with	   ‘utmost	  caution’	  having	  been	  instructed	  that	  political	  correspondence	  with	  the	  Amir	  was	  to	  be	  left	  exclusively	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Governor-­‐General.140	  There	  was	  a	   commitment	   to	   keeping	   the	   affairs	   of	   Herat,	   Persia,	   and	   Afghanistan	  separate,	  for	  fear	  of	  offending	  either	  side.	  Therefore,	  when	  Muhammad	  Yusuf,	  the	  new	  ruler	  of	  Herat	   requested	  a	  British	  envoy	   from	  Peshawar,	   the	   stern	  reply	   from	   Dalhousie	   was	   that	   this	   was	   ‘out	   of	   the	   question’,	   and	   that	   the	  mere	   ‘fact	   of	   congratulations’	   would	   be	   ‘unpalatable’	   to	   Dost	   Muhammad	  Khan’.141	  Adding	   to	   this	   imperative,	   in	   the	   view	   of	   Calcutta	   were	   growing	  signs	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  cooperation	  on	  the	  frontier,	  including	  indications	  that	  the	  Amir	  was	  ‘curbing	  the	  Mohmand	  Tribes’.142	  The	  key	  Afghan	  intermediary	  for	   the	  British,	  Ghulam	  Haider	  Khan,	  had	  also	  raised	   the	  prospect	  of	  a	  vakil	  arrangement	  between	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Afghans,	  a	  suggestion	  that	  offered	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to	  ameliorate	  the	  existing	  improvised	  newswriter	  system;	  this	  proposal	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  on	  17	  July	  1856.143	  	  Unfortunately	   for	   the	   British	   their	   wish	   for	   a	   carefully	   delineated	   regional	  order	   did	   not	   match	   their	   institutional	   arrangements	   for	   diplomatic	  intercourse.	   In	   a	   remarkable	   failure	   to	   align	   actions,	   Charles	   Murray,	   the	  envoy	   at	   Tehran	   had,	   in	   early	   1856,	   and	   in	   response	   to	   a	   request	   from	  Muhammad	   Yusuf	   Khan,	   recognised	   and	   congratulated	   him	   on	   his	   new	  position	  of	  authority	  at	  Herat,	  thereby	  contradicting	  the	  policy	  from	  Calcutta	  of	  keeping	  Persian,	  Herati,	  and	  Afghan	  affairs	  separate.	  Defending	  his	  actions	  to	   an	   outraged	   Governor-­‐General,	   Murray	   insisted	   ‘I	   viewed	   his	   Highness	  solely	  in	  the	  light	  of	  de	  facto	  (perhaps	  also	  de	  jure)	  ruler	  of	  Herat’.	  He	  argued	  that	  this	  presented	  no	  clash	  of	  interests	  at	  the	  time	  when	  he	  had	  not	  received	  news	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad’s	  capture	  of	  Kandahar.144	  It	  was	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  failings	  of	  the	  British	  information	  system	  in	  this	  region,	  but	  in	  a	  wider	  sense	   reflected	   how	   the	   ambiguity	   surrounding	   political	   authority	   in	   the	  region	   continued	   to	   complicate	   the	   interstate	   order	   that	   the	   British	   were	  attempting	  to	  establish	  through	  their	  diplomatic	  relations.	  	  	  With	  news	  of	  a	  growing	  Persian	   troop	  presence	  near	   the	  city,	   in	  May	  1856,	  the	   British	   Ambassador	   at	   Constantinople	   warned	   his	   Persian	   counterpart	  that	  the	  occupation	  of	  Herat	  was	  a	  ‘distinct	  cause	  of	  quarrel’.145	  In	  September,	  a	  British	  military	  and	  naval	  force	  was	  despatched	  to	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  and	  the	  British	   consuls	   at	   Tehran	   and	   Tabriz	   were	   ordered	   to	   leave.146	  Meanwhile,	  arms	  and	  ammunition	  were	  dispatched	  to	  the	  Khan	  of	  Kelat	  and	  also	  via	  the	  Bolan	  Pass	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  at	  Kandahar.147	  With	  a	  greater	  volume	  of	   material	   now	   filtering	   down	   through	   the	   Punjab,	   frontier	   officials	   were	  receiving	  more	   details	   on	   the	   regional	   impact	   of	   Herat’s	   precarious	   status.	  Information	   was	   sketchy,	   and	   not	   helped	   by	   flooding	   between	   Herat	   and	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Kandhar.148	  One	  such	  newswriter,	  Khan	  Bahadur	  Khan,	  who	  was	  embedded	  with	   the	   Amir’s	   court	   at	   Kandahar	   fed	   through	   numerous	   reports	   replete	  with	  stories	  of	  intrigue	  and	  suspicion.	  The	  Persian	  presence	  at	  Herat	  seemed	  to	   be	   sending	   ripples	   though	   the	   delicately	   balanced	   loyalties	   of	   the	  chiefships	  in	  the	  territories	  between	  Herat	  and	  Kandahar,	  with	  some	  reports	  suggesting	   the	   previously	   loyal	   forts	   of	   Lash	   Jowain	   and	   Farah	   were	   now	  vacillating.149	  Whilst	   some	   suspected	   Russian	   machinations	   behind	   Persian	  moves,	   these	   newswriter	   reports	   offered	   no	   evidence	   of	   this,150	  and	   with	  regards	   to	   the	   paranoia	   of	   a	  move	   on	   Afghanistan	   the	   Chief	   Commissioner	  communicated	   to	   the	  Governor-­‐General	   that	   there	  was	   nothing	   ‘to	   indicate	  that	  this	  power	  is	  prepared	  to	  assist	  Persia	  with	  troops	  for	  such	  a	  design’.151	  	  	  The	  more	  pressing	  concern	   that	   this	   information	  raised	  was	   the	  stability	  of	  the	   Afghan	   polity	   itself.	   Ever	   prone	   to	   rumour,	   the	   newswriter	   system	  had	  already	  thrown	  up	  news	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  death	  on	  23	  June,	  upon	  notice	   of	   which	   the	   Chief	   Commissioner’s	   Secretary	   rather	   pessimistically	  prophesied	   that	   ‘civil	   war	   and	   general	   confusion	   in	   Cabul	   may	   be	  anticipated’.152	  Although	  this	  rumour	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  false,	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  was	   once	   again	   coming	   under	   scrutiny	   with	   a	   general	   pessimism	   over	   its	  cohesion	   especially	   in	   the	   event	   of	   an	   invasion.	   This	   analysis	   evoked	   the	  criteria	  that	  the	  British	  had	  used	  in	  the	  past	  to	  describe	  the	  Afghan	  political	  community.	   ‘There	   can	   be	   little	   question’,	   one	   official	   wrote,	   ‘that	  many	   in	  Candahar	  and	  Cabul	  …	  would	  join	  such	  invaders.	  For	  if	  the	  exiled	  Baruckzais	  have	  many	  enemies,	  they	  also	  have	  numerous	  friends	  and	  moreover	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  the	  Ameer’s	  policy	  and	  administration	  have	  for	  some	  years	  been	  highly	   unpopular	  …	   in	   a	   crisis,	   he	   could	   count	   on	   few	   steadfast	   adherents,	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   his	   own	   sons	   and	   their	   immediate	   followers.’153	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  L/PS/5/229,	  Acting	  Political	  Superintendent	  Upper	  Sind	  to	  Acting	  Commissioner,	  Upper	  Sind,	  30	  August,	  p.	  2-­‐4.	  149	  IOR/L/PS/5/228,	  newsletter	  from	  Khan	  Bahadur	  Khan	  at	  Kandahar,	  (no	  date),	  p.	  31-­‐40.	  150	  One	  newswriter,	  who	  had	  apparently	  travelled	  from	  Kandahar	  to	  Herat	  himself,	  reported	  ‘There	  is	  not	  a	  single	  Russia	  with	  the	  Persian	  Troops	  and	  if	  any	  one	  says	  there	  is,	  he	  does	  not	  tell	  truth.’	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  Edwardes	  to	  James,	  20	  December	  1856,	  p.	  20.	  151	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  James	  to	  Edmunstone,	  5	  December	  1856,	  p.	  12.	  152	  IOR/L/PS/5/228,	  Temple	  to	  Edmunstone,	  23	  June	  1856,	  p.	  53.	  153	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  H.	  R.	  James	  to	  Edmunstone,	  5	  December	  1856,	  p.	  12.	  See	  also	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  H.	  R.	  James	  to	  Edmunstone,	  23	  December	  1856,	  p.	  16.	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British	   were	   partly	   led	   to	   this	   conclusion	   by	   the	   ‘exiles’	   they	   were	   reliant	  upon	  for	  the	  news	  they	  received.154	  But	  it	  was	  becoming	  clear	  to	  the	  British	  that	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   Afghan	   polity	   was	   tenuous	   and	   rested	   on	   the	  authority	  of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.155	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  1856,	  continued	  Persian	  troop	  presence	  in	  Herat	  and	  the	  refusal	  of	   Tehran	   to	   heed	  British	   demands	   for	   their	  withdrawal	   led	   to	   a	   brief	  war	  between	   the	   two	  countries.	  Utilizing	   the	   island	  of	  Kharg	   in	   the	  Persian	  Gulf	  once	  more,	  the	  British	  landed	  troops	  at	  Bushire.	  In	  early	  1857	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  these	   hostilities,	   the	   British	   bolstered	   their	   existing	   agreement	   with	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan,	   offering	   financial	   assistance	   to	   aid	   his	   defence	   against	  Persia	  and	  proposing	  the	  stationing	  of	  British	  Officers	  at	  Kandahar	  to	  aid	  this.	  Both	   of	   these	   stipulations	   were	   only	   to	   last	   as	   long	   as	   hostilities	   ensued,	  therefore	  when	  Persian	  forces	  capitulated	  and	  withdrew	  from	  Herat	  in	  March	  1857,	   British	   support	   also	   ended,	   despite	   a	   request	   from	  Dost	  Muhammad	  that	  it	  continue.156	  As	  such,	  the	  treaty	  was	  one	  of	  circumstance,	  not	  designed	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  status	  in	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations,	  but	  rather	  an	  expedient,	  designed	   to	  bolster	  Afghan	  defences	   against	   Persia.	   The	  Herat	   crises	   of	   the	  1850s	  were	  providing	  a	  validation	  for	  the	  British	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  diplomatic	  exchange	   with	   ‘uncivilized	   states’.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   violent	   geography	   that	  informed	   British	   perceptions	   of	   Afghanistan,	   and	   was	   sustained	   by	   the	  frontier	   information	   system,	   advised	   against	   the	   expectation	   of	   such	  reciprocity	  from	  Kabul.	  The	  reticence	  that	  described	  interactions	  with	  Kabul	  was	   therefore	   not	   simply	   a	   hangover	   from	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	   and	  the	  violent	  geography	   that	  resulted	   from	   it,	  but	  was	  symptom	  of	   this	  wider	  diplomatic	   prejudice	   against	   such	   states.	   Central	   to	   this	   was	   the	   notion	   of	  reciprocity.	  Persian	  actions	  validated	  the	  belief	  that	  reciprocity	  was	  not	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  ‘Mahommedan’	  states.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  An	  early	  example	  of	  such	  a	  source	  was	  Muhammad	  Mosin,	  son	  of	  Mirza	  Aga	  Jan,	  a	  former	  governor	  of	  Jalalabad,	  whose	  correspondence	  with	  a	  former	  member	  of	  Shah	  Shuja’s	  retinue	  gave	  insight	  into	  the	  state	  of	  Kabul	  politics	  after	  the	  British	  annexation	  of	  the	  Punjab.	  See,	  IOR/L/PS/5/201,	  Burn	  to	  Elliot,	  25	  May	  1849,	  p.	  108.	  155	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  H.	  R.	  James	  to	  Edmunstone,	  18	  December	  1856,	  p.	  97.	  156	  The	  subsidy	  was	  discontinued	  in	  September	  1858.	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.21.	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The	   distinction	   between	   de	   facto	   and	   de	   jure	   rulership	   was	   a	   further	  manifestation	   of	   an	   emergent	   positivist	   approach	   to	   the	   construction	   of	  international	  legal	  parameters,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  an	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  Law	  as	   tactic.	   There	   were	   diplomatic	   and	   strategic	   reasons	   for	   why	   legal	  recognition	  was	  often	  restricted	   to	  de	  facto	   recognition,	  but	   this	   status	  also	  cemented	   the	   essentially	  unstable	   view	   that	   the	  British	  had	  of	   ‘uncivilized’,	  ‘barbarous’	   states.	   Legally	   binding	   treaties	   implied	   an	   international	   order,	  but	   the	   sense	   of	   subjugation	   that	   inhered	   within	   ever-­‐present	   imperial	  visions	  of	  control	  over	  these	  ‘lesser’	  states	  remained	  in	  the	  background.	  The	  fact	   that	   the	  British	   felt	   entitled	   to	   choose	  whether	   they	   recognized	  Afghan	  rulers	  de	  jure	  or	  de	  facto,	  demonstrated	  a	  perception	  that	  Afghan	  sovereignty	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  requirements	  of	  sovereign	  recognition	  as	  would	  ascribe	  to	  ‘civilized’	  states.	  	  	  
Non-­Intervention	  and	  the	  Bellew	  and	  Lumsden	  Mission	  1857	  	  The	   Anglo-­‐Persian	   war	   compelled	   the	   British	   to	   overcome	   the	   sense	   of	  exclusion	  that	  had	  prevailed	  over	  their	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Afghanistan	  since	  1842,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  general	  character	  of	  that	  policy	  as	  one	  of	  non-­‐intervention.	   However,	   the	   crisis	   was	   significant	   in	   forcing	   a	  reconsideration	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   British	   policy	   towards	   Herat.	   As	   the	   new	  Governor-­‐General	  Lord	  Canning	  outlined	  in	  a	  minute	  shortly	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  new	  treaty	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad,	  whereas	  previously	  the	  British	  had	  sought	  an	  independent	  Herat	  that	  belonged	  ‘neither	  to	  the	  Shah	  of	  Persia,	  nor	  to	   the	   Ameer	   of	   Cabul’,	   this	   policy	   was	   now	   discredited	   as	   ‘visionary	   and	  unobtainable’.157	  But	   if	   such	   were	   the	   case,	   then	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   unified	  Afghan	   polity,	   including	  Herat,	  was	   equally	   visionary.	   	   Although	  Herat	  was	  judged	  to	  be	  ‘Afghan	  and	  not	  Persian’,	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  believed	  that	  the	  idea	  ‘that	  all	  Afghanistan	  should	  be	  united	  under	  one	  strong	  hand	  is	  probably	  not	  attainable	  at	  present;	   it	   is,	   indeed,	  nearly	  certain	   that	  with	   the	  death	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  IOR/L/PS/18/A3,	  ‘Afghanistan	  and	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  pursued	  towards	  Herat’,	  Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General,	  5	  February	  1857,	  p.	  3.	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Dost	  Mahomed	  a	  further	  disruption	  will	  take	  place’.158	  Fearing	  that	  instability	  in	   Afghanistan	   was	   inevitable	   due	   to	   its	   inherently	   fissiparous	   political	  tendencies	  the	  policy	  became	  one	  of	  encouraging	  ‘unity	  without	  intervention’,	  the	  aim	  being	  to	  prove	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  British	  government	  by	  protecting	  Afghanistan	  from	  ‘without’	  whilst	  not	  sending	  ‘a	  single	  Englishman,	  armed	  or	  unarmed,	  into	  their	  country,	  except	  with	  their	  own	  good	  will’.159	  	  	  In	   fact,	   achieving	   this	   ‘good	  will’	   for	  a	  mission	  was	  an	  additional	   important	  outcome	   of	   the	   treaty	  which	   included	   an	   agreement	   over	   the	   sending	   of	   a	  British	  expedition	  to	  Kandahar	  to	  oversee	  the	  dispensation	  of	  British	  military	  aid.	  The	  officer	   selected	   to	   lead	   the	  mission,	  Major	  Harry	  Lumsden,	  and	  his	  assistant	  Henry	  Bellew,	  were	  to	  be	  the	  first	  European	  officials	  in	  Afghanistan	  since	   the	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   War.160	  Besides	   their	   official	   role,	   they	   would	   also	  establish	   an	   intelligence	   thoroughfare	   for	   information	   from	   Herat,	   and	  provide	   a	   contingency	   should	   Persian	   troops	   advance	   on	   Afghanistan.161	  Judging	  the	  quality	  of	  this	  information	  however	  was	  not	  always	  a	  simple	  task.	  As	  Bellew	  noted	  regarding	  possible	  Persian	  advances	  on	  Farah,	  ‘the	  rumours	  daily	  current	  in	  the	  city	  [of	  Kandahar]	  were	  so	  conflicting,	  and	  yet	  at	  times	  so	  plausible,	   that	   it	   was	   difficult	   to	   discriminate	   between	   probable	   truth	   and	  falsehood.’	   Even	   the	   state	   of	   internal	   affairs	  was	   opaque	  with	   the	   death	   of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  being	  ‘periodically	  reported	  at	  intervals	  of	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  or	  so.’162	  	  But	   beyond	   this,	   the	   Lumsden	   and	   Bellew	   mission	   offered	   a	   valuable	  opportunity	   to	   ameliorate	   what	   one	   observer	   described	   as	   the	   ‘extreme	  ignorance	   of	   the	   politics	   and	   popular	   feelings	   beyond	   the	   passes’.163	  This	  projection	  of	  a	  violent	  unknown	  geography	  was	  alluded	   to	   in	   the	  published	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  IOR/L/PS/18/A3,	  ‘Afghanistan	  and	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  pursued	  towards	  Herat’,	  Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General,	  5	  February	  1857,	  p.	  3.	  159	  IOR/L/PS/18/A3,	  ‘Afghanistan	  and	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  pursued	  towards	  Herat’,	  Minute	  by	  the	  Governor	  General,	  5	  February	  1857,	  p.3.	  160	  H.	  W.	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan	  in	  1857	  (London:	  Smith,	  Elder	  and	  Co.,	  1862).	  	  For	  a	  list	  of	  European	  explorers	  who	  visited	  Afghanistan	  from	  1843-­‐1878	  see	  Appendix	  4.	  161	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  224-­‐6;	  242.	  162	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  242.	  163	  IOR/L/PS/18/A3,	  ‘Afghanistan	  and	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  pursued	  towards	  Herat’,	  Minute	  by	  the	  Honourable	  J.	  P.	  Grant,	  8	  February	  1857,	  p.	  7.	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account	  that	  followed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  their	  trip.	  Bellew	  evocatively	  described	  the	  situation	  prior	   to	   their	  arrival	  as	  one	   in	  which	   ‘ominous’	  accounts	  were	  being	   daily	   brought	   down	   to	   Peshawar	   relating	   ‘court	   intrigues	   and	  dissensions	  now	  rife	  among	  the	  Amir’s	  sons	  and	  the	  chiefs	  of	  the	  country’.164	  Since	  the	  ‘worldwide	  notoriety’	  that	  the	  country	  had	  gained	  during	  1838-­‐42,	  Bellew	  recorded	  that	  Afghanistan	  had	  been	  ‘shut	  out	  from	  the	  world,	  and,	  as	  it	   were,	   sunk	   in	   oblivion’. 165 	  Although	   he	   was	   ostensibly	   tasked	   with	  providing	   medical	   support	   to	   the	   mission,	   Bellew	   was	   able	   to	   establish	   a	  small	  clinic	  to	  the	  growing	  interest	  and	  suspicion	  of	  his	  hosts,	  playing	  on	  the	  exalted	   perception	   of	   European	   medicine,	   and	   thereby	   ‘acquiring	   what	  information	   of	   the	   people	   and	   country	   the	   limited	   means	   at	   my	   disposal	  would	   permit	   of.’166	  This	   was	   particularly	   effective	   in	   gaining	   information	  from	  the	  Kandahar	  sirdar	  Kohendil	  Khan,	  whose	  recurrent	  problem	  with	  gout	  allowed	   a	   close	   relationship	   to	   build	   between	   the	   two	   men,	   much	   to	   the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  sirdar’s	  Afghan	  physicians.167	  	  Harry	   Lumsden’s	   role	   was	   of	   a	   far	   more	   military	   nature.	   This	   is	   certainly	  apparent	   in	  the	  unpublished	  material	  provided	  by	  Lumsden	  which	  included	  details	   concerning	   the	   geography	   along	   the	   route	   to	   Kandahar.168 	  Upon	  arrival	   in	   Kandahar,	   Lumsden	   functioned	   as	   something	   of	   a	   proto-­‐Defence	  Attaché,	   appraising	   the	   status	   of	   the	   Afghan	   troops	   stationed	   there.	   These	  assessments	   were	   typically	   unflattering,	   betraying	   a	   heavy	   dose	   of	   what	  Patrick	   Porter	   has	   termed	   ‘military	   orientalism’.169	  This	   view	   was	   perhaps	  not	  aided	  by	  the	  unnerving	  habit	  of	  Afghan	  troop	  contingents	  to	  greet	   their	  guests	  dressed	  in	  reclaimed	  British	  uniforms	  left	  over	  from	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   occasionally	   accompanied	   by	   renditions	   of	   ‘God	   Save	   the	   Queen’.170	  Bellew	  reported	  in	  his	  account	  that	  ‘the	  Afghan	  army	  is	  an	  armed,	  and,	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  2.	  165	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  2.	  166	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  226.	  167	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  226;	  234-­‐5;	  248.	  168	  IOR/L/PS/5/230,	  James	  to	  Edmunstone,	  6	  April	  1857,	  p.	  287-­‐98.	  169	  Patrick	  Porter,	  Military	  Orientalism:	  Eastern	  War	  Through	  Western	  Eyes	  (London:	  Hurst,	  2009).	  170	  These	  musical	  renditions,	  which	  included	  ‘Rule	  Britannia’,	  were	  rather	  ungratefully	  received	  as	  ‘excruciating	  imitations’.	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  113-­‐4;	  121;	  128;	  208.	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most	   part,	   undisciplined	  mass,	  with	   divided	   and	   often	   conflicting	   interests,	  and,	   consequently,	   not	   at	   all	   times	   to	  be	  depended	  on	   for	   its	   fidelity	   to	   the	  king	  or	  his	  government.’171	  Afghan	  troops	  were	  viewed	  as	  more	  adherent	  to	  their	  ‘real	  masters’,	  the	  tribal	  chiefs	  who	  were	  themselves	  seen	  as	  ‘refractory’,	  ‘jealous’,	  and	  ‘intriguing	  for	  ascendancy	  in	  the	  councils	  or	  government	  of	  the	  country’.	  These	   ‘chiefs’	  were	   labelled	  as	   ‘the	  main	  cause	  of	   the	  weakness	  of	  the	   Kabul	   government,	  whose	   authority	   does	   not	   extend	  much	   beyond	   the	  capital’.172	  	  	  The	  form	  and	  function	  of	  the	  state	  was	  particularly	  troubling	  for	  the	  mission.	  Aside	  from	  the	  limited	  sovereign	  reach	  of	  the	  Amir,	  and	  the	  apparent	  division	  of	  the	  country	  into	  zones	  of	  authority	  (witnessed	  in	  the	  periodic	  changing	  of	  escort	  as	   they	  entered	  new	  territories),	   there	  was	   the	   tyranny	  of	   the	  ruling	  classes	   over	   the	   population.173	  Added	   to	   this	   was	   an	   apparently	   growing	  influence	   in	   the	   role	   that	   Islam	   played	   in	   the	   moral	   order	   sustaining	   the	  legitimacy	  of	   ruling	  elites.	   In	  one	   incident,	   a	   local	  dispute	  between	  a	  Hindu	  family	   and	   a	   faction	   of	  mullahs	   prompted	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   sirdar	   on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Hindus;	  a	  move	  that	  escalated	  the	  situation	  into	  a	  wider	  protest	  against	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  sirdar	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  ‘infidel’	  British	  mission.	  As	  Bellew	   recalled,	   ‘[t]heir	  whole	  body,	  with	   all	   their	  disciples	   (or	  Talibu-­l-­
ilm)174	  to	   the	  number	  of	  some	  five	  or	  six	  hundred,	  collected	  at	   the	  Ziarat	  of	  
Hazrat-­ji	  –	  a	  sacred	  shrine	  held	  in	  great	  veneration	  by	  the	  people	  …	  Here	  they	  hoisted	  the	  green	  flag,	  ranted	  and	  raved	  for	  hours	  together	  in	  a	  perfect	  frenzy	  of	   fanaticism,	   and	   in	   the	   afternoon	   marched	   upon	   the	   Kabul	   gate.’175	  The	  tendency	   to	   present	   such	   efforts	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   ‘fanaticism’	   was	  becoming	  a	  popular	  trope	  in	  describing	  religiously	  inspired	  resistance	  –	  one	  that	  was	  increasingly	  encountered	  by	  the	  British	  on	  the	  frontier.	  Despite	  the	  apparent	  authority	  that	  the	  sirdar	  had	  over	  this	  ‘mullah	  fraternity’,	  who	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  43-­‐4.	  172	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  44.	  173	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan.	  This	  applied	  to	  the	  Afghan	  escorts	  that	  protected	  them	  (‘truly	  these	  men	  are	  a	  curse	  upon	  the	  country	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  protect’	  174),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  taxation	  and	  legal	  regimes	  of	  the	  government	  (275-­‐6).	  174	  ‘Religious	  students’,	  apparently	  a	  nineteenth	  century	  variant	  on	  the	  more	  familiar	  Taliban.	  175	  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  395.	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expelled	   from	   the	   city,	   this	   ‘fanaticism’	   evoked	   British	   prejudices	   against	  what	  was	  essentially	  viewed	  as	  an	  irrational	  influence	  on	  governance.176	  	  The	  Lumsden	  and	  Bellew	  mission	  was	   far	  more	  a	  surveillance	  mission	  than	  any	  of	  the	  trips	  of	  their	  colonial	  forbears,	  a	  preview	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  military	  ‘intelligence’,	  was	  beginning	  to	  develop	  into	  a	  core	  competency	  of	  European	  armies.177	  Indeed,	  the	  data	  that	  the	  mission	  provided	  was	  a	  barometer	  for	  the	  changing	   form	   of	   colonial	   knowledge	   in	   this	   era,	   and	   in	   this	   location.	   The	  administration	   of	   the	   north-­‐west	   frontier	   in	   particular	   was	   encouraging,	  institutionalising,	  and	  incubating	  a	  more	  official	  breed	  of	  colonial	  knowledge;	  avowedly	   utilitarian,	   and	   often	   linked	   to	   the	   practicalities	   of	   military	  occupation.178	  Not	  all	  of	  these	  features	  translated	  to	  the	  material	  produced	  by	  the	   mission	   however.	   On	   top	   of	   this	   technocratic	   methodology	   their	   work	  betrayed	   a	   sense	   that	   Afghanistan	  was	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   polity.	   It	   provided	  raw	  material	   on	   the	   essentially	   dysfunctional	   nature	   of	   rule	   and	   authority,	  one	   that	   reprised	   well-­‐versed	   themes	   of	   lawlessness	   and	   instability,	   and	  would	  be	  drawn	  upon	  by	  subsequent	  official	  observers.179	  	  	  In	  June	  1857	  the	  Kandahaar	  mission	  received	  news	  of	  a	  widespread	  mutiny	  amongst	   the	  native	   Indian	   troops	  of	   the	   Indian	  Army.	   It	   soon	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  British	  colonial	  state	  in	  India	  was	  facing	  its	  biggest	  crisis	  to	  date.	  The	  mutiny	  put	  the	  mission	   in	  a	  precarious	  position.180	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  was	   connected	   to	   events	   in	   India	   was	   unclear,	   indeed	   the	   news	   that	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	   had	   quelled	   a	   rumoured	   jihad	   against	   the	   British	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  David	  B.	  Edwards,	  Heroes	  of	  the	  Age:	  Moral	  Faultlines	  on	  the	  Afghan	  Frontier	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996),	  Chapter	  5.	  177	  See:	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  State.	  Official	  instructions	  to	  the	  Lumsden	  mission	  included	  ‘to	  watch	  closely	  the	  progress	  of	  events	  in	  Afghanistan,	  especially	  in	  and	  about	  Kandahar’;	  to	  become	  ‘acquainted	  with	  the	  state	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  country,	  more	  particularly	  with	  the	  relations	  of	  the	  principal	  and	  most	  influential	  Chiefs	  with	  the	  Ameer’;	  and	  to	  keep	  ‘informed	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  vakil	  …	  of	  all	  that	  is	  passing	  in	  the	  capital’.	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  20-­‐1.	  	  178	  Anderson,	  ‘Poetics	  and	  politics	  in	  ethnographic	  texts’.	  179	  J.	  L.	  Vaughan,	  ‘Afghanistan	  and	  the	  Military	  Operations	  Therein’,	  RUSI	  Journal,	  22/98	  (1878),	  1003-­‐1026.	  180	  Bellew	  recorded	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  citadel	  in	  which	  they	  had	  been	  secured	  with	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  ‘Kandahar	  Chiefs’	  attempting	  their	  seizure,	  along	  with	  a	  ‘deputation’	  of	  mullahs	  who	  demanded	  the	  British	  should	  be	  handed	  over	  to	  them	  or	  ejected	  from	  the	  country.	  Bellew,	  
Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  255-­‐6.	  
	   220	  
emanating	   from	   Kabul	   was	   looked	   upon	   favourably	   by	   the	   British. 181	  Lumsden	  noted	  in	  a	  later	  dispatch	  that	  had	  the	  earlier	  agreement	  of	  1857	  not	  been	  signed	  prior	  to	  the	  mutiny	  the	  Amir	  ‘could	  not	  have	  prevented	  a	  general	  rush	  down	  the	  passes’.182	  	  	  Having	   survived	   the	   turbulence,	   the	   mission	   withdrew	   in	   May	   1858.	  Lumsden	  and	  Bellew	  had	  yielded	   the	  most	   substantial	   collection	  of	  British-­‐sourced	   information	   on	   Afghanistan	   since	   1842	   and	   both	   would	   go	   on	   to	  become	   prominent	   advisors	   on	   Afghanistan	   policy.	   Yet	   Lumsden’s	   final	  report	   was	   unequivocal	   in	   its	   recommendations	   for	   keeping	   Russian	  influence	  at	  bay,	  advising	  that	  this	  could	  be	  achieved	  by:	  	   ‘having	   as	   little	   to	   say	   to	   Afghans	   as	   possible	   beyond	   maintaining	  friendly	   and	   intimate	   intercourse	   with	   the	   de	   facto	  Government;	   by	  never	   on	   any	   occasion	   interfering	   with	   the	   internal	   politics	   of	   the	  country,	  nor	  assisting	  any	  particular	  faction,	  but	  honestly	  leaving	  the	  Afghans	  to	  manage	  their	  own	  affairs	  in	  the	  way	  which	  suits	  them	  best	  …	  unless	  under	   the	  most	  pressing	  danger	   to	  Afghanistan,	   and	   at	   the	  spontaneous	   and	   urgent	   demand	   of	   that	   Government	   itself,	   no	  proposition	  involving	  the	  deputing	  of	  British	  officers	  into	  the	  country	  should	  for	  a	  moment	  be	  entertained.’183	  	  	  This	  advice	  would	  have	  a	  prolonged	  influence	  on	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  for	  the	   remainder	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan’s	   rule.	   In	   1858	   the	   heir-­‐apparent,	  Ghulam	   Haidar	   Khan,	   died.	   Sher	   Ali	   Khan	   was	   appointed	   in	   his	   place	   yet	  Calcutta	   refused	   the	  Afghan	   request	   for	  kilat	   (congratulations)	  of	  his	   status	  for	  fear	  it	  would	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  promise	  of	  future	  support	  or	  recognition.	  Sultan	   Ahmad	   Khan,	   ruler	   of	   Herat	   was	   knowingly	   influencing	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	   at	   this	   time,	   telling	   the	   Amir	   that	   ‘the	   English	   are	   a	  deceitful	   race’	   and	   encouraging	   him	   to	   ally	  with	   Persia.184	  Yet	   despite	   their	  knowledge	   of	   this	   there	   was	   little	   change	   in	   policy	   for	   the	   British.	   The	  stationing	  of	  a	  British	  officer	  in	  Herat	  was	  proposed	  in	  1859	  when	  a	  Russian	  adventurer	   arrived	   in	   the	   city	   on	   a	   ‘scientific	   mission’	   and	   requested	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  Bellew,	  Journal	  of	  a	  Political	  Mission	  to	  Afghanistan,	  269.	  182	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  21.	  183	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  21.	  184	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  22.	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permission	   to	   travel	   to	   Kabul.	   But	   the	   refusal	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	   to	  receive	  him	  appeared	  to	  validate	  the	  British	  policy	  of	  non-­‐interference.	  185	  	  In	   1862	   hostilities	   broke	   out	   between	  Dost	  Muhammad	   and	   Sultan	   Ahmad	  Khan	   at	   Herat,	   with	   Afghan	   troops	   besieging	   the	   city.	   The	   Shah	   of	   Persia	  lodged	   a	   protest	   with	   a	   British	   claiming	   a	   contravention	   of	   the	   treaty	   that	  settled	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  war.	  Yet	  with	  a	  vakil	  of	  the	  British	  government	  now	  stationed	   at	   Kabul	   and	   travelling	   with	   the	   Amir,	   the	   British	   were	   able	   to	  ascertain	  that	  this	  was	  an	  internal	  dispute	  and	  therefore	  claim	  its	  irrelevance	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  treaty.	  Indeed,	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  observed	  that	  the	  striking	  of	  coins	  and	  the	   ‘prayers	  permitted	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  name’	  were	  ‘not	  only	  untoward	  signs	  of	  subjection	  incompatible	  with	  independence,	  but	  were	   also	   accepted	  by	  Persia	   in	   direct	   breach	   of	   her	   treaty	  with	   us’.186	  	  Anxious	   that	   they	   would	   be	   seen	   as	   complicit,	   the	   British	   nonetheless	  withdrew	  their	  vakil	  and	  refused	  Dost	  Muhammad’s	  requests	  for	  assistance.	  	  	  The	  siege	  of	  Herat	  lasted	  until	  May	  when	  the	  city	  fell	  to	  the	  Amir’s	  forces.187	  Responding	  to	   the	   formal	  notification,	   the	  Governor-­‐General	  reminded	  Dost	  Muhammad	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Persian	  agreement	  and	  urged	  him	  not	  to	  be	  ‘led	  into	  any	   enterprise	   which	   could	   justly	   give	   umbrage	   to	   Persia	   and	   warrant	   an	  appeal	  …	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   treaty’.188	  The	   plea	  would	   go	   unheard	   as	  news	   was	   already	   filtering	   in	   of	   the	   Amir’s	   death.	   The	   nominal	   ruler	   of	  Afghanistan,	  Sher	  Ali	  moved	   to	  assure	   the	  British	   that	  he	  would	   ‘follow	   the	  laudable	  example’	  of	  his	   father	   ‘in	  maintaining	   the	   strong	   ties	  of	   friendship	  and	  amity’189	  between	  the	  Afghans	  and	  the	  British,	  but	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  was	  already	  urging	  caution,	  instructing	  the	  vakil	   ‘to	  abstain	  from	  acts	  which	  in	  the	  present	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  any	  efficient	  authority	  …	  could	  be	  held	  to	  commit	  the	  British	  Government	  to	  the	  support	  of	  any	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  22.	  186	  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Punjab	  to	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  23	  September,	  1862,	  p.	  13.	  187	  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  28	  May	  1863,	  p.	  473-­‐4.	  188	  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Governor	  General	  to	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  3	  July	  1863,	  p.	  485-­‐6.	  189	  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Sher	  Ali	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  11	  July	  1863,	  p.	  490.	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rival	   candidates	   for	   power.’190	  It	   was	   clear	   that	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   was	  prioritizing	   Anglo-­‐Persian	   relations	   at	   this	   time,	   uncertain	   of	   the	   internal	  machinations	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  at	  Kabul	  (partly	  because	  the	  vakil	  was	  with	  Sher	   Ali	   in	   Herat),	   and	   preferring	   the	   imperfect	   treaty	   with	   the	   known	  quantity	   of	   the	   Shah	   of	   Persia.	   It	   was	   also	   clear	   that	   recognition	   was	   not	  considered	  necessary	   for	   the	  ambiguous	  sovereign	  order	  of	  Afghanistan.	  By	  October	  vakil	  reports	  were	  reportedly	  coming	  in	  ‘thick	  and	  fast’,191	  yet	  still	  no	  British	  recognition	  was	  forthcoming	  until	  December,	  nearly	  six	  months	  after	  Sher	  Ali	  first	  succeeded	  to	  the	  throne.192	  	  The	  selection	  of	  Sher	  Ali	  as	  heir-­‐apparent	  had	  always	  been	  contentious	  with	  Dost	  Muhammad’s	  older	  sons	  who	  had	  opposed	  his	  selection	  from	  the	  outset.	  The	  death	  of	  the	  Dost	  prompted	  a	  descent	  into	  civil	  war,	  as	  the	  rebelling	  sons	  surrendered	  the	  hard-­‐earned	  territories	  in	  Afghan	  Turkestan	  to	  compete	  for	  the	   throne	   in	   Kabul.	   Afghanistan	   appeared	   to	   the	   British	   to	   be	   descending	  into	   anarchy,	   validating	   once	   more	   the	   perception	   of	   a	   violent	   geography	  beyond	  the	  passes,	  and	  reconfirming	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  for	  the	  next	  six	  years.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion:	   Part	   I	   -­	   Anglo-­Afghan	  Relations	  During	   the	   Second	  Reign	   of	  Dost	  
Muhammad	  Khan	  	  The	   first	   half	   of	   this	   chapter	   has	   considered	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	   and	   its	   aftermath	   on	  British	   perceptions	   of	   Afghanistan.	   It	   has	  been	   argued	   that	   this	   period	   witnessed	   the	   emergence	   and	   nurturing	   of	   a	  particular	  projection	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  ‘violent	  geography’.	  Partly	  a	  function	  of	   the	   fragile	   information	   system	   that	   informed	   British	   knowledge,	   this	  perception	   sustained	   a	   resilient	   policy	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   by	   the	   British	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  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Governor	  General	  to	  the	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Punjab,	  3	  July	  1863,	  p.	  483-­‐4.	  191	  IOR/L/PS/5/257,	  Commissioner	  and	  Superintendent	  of	  Peshawar	  to	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Punjab,	  15	  October	  1863,	  p.	  547.	  192	  IOR/L/PS/18/A5,	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  Afghan-­‐Turkistan’,	  p.	  110.	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throughout	  this	  period,	  which	  in	  turn	  perpetuated	  the	  idea	  that	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  space	  of	  exception,	  prone	  to	  violence	  and	  often	  a	  venue	  for	  sedition	  and	  intrigue.	   This	   perception	   was	   mediated	   by	   shared	   interests	   faced	   by	   the	  British	  and	  Afghans	  during	  Persian	  efforts	  on	  Herat,	   but	  was	   followed	  by	  a	  return	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  exception	  once	  the	  threat	  had	  passed.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  those	  who	  view	  nineteenth	  century	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  as	  driven	  by	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  rivalry,	  this	  section	  has	  highlighted	  the	  instances	  of	  collusion	   and	   cooperation	   between	   these	   two	   powers	   in	   the	   region,	  particularly	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war.	  This	  cooperation,	  it	  has	  been	  shown,	  sprung	  from	  shared	  imperial	  visions	  concerning	  ‘civilized’	  and	  ‘uncivilized’	  states	  but	  also	  shared	  visions	  concerning	  the	  duties	  of	  such	  states	   with	   respect	   to	   their	   sovereign	   ‘others’.	   This	   shared	   perspective	   on	  global	  order	  served	  to	  regulate	  and	  routinize	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations,	  whilst	  it	   served	   to	   subjugate	   and	   exclude	   the	   ‘uncivilized’	   states	   against	   whom	   it	  was	   applied.	   Sovereign	   status	  was	   thereby	  determined	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   by	  perceptions	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  status,	  and	  rhetorically	  bounded	  by	  the	  visions	   of	   great	   powers.	  Moreover,	   as	   the	   favourable	   treatment	   afforded	   to	  Persia	   shows,	   there	  were	   gradations	  within	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘civilized’	   and	  ‘uncivilized’	  states.	  Some	  ‘uncivilized’	  states	  were	  more	  unequal	  than	  others.	  Whilst	   these	   instances	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   cooperation	   are	   significant,	   the	  argument	  is	  not	  that	  rivalry	  between	  them	  was	  non-­‐existent,	  rather	  that	  the	  conflictual	   narrative	   of	   the	   ‘great	   game’	   that	   often	   describes	   this	   period	  should	   be	   questioned.	   Regional	   order	   rested	   on	   more	   than	   a	   zero-­‐sum	  mentality,	  but	  was	  shaped	  by	  historically	  contingent	  ideas	  of	  sovereign	  status,	  and	  normatively	  policed	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  great	  powers.	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Part	   II	   -­	  The	  Era	  of	   Frontier	  Management:	  Towards	   the	   Second	  Anglo-­
Afghan	  War,	  1857-­1878	  	  
Sentiment	  and	  ‘Science’:	  The	  Frontier	  State	  of	  Mind	  	  The	  Sepoy	  mutiny	  of	  1857	  issued	  forth	  a	  profound	  shift	  in	  the	  structure	  and	  character	  of	  British	  rule	  in	  India,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  perceptions	  the	  British	  had	  of	   the	   Indian	   population.	   The	   India	   Act	   of	   1858	   transferred	   the	   control	   of	  British	  policy	   in	   India	   to	   the	  Crown	  and	  abolished	   the	  East	   India	  Company.	  The	  new	  post	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  India	  was	  created	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	   a	   newly	   created	   Council	   of	   India,	   viewed	   essentially	   as	   a	   consultative	  body,193	  and	   the	   position	   of	   Governor-­‐General	   became	   that	   of	   the	   Viceroy	  (although	   ‘Governor-­‐General’	   was	   still	   accepted	   parlance).	   Resistance	   to	  British	   rule	   was	   certainly	   not	   unheard	   of	   in	   India	   prior	   to	   1857,	   but	   the	  geographical	   scale	   of	   the	   uprising	  was	   unprecedented,	   as	  was	   the	   brutality	  inflicted	   upon	   the	   Indian	   population	   by	   the	   British	   in	   its	   aftermath.	   The	  situation	   on	   the	   frontier	   however,	   was	   relatively	   calm.	   Telegrams	   had	  notified	   British	   authorities	   of	   the	   uprisings,	   who	   responded	   by	   disarming	  native	   Indian	  regiments.	  Since	   the	  annexation	  of	   the	  Punjab	   the	  British	  had	  also	   been	   raising	   irregular	   units	   from	   the	   ‘Pathan’	   population.194	  Originally	  these	  had	  been	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  fighting	  the	  Sikhs,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  antipathy	  between	  these	  two	  groups	  and	  establishing	  in	  effect,	  a	  policy	   of	   divide	   and	   rule.195	  In	   certain	   areas	   this	   policy	   also	   doubled	   as	   a	  method	   of	   pacification	   by	   uprooting	   those	   marked	   as	   potential	   future	  troublemakers.196	  The	   first	  contingents	  had	  been	  established	   in	  1846	  as	   the	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  Henry	  Rawlinson,	  England	  and	  Russia	  in	  the	  East	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  1875).	  194	  ‘Pathan’	  was	  a	  British	  neologism	  used	  to	  encompass	  both	  the	  Pakhtun	  and	  Pashtun	  populations	  of	  the	  northwest	  frontier	  of	  India.	  See	  Lindholm,	  ‘Images	  of	  the	  Pathan’.	  195	  ‘Divide	  et	  impera’	  was	  exactly	  how	  the	  policy	  was	  described	  by	  the	  prominent	  frontier	  public	  official	  Henry	  Bartle	  Frere.	  IOR/L/PS/18/A12,	  H.	  B.	  E.	  Frere,	  Memorandum	  –	  Sind	  and	  Punjab	  Frontier	  Systems,	  22	  March	  1876.	  196	  In	  Hazara	  district	  the	  Commissioner	  was	  advised:	  ‘to	  discourage	  disturbance	  by	  levelling	  all	  forts	  not	  garrisoned	  by	  our	  own	  troops	  …	  A	  still	  further	  security	  for	  peace	  might	  be	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Punjab	   ‘Guides’	   under	   Commandant	   Major	   Harry	   Lumsden,	   a	   position	   he	  would	   hold	   till	   1862.	   They	   subsequently	   became	   expanded	   under	   the	   new	  name	   of	   the	   Punjab	   Field	   Force	   or	   ‘Piffers’197	  and	   were	   tasked	   with	   the	  policing	  of	  the	  frontier	  districts.	  These	  irregular	  units	  would	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  mutiny	  in	  Delhi	  in	  1857.198	  	  The	   ‘loyalty’	  of	  the	  Punjab	  during	  the	  Sepoy	  rebellion	  bolstered	  its	  role	  as	  a	  key	  recruiting	  ground	  for	  the	  Indian	  Army,	  whilst	  other	  regions	  that	  had	  seen	  greater	   instability	   during	   the	   uprising	   such	   as	   Benaras	   and	   Awadh	   were	  dropped	   as	   centres	   of	   recruitment.	   By	   1875,	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   the	  increasingly	   fashionable	   theories	   of	   ‘martial	   races’,	   half	   of	   the	   Indian	  Army	  would	   be	   recruited	   from	   the	   Punjab. 199 	  This	   recruitment	   reflected	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Punjab,	  and	  the	  frontier	  in	  particular,	  became	  a	  site	  for	  policy	  experimentation	  from	  the	  late	  1840s	  onwards.200	  In	  Hazara	  district	  for	  example,	   the	   Commissioner	   Major	   Abbott	   -­‐	   whose	   earlier	   role	   as	   Major	  D’Arcy	   Todd’s	   assistant	   at	   Herat	   during	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   War	   had	  earned	  him	  recognition	  -­‐	  had	  established	  a	  more	  efficient	  system	  for	  the	  use	  troops	   in	   his	   district.	   This	   involved	   smaller,	   more	   mobile	   units,	   and	   the	  reduction	  of	  Sikh-­‐era	   land	  taxes,	   thereby	  (perhaps	  unsurprisingly)	  reducing	  the	   need	   for	   punitive	   raids.201	  Elsewhere,	   Lumsden	   developed	   the	   idea	   of	  controlling	  the	  ‘Khyber	  tribes’	  by	  restricting	  their	  access	  to	  salt	  markets,	  and	  establishing	   Rahmut	   Khan	   Orakzai,	   a	   former	   collaborator	   of	   the	   British	  during	   the	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war,	   as	   a	   guardian	   of	   the	   Khyber	   Pass	   through	   a	  subsidy	  payment	  of	  2000	  rupees	  per	  year.202	  Perhaps	  most	   famous	  was	   the	  ‘Sandeman	   System’	   on	   the	   Baloch	   frontier,	   established	   later	   on	   in	   1876	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  obtained	  from	  the	  chiefs	  and	  elders,	  by	  taking	  the	  sons	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  into	  service,	  and	  employing	  them	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Punjab.'	  IOR/L/PS/5/200,	  Burn	  to	  Elliot,	  28	  April	  1849,	  p.	  664.	  197	  This	  initiative	  was	  first	  approved	  by	  the	  Governor	  General	  as	  early	  as	  1849	  under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  ‘Punjab	  Irregular	  Force’.	  See:	  IOR/L/PS/5/200,	  15	  May	  1849,	  p.	  749.	  198	  See	  Allen,	  Soldier	  Sahibs.	  199	  Bayly,	  Indian	  Society	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  194	  200	  Tim	  Moreman,	  The	  Army	  in	  India	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  Frontier	  Warfare,	  1849-­1947	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  1998).	  As	  one	  observer	  later	  described	  the	  frontier,	  ‘no	  better	  school	  for	  soldiers	  could	  be	  found’.	  IOR/L/PS/18/A23	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  the	  Rectification	  of	  the	  North-­‐West	  Frontier	  of	  India’	  Maj	  Gen	  Henry	  Green,	  30	  December	  1878,	  p.	  5.	  201	  IOR/L/PS/5/200,	  Abbott	  to	  Lawrence,	  29	  May	  1849,	  p.	  665-­‐8.	  202	  IOR/L/PS/5/201,	  Burn	  to	  Elliot,	  26	  September	  1850,	  p.	  83-­‐5.	  
	   226	  
Captain	  Robert	  Sandeman,	   the	  epitome	  of	  what	  Hopkins	  and	  Marsden	   term	  ‘frontier	   governmentality’;	   the	   assertion	   of	   state	   suzerainty	   ‘through	   the	  administration	  of	  difference’.203	  	  Some	   of	   these	   experiments	   were	   simply	   the	   importation	   of	   techniques	  deployed	   elsewhere	   within	   the	   colonial	   state,	   but	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	  certain	   mentality	   associated	   with	   the	   political	   officers	   responsible	   for	  carrying	  out	   these	  policies	   that	   suggested	  a	   sense	  of	  entrepreneurialism.	   In	  Caroe’s	   typically	   eulogising	   prose	   these	   new	   imperial	   heroes	   -­‐	   men	   of	   the	  frontier	   -­‐	   were	   ‘a	   splendid	   band	   of	   brothers’,204	  ‘men	   of	   action	   rather	   than	  men	   of	   thought	   and	   plan’,	   lacking	   ‘the	   subtler	   insight	   and	   grace	   of	  Elphinstone’,	   even	   ‘half	   Pathans	   themselves’. 205 	  The	   success	   of	   these	  individuals	   Caroe	   attributed	   to	   their	   ability	   to	  mirror	   the	   society	   in	   which	  they	  were	  working:	   ‘the	  manliness,	  the	  wit,	  the	  good-­‐fellowship,	  the	  loyalty,	  even	   the	   heroism’.206	  As	   he	   asserted,	   ‘Englishmen	   and	   Pathans	   looked	   each	  other	   between	   the	   eyes,	   and	   there	   they	   found	   –	   a	   man’.207	  This	   apparent	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  ‘know	  the	  country’,208	  and	  the	  people,	  was	  in	  large	  part	  an	  expression	  by	  Caroe	  of	  a	  certain	  imperial	  nostalgia;	  there	  was	  more	  to	  these	  policies	  than	  the	  benevolent	  subjection	  of	  the	  tribes.	  	  	  Such	  perspectives	  also	   reflected	  a	  wider	   sense	  of	   civilizing	  missionary	  zeal,	  and	  intimacy	  with	  the	  local	  population	  that	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  and	  described	  the	   culture	   surrounding	   these	   men	   that	   was	   often	   expressed	   in	   their	   own	  service	   memoirs.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   one	   -­‐	   Herbert	   Edwardes	   -­‐	   the	   frontier	  political	  officer	  was	  engaged	   in	   ‘a	  pursuit	  more	  active,	  more	  directly	  useful,	  than	   the	   furbishing	   of	   rusty	   arms’,	   one	   that	   ‘sends	   him	   forth	   beyond	   our	  boundaries	  to	  be	  the	  pioneer	  of	  Christian	  civilization	  in	  lands	  where	  Idolatry	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Hopkins	  and	  Marsden,	  Fragments	  of	  the	  Afghan	  Frontier,	  51.	  For	  the	  Sandeman	  system	  see	  also:	  Christian	  Tripodi,	  	  ‘“Good	  for	  one	  but	  not	  the	  other”	  the	  “Sandeman	  System”	  of	  Pacification	  as	  Applied	  to	  Baluchistan	  and	  the	  North-­‐West	  Frontier	  1877-­‐1947’,	  The	  Journal	  
of	  Military	  History,	  73/3	  (2009),	  767-­‐802.	  204	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  332.	  205	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  345.	  206	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  345.	  207	  Caroe,	  The	  Pathans,	  332.	  208	  Bayly,	  Christopher	  A.,	  ‘Knowing	  the	  Country’,	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  27/1	  (1993),	  3-­‐43;	  Cotton,	  Nine	  Years	  on	  the	  North-­West	  Frontier	  of	  India,	  5-­‐6,	  13-­‐17.	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too	   often	   occupies	   the	   Temple,	   Corruption	   the	   Tribunal,	   and	   Tyranny	   the	  Throne’.209	  Lieutenant	   General	   Sir	   Sydney	   Cotton	   had	   clearly	   inherited	   this	  tradition	  too,	  writing	  in	  his	  memoirs:	  ‘There	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  …	  that	  we	  have	  been	  sent	  by	  Divine	  Providence,	  to	  these	  out-­‐of-­‐the-­‐way	  corners	  of	  the	  globe,	  for	  some	  much	  more	  important	  purpose	  than	  to	  satisfy	  ourselves;	  and	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  either,	  but	  that	  the	  civilization	  and	  restoration	  of	  these	  demi-­‐savages	  and	   fanatics,	  must	  be	  mainly	   the	  great	  object	  of	   the	  mission	  which	  has	  been	  allotted	  to	  us.’210	  In	  many	  ways	  these	  individuals	  were	  the	  regional	  successors	   of	   the	   early	   Afghanistan	   explorers,	   and	   many	   of	   them	   would	  contribute	   to	   a	   new	   ‘expert’	   community	   of	   knowledge,	   yet	   they	   were	  increasingly	   caught	   somewhere	   between	   the	   improvised	   and	   pioneering	  approach	   of	   the	   early	   nineteenth-­‐century,	   and	   the	   officializing	   culture	   that	  was	  beginning	  to	  shape	  the	  colonial	  state	  in	  India	  from	  1850.	  	  	  The	   shift	   towards	   the	  Viceregal	   system	  after	   the	  mutiny	   sat	  within	  a	  wider	  cultural	  shift	  concerning	  the	  administration	  and	  conduct	  of	  the	  colonial	  state.	  As	   Hevia	   notes,	   government	   departments	   were	   marking	   a	   transition	   from	  operating	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  of	  custom	  and	  personal	  relations’,	  to	  more	  ‘“rational”,	  disinterested	  procedures’.211	  In	   India,	   the	  period	   from	  1850-­‐1870	  marked	  a	  ‘turning	  point’,	  as	  the	  colonial	  state	   ‘moved	  into	  a	  higher	  gear,	   fortified	  by	  a	  new	  ‘scientific’	  and	  professional	  culture’.212	  The	  Northcote-­‐Trevelyn	  report	  of	  1853,	   which	   reformed	   the	   civil	   service	   (including	   the	   introduction	   of	  entrance	   examinations),	   was	   simply	   one	   manifestation	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  Benthamite	  utilitarianism	  on	  the	  thinking	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  public	  practice.	  	  	  In	   India,	   there	   was,	   to	   borrow	   Jordan	   Branch’s	   terminology,	   a	   process	   of	  ‘colonial	   reflection’,213 	  as	   a	   bureaucratising	   civil	   service	   sent	   forth	   new	  graduates	  to	  administer	  India,	  who	  in	  turn	  brought	  back	  their	  skills	  and	  put	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  Edwardes,	  A	  Year	  on	  the	  Punjab	  Frontier,	  xi.	  210	  Cotton,	  Nine	  Years	  on	  the	  North-­West	  Frontier	  of	  India,	  93.	  211	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  State,	  35.	  212	  C.	  A.	  Bayly,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern	  World	  1780-­1914	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2004),	  249.	  213	  Branch,	  “Colonial	  reflection’	  and	  territoriality’;	  Bayly,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern	  World	  1780-­
1914.	  
	   228	  
them	   to	   use	   in	   Britain.	   New	   ‘webs	   of	   empire’	   were	   forming	   around	   this	  professionalizing	   class,	   emboldened	  by	  new	   technologies	  of	   communication	  that	  speeded	  up	  the	  management	  of	  distant	  locales,	  providing	  a	  technological	  vehicle	   for	   the	   realization	   of	   a	   truly	   ‘imperial’	   policy.214	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  volume	  of	  official	  correspondence	  was	  growing	  too.	  By	  the	  1850s	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  was	   handling	   eight	   times	   the	  material	   it	   had	   been	   processing	   at	   the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.215	  Partly	  as	  a	  response	  to	  this,	  and	  partly	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   rationalization,	   official	  memoranda	   took	   on	  more	  sweeping	   view	   of	   policy	   problems.	   The	   Foreign	   Office	   and	   the	   Viceroy	   no	  longer	   dealt	   so	   regularly	   with	   gifted	   amateurs,	   or	   charismatic	   adventurer-­‐officials	  in	  the	  mould	  of	  Masson	  and	  Burnes,	  but	  rather	  expected	  pre-­‐formed	  policy	  briefings	  that	  marshalled	  a	  range	  of	  views	  from	  official	  ‘experts’	  -­‐	  often	  members	  of	  the	  India	  Council	  -­‐	  skilfully	  edited	  and	  directed	  to	  a	  central	  policy	  question.216	  	  	  This	  bureaucratizing	  trend	  was	  not	  just	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	  civil	  service.	  The	  military	   too	   had	   been	   nurturing	   reformist	   zeal,	   partly	   brought	   on	   by	   the	  failures	  of	   the	  Crimean	  War	   in	  which	   inadequate	   logistics	  and	  poor	  medical	  care	  had	  exposed	  the	  structural	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  British	  Army.217	  Although	  this	   reforming	   spirit	   took	   longer	   to	   manifest	   itself	   in	   the	   military,218	  there	  was	   -­‐	   as	   with	   the	   civil	   service	   -­‐	   evidence	   of	   a	   more	   professional	   creed.	   In	  1857	   the	   United	   Services	   Institution	   began	   disseminating	   new	   military	  thinking	   to	   the	   officer	   class	   through	   its	   journal,219	  covering	   topics	   from	  tactical	   development,	   military	   health,	   new	   military	   technologies,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Bell,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Greater	  Britain.	  	  215	  Johnson,	  Spying	  for	  Empire,	  93.	  216	  This	  shift	  in	  the	  collation	  of	  official	  knowledge	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  Political	  and	  Secret	  Department	  ‘Series’	  Memoranda.	  See	  the	  hand	  notes	  to	  L/PS/18.	  217	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  State,	  Chapter	  3.	  218	  The	  Cardwell	  Reforms	  of	  1868-­‐1874	  were	  crucial	  in	  this	  respect,	  resolving	  the	  divided	  power	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  authorities	  (especially	  over	  financing);	  reducing	  mandatory	  enlistment	  periods	  on	  regular	  duty	  through	  implementing	  a	  reservist	  duty	  after	  a	  certain	  period;	  ending	  the	  sale	  of	  commissions;	  and	  introducing	  an	  examination	  system	  for	  entry	  into	  military	  academies,	  although	  this	  last	  measure	  was	  held	  up	  by	  the	  conservative	  influence	  of	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  the	  Duke	  of	  Cambridge.	  Hevia,	  The	  Imperial	  Security	  
State,	  38-­‐9.	  219	  Originally	  named	  the	  ‘Naval	  and	  Military	  Museum’,	  The	  United	  Services	  Institution	  had	  been	  in	  existence	  since	  1831	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  establishing	  a	  ‘strictly	  scientific	  and	  professional	  approach’	  to	  the	  study	  of	  military	  affairs.	  See:	  ‘The	  Royal	  United	  Services	  Institute	  Through	  History’,	  RUSI	  (http://www.rusi.org/history).	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financial	   administration.	   On	   the	   frontier,	   the	   entrepreneurialism	   and	  intuition	   of	   the	   ‘brotherhood’	   was	   giving	   way	   to	   a	   more	   technocratic	  approach,	   but	   with	   the	   increasing	   strategic	   importance	   of	   the	   frontier	   this	  was	  an	  approach	  over	  which	  the	  military	  had	  a	  strong	  shaping	  influence.	  	  	  The	   service	   memoirs	   of	   Sydney	   Cotton	   were	   typical	   in	   this	   respect,	  advocating	   firm	   military	   control	   over	   administrative	   affairs,	   as	   much	   as	  defence.	  This	  was	  justified	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  practicalities	  of	  creating	  a	  unified	  authority,	  but	  also	  on	   the	  deep	   insight	  of	   the	   frontier	  officer,	  on	  his	  capacity	  to	  separate	  fact	  from	  fiction	  and	  to	  ‘know	  the	  country’.	  Moreover,	  as	  Cotton	   urged,	   this	   need	   for	   military	   authority	   was	   demanded	   by	   the	  ‘character’	  of	   the	   frontier	   inhabitants:	   ‘Warlike	   in	   their	  habits	  and	  pursuits,	  and	  indeed	  somewhat	  chivalrous	  in	  their	  feelings,	  the	  mountaineers,	  with	  the	  people	  of	   the	   adjacent	   countries	  …	  entertain	   a	  much	  higher	   respect	   for	   the	  soldier	   than	   for	   the	   civilian’,	   he	   claimed.220	  ‘Civil	   government	   in	   such	   a	  country’,	  he	  claimed,	   ‘is,	   in	  truth,	  not	  only	  a	  stumbling	  block,	  but	  a	  manifest	  absurdity’.221	  Indeed	   in	  many	  ways	   the	   frontier	  was	  becoming	  an	   incubator	  for	   a	   particularly	   vocal	   military	   ‘epistemic	   community’,222	  one	   emboldened	  by	   a	   more	   ‘scientific’	   approach	   to	   their	   profession,	   but	   sustained	   by	   the	  powerful	   allure	   of	   their	   semi-­‐mythic	   status,	   given	   credence	   by	   engrained	  prejudices	  that	  set	  the	  frontier	  apart	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  India.	  It	  was	  within	  this	  wider	  cultural,	  intellectual,	  and	  institutional	  setting	  that	  the	  frontier	  debates	  informing	  policy	  towards	  Afghanistan	  from	  the	  1860s	  onwards,	  were	  taking	  place.	  	  A	  prominent	  contributor	  to	  these	  debates,	  and	  an	  individual	  who	  appeared	  to	  straddle	  this	  civil-­‐military	  divide,	  was	  the	  former	  Chief	  Commissioner	  of	  Sind	  Province,	  Sir	  Henry	  Bartle	  Frere.	  His	  1863	  minute	  on	  Punjab	  frontier	  policy,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  Cotton,	  Nine	  Years	  on	  the	  North-­West	  Frontier,	  14.	  221	  Cotton,	  Nine	  Years	  on	  the	  North-­West	  Frontier,	  13.	  222	  As	  Peter	  Haas	  describes	  them,	  an	  epistemic	  community	  is	  a	  network	  of	  ‘knowledge-­‐based	  experts’	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  ‘articulating	  the	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  relationships	  of	  complex	  problems,	  helping	  states	  identify	  their	  interests,	  framing	  the	  issues	  for	  collective	  debate,	  proposing	  specific	  policies,	  and	  identifying	  salient	  points	  for	  negotiation’.	  Peter	  Haas,	  ‘Introduction:	  Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  International	  Policy	  Coordination’,	  International	  
Organization,	  46/1	  (1992),	  2.	  See	  also:	  John	  Gerard	  Ruggie,	  ‘International	  Responses	  to	  Technology:	  Concepts	  and	  Trends’,	  International	  Organization,	  29/3	  (1975),	  557-­‐83.	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in	   response	   to	   the	   Viceroy’s	   request	   for	   clarity	   on	   the	   policy,	   offered	   ‘two	  modes	  in	  which	  a	  powerful,	  regular,	  and	  civilized	  government	  can	  habitually	  deal	  with	   inferior	   semi-­‐civilized,	   and	   less	   perfectly	   organized	  Governments	  either	   within	   or	   beyond	   its	   own	   frontier’.223	  Frere’s	   concept	   rested	   on	   a	  distinction	  between	  the	   ‘English	  system	  …	  of	  moral	  force	  (yet	  buttressed	  by	  physical	   force)’	   and	   the	   ‘French	   system’,	   ‘one	   essentially	   of	   physical	   force’.	  Whilst	  Frere	  argued	  that	  the	  English	  system	  was	  most	  correct	  in	  appealing	  to	  ‘the	  highest	  motives	  of	  human	  action	  …	  which	  even	  the	  most	  savage	  nations	  feel’,	  he	  suggested	  that	  the	  ‘French	  system’	  most	  accurately	  described	  current	  policy	   on	   the	   Punjab.	   For	   Frere,	   the	   ‘English’	   policy	   pursued	   in	   Sind	   had	  promoted	  stability	  and	  this	  ‘system’	  applied	  elsewhere	  would	  promote	  more	  ‘economical’	  results,	  more	  ‘consistent	  with	  political	  safety’.224	  	  In	  response	  however,	  was	  an	  array	  of	  opinion	  favouring	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  existing	   approach,	   often	   from	   former	  military	   officers,	  who	   referred	   to	   the	  inherently	   ‘warlike’	   nature	   of	   the	   ‘mountaineers’.	   As	   Sir	   Charles	   Napier	  wrote:	   ‘Knowing	   the	   character	   of	   the	   whole	   part	   of	   that	   country	   …	   I	   can	  assure	  his	  Lordship	  that	  he	  may	  always	  expect	  inroads	  from	  the	  mountains.	  Nothing	  can	  prevent	   it’.225	  The	  Commander	   in	  Chief	   in	   India,	   Sir	  Hugh	  Rose	  agreed.	  The	   tribes	  of	   the	  mountains	   ‘are	   all	  Mahomedans	  whose	  habits	   are	  raids,	  murders,	  robbery,	  and	  cattle-­‐lifting.	  …	  Their	  existence	  is	  one	  perpetual	  state	   of	   intestine	   war.’ 226 	  A	   consistent	   military	   presence	   was	   therefore	  advocated	  by	   the	  Viceroy.	   Such	   attitudes	   reflected	   the	   attitude	  of	   exclusion	  that	   continued	   to	   prevail	   at	   this	   time,	   but	   comments	   by	   Frere	   on	   the	  
character	  of	  British	  policy	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  more	  narcissistic	  tendency	  in	  which	  the	  British	  were	  beginning	  to	  compare	  their	  stance	  with	  those	  of	  other	  ‘imperial’	  entities.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  L/PS/18/A4,	  H.	  B.	  E.	  Frere	  ‘Minute	  by	  His	  Excellency	  the	  Governor	  of	  Bombay,	  12	  December	  1863,	  p.	  1.	  224	  L/PS/18/A4,	  H.	  B.	  E.	  Frere	  ‘Minute	  by	  His	  Excellency	  the	  Governor	  of	  Bombay,	  12	  December	  1863,	  p.	  1-­‐3.	  225	  L/PS/18/A4,	  Sir	  Charles	  Napier	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  1850,	  p.	  10.	  226	  L/PS/18/A4,	  Sir	  Hugh	  Rose,	  1862,	  p.	  10.	  
	   231	  
There	  was	  evidence	  of	  a	  shared	  imperial	  ‘frontier’	  mentality	  elsewhere	  too.	  In	  1864,	   the	   Russian	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Prince	   Gorchakov,	   published	   a	  memorandum	  in	  which	  he	  outlined	  the	  position	  of	  Russia	  in	  Central	  Asia	  as	  ‘that	   of	   all	   civilised	   States	  which	   are	   brought	   into	   contact	  with	   half-­‐savage	  nomad	   populations,	   possessing	   no	   fixed	   social	   organisation.’ 227 	  In	   such	  situations,	   the	   ‘civilized’	   state,	  he	   insisted,	  was	   forced	   ‘in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  security	   of	   its	   frontier	   and	   its	   commercial	   relations,	   to	   exercise	   a	   certain	  ascendency’	  over	  the	  ‘tribes’	  on	  the	  frontier.	  ‘It	  is	  a	  peculiarity	  of	  Asiatics’,	  he	  asserted,	  ‘to	  respect	  nothing	  but	  visible	  and	  palpable	  force;	  the	  moral	  force	  of	  reason	  and	  of	   the	   interests	  of	   civilisation	  has	  as	  yet	  no	  hold	  upon	   them.’228	  The	   need	   for	   expansion	   that	   attended	   this	   situation	   was	   also	   presenting	  financial	  pressures	  to	  the	  Russian	  Government,	  forcing	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  ‘system’	   dependent	   ‘not	   only	   on	   reason,	   which	   may	   be	   elastic,	   but	   on	  geographical	   and	  political	   conditions,	  which	  are	   fixed	  and	  permanent’.229	  In	  acting	   to	   promote	   ‘the	   interests	   of	   humanity	   and	   civilisation’,	   Gorchakov	  expressed	  a	  hope	   for	   ‘just	  and	  candid	  appreciation’	   from	  other	   like-­‐minded	  states,	  naming	   the	  United	  States,	  France	   in	  Algeria,	  Holland	   in	  her	  colonies,	  and	  England	  in	  India.230	  	  	  Both	  Britain	  and	  Russia,	  through	  their	  mutual	  self-­‐identification	  as	  ‘civilized’	  imperial	   states	  were	   drawing	   upon	   a	  more	   global	   perspective	   in	   validating	  their	  actions.	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  of	  imperial	  expansion	  was	  sought	  too	  in	  the	  ‘civilized’	  pursuit	  of	  ordered,	  systemic,	  and	  ‘scientific’	  approaches.	  These	  were	   empires	   seeking	   to	   tame	   the	   frontiers	   of	   their	   new	   territories,	  and	  the	  frontiers	  of	  their	  imaginations	  too.	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  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  146.	  228	  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  146.	  229	  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  148.	  230	  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  146-­‐9.	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The	  civil	  war	  that	  was	  engulfing	  Afghanistan	  in	  the	  mid	  1860s,	  following	  the	  death	   of	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan	  was	   providing	   a	   constant	   reminder	   of	   the	  perils	  of	  the	   ‘barbarous’	  geography	  the	  British	  felt	  they	  were	  confronting	  to	  the	  north-­‐west	  of	  India.	  Sher	  Ali	  was	  threatened	  from	  the	  north	  by	  his	  older,	  and	  disaffected,	  brother	  Muhammad	  Afzul	  Khan	  whose	  decade	  of	  experience	  conquering	   and	   administering	   the	   northern	   provinces	   contributed	   to	   his	  sense	  of	   entitlement.231	  Following	  a	   confrontation	   in	   the	  north	  between	   the	  armies	   of	   Muhammad	   Afzul	   Khan	   and	   Sher	   Ali,	   and	   despite	   a	   brief	  reconciliation,	  Sher	  Ali	  imprisoned	  his	  brother	  on	  account	  of	  the	  ‘intrigues’	  of	  Muhammad	   Afzul’s	   son	   Abdur	   Rahman,	   who	   opposed	   their	   compact.	  Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  south,	  another	  brother	  of	  Sher	  Ali,	  Muhammad	  Amin	  Khan,	  announced	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  Amir,	  citing	  the	  treatment	  of	  Afzul	  Khan,	  but	  also	  fearing	  his	  replacement	  by	  one	  of	  Sher	  Ali’s	  sons.232	  	  With	   regular	   newsletters	   and	   vakil	   reports	   filtering	   down	   to	   the	   frontier	  posts	  the	  British	  were	  apt	  to	  interpret	  the	  situation	  as	  resembling	  a	  complete	  collapse	   in	   order.	   In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   imprisonment	   of	  Afzul	  Khan,	   one	  
vakil	  recorded	  that	  rather	  than	  pledging	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Amir,	  Afzul	  Khan’s	  troops	  had	  largely	  dispersed,	  and	  those	  who	  had	  been	  induced	  to	   join	  were	  ‘not	   trusted’.	  The	  vakil	   reported	   that	   ‘thoughtful	  people	   assert	   that	  half	   the	  army,	  and	  half	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Cabul	  Government	  have	  [sic]	  been	  lost	  and	  the	   other	   half	   is	   destitute	   of	   the	   discipline	   and	   order	  which	   existed	   in	   the	  time	   of	   the	   late	   Ameer’.233	  A	   request	   from	   the	   Kandahar	   sirdar	   for	   support	  from	   the	   British	   was	   turned	   down,	   indeed,	   frontier	   officers,	   pessimistic	   of	  Amin	  Khan’s	  prospects,	  requested	  advice	  from	  the	  Governor-­‐General’s	  office	  on	   the	   accepted	   protocol	   for	   the	   reception	   of	   exiled	   Afghan	   leaders.	   In	  response	   the	   Governor-­‐General	   instructed	   that	   such	   ‘refugees’	   should	   be	  discouraged.	   They	   were	   to	   be	   allowed	   ‘no	   maintenance	   allowance’;	   must	  dismiss	  ‘armed	  followers’;	   ‘retain	  only	  a	  few	  servants’;	  and	  ‘must	  live	  where	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ordered’.	  In	  addition,	  they	  were	  not	  to	  communicate	  with	  Kabul	  and	  were	  not	  permitted	  to	  leave	  British	  territory	  without	  permission.234	  	  For	  some,	  this	  violence	  was	  a	  function	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  culture	  of	  succession.	  John	  Wyllie,	   a	  prominent	   advisor	   to	   the	  Viceroy,	  bemoaned	   the	   ‘nemesis	  of	  Muhammadan	  polygamy’	  in	  which	  ‘children	  by	  different	  mothers	  scrambling	  for	   the	   inheritance	   …	   [had]	   laid	   its	   curse	   of	   anarchy	   and	   civil	   war’	   on	   the	  country.235	  The	  conflict	  was	  viewed	  as	  entirely	  an	  internal	  matter	  and	  British	  officials	  remained	  resolute	  in	  their	  non-­‐commitment	  to	  any	  of	  the	  competing	  rulers.	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  claim	  by	  Afzul	  Khan’s	  son,	  Azim	  Khan,	  when	  he	  eventually	   took	  Kabul	   following	  an	  uprising	  against	  Sher	  Ali,	   that	  he	  would	  form	  an	  alliance	  with	  Russia	   in	  defiance	  of	   the	   ‘inhospitable	  and	  ungrateful	  English’.236	  Alarmed	  by	  this	  announcement	  and	  fearing	  a	  diplomatic	  incident,	  the	   British	   vakil	   opened	   negotiations.	   The	   Viceroy,	   however,	   correctly	  suspecting	  a	  ruse	  was	  nonplussed	  in	  his	  reply.	  In	  response,	  Azim	  Khan	  sought	  support	  from	  the	  British	  instead,	  a	  request	  declined	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  government	   of	   India	  would	  not	   ‘break	   the	   existing	   engagements’	  with	   Sher	  Ali.237	  The	   incident	  was	  a	   further	   indication	  of	   the	   relatively	   casual	  attitude	  towards	  Russian	   influence	  at	   this	   time,	  even	  though	  the	  rumour	  of	   this	  was	  reported	   as	   far	   as	   Tehran	   and	   picked	   up	   by	   British	   representatives	   who	  recorded	  it	  as	  having	  evolved	  into	  a	  report	  that	  Afzul	  Khan’s	  son	  at	  Bokhara	  had	  been	   recognized	  as	  Amir	  of	  Afghanistan	  by	   the	  Russian	  Government	   in	  return	  for	  his	  vassalage.238	  	  	  Not	  all	  observers	  were	  so	  casual.	  Henry	  Rawlinson,	  who	  had	  made	  his	  career	  since	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  as	  a	  commentator	  on	  the	  ‘Eastern	  Question’,	  published	   a	  memorandum	   in	   1868	   in	   which	   he	   sought	   to	   provoke	   a	  more	  active	   British	   policy	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Persia.	   For	   the	   historian	   Fraser-­‐Tytler,	   this	  memo	  was	   the	   ‘foundation’	  upon	  which	   the	  Forward	  Policy	  was	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built.239	  Certainly,	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	   more	   technocratic	   nature	   of	   official	  memoranda,	  Rawlinson	  backed	  up	  his	  argument	  with	  data	  on	  the	  logistics	  of	  a	   Russian	   advance,	   rationalising	   his	   advocacy	   of	   a	   more	   active	   British	  response.	   But	   his	   call	   at	   this	   stage	   was	   largely	   for	   political	   measures.	  	  Rawlinson	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  shifting	  allegiances	  within	  the	  Afghan	  ruling	  class	  as	  prominent	  Afghan	  exiles	   in	  Bokhara	  fell	  under	  the	  sway	  of	  growing	  Russian	   influence	   in	   the	   region,	   potentially	   creating	   political	   inroads	   into	  Afghanistan.	   The	   vague	   political	   geography	   of	   the	   northern	   territories	  was	  accordingly	  translated	  into	  the	  possibility	  of	  Russian	  influence,	  given	  weight	  by	   the	  knowledge	   that	  Abdur	  Rahman	  Khan	  had	  married	  a	  daughter	  of	   the	  Bokharan	  Amir.	   Rawlinson	   further	   claimed	   that	  Russia	   now	  had	   an	  Afghan	  contingent	   within	   her	   service,	   drawn	   from	   this	   growing	   Afghan	   diaspora	  escaping	   the	   conflict	   in	   northern	   areas,	   and	   commanded	   by	   a	   grandson	   of	  Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan.240	  	  	  In	   making	   his	   argument,	   Rawlinson	   skilfully	   reprised	   engrained	   British	  perceptions	   of	   simmering	   Afghan	   nefarious	   intent,	   claiming	   that	   there	   ‘is	  unfortunately	  …	  at	   the	  present	   time	   in	   the	  Afghan	   territory	   a	  machinery	  of	  agitation	   singularly	  well	   adapted	   for	   acting	  on	  what	  Sir	  R.	  Temple	   calls	   the	  "seething,	   fermenting,	   festering	   mass"	   of	   Mahomedan	   hostility	   in	   India.’241	  This	   vague	   conspiracy	  was	   attached	   to	   the	   ‘malcontents’	   of	   northern	   India,	  comprising	  a	  somewhat	  unhelpfully	  narrowed-­‐down	  typology	  of	   the	  classes	  ‘who	   are	   necessarily	   our	   enemies,	   and	   are	   not	   open	   to	   any	   conciliation’.	  These	   included	   ‘the	   priestly	   class’	   (Hindu	   and	   Muslim);	   the	   military	   and	  political	   class;	   the	   native	   princes	   and	   chiefs;	   and	   finally	   ‘the	   mob’,	   ‘the	  
canaille,	   [and]	   the	   blackguardism	   of	   the	   whole	   population’. 242 	  Even	  Rawlinson	   did	   not	   believe	   that	   Russian	   invasion	   was	   likely,	   rather	   the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  threat	  had	  far	  more	  to	  do	  with	  perceptions	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  its	  political	  status	  than	  is	  afforded	  by	  accounts	  that	  simply	  highlight	  the	  ‘forward	  policy’	  concept.	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  Such	  ‘panic	  mongers’,	  as	  Wyllie	  termed	  them,243	  were	  not	  influential	  however	  on	  the	  thinking	  of	  Henry	  Lawrence,	   the	  Viceroy	  at	   this	   time.	  Rawlinson	  had	  suggested	   closer	   engagement	   with	   Sher	   Ali	   through	   the	   deputation	   of	   a	  British	  officer	  at	  his	  court,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  supply	  lines	  to	  the	   frontier,	   including	   an	   outpost	   at	   the	  Bolan	   Pass.	   Yet	   Lawrence	   rejected	  this	   advice,	   pointing	   to	   the	   Lumsden	   mission	   as	   evidence	   against	   the	  stationing	  of	  British	  agents	  in	  Afghanistan,	  suggesting	  they	  had	  been	  ‘in	  great	  personal	   danger	   …	   utterly	   helpless,	   and	   in	   a	   condition	   of	   practical	  imprisonment’.244	  British	   presence	   he	   argued	   would	   ‘engender	   irritation,	  defiance,	  and	  hatred	   in	  the	  minds	  of	  Afghans’.245	  Lumsden	  himself	  had	  even	  suggested	   that	   more	   could	   be	   achieved	   at	   Peshawar	   than	   Kandahar.	   Once	  more,	   this	  policy	  was	   justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  avoiding	  entanglements	   in	  Afghan	   politics.	   Presuming,	   as	   Rawlinson	   had,	   that	   the	   ‘stirring	   up’	   of	  ‘elements	  of	   dissatisfaction’	  was	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  Russia’s	   chosen	  mode	  of	  influence,	  ‘our	  strongest	  security’,	  the	  Viceroy	  wrote,	  ‘would	  …	  be	  found	  to	  lie	  in	   previous	   absence	   from	   entanglements’	   at	   Kabul,	   Kandahar	   and	  elsewhere.246	  	  	  Whilst	   this	  period	  of	  British	  policy	  has	  been	  described	   in	  many	  accounts	  as	  ‘masterly	   inactivity’, 247 	  this	   question	   of	   sovereign	   recognition,	   and	   the	  inability	  of	  the	  British	  to	  scrutinize	  Afghanistan’s	  internal	  politics	  was	  crucial	  to	   understanding	   the	   policy.	   Lawrence’s	   preferred	   method	   of	   influence	  revolved	   around	   precisely	   avoiding	   any	   commitments	   to	   Afghan	   rulers	  whose	   position	   was	   tenuous:	   ‘Our	   relations	   should	   always	   be	   with	   the	   de	  
facto	  ruler	  of	  the	  day,	  and	  so	  long	  as	  the	  de	  facto	  ruler	  is	  not	  unfriendly	  to	  us,	  we	   should	   always	   be	   prepared	   to	   renew	   with	   him	   the	   same	   terms	   and	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  247	  The	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  was	  originally	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  from	  an	  article	  by	  J.S.	  Wyllie	  on	  the	  Afghan	  policy	  of	  Governor	  General	  Lawrence	  during	  the	  civil	  war,	  though	  became	  a	  catch-­‐phrase	  for	  those	  who	  favoured	  a	  ‘stationary’	  approach.	  Wyllie	  would	  subsequently	  write	  a	  critique	  of	  such	  a	  policy	  in	  which	  he	  referred	  to	  ‘mischievous	  inactivity’.	  Wyllie,	  Essays	  on	  the	  External	  Policy	  of	  
India;	  BL	  W3/3695,	  Earl	  of	  Northbrook,	  ‘The	  Afghan	  Question’,	  Speech	  at	  the	  Guildhall,	  Winchester,	  11	  November	  1878,	  p.	  5.	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favourable	   conditions	  obtained	  under	  his	  predecessor.	   In	   this	  way	  we	  shall	  be	  enabled	  to	  maintain	  our	  influence	  in	  Afghanistan	  far	  more	  effectually	  than	  by	  any	  advance	  of	  troops’.248	  As	  Chakravarty	  observes,	  therefore,	  recognition	  was	  the	  ‘principle	  hinge’	  on	  which	  Lawrence’s	  Afghanistan	  policy	  hung.249	  	  	  Not	  all	  government	  officials	  agreed	  with	  this	  approach	  however.	  George	  Yule,	  the	  former	  Commissioner	  of	  the	  Indian	  province	  of	  Oude	  decried	  the	  practice	  of	  saying	  ‘Good	  morning,	  Sir,	  how	  do	  you	  do?’	  to	  successive	  rulers,	  which	  he	  argued	  ‘must	  disgust	  all	  the	  leading	  men,	  and	  prolong	  indefinitely	  the	  ill	  will	  which	   the	   nation	   already	   entertains	   towards	   us’.	   Yule	   proposed	   a	   more	  tailored	  approach	   in	  which	   ‘something	  more	  than	  words	  should	  be	  given	  to	  each	  man	   according	   to	   his	   character	   and	   condition,	   little,	   comparatively,	   to	  one	  not	   likely	   to	   rule	  well	   or	   long,	  much	   to	   one	  who	  promised	  better.’250	  A	  state	  of	  sovereign	  ambiguity	  was	  once	  more	  creating	  confusion	  for	  the	  British,	  yet	   this	   underscored	   once	   more	   the	   presumption	   that	   it	   was	   possible	   to	  gauge	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Afghan	   rulers	   from	   a	   distance.	   Moreover,	   it	   was	   a	  further	   indication	   that	   the	  British	  did	  not	   feel	   it	  necessary	   to	   recognize	   the	  sovereign	  of	  a	  territory	  they	  were	  beginning	  to	  view	  as	  naturally	  fragmented,	  and	  beyond	  the	  norms	  of	  interstate	  intercourse.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  deal	  with	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  Afghan	  politics,	  greater	  efforts	  were	  put	  on	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  with	  Russia.	  The	  Gorchakov	  memorandum	  of	  1864	  had	  framed	  the	  problem	  Russia	  faced	  with	  her	  frontiers	  in	  Central	  Asia	  in	   terms	   that	   the	   British	   could	   recognize	   as	   one	   of	   managing	   ‘uncivilized’	  populations.	   Responding	   to	   this,	   the	   Foreign	   Secretary	   at	   the	   time,	   John	  Russell,	  had	  proposed	  a	  more	  cooperative	  approach	  to	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  actions	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  but	  following	  a	  lukewarm	  response	  from	  St	  Petersburg	  and	  a	  general	  absence	  of	  urgency	  over	  Russian	  expansion,251	  the	  plan	  was	  shelved	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  29.	  249	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus,	  48.	  250	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  31.	  251	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  India	  in	  1867	  reflected	  this	  when	  he	  wrote:	  ‘The	  conquests	  which	  Russia	  has	  made,	  and	  apparently	  is	  still	  making,	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  appear	  …	  to	  be	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  she	  finds	  herself	  placed,	  and	  to	  afford	  no	  ground	  whatever	  for	  representations	  indicative	  of	  suspicion	  or	  alarm	  on	  the	  part	  of	  this	  country.’	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  32.	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after	   Russell’s	   departure	   from	   his	   post	   in	   1865.252	  It	   was	   resurrected	   in	   a	  revised	  form	  upon	  the	  arrival	  of	  Lord	  Clarendon	  as	  Foreign	  Secretary	  in	  1869,	  who	   took	  advantage	  of	  a	  propitious	  atmosphere	   in	   the	  Russian	  and	  English	  press	   by	   suggesting	   a	   ‘neutral’	   territory	   between	   the	   two	   powers.253	  The	  suggestion	  prompted	  a	  response	   from	  Gorchakov	  that	   the	  Russian	  Emperor	  viewed	  Afghanistan	   ‘as	   completely	   outside	   the	   sphere	  within	  which	   Russia	  may	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  exercise	  her	  influence.	  No	  intervention	  or	  interference	  whatever,	   opposed	   to	   the	   independence	   of	   that	   State	   enters	   into	   his	  intentions.’254	  The	   comment	   initiated	  an	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  attempt	   to	  mutually	  agree	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  a	  ‘neutral’	  territory.	  	  This	  demarcation	  immediately	  faced	  ambiguities	  however.	  As	  a	  Secret	  Letter	  considering	  the	  ‘present	  possessions	  of	  the	  Amir’	  noted	  in	  1870,	  in	  ‘countries	  which	  have	  never	  been	  scientifically	  surveyed,	  and	  boundaries	  of	  which	  have	  been	  liable	  to	  more	  or	  less	  fluctuation,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  describe	  existing	  boundaries	   with	   perfect	   accuracy.’255	  As	   another	   British	   official	   remarked,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  such	  thing’	  as	  an	  Afghan	  boundary.256	  The	  British	  proposed	  as	  a	  northern	  limit,	  the	  Oxus	  river,	  primarily	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  establish	  a	  neutral	  zone	   north	   of	   the	   Hindu	   Kush,	   leaving	   Afghanistan	   under	   their	   theoretical	  sphere	   of	   influence,	   but	   this	   betrayed	   a	   misleading	   sense	   of	   territorial	  fixity. 257 	  Sher	   Ali	   had,	   by	   September	   1868,	   recovered	   Kabul,	   with	   the	  assistance	  of	  his	  son	  who	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  in	  Kandahar.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  declaration	  of	  loyalty	  from	  the	  northern	  states	  of	  Afghan-­‐Turkistan,	  yet	  the	   recovery	   of	   his	   status	  was	   still	   recent	   and	   the	   continued	   loyalty	   of	   the	  north	  in	  particular,	  given	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  exiled	  chiefs,	  remained	  unclear.	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  diplomatic	  debate	  however,	  and	  in	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  increasing	  capacity	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  to	  create	  its	  own	  official	  histories,	  a	  study	   was	   commissioned	   attempting	   to	   identify	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   Afghan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  A.	  P.	  Thornton,	  ‘The	  Reopening	  of	  the	  ‘Central	  Asian	  Question’,	  1864-­‐9’,	  History	  41	  (1956),	  122-­‐136.	  253	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus,	  56.	  254	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  43.	  255	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  44.	  256	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus,	  62.	  257	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus,	  62.	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territory.258	  This	   was	   a	   quest	   for	   ‘territorial	   fixity’259	  that	   was	   far	   more	  technocratic	   than	   the	   earlier	   rather	   tentative	   efforts	   of	   the	   East	   India	  Company,	   drawing	   upon	   four	   ‘authorities’	   for	   political	   boundaries:	   the	  treaties	  between	   the	  contending	  parties;	   ‘statements	  respecting	  payment	  of	  revenue	   or	   tribute	   to	   the	   suzerain’;	   ‘the	   recognized	   obligation	   of	   inferior	  chieftain	  to	  do	  homage,	  to	  render	  military	  service,	  or	  to	  pay	  a	  nuzzerana260	  on	  succession’;	   and	   ‘the	   permanent	   establishment	   of	   frontier	   posts	   for	   the	  collection	   of	   customs	   on	   goods,	   and	   taxes	   on	   travellers’.	   Yet	   these	   efforts	  carried	   the	   caveat	   that	   determining	   such	   limits	   was	   not	   possible	   ‘with	   the	  precision	   which	   is	   attainable	   in	   the	   description	   of	   civilized	   countries.’	  Crucially,	   the	  resulting	  map	  and	  the	  history	  that	  accompanied	   it	  drew	  upon	  existing	   European	   knowledge	   of	   the	   territory,	   thereby	   reactivating	   the	  corpus	   of	   colonial	   knowledge,	   and	   especially	   the	  works	   of	   Elphinstone	   and	  Burnes.	  This	  reactivation	  was	  observable	  in	  other	  forums	  too.	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  the	   Royal	   United	   Services	   Institute	   chaired	   by	   Henry	   Rawlinson	   and	  delivered	   by	   George	   Campbell,	   an	   officer	   of	   the	   Bengal	   Civil	   Service,	   the	  speaker	   remarked	  on	  how	  Elphinstone	  had	   ‘in	  many	   respects	   occupied	   the	  ground	  so	  fully	  and	  so	  well,	  as	  hardly	  to	  leave	  room	  for	  another’.261	  However,	  it	   was	   noted	   that	   the	   political	   circumstances	   had	   ‘entirely	   changed’	   since	  Elphinstone’s	   time,	   and	   Campbell	   added,	   ‘we	   can	   hardly	   suppose	   that	   after	  years	   of	   British	   occupation	   there	   is	   not	   room	   for	   at	   least	   an	   enlarged	   and	  modernized	  work’.262	  	  The	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  debate	  over	  the	  limits	  of	  Afghan	  territory	  would	  continue	  until	   1873	   when	   an	   agreement	   was	   finally	   made	   in	   which	   the	   territories	  previously	  held	  by	  Dost	  Muhammad,	   and	  now	  held	  by	   Sher	  Ali,	  were	   to	  be	  considered	  Afghan	   territory,	   but	   the	   entire	   debate	  was	   conducted	   over	   the	  head	  of	   the	  Afghan	  Amir.	   In	  effect	   this	  was	  a	  regulation	  of	  Amir’s	  sovereign	  authority	  by	  the	  two	  imperial	  powers	  of	  Russia	  and	  Britain.	  The	  negotiations	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  IOR/L/PS/18/A5,	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  Afghan-­‐Turkistan’	  by	  J.	  Talboys	  Wheeler,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  to	  Government	  of	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  in	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  Foreign	  Department	  (Calcutta,	  Officer	  of	  Superintendent	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  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	  	  260	  financial	  tribute.	  261	  George	  Campbell,	  ‘The	  North-­‐West	  Frontier	  of	  India’,	  RUSI	  Journal,	  13/54	  (1869),	  224.	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served	   the	   wider	   purpose	   of	   managing	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   in	   Central	  Asia,	  yet	  they	  also	  reflected	  once	  more	  the	  prevailing	  attitude	  that	  it	  was	  the	  duty	   of	   civilized	   states,	   with	   their	   growing	   ‘scientific’	   paraphernalia	   of	  boundary	   mapping	   and	   expertise,	   to	   establish	   the	   borders	   of	   their	  ‘uncivilized’	   frontier	   communities.	   Afghanistan	   was	   not	   just	   viewed	   as	  technologically	   incapable	   of	   carrying	   out	   such	   frontier	  management,	   but	   it	  was	   seen	   as	   unable	   to	   reciprocate	   the	   diplomatic	   pledges	   upon	  which	   any	  agreement	  would	  lie.	  	  	  The	  Amir	  was	   himself	   a	   subject	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   this	   negotiated	   settlement,	  such	  that	  the	  British	  committed	  to	  maintaining	  the	  ‘peaceful	  attitude’	  of	  Sher	  Ali	  with	  regards	  to	  Russian	  interests.	  Just	  as	  the	  frontier	  resembled	  a	  site	  of	  anxiety	   to	   the	   British,	   so	   did	   it	   for	   the	   Russians,	   this	   shared	   fear	   is	   often	  reduced	  to	  a	  masking	  tactic	  for	  acquisitive	  territorial	  urges,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  it	  helped	  impose	  a	  routine	  on	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations.	  Such	  was	  the	  power	  of	  this	  idea	  that	  in	  October	  1867	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  was	  moved	  to	  remark	  ‘I	  am	  not	  myself	  at	  all	  certain	  that	  Russia	  might	  not	  prove	  a	  safer	  ally,	  a	  better	  neighbour,	  than	  the	  Mahommedan	  races	  of	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Cabul.	  She	  would	  introduce	   civilization;	   she	   would	   abate	   the	   fanaticism	   and	   ferocity	   of	  Mahommedanism,	  which	  still	  exercises	  so	  powerful	  an	  influence	  in	  India.’263	  	  	  The	  colonial	  knowledge	  upon	  which	  these	  territorial	  delimitations	  were	  built	  included	  treaty	  agreements	  signed	  between	  the	  rulers	  of	  these	  states,264	  and	  the	   employment	   of	   ‘local’	   knowledge	   embodied	   within	   the	   works	   of	  Elphinstone	   et	   al	   did	   contribute	   to	   a	   degree	   of	   hybridity	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  incorporation	  of	  indigenous	  forms	  of	  territoriality,	  but	  a	  new	  form	  of	  closure	  was	  now	  impacting	  on	  the	  Afghan	  polity,	  driven	  by	  imperial	   interests.	   In	  an	  example	  of	  Jordan	  Branch’s	  observation,	  cartography	  –	  albeit	  rudimentary	  in	  this	   instance	   –	   was	   beginning	   to	   make	   ‘certain	   goals	   imaginable	   and	  appealing’.265	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  30.	  264	  IOR/L/PS/18/A5,	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  Afghan-­‐Turkistan’,	  see	  chapter	  four	  for	  a	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  on	  Kabul-­‐Bokhara	  treaty	  negotiations	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  to	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  borders	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  1850-­‐1862.	  265	  Branch,	  ‘Mapping	  the	  Sovereign	  State’,	  21.	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The	  Frontier	  Debate	  Takes	  Off,	  1874-­78	  	  The	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  is	  regularly	  attributed	  to	  the	  reckless	  actions	  of	  Lord	  Lytton,	  the	  Viceroy	  of	  India	  who	  succeeded	  from	  Northbrook	  in	  1876.	  However,	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  British	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  again	   in	   1878	   preceded	   him.	   The	   1870s	   saw	   a	   reappraisal	   of	   questions	  surrounding	   Afghan	   policy	   as	   the	   intellectual,	   institutional,	   and	   political	  changes	   charted	   in	   this	   chapter	   began	   to	   manifest	   themselves	   in	   a	   fierce	  frontier	  debate.	  Two	  primary	  issues	  dominated	  this:	  the	  stationing	  of	  British	  officers	  in	  Afghan	  territory,	  and	  the	  administration	  of	  frontier	  defence.	  	  The	  first	  issue	  related	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  intelligence	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	   states	   beyond	   it.	   The	   scepticism	   with	   which	   ‘native	   informants’	   were	  viewed	   in	   Afghanistan	   was	   part	   a	   broader	   move	   away	   from	   the	   ‘local	  knowledge’	   of	   the	   colonial	   state	   in	   India,	   towards	   more	   official	   collection	  methods.	  This	  was	  a	  process	  that	  began	  prior	  to	  the	  mutiny	  of	  1857	  but	  was	  advanced	   in	   its	   aftermath	   as	   officials	   sought	   more	   formal	   methods	   and	  practices.266	  But	   whilst	   there	   was	   a	   long-­‐term	   decline	   in	   the	   use	   of	   ‘native	  informants’	   in	   the	   centre,	   on	   the	   periphery	   where	   official	   presence	   was	  weakest,	  the	  old	  practices	  necessarily	  lived	  on.	  In	  the	  1870s,	  these	  practices	  faced	  their	  most	  sustained	  challenge.	  	  	  Taking	   up	   his	   post	   in	   1874,	   the	   new	   Secretary	   of	   State	   to	   India	   under	  Disraeli’s	  administration,	  the	  Marquis	  of	  Salisbury,	   indicated	  these	  concerns	  to	   the	  Viceroy	  remarking	  on	  the	   ‘comparative	  scantiness	  of	   the	   information	  [from	  Afghanistan]	  which	  it	  is	  in	  your	  Excellency’s	  power	  to	  supply’.267	  Under	  scrutiny	   was	   not	   merely	   the	   content	   but	   the	   methodology	   of	   information	  collection.	  Speaking	  of	  the	  vakil	  at	  Kabul,	  Salisbury	  doubted	  whether	  he	  was	  able	  to	  supply	  ‘any	  facts	  which	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  Ameer’s	  wish	  that	  you	  should	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  Bayly,	  Empire	  and	  Information.	  267	  IOR/L/PS/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  Marquis	  of	  Salisbury,	  22	  January	  1875,	  p.	  57.	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receive’,268	  adding	   ‘it	   is	   not	   likely	   that	   any	   Native	   agent	   would	   possess	   a	  sufficient	  insight	  into	  the	  policy	  of	  western	  nations	  to	  collect	  the	  information	  you	  require’.	  Salisbury	  also	  questioned	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  agent	  ‘in	  respect	  to	   religious	   and	   national	   controversies’,	   a	   neutrality	   he	   argued	   ‘only	   a	  European	   can	   possess’.269	  Giving	   a	   more	   local	   perspective	   Frere	   recorded	  that	  although	  the	  abstracts	  that	  were	  passed	  to	  the	  Viceroy	  from	  the	  frontier	  officers	   were	   ‘weeded	   of	   much	   extraneous	   and	   trifling	   matter’,	   they	   still	  contained	   a	   ‘vast	   portion	   of	   Durbur	   [sic]	   gossip	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	  important	   items	  of	   intelligence	  which	   [even]	   the	  most	  ordinary	  newswriter	  at	   a	  Native	  Court	   cannot	  help	   sometimes	   transmitting.’270	  The	  British	  had	  a	  concept	  of	  what	  appropriate	  intelligence	  looked	  like	  and	  ‘Durbur	  gossip’	  and	  ‘hearsay’	  was	  not	  it,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  precisely	  this	  form	  of	  rumour	  that	   they	   feared	   breaking	   out	   across	   India.	   On	   the	   frontier,	   a	   more	  instrumental	  form	  of	  practical	  knowledge	  was	  now	  being	  sought.	  	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  vakil’s	  role	  as	  an	  intelligence	  source,	  his	  capacities	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  British	   influence	  were	  also	  questioned.	  This	  was	  a	   judgement	  based	   largely	  on	  prejudice,	  revolving	  around	  the	  belief	  that	  European	  diplomats	  with	  their	  ‘superior	   intellect	   and	   force	   of	   character’	   could	   more	   easily	   sway	   the	  ‘stubborn	   prejudices’	   of	   the	   Amir,	   who	   could	   only	   reason	   by	   his	   ‘Asiatic	  experience’.271	  For	  Frere,	  this	  called	  for	  a	  renaissance	  of	  the	  ‘noble	  school	  of	  frontier	  officers’,	  a	  nostalgia	  within	  empire	  that	  called	  for	  men	  trained	  up	  ‘in	  the	   spirit	   of	   your	   Malcolms,	   Elphinstones,	   and	   Metcalfes	   …	   who	   by	   their	  character	   and	   the	   confidence	   the	  Natives	  have	   in	   them,	   can	  hold	   their	   own	  without	   the	   immediate	   presence	   of	   battalions	   and	   big	   guns.’ 272 	  This	  retrograde	  approach	  to	  policy	  design	  was	  evident	  elsewhere	  too.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  268	  The	  frontier	  officers	  Cavagnari	  and	  Pollock	  had	  confirmed	  this	  was	  the	  case	  in	  an	  official	  dispatch.	  The	  latter	  remarked	  that	  ‘intelligence	  from	  Afghanistan	  was	  never	  so	  hard	  to	  obtain	  as	  it	  is	  now’,	  and	  information	  from	  Central	  Asia	  was	  even	  more	  scarce.	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  Salisbury,	  15	  November	  1875,	  p.	  60.	  See	  also:	  Ewans,	  Securing	  the	  Indian	  
Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  59-­‐60.	  269	  IOR/L/PS/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  Marquis	  of	  Salisbury	  to	  Lord	  Northbrook,	  22	  January	  1875,	  p.	  57.	  270	  Sir	  Bartle	  Frere,	  Afghanistan	  and	  South	  Africa,	  Letters	  to	  the	  Right	  Hon.	  W.	  E.	  Gladstone	  M.P.	  
regarding	  portions	  of	  his	  Midlothian	  Speeches,	  and	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  later	  Sir	  John	  Kaye,	  and	  other	  
papers,	  Fifth	  Edition	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  1881),	  61.	  271	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  61-­‐2.	  See	  also	  Frere,	  Afghanistan	  and	  South	  Africa,	  31-­‐2	  272	  Frere,	  Afghanistan	  and	  South	  Africa,	  33.	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  Where	  political	  knowledge	  was	  deficient,	  Afghanistan	  ‘experts’	  filled	  the	  gap.	  Nostalgia	   prevailed	   here	   too,	   with	   Lumsden	   remarking	   on	   how	   the	  ‘attachment	   of	   the	   nobles	   to	   the	   person	   and	   Government	   of	   the	   Amir	   Dost	  Muhammad	  Khan	  is	  not	  found	  to	  have	  passed	  to	  the	  Amir	  Sher	  Ali	  Khan,	  nor	  to	  the	  Government	  he	  has	  essayed	  to	  improve’.273	  Drawing	  on	  the	  deep	  well	  of	  colonial	  knowledge	  Rawlinson	  chose	  to	  highlight	  the	  	  ‘natural	  incoherency	  and	   indocility’	   of	   the	   Afghan	   population,	   presenting	   Sher	   Ali’s	   reign	   as	   a	  reminder	  that	  ‘Afghanistan	  never	  has	  had,	  and	  never	  can	  have,	  the	  cohesion	  and	   consistency	   of	   a	   regular	   monarchical	   government’.	   There	   was	   ‘little	  prospect’	  of	  even	  settled	  government	  under	  Sher	  Ali,	  he	  concluded.274	  Others	  favoured	   a	   more	   conspiratorial	   outlook	   based	   more	   on	   conjecture	   and	  paranoia	  than	  empirics.	  As	  Salisbury	  warned,	  ‘[t]he	  disposition	  of	  the	  people	  in	   various	   parts	   of	   Afghanistan,	   the	   designs	   and	   intrigues	   of	   its	   Chiefs,	   the	  movement	   of	   nomad	   tribes	   upon	   its	   frontier,	   the	   influence	   which	   foreign	  powers	  may	  possibly	  be	  exerting	  within	  and	  without	  its	  borders,	  are	  matters	  of	  which	  a	  proper	  account	  can	  only	  be	  rendered	  to	  you	  by	  an	  English	  agent	  residing	   in	   the	   country.’275	  Salisbury	   also	   pointed	   attention	   towards	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  ‘the	  first	  Mahometan	  State	  in	  the	  world’,	  as	  an	  epicentre	  of	  a	   pan-­‐Islamic	   conspiracy,	   giving	   ‘renewed	   vigour	   to	   the	   impulses	   of	  fanaticism	  which	  in	  these	  countries	  are	  never	  in	  complete	  repose’.276	  	  The	  proposed	  solution	  to	  these	  deficiencies	  in	  political	   intelligence	  involved	  the	   stationing	   of	   British	   officers	   in	   Afghanistan	   itself,	   but	   this	   carried	   a	  number	  of	  risks.	  First	  was	  the	  danger	  presented	  to	  the	  agents	  themselves;	  a	  fear	  that	  recalled	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  and	  the	  violent	  geography	   that	   had	   been	   nurtured	   throughout	   the	   preceding	   decades.	   This	  view	   resonated	   particularly	   with	   Lawrence	   and	   Mayo,	   who	   impressed	   the	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  Lumsden,	  ‘A	  Consideration	  of	  the	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  Asia’,	  24	  June	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  p.	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  Rawlinson,	  England	  and	  Russia	  in	  the	  East,	  370.	  275	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	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  Salisbury	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  January	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risks	  on	  Russian	  diplomats	  as	  well.277	  There	  was	  an	  associated	   concern	   too	  that	   the	   agents	  would	   become	   the	   guarantors	   of	   a	   despotic	   government.278	  Added	   to	   this	  was	   the	  potential	   impact	  on	  British	  prestige	   should	   the	  Amir	  refuse	   the	   request,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   which	   Northbrook	   suggested	   was	  ‘beyond	  doubt’.279	  Indeed	  Bellew	  was	  able	  to	  inform	  the	  Viceroy,	  through	  his	  medical	  contact,	  Syed	  Nur	  Muhammad,	  that	  the	  Amir	  perceived	  the	  stationing	  of	   English	   officers	   at	   Kabul	   as	   ‘tantamount	   to	   his	   relinquishing	   of	   his	   own	  authority’.280	  	  	  The	   question	   of	   stationing	   agents	   in	   Afghanistan	   involved	   not	   simply	  questions	  of	   information	   and	   intelligence	   gathering,	   but	   it	  was	   viewed	  as	   a	  signifier	  of	  British	  influence	  at	  Kabul;	  an	  influence	  that	  had	  been	  on	  the	  wane	  since	  the	  1873	  conference	  at	  Simla.	  The	  British	  were	  aware	  of	  Russian	  ‘native	  informants’	   at	   Kabul	   yet	   their	   influence	   was	   not	   initially	   considered	  significant.	  The	  Amir	  had	  also	  been	  passing	  letters	  to	  the	  British	  addressed	  to	  Sher	  Ali	  from	  General	  Kaufmann,	  the	  Russian	  Governor-­‐General	  of	  Turkistan.	  In	  turn	  the	  British	  had	  been	  instructing	  him	  in	  his	  replies	  –	  a	  practice	  that	  the	  Russians	  were	  aware	  of.281	  Once	  more	  there	  was	  great	  power	  collusion	  over	  their	   respective	   interests	   in	   Afghanistan.	   As	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   cooled	  however,	  the	  Amir’s	  correspondence	  with	  Britain	  began	  to	  dry	  up	  too,	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  Russian	  influence	  was	  ongoing.	  Throughout	  the	  summer	   of	   1876,	   as	   Sher	   Ali	   considered	   a	   further	   British	   request	   for	   the	  stationing	   of	   agents	   at	   Kabul,	   the	   vakil	   reported	   ‘frequent	   confidential	  emissaries’	   from	   General	   Kaufmann.282	  In	   August	   1877	   a	   Turkish	   Envoy	   to	  Afghanistan,	   having	   passed	   through	   the	   country	   to	   India,	   reported	   to	   the	  British	   that	  Sher	  Ali	  was	   ‘badly	  disposed’	   towards	   the	  British	  on	  account	  of	  their	   movement	   towards	   Kalat,	   and	   that	   Russian	   influence	   was	   ‘in	   the	  ascendent’.	   He	   also	   reported	   an	   ‘active	   Russian	   agent’	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	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Kokandi	   notable. 283 	  The	   question	   of	   stationing	   British	   agents	   therefore	  became	  more	  pressing.	  	  The	   second	   aspect	   of	   frontier	   policy	   that	   saw	   greater	   debate	   in	   the	   1870s	  concerned	  how	  to	  administer	  this	  territory.	  As	  discussed,	  conversations	  over	  this	   topic	   preceded	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   tensions.	   In	   the	   1870s	   however,	   the	  debate	  took	  on	  greater	  urgency,	  driven	  partly	  by	  the	   ‘epistemic	  community’	  of	  the	  professionalizing	  military,	  and	  partly	  by	  a	  greater	  ‘imperial	  character’	  to	  British	  frontier	  policy.	  	  	  	  Rail	   transport	   had	   revolutionized	   military	   thought	   in	   India.	   The	   events	   of	  1857	  had	  elevated	  the	  imperative	  for	  rapid	  concentration	  of	  military	  force	  at	  potentially	  short	  notice,	  and	  from	  potentially	  distant	  locations.	  With	  growing	  military	   recruitment	   and	   presence	   on	   the	   north-­‐west	   frontier	   this	   troop	  transportation	   became	   ever	  more	   crucial.	   Routes	   to	   the	   north-­‐west	   offered	  the	  dual	  benefit	  of	  allowing	  ‘rapid	  concentration’284	  to	  the	  frontier,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   option	   of	   transporting	   reinforcements	   to	   any	   internal	   disturbances	  elsewhere	  in	  India.	  Rail	  transport	  also	  offered	  a	  more	  economical	  use	  of	  force.	  As	  early	  as	  1858,	  Colonel	  J.	  P.	  Kennedy	  Late	  calculated	  that	  railways	  offered	  to	   cut	   gross	   troop	  numbers	   in	   India	   from	  325,000	  men	   to	  100,000	   thereby	  reducing	   costs	   from	   a	   remarkably	   precise	   figure	   of	   £13,776,363	   to	  £6,202,045.285 	  New	   possibilities	   opened	   up,	   including	   the	   occupation	   of	  Quetta,	  which	  as	  Napier	  noted,	  was	  now	  more	  possible	  and	  desirable	  through	  canal	   and	   railway	   transport.286 	  Technology	   and	   mobility,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  institutionalization	   of	   ‘military	   science’	   also	   allowed	   policy	   makers	   to	   see	  more	  clearly	  the	  connections	  between	  previously	  distinct	  realms	  of	  practice.	  Henry	  Bartle	  Frere,	   for	  example,	  was	  able	   to	   reflect	  on	   the	   relevance	  of	  his	  experience	   administering	   Tanzania	   and	   South	   Africa	   to	   the	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north-­‐west	   of	   India.287	  The	   Royal	   United	   Services	   Institute288	  meanwhile,	  published	  articles	  that	  considered	  similar	  ‘frontier	  defence’	  problems	  in	  such	  disparate	   locales	   as	   Kurdistan,	   and	   Myanmar,	   including	   advice	   on	   dealing	  with	   regions	   elsewhere	   in	   India.289	  The	   specificity	   surrounding	   local	   policy	  debates	  on	  the	  frontier	  was	  being	  cast	  into	  a	  wider,	  more	  generic	  problem	  of	  frontier	  defence.	  	  As	  a	  corollary	  of	  the	  professionalising	  and	  reformist	  creed	  that	  was	  impacting	  on	   official	   practice	   elsewhere,	   the	   frontier	   was	   subject	   to	   administrative	  streamlining	   too.	   Northbrook	   was	   among	   many	   who	   called	   for	   a	   greater	  ‘unity	  of	  administration’,290	  and	  as	  Salisbury	  observed:	   ‘With	  the	  help	  of	  rail	  and	   telegraph	  …	  one	  man	  can	  govern	  a	   large	   territory	  almost	  as	  easily	  as	  a	  small	  one’.291	  Frere,	  reprising	  his	  two	  ‘systems’	  of	  frontier	  management	  that	  had	   initially	   met	   with	   lukewarm	   reception,	   was	   a	   vocal	   supporter	   of	   such	  reform.	   He	   once	   more	   called	   for	   a	   ‘Sind	   system’	   of	   unified	   command;	  operating	  with	  the	  population	  through	  local	  elites;	  on	  the	  principle	  of	   ‘do	  as	  we	  would	  be	  done	  by’;	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	   ‘the	  ordinary	  rules	  of	  war	  in	  civilized	  countries’.	  Such	  a	  system,	  he	  argued	  should	  replace	  the	  divided	  and	  divisive	   ‘Punjab	   system’,	   which	   rejected	   the	   principle	   that	   it	   was	   ‘possible	  and	  desirable	   to	  carry	  on	  war	  against	  such	  barbarous	   frontier	   tribes	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  against	  civilized	  mountaineers	   in	  Europe’.	  The	  exception	  to	   this	  was	  Peshawar,	  which	  qualified	   as	   a	   ‘settled	   area’	   and	  was	   therefore	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  interventionist	  policy	  of	  administration,	  resulting	  in	  fewer	  incidents	  of	  unrest.	  As	  Frere	  summarized,	  whilst	  Sind	  was	  dealt	  with	   ‘as	  far	  as	  possible	  as	  we	  would	  with	  Belgium	  or	  Switzerland’,	   in	  Punjab	  the	  ‘tribes’	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were	   dealt	   with	   ‘as	   the	   French	   would	   with	   tribes	   beyond	   their	   border	   in	  Algeria	  –	  as	  powers	  outside	  the	  pale	  of	  civilized	  diplomacy’.292	  	  	  The	   improvised	   and	   intuitive	   mode	   of	   the	   man	   of	   the	   frontier	   was	   being	  challenged	  by	   the	   technocratic	  administrator;	  but	  more	   than	  this,	   the	  perils	  of	   the	   civil-­‐military	   divide	   that	   so	   exercised	   Edwardes	   and	   Cotton	   was	  coming	  under	  the	  control	  of	  a	  predominant	  militarist	  epistemic	  community,	  who	  were	   capturing	   the	  debate.	  Not	   all	   supported	   this	   trend.	   Lawrence	   for	  example	   believed	  military	  men,	   as	   well	   as	  merchants	   and	   ‘men	   of	   science’	  were	   too	   often	   ‘disposed	   to	   advocate	   forward	  movements	   as	   conducive	   to	  their	   professional	   advancement	   …	   hence	   arises	   a	   feeling	   to	   despise	   what	  looks	   like	   a	   policy	   of	   inaction’.293	  But	   Lawrence	   was	   increasingly	   in	   the	  minority	  in	  the	  debate.	  	  In	   the	   vision	   of	   the	   most	   ardent	   supporters	   of	   this	   systemic	   approach	   to	  frontier	  management,	   ‘colonial	  knowledge’	  as	  an	  intellectual	  endeavour	  was	  suppressed	   by	   a	   sweeping	   technocracy,	   and	   was	   immediately	   applied	   to	  policy	  ends.	  Discussing	  the	  recent	  occupation	  of	  Quetta,	  Major	  General	  Henry	  Green	  wrote:	   ‘The	  Baloch,	  although	  a	  Mahomedan,	   is	  not	  a	  religious	   fanatic,	  and	   he	   bears	   no	   hostile	   feeling	   towards	   Europeans	   …	   From	   Quetta	   to	  Candahar	   I	   am	   less	   acquainted	   with	   the	   character	   of	   the	   people.	   I	   should,	  however,	  imagine	  that	  a	  policy	  of	  liberality,	  firmness,	  and	  justice	  would	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  upon	  them	  as	  it	  has	  upon	  the	  Baloch.’294	  On	  the	  ‘Patan	  tribes’	  he	   was	   less	   favourable,	   yet	   still	   utilitarian	   in	   his	   outlook:	   ‘They	   have	   no	  acknowledged	   head;	   even	   their	   tribal	   chiefs	   receive	   only	   a	   nominal	  obedience;	   they	   are,	   as	   a	   rule,	   fanatics	   in	   religion,	   treacherous,	   revengeful,	  and	   totally	  untrustworthy;	   they	  hate	  all	  Europeans,	  and	   the	   life	  of	  a	  British	  Officer	  entering	  their	  mountains	  is	  as	  insecure	  now	  as	  it	  was	  30	  years	  ago.	  …	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Such	  races	  are,	  I	  consider,	  one	  of	  the	  best	  defences	  that	  we	  could	  have	  in	  the	  rear	  and	  flanks	  of	  an	  invading	  army’.295	  	  This	   technocracy	  was	  observable	  elsewhere.	  The	  capture	  of	  Quetta	   in	  1877	  had	  been	  one	  stage	  in	  what	  was	  know	  being	  described	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	   the	   ‘scientific	   frontier’,	   a	   strategic	   concept	   that	   attempted	   to	   define	   the	  most	  effective	  arrangement	  of	  forces	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  defence	  of	  north	  India.	   In	   this	   vision	   Kabul,	   Kandahar,	   and	   Herat	   became	   vertices	   on	   a	  strategic	   triangle	   that	   might	   be	   dominated	   by	   either	   Russia	   or	   Britain	  through	   the	   ‘aids	   of	   military	   science’.	   For	   Major	   General	   E.	   B.	   Hamley,	  Kandahar	  was	  the	  key	  node	  of	  this	  defensive	  posture,	  with	  the	  Lower	  Indus	  to	   be	   the	   ‘fixed	   pivot	   of	   operations,	   supporting	   forward	   camps	   that	   would	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Bolan	  Pass	  as	  a	  line	  of	  retreat.296	  This	  particular	  techno-­‐cultural	   mediation	   allowed	   the	   frontier	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   one,	   and	  therefore	  matched	  the	  administrative	  drive	  for	  a	  more	  unitary	  approach.	  But	  it	   also	   suggested	   something	   of	   the	   ‘imperial	   character’	   that	   frontier	   policy	  was	  now	  exhibiting.297	  Such	  an	  outlook	  inevitably	  brought	  comparisons	  with	  Russia.	  For	  Rawlinson	  there	  was	  an	  ‘essential	  difference’:	  Russian	  policy	  was	  ‘positive,	   active,	   and	   aggressive’;	   British	   policy	   was	   ‘purely	   defensive	   and	  stationary’.298	  The	   advances	   being	   made	   by	   Russia	   were	   not	   necessarily	  viewed	  as	  aggressive	  towards	  British	  India	  itself.	  Indeed,	  Frere	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  viewing	  the	  taking	  of	  Merv,	  ‘a	  troublesome	  refuge	  for	  frontier	  robbers	  and	  man-­‐stealers’	   as	   a	   necessary	   step,	   ‘useful	   to	   civilization	   and	   good	   order,	  irrespective	   of	   Russian	   interests’.299	  The	   fear	   was	   rather	   that	   a	   Russian	  advance	  would	  be	  taken	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  British	  weakness,	  and	  moreover,	  in	  failing	  to	  appear	  to	  respond,	  local	  opinion	  would	  turn	  against	  the	  British.	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  IOR/L/PS/18/A23,	  Major	  General	  Henry	  Green	  (Retd),	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  the	  Rectification	  of	  the	  North-­‐West	  Frontier	  of	  India’,	  30	  December	  1878.	  p.	  4-­‐5.	  296	  E.	  B.	  Hamley,	  ‘The	  Strategical	  Conditions	  of	  our	  Indian	  North-­‐West	  Frontier’,	  RUSI	  Journal,	  22/98	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  1027-­‐1046.	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  The	  words	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  Government	  of	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  dispatch	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  p.	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  Sir	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But	   responding	   to	   this	   fear	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   establishing	   the	  ‘scientific	  frontier’.	  Emboldened	  by	  their	  prolonged	  occupation	  on	  the	  north-­‐west,	   many	   officials	   were	   now	   projecting	   into	   Afghanistan	   what	   they	  perceived	  as	  the	  ‘civilizing	  effect	  of	  European	  contact	  …	  upon	  semi-­‐barbarous	  tribes’.300	  In	  this	  policy	  shift	  the	  representation	  of	  an	  ‘uncivilized	  Afghanistan	  had	   found	   a	   natural	   response.	   The	   ‘civilizing	   effect’	   as	   embodied	   in	   the	  frontier	  system	  of	  Sind	  could	  emanate	  out	  across	  the	  region.	  Rawlinson	  drew	  on	  his	  own	  experiences	  in	  Kandahar	  to	  assert	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  Asiatic	  nation,	  more	   amenable	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   kindly	   treatment,	   or	   …	   more	   easily	  managed’	   than	   the	   Afghans,	   and	   argued	   that	   the	   policies	   deployed	   in	   Sind	  would	  have	  the	  same	  results	  ‘in	  the	  plain	  of	  Jellalabad	  and	  elsewhere’.301	  For	  Henry	  Green,	   the	  British	   ‘experience	   of	  Asiatics’	   had	   taught	   them	   that	   they	  must	  be	   ‘amongst	   the	  people’	   they	  wished	   to	   influence,	   and	   therefore	   ‘such	  influence	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  exerted	  from	  Calcutta	  of	  from	  Simla’.302	  	  	  The	  policy	  of	  ‘civilizing	  influence’	  also	  injected	  into	  the	  debate	  contemporary	  ideas	  of	  racial	  supremacy,	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  by	  Darwin’s	  theory	  of	  evolution	  which	  had	  exerted	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  public	  intellectual	  thought	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  On	  the	  Origin	  of	  Species	  in	  1859.	  Such	  thinking	  was	  mirrored	  in	  Salisbury’s	  increasing	  support	  for	   ‘pacific	  invasion’	  of	  Afghanistan,	  which	  he	  described	  as	  the	  principle	  that	  ‘when	  you	  bring	  the	  English	  into	  contact	  with	  inferior	  races,	  they	  will	  rule	  whatever	  the	  ostensible	  format	  of	  their	  presence	  …	   not	   by	   any	   political	   privilege	   or	   military	   power,	   but	   by	   the	   right	   of	   the	  strongest	  mind’.303	  Frere’s	   views	  on	   the	  personal	   and	   racial	   qualities	   of	   the	  English	  officers	  who	  would	  carry	  out	  this	  task	  mirrored	  such	  views.304	  Indeed	  for	   these	  observers,	   this	  need	   to	  exert	  a	   ‘civilizing	  effect’	  was	  not	   just	  good	  policy,	  but	  also	  a	  duty.	  Frere	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  outspoken	  on	  this	  belief,	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  Securing	  the	  Indian	  Frontier	  in	  Central	  Asia;	  Rawlinson,	  England	  and	  
Russia	  in	  the	  East.	  302	  IOR/L/PS/18/A23,	  Major	  General	  Henry	  Green	  (Retd.),	  ‘Memorandum	  on	  the	  Rectification	  of	  the	  North-­‐West	  Frontier	  of	  India’,	  30	  December	  1878,	  p.	  6.	  303	  John	  Lowe	  Duthie,	  ‘Pragmatic	  Diplomacy	  or	  Imperial	  Encroachment?	  British	  Policy	  Towards	  Afghanistan,	  1874-­‐1879’,	  The	  International	  History	  Review,	  4/5	  (1983),	  489.	  304	  Duthie,	  ‘Pragmatic	  Diplomacy	  or	  Imperial	  Encroachment?’,	  479.	  
	   249	  
arguing	   that	   the	  British	  were	  had	  been	  exhibiting	   a	   ‘neglect	   of	   neighbourly	  duties	   and	   responsibilities,	   incumbent	   on	   a	   rich,	   civilized,	   and	   powerful	  nation,	   towards	   poor	   barbarous	   tribes	   on	   its	   borders.	   We	   have	   allowed	   a	  noble	  people,	  capable	  of	  rapid	  and	  permanent	  advancement	  in	  civilization,	  to	  grow	  in	  numbers,	  whilst	  they	  festered	  in	  barbarism’.305	  	  	  
Lord	  Lytton	  and	  the	  Second	  Anglo-­Afghan	  War	  	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   in	   the	   mid	   1870s	   were	   in	   decline.	   The	   1873	  agreement	   that	   agreed	   spheres	   of	   influence	   and	   settled	   the	   northern	  boundary	   at	   the	   Oxus	   river,	   had	   been	   based	   on	   allaying	   fears	   that	   sprung	  from	   rivalry,	   but	   it	  was	   also	   a	   reflection	   of	   a	   shared	  desire	   to	   delimit	   their	  respective	   realms	   of	   expansion,	   and	   to	   manage	   relations.	   Once	   again,	   the	  distinction	  between	  ‘civilized’	  and	  ‘uncivilized’	  was	  central	  to	  this.	  Combined	  with	   the	   fashionable	   theories	  on	   race	  and	  natural	   selection,	   this	  distinction	  amounted	  to	  an	   imperial	  expansionist	  creed,	   that	  was	  recognised	   in	  Russia,	  and	  viewed	  by	  many	  in	  Britain	  as	  a	  natural,	  almost	  inevitable	  outcome.	  In	  a	  correspondence	  with	  India	  Council	  Member,	  and	  historian	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	   John	  Kaye,	  Henry	  Bartle	  Frere	  outlined	   this	   creed	   in	   revealing	  detail:	  	   ‘I	   need	   not	   …	   repeat	   how	   the	   annexation	   comes	   about;	   how	   the	  civilized	  power;	  theirs	  as	  well	  as	  ours,	  is	  forced	  to	  put	  its	  best	  men	  in	  contact	   with	   the	   uncivilized	   neighbour;	   how,	   if	   the	   frontier	  commander	  is	  ambitious,	  his	  uncivilized	  neighbours	  give	  him	  constant	  and	  apparently	  justifiable	  cause	  for	  hostilities,	  which	  in	  the	  end	  must	  always	   lead	   to	   the	   victorious	   advance	   of	   the	   stronger	   and	   more	  civilized	   power;	   how,	   if	   the	   frontier	   commander	   is	   conscientious	   or	  unambitious,	   the	   uncivilized	   neighbour	   gravitates	   to	   the	   stronger	  power	  …	  how,	  when	  any	  semi-­‐civilized	  “Humpty	  Dumpty”	  gets	  his	  fall,	  “all	  the	  king’s	  horses	  and	  all	  the	  king’s	  men”	  are	  utterly	  unable	  to	  set	  him	   up	   again;	   …	   how	   the	   one	   power	   is	   insensibly	   and	   by	   internal	  vigour	   urged	   to	   grow	   and	   aggress,	   while	   the	   other	   has	   no	   inherent	  force	   of	   resistance,	   unless	   he	   gives	   up	   his	   antiquated	   arms	   and	  indiscipline,	  and	  takes	  to	  himself	   the	  powerful	  weapons	  and	  military	  array	  of	  civilized	  nations,	  which	  are	  of	  no	  avail	  …	  unless	  he	  abandons	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also	   his	   barbarous	   habits	   and	   policy	   of	   finance	   and	   internal	  administration,	   in	   a	   word,	   unless	   he	   enters	   the	   ranks	   of	   civilized	  nations.’	  	  The	   1873	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   agreement	   was	   a	   weak	   commitment,	   based	   on	  correspondence	  between	  the	  foreign	  ministers	  of	  each	  country,	  and	  exhibited	  a	   poor	   grasp	   of	   the	   geography	   it	   related	   to.306 	  Nonetheless,	   under	   the	  agreement,	  Britain	  had	  committed	  to	  using	  their	  influence	  to	  restrain	  Sher	  Ali	  from	   any	   hostile	   actions	   to	   the	   north,	   and	  when	   Prime	  Minister	   Gladstone	  implied	   publically	   that	   the	   British	   commitment	   only	   amounted	   to	   a	   ‘moral	  influence’,	   there	   was	   indignation	   from	   the	   Russians,	   demonstrating	   the	  weight	  they	  ascribed	  to	  the	  quasi-­‐treaty.	  The	  British	  too	  indicated	  their	  trust	  in	  Russian	  commitments	  when	  they	  refused	  a	  defensive	  agreement	  with	  Sher	  Ali	  at	  a	   later	  1873	  conference	  with	   the	  Afghan	  Amir.	  At	   this	  conference	   the	  Amir	  had	  expressed	  his	  alarm	  at	  the	  Russian	  threat,	  which	  he	  said	   ‘aroused	  the	  gravest	  apprehensions	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Afghanistan’.307	  But	  upon	   communicating	   this	   alarm	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   in	   London,	  Northbrook	  was	  instructed	  to	  inform	  the	  Amir	  that	  the	  British	   ‘do	  not	  at	  all	  share	  his	  alarm,	  and	  consider	  there	  is	  no	  cause	  for	  it’.308	  The	  British	  did	  not	  credit	  the	  Amir	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  faithfully	  sustain	  a	  defensive	  agreement,	  and	  as	  the	  official	  history	  put	  it,	  they	  were	  against	  ‘causing	  needless	  irritation	  to	  a	  friendly	  power’.309	  For	  these	  reasons,	  Sher	  Ali	  did	  not	  get	  the	  support	  he	  hoped	   for	   from	   the	   British	   at	   the	   1873	   conference,	   despite	   the	   demands	  placed	  on	  him	  by	  the	  British	  to	  accept	  their	  Officers	  into	  his	  territory.	  	  	  Prior	   to	   his	   departure	   for	   his	   post	   in	   India,	   Lord	   Lytton	   had	   studied	  Rawlinson’s	   work,	   and	   Frere	   had	   handed	   him	   his	   memo	   on	   the	   Sind	   and	  Punjab	  policies	  on	  his	  way	  through	  Aden.310	  Lytton	  was	  therefore	  briefed	  on,	  and	   adopted	   the	   views	   of,	   two	   of	   the	   more	   committed	   advocates	   of	   this	  civilizing	  creed,	  wrapped	  in	  the	  systemic,	  ‘scientific’	  policy	  language	  of	  a	  new	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epistemic	   community.	   Added	   to	   this	   was	   the	   advice	   of	   his	   closest	   military	  advisor,	   Colonel	   Colley,	   who	   was	   an	   ardent	   proponent	   of	   the	   ‘scientific	  frontier’.311	  Lytton	   arrived	   in	   India	   in	   1876	  with	   permissive	   directives.	   His	  predecessor,	  Northbrook,	  had	  resigned	  over	  the	  continual	  disagreements	  he	  had	   with	   Salisbury	   over	   the	   need	   for	   British	   agents	   in	   Kabul,	   which	  Northbrook	  viewed	  as	  premature,	  likely	  to	  prove	  ineffective,	  and	  unlikely	  to	  be	  accepted	  without	  a	  better	  offer	  being	  put	  to	  Sher	  Ali.312	  Lytton,	  by	  contrast,	  arrived	   with	   the	   firm	   instruction	   to	   view	   Afghan	   policy	   and	   frontier	  administration	  ‘as	  an	  imperial	  concern’.313	  	  Rather	  than	  Northbrook’s	  insistence	  that	  Afghan	  policy	  should	  be	  conducted	  in	  communication	  with	  Russia	  through	  St	  Petersburg,	  Lytton	  adopted	  a	  more	  unilateral	  approach	  and	  was	  granted	  ‘considerable	  discretion’	  in	  keeping	  the	  policy	  exclusively	  under	  his	  control.314	  Underpinning	  all	  of	   this	  were	  Anglo-­‐Russian	   tensions	   over	   the	   Balkans	   that	   had	   been	   ongoing	   since	   1875.	  Meanwhile,	   months	   after	   the	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   agreement	   on	   the	   borders	   of	  Afghanistan,	  Russian	  troops	  had	  annexed	  the	  Central	  Asian	  Khanate	  of	  Khiva.	  Kokend	   followed	   in	   1876.	   Whilst	   neither	   of	   these	   moves	   contradicted	   the	  1873	   agreement,	   they	   indicated	   expansionist	   tendencies	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  Russians	  and	  further	  concerned	  Sher	  Ali.	  Prior	  to	  Lytton’s	  departure	  for	  India,	  Salisbury	   and	   Lytton	   had	   established	   a	   plan	   to	   pressure	   Russia	   in	   Central	  Asia	  as	  a	  strategic	  diversion	  by	  raising	  an	  insurrection	  amongst	  the	  Turkmen	  population	  and	  the	  Khanates	  of	  Central	  Asia.	  This	  has	  tended	  to	  sustain	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  tensions,	  yet	  this	  obscures	  the	  fact	  that	  Lytton	  had	  much	  say	  over	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  that	  campaign	  was	  carried	  out.	  	  Lytton’s	  campaign	  to	  restore	  British	  political	  influence	  in	  Afghanistan	  began	  through	  political	  means	  in	  a	  request	  for	  the	  stationing	  of	  a	  British	  officer	   in	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Kabul.	  In	  return,	  the	  Amir	  was	  to	  be	  granted	  the	  concessions	  he	  had	  sought	  at	  the	  1869	  Ambala	  conference	  and	  the	  later	  1873	  Simla	  conference,	  specifically,	  the	  payment	  of	  a	   subsidy;	   recognition	  of	  his	   chosen	  heir;	   and	   the	  pledge	  of	  support	   in	   case	   of	   external	   aggression.315	  In	   reply,	   the	   Amir	   refused	   the	  proposed	  British	  mission	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  he	  could	  not	  ensure	  its	  safety	  and	   it	   would	   entail	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   Russian	   mission	   too.	   However,	   he	  eventually	   agreed	   to	   a	  meeting	   to	   discuss	   terms	   for	   improved	   relations	   to	  which	  he	  agreed	  to	  send	  his	  own	  vakil,	  Syed	  Nur	  Muhammad.	  This	  meeting	  took	  place	  in	  October	  1876	  in	  Peshawar.	  It	  was	  clear	  at	  this	  meeting	  that	  the	  Viceroy	   would	   only	   accept	   terms	   that	   amounted	   to	   a	   state	   of	   divided	  sovereignty	   for	   the	   Amir	   including	   British	   oversight	   over	   Afghanistan’s	  external	  relations;	  a	  commitment	   to	  pass	  on	  all	  communication	  with	  Russia	  including	   any	   Russian	   agents;	   the	   stationing	   of	   British	   agents	   in	   Herat	  (though	  not	  in	  Kabul);	  and	  that	  Afghanistan	  be	  ‘freely	  opened	  to	  Englishmen’	  (though	  accepting	  the	  Amir	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  their	  safety).316	  	  	  This	  meeting	  also	  made	  clear	  the	  extent	  of	  distrust	  that	  the	  Amir	  had	  of	  the	  British.	  The	  one-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  the	  British	  negotiating	  posture	  had	  angered	  Sher	  Ali	  since	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  1873	  conference	  in	  Simla	  at	  which	  the	  British	  had	   rejected	   a	   formal	   defensive	   treaty	   against	   Russia	   yet	   requested	   the	  stationing	  of	  British	  officers	  in	  Afghanistan.317	  Added	  to	  this	  was	  the	  Seistan	  border	   commission	   of	   1872	   which	   had	   demarcated	   Afghan	   and	   Persian	  territorial	  possessions	  in	  Seistan,	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  both	  parties,	  yet	  resulted	  in	  an	   outcome	   that	   was	   viewed	   as	   favourable	   to	   Persia.318	  In	   addition,	   the	  British	   refusal	   to	   recognise	   Sher	   Ali’s	   nominated	   heir	   Abdullah	   Jan,	   whilst	  speaking	  out	  on	  the	  Amir’s	  political	  prisoners,	  notably	  the	  rebel	  chief	  Yakub	  Khan,	  demonstrated	  British	  duplicity.	  The	  Amir	  was	  known	  to	  have	  excerpts	  of	   the	  London	  News	   read	  to	  him	  in	  court	  which	  only	  added	  to	  his	  suspicion.	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The	   low	   value	   that	   appeared	   to	   be	   afforded	   to	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations,	   as	  well	   as	   reported	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   diplomacy	   over	   Central	   Asia	   appeared	   to	  demonstrate	   great	   power	   collusion	   over	   the	   status	   of	   Afghanistan.319	  This	  fear	  was	   only	   added	   to	  when	   Sher	   Ali’s	   cousin,	  who	  was	   living	   in	   London,	  wrote	   to	  him	  on	  a	  book	  he	  had	  read	  by	  a	   ‘great	  man’	  which	  argued	   for	   the	  annexation	  of	  Herat	  and	  Kandahar	   in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  Russian	  move	  on	  Merv.	  The	  book	  was	  the	  reissue	  of	  Rawlinson’s	  articles.320	  	  The	  outcome	  of	   the	  Peshawar	  meeting	   in	  1876	  was	   a	  draft	   agreement	   that	  was	  delivered	  to	  the	  Amir	   in	   terms	  that	  resembled	  an	  ultimatum.	  The	  Amir	  was	  instructed	  that	  if	  he	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  concessions	  ‘the	  Viceroy	  would	  be	  free	   to	   adopt	  his	  own	   course	   in	  his	   rearrangement	  of	   the	   frontier	   relations	  without	   regard	   to	   Afghan	   interests’.321	  In	   truth,	   the	   Viceroy	   continued	  with	  these	   rearrangements	   regardless,	   rooted	   in	   the	   move	   towards	   a	   ‘scientific	  frontier’.	  The	  signing	  of	  a	  treaty	  with	  Kalat	  in	  late	  1876	  gave	  the	  British	  the	  option	  of	  stationing	  troops	  in	  Quetta	  which	  would	  allow	  defence	  of	  the	  Bolan	  Pass.	  Meanwhile	   troops	  were	  moved	   closer	   to	   the	   Indus	   and	   the	   river	  was	  bridged	  at	  Attock.	  Both	  of	  these	  moves	  Sher	  Ali	  took	  as	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  his	  authority.322	  	  The	   reception	   of	   the	   draft	   agreement	   at	   the	   Kabul	   durbar	   was	   reported	  unfavourably	  by	  the	  vakil.	  The	  Amir	  declined	  to	  accept	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  draft	  yet	   agreed	   to	   a	   further	  meeting	   in	   February	   1877	   at	   Peshawar.	   In	   light	   of	  British	  moves	  elsewhere	  on	   the	   Indus	   these	  discussions	  were	   conducted	   in	  an	   atmosphere	   of	   deep	   mistrust.	   The	   British	   had	   bolstered	   their	   military	  moves	  on	  the	  Indus	  with	  a	  permanent	  troop	  presence	  at	  Quetta	  as	  well	  as	  a	  further	   garrison	   in	   the	   Kurram	   valley,	   thereby	   threatening	   Kabul	   and	  Jalalabad.	  Agents	  were	  also	  sent	  to	  Wakan	  and	  Chitral	   to	   improve	  relations,	  and	   influence	   was	   expanded	   in	   Kashmir. 323 	  Lytton	   was	   establishing	   a	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‘scientific’	  frontier.	  Meanwhile,	  reports	  began	  filtering	  in	  to	  frontier	  posts	  of	  agitation	   for	   religious	   war	   against	   the	   British.	   The	   Amir	   was	   engaged	   in	  protracted	   discussions	   with	   members	   of	   his	   court	   as	   the	   political	   ecology	  began	  to	  exhibit	  signs	  of	  a	  profound	  shift.	  As	  one	  report	  recorded:	  	   [E]xtraordinary	  symptoms	  …	  are	  observable	  in	  the	  Cabul	  Durbar;	  the	  troops	   look	   out	   of	   control	   or	   headstrong	   …	   and	   some	   of	   Durbar	  officials,	  Chiefs	  and	  influential	  persons	  seem	  happy,	  and	  other	  appear	  in	  a	  depressed	  condition.	  Those	  who	  were	  never	  allowed	  an	  audience	  in	   Durbar	   seem	   exalted	   and	   honoured,	   and	   those	   who	   could	   never	  speak	   a	   word	   …	   are	   now	   honourably	   received	   in	   private	   …	   Of	   the	  bazaar	  people	  some	  express	  their	  readiness	  to	  take	  part	  in	  a	  religious	  war	   and	   others	   desire	   change	   of	   rulers.	   …	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   has	  become	   altered,	   and	   the	   temperament	   of	   the	   people	   is	   undergoing	  change.	  Every	  one	  looks	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  report	  from	  Peshawar.324	  	  In	  the	  process	  of	  these	  protracted	  negotiations	  the	  chief	  Afghan	  envoy,	  Syed	  Nur	  Muhammad	  Shah	  died.	  Rather	  than	  wait	  for	  a	  new	  envoy	  to	  arrive,	  whom	  it	  was	  reported	  to	  the	  Viceroy,	  had	  been	  given	  permission	  to	  accede	  to	  British	  demands,	   Lytton	   instead	   instructed	   his	   chief	   negotiator	   to	   terminate	   the	  conference.	  	  	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   were	   now	   in	   terminal	   decline.	   The	   vakil	   was	  instructed	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Kabul.	  Lytton	  became	  convinced	  that	  the	  Amir’s	  authority	  was	  in	  a	  parlous	  state	  and	  would	  soon	  fall	  through	  sheer	  instability	  within	   the	   country.	   British	   officials	   began	   a	   campaign	   of	   agitation	   amongst	  the	   tribes	   of	   the	   frontier	   using	   the	   declaration	   of	   war	   by	   Russia	   against	  Turkey	  in	  April	  1877	  as	  a	  means	  to	  instigate	  disaffection	  against	  Sher	  Ali	  by	  associating	   him	   with	   Russia	   through	   his	   correspondence. 325 	  Through	  merchant	   networks	   the	   British	   began	   recording	   favourable	   indications	   of	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  country.	  As	  one	  report	  noted,	  ‘the	  Kazalbash	  [sic]	  tribes	  and	   the	   residents	   of	   the	   city	   of	   Cabul	   consider	   that	   perpetual	   peace	   is	  ensured	   under	   British	   rule,	   and	   they	   earnestly	   wish	   to	   see	   a	   British	  administration	   established	   in	   Afghanistan	  …	   The	   elders	   of	   the	   people	   have	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  Foreign	  Department	  Proceedings	  1876-­‐1879,	  Secret	  Consultations,	  No.	  155,	  letter	  IV,	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  February	  1877;	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	  ‘Afghanistan’,	  p.	  84-­‐5.	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  Chakravarty,	  From	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been	   divested	   of	   their	   ancient	   jagirs	   and	   powers,	   and	   are	   heart-­‐broken’.326	  Throughout	  1877,	  the	  predicted	  fall	  of	  Sher	  Ali’s	  authority	  did	  not	  come,	  but	  Lytton	   had	   become	   convinced	   through	   the	   apparently	   mutinous	   factions	  surrounding	  the	  Amir	  that	  it	  would	  be	  an	  easy	  task	  to	  disassemble	  the	  Afghan	  polity.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	   full	   realisation	  of	   the	   ‘scientific	   frontier’	  with	  a	  strong	  military	  presence	  in	  Kandahar	  and	  Herat.	  	  	  Meanwhile	   Russia	   was	   closing	   in	   on	   Constantinople,	   the	   fall	   of	   which	   the	  British	   viewed	   as	   a	   casus	   belli.	   War	   between	   Britain	   and	   Russia	   seemed	  imminent	  as	  the	  British	  occupied	  Cyprus	  and	  moved	  Indian	  troops	  to	  Malta.	  The	  Russians	  had	  agreed	   in	  advance	   that	  upon	   the	  entry	  of	   the	  British	   into	  the	  Russo-­‐Turkish	  war	  they	  would	  attempt	  to	  antagonise	  Sher	  Ali	  against	  the	  British	  in	  India.	  The	  arrival	  of	  a	  Russian	  Agent	  in	  Kabul	  in	  July	  1878,	  despite	  the	  protests	  of	  Sher	  Ali,	  was	  the	  leading	  edge	  of	  this	  new	  front.	  Hearing	  news	  of	  his	  arrival,	   the	  British	   lodged	  a	  complaint	  at	  St	  Petersburg.	   In	  August	  the	  Russian	  envoy	  was	  ordered	  back	  to	  Tashkent	  after	  the	  signing	  of	   the	  Berlin	  treaty	  that	  put	  an	  end	  to	  Russian-­‐Turkish	  hostilities,	  although	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  mission	  remained	  in	  Kabul.327	  The	  British	  meanwhile,	  were	  still	  awaiting	  a	   response	   to	   their	   protest.	   Despite	   this	   Lytton	   pressed	   on	   with	   restoring	  British	   influence.	  He	   first	   sent	  a	  minute	   to	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	   Council	   of	   India	   outlining	   his	   arguments	   for	   a	   stronger	   line	   of	   defence	  ‘along	   the	   Hindu-­‐Kush	   from	   the	   Pamir	   to	   Bamian,	   holding	   the	   northern	  debouches	  of	   the	  principle	  passes;	  and	  thence	  southwards	  by	  the	  Helmund,	  Girishk,	   and	   Candahar	   to	   the	   Arabian	   sea’.328	  	   He	   then	   dispatched	   his	   own	  mission	  to	  Kabul	  on	  21	  September,	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  London,	  demanding	  its	  entry	  into	  the	  country.	  The	  mission	  was	  turned	  back	  at	  the	  Khyber	  Pass.	  Lytton	   continued	   to	   urge	   Cabinet	   on	   the	   need	   to	   at	   least	   restore	   political	  influence.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  October	  he	  was	  given	  permission	  by	  London	  to	  issue	  an	  ultimatum	  to	  the	  Amir	  demanding	  a	  written	  apology,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  permanent	  British	  mission,	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Khyber	  Pass,	  or	  face	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  326	  IOR/L/PS/18/A19,	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  ‘Russian	  Correspondence	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military	   invasion.329	  The	   ultimatum	  was	   sent	   on	   2	   November,	   receiving	   no	  reply,	   the	   order	   to	   advance	  was	   given	   on	   21	   November.	   On	   30	   November,	  Sher	  Ali’s	  reply	  arrived	  –	  he	  had	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  ultimatum.	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  329	  Chakravarty,	  From	  Khyber	  to	  Oxus,	  208.	  
	   257	  
Conclusion:	  The	  Era	  of	  Exception	  	  Anglo-­‐Russian	  relations	  played	  a	  prominent	  part	  in	  the	  wider	  political	  setting	  that	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  war	  in	  1878,	  but	  the	  signing	  of	   the	   treaty	   in	  Berlin	  removed	  the	   immediate	  need	   for	   invasion	  on	  geopolitical	   grounds,	   and	   indeed	   made	   non-­‐intervention	   of	   greater	  importance	  so	  as	  not	  to	  inflame	  relations	  once	  more.	  The	  reaction	  of	  Lytton’s	  superiors	   demonstrated	   their	   views	   on	   the	   ill-­‐judgement	   of	   such	   a	  campaign.330	  The	   histories	   of	   this	   period	   reveal	   a	   belligerent	   Viceroy,	   a	  divided	   cabinet,	   and	   a	   prevaricating	   Foreign	   Secretary.	   But	   whilst	   the	  diplomatic	   minutiae	   of	   the	   decision	   to	   go	   to	   war	   reveals	   much	   of	   the	  individual	  decisions	  that	  led	  to	  war,	  this	  chapter	  has	  sought	  instead	  to	  locate	  the	   decision	   in	   the	   wider	   cultural,	   intellectual,	   and	   political	   trends	   in	   the	  management	  of	  the	  north-­‐west	  frontier	  of	  India.	  	  It	   is	   not	   sufficient	   explanation	   to	   simply	   put	   the	   Second	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  down	  to	  an	  imperial	  urge.	  Since	  the	  1850s	  the	  British	  had	  been	  increasingly	  comfortable	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘imperial’	   policy,	   but	   this	   does	   not	   give	  content	  to	  this	  desire.	  This	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  Lytton	  was	  operating	  in	  a	  permissive	  environment	  brought	  about	  by	   two	  crucial	  conditions.	  First	  was	  the	   concept	   of	   the	   ‘scientific	   frontier’	   which	   reduced	   Afghanistan	   to	   a	  problem	  of	  imperial	  defence,	  and	  removed	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  intricate	  nature	   of	   Afghan	   politics	   as	   a	  means	   of	   political	   influence.	   Second	  was	   the	  prevailing	  view	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  an	  ‘uncivilized’	  barbarous	  state	  which	  was	  effectively	   exempt	   from	   the	   considerations	  of	   international	   legal	  provisions	  due	  to	  its	  internal	  and	  cultural	  attributes.	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  a	  September	  1878	  minute	  sent	  by	  Lytton	  outlining	  his	  plans,	  which	  had	  elicited	  some	  resistance	  from	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  India,	  Rawlinson	  issued	  a	  telling	  rebuke:	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…	   it	   is	   mere	   affectation	   to	   pretend	   to	   apply	   the	   nice	   distinctions	   of	  European	  diplomacy	  to	  our	  relations	  with	  a	  barbarian	  Chief	   like	  Shir	  Ali	   Khan.	   To	   hold	   that	   he	   is	   an	   independent	   Prince,	   bound	   by	   no	  obligations	   to	   the	  British	  Government,	  and	   free	   to	  contract	  or	  refuse	  alliances	  as	  he	  pleases,	   is	   to	   ignore	   the	   true	  bearing	  of	   the	  case	  …	   in	  the	   relations	   of	   the	   great	   European	   Powers	   with	   the	   half	   civilised	  Chieftains	   of	   the	   East,	   the	   fine	   drawn	   distinctions	   of	   Western	  international	   law	   are	   brushed	   aside	   as	   mere	   cobwebs	   when	  substantial	   and	   Imperial	   interests	   intervene;	   and	   there	   is	   this	   to	   be	  said	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  a	  high-­‐handed	  course,	  that	  an	  honest	  deference	  to	  other	  considerations	  would	  be	  misunderstood	  by	  orientals	  and	  be	  attributed	  to	  weakness.331	  	  	  Rawlinson	  was	  not	   alone	   in	   these	   views.	   Contributing	   to	   the	   debate	   in	  The	  
Times	   the	   prominent	   jurist	   Sir	   James	   Fitzjames	   Stephen	  wrote:	   ‘there	   is	   no	  law	  by	  which	  the	  case	  between	  Shere	  Ali	  [sic]	  and	  ourselves	  can	  be	  tried.	  We	  are	  exceedingly	  powerful	  and	  highly	  civilized;	  he	  is	  comparatively	  weak	  and	  half	   barbarous.	   He	   cannot	   be	   permitted	   to	   follow	   a	   course	   of	   policy	  which	  may	  expose	  us	  to	  danger.	  We	  are	  to	  be	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  cause,	  and	  we	  are	  to	  decide	  according	  to	  our	  own	  interests.’332	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  intellectual	  bedrock	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  particularly	  vocal	  military	  epistemic	  community,	  whose	  ‘scientific’	  approach	  to	  frontier	  defence	  provided	   a	   pre-­‐formed	   vehicle	   for	   the	   expansive	   policies	   of	   the	   Governor-­‐General.	   Adding	   weight	   to	   this	   movement	   was	   a	   growing	   sense	   of	   the	  possibility	   to	   ‘civilize’	  what	   had	   often	   been	   viewed	   as	   a	   population	   beyond	  redemption.	  Here	  the	  sentimental	  aspects	  of	  the	  ‘frontier	  state	  of	  mind’	  were	  most	   obvious.	   This	   missionary	   zeal	   had	   a	   much	   longer	   history	   and	   much	  deeper	  cultural	  heritage	  than	  has	  been	  discussed	  here,	  but	  on	  the	  frontier	  it	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merged	  with	  a	  powerful	  reforming	  spirit,	  given	  credence	  by	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  rational,	  systemic	  approach	  to	  frontier	  management.	  	  If	  the	  British	  gradually	  lost	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  language	  of	  South	  Asian	  politics	   throughout	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   as	   Benjamin	   Hopkins	  summarises,333	  then	  this	  was	  a	  language	  over	  which	  they	  only	  ever	  exhibited	  a	   slender	   grasp.	   It	   was	   a	   language	   heavily	   driven	   by	   their	   own	   ideas	   and	  prejudices,	  but	  accented	  by	  a	  tenuous	  and	  tendentious	  understanding	  of	  local	  conditions.	   But	   the	   forgetting	   of	   this	   language	   meant	   beginning	   to	   speak	  another.	   This	   chapter	   has	   argued	   that	   this	   new	   dialogue	   was	   far	   more	  introspective,	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   an	   expression	   of	   internal	   administrative	  anxieties	   and	   disputes,	   on	   the	   other	   an	   expression	   of	   curious	   narcissitic	  tendency	   in	   which	   the	   ‘character’	   of	   British	   imperial	   rule	   was	   subject	   to	  examination.	   The	   frontier	   debate	   drifted	   from	   the	   prejudice	   and	   violent	  geography	  of	  the	  post-­‐1842	  era,	  to	  a	  more	  imperialist	  debate,	  driven	  in	  large	  part	   by	   the	   formalizing	   influence	   of	   bureaucratic	   competence,	   and	   the	  positivist	   epistemology	   of	   a	   ‘scientific’	   approach	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   public	  affairs.	  This	   inevitably	  moved	  the	   ‘expert’	   community	  away	   from	  the	  rather	  more	  improvised	  and	  subjective	  dialogue	  of	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  colonial	  knowledge.	  	  	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   colonial	   knowledge	   entered	   the	   debate	   it	   was	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   justifying	   the	  need	   for	  a	  civilizing	   influence,	  an	  argument	  often	  couched	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘character’	   and	   ‘nature’.	   In	   its	   place,	   the	   predominant	  new	  military	   science	  allowed	  a	   language	   that	   all	  participants	   could	  become	  competent	  in,	  and	  many	  already	  were,	  as	  graduates	  of	  the	  new	  professional	  schools	   of	  military	   education.	   It	   was	   a	   language	   that	   created	   an	   illusion	   of	  control,	  and	  placated	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  Afghan	  politics	  and	  society.	  This	  new	  aspect	  to	  colonial	  knowledge	  did	  not	  require	  a	  process	  of	  policy	  application	  in	  order	  to	  refine	  it	  into	  digestible	  form;	  it	  came	  preformed	  in	  the	  categories	  of	  the	  policy	  debates	  it	  informed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  333	  Hopkins,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Afghanistan.	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   Chapter	  Five	  	  	   Conclusion	  	  	  	  This	   thesis	   set	   out	   to	   achieve	   two	  principal	   goals:	   to	   recover	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	   from	   what	   has	   been	   described	   as	   the	   oblivion	   of	   great	   power	  politics,	   and	   to	   further	   contribute	   to	   the	   insights	   that	   imperial	   history	   can	  offer	   the	   IR	   discipline.	   In	   conclusion	   this	   chapter	   considers	   the	   findings	   of	  this	  work	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  aims	  using	  the	  three	  themes	  outlined	  in	  the	  introduction	   of	   ‘knowledge’,	   ‘policy’,	   and	   ‘exception’,	   and	   offers	   some	  reflections	   on	   the	   contemporary	   relevance	   of	   this	   study	   to	   international	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  today.	  	  	  
Knowledge	  
	  The	   arrival	   of	   European	   explorers	   in	   Afghanistan	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  nineteenth	   century	   marked	   the	   overture	   to	   a	   renewed	   era	   of	   European	  engagement	   with	   Afghanistan.	   These	   adventurers,	   officials,	   military	   men,	  itinerants,	  and	  scholars	  carried	  with	  them	  their	  own	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  baggage	   that	   informed	   their	   observations.	   By	   focussing	   on	   their	   activities,	  their	  publications,	  and	  their	  formation	  of	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  a	  ‘knowledge	  community’,	   this	   work	   has	   shifted	   forward	   the	   conventional	   narrative	   of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  which	  tends	  to	  begin	  with	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War.	  The	  activities	  and	  works	  of	  these	  early	  explorers,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  impact	  on	  policy,	   is	   generally	   overlooked	   in	   existing	   histories,	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   more	  dramatic	   story	   of	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   rivalry.	   Yet	   as	   recent	   scholarship	   is	  increasingly	  showing,	  the	  ‘great	  game’	  narrative	  offers	  little	  by	  way	  of	  insight	  into	   the	  development	  of	  British	  understandings	  of	  Afghanistan	   itself	   at	   this	  time.	  Colonial	  frontiers	  rarely	  expanded	  blindly,	  and	  the	  knowledge	  that	  this	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community	  provided	  informed	  the	  imperial	  gaze	  as	  it	   looked	  out	  beyond	  its	  existing	   territories.	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   colonial	   state	   ‘saw’	   was	  mediated	   through	   these	   individuals	   and	   their	   cultural	   and	   intellectual	  worldviews,	  but	   this	   epistemic	  baggage	  was	  not	   totalizing.	  These	  European	  explorers	   were	   parasitic	   upon	   their	   hosts.	   Their	   observations	   were	  determined	   to	   a	   significant	   extent	   by	   the	   people	   with	   whom	   they	   were	  inclined	   to	   interact	  with,	   and	  were	  able	   to	   interact	  with.	  This	  encounter	  on	  the	   periphery	   of	   the	   colonial	   state	  was	   to	   an	   extent,	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	   at	  least,	  a	  dialogue.	  	  	  A	  principal	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  growing	  literature	  that	   has	   sought	   to	   rectify	   of	   what	   has	   been	   described	   as	   the	   ‘wilful	  forgetting’1 	  of	   empire	   within	   IR	   and	   the	   overlooking	   of	   the	   nineteenth	  century	  more	  generally.2	  By	  focussing	  attention	  on	  the	  accumulation	  and	  use	  of	   colonial	   knowledge	   this	   thesis	   has	   explored	   a	   new	   avenue	   for	   research	  within	   this	   ‘imperial	   turn’.	   Chapter	   two	   showed	   how	   this	   knowledge	  demonstrated	   a	   capacity	   to	   produce,	   for	   European	   observers,	   a	   ‘normative	  conception’	  of	   the	  Afghan	  polity,	   linking	  authority,	   territory,	  and	  population	  into	  a	  coherent	  narrative.3	  Colonial	  knowledge,	  in	  this	  respect,	  was	  a	  site	  for	  the	  colonial	  political	  imagination	  and	  a	  venue	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  Afghanistan’	  in	  the	  colonial	  mind.	  But	  the	  dialogic	  aspect	  to	  the	  encounters	  that	   crafted	   this	   idea,	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   presumption	   that	   European	  political	  ideals	  were	  simply	  projected	  into	  the	  non-­‐European	  space	  is	  not	  the	  case.	   The	   process	   of	   imagining	   Afghanistan	   was	   in	   part	   the	   process	   of	  transculturation. 4 	  Those	   at	   the	   receiving	   end	   of	   this	   process	   had	   the	  opportunity	  to	  talk	  back	  and	  this,	   in	  turn,	  was	  socialized	  into	  the	  normative	  and	  conceptual	  universe	  of	  these	  European	  observers.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Vitalis,	  ‘Birth	  of	  a	  Discipline’,	  160;	  Duncan	  Bell,	  ‘Writing	  the	  World:	  Disciplinary	  history	  and	  beyond’,	  International	  Affairs,	  85/1,	  (2009),	  8.	  2	  Barry	  Buzan	  and	  George	  Lawson	  ‘The	  global	  transformation:	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  making	  of	  modern	  international	  relations’,	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  (Forthcoming,	  available	  online:	  http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44894/).	  3	  Bierstecker	  and	  Weber,	  State	  Sovereignty	  as	  Social	  Construct.	  4	  Pratt,	  Imperial	  Eyes,	  7.	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With	  this	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  claim	  too	  much	  for	  colonial	  knowledge.	  The	  work	  of	   these	   individuals	  was	  often	  amateurish,	   frequently	  prejudiced,	  and	  always	  limited	  in	  its	  scope.	  The	  power	  of	  colonial	  knowledge	  derived	  not	  from	  its	  capacity	  to	  capture	  social	  reality	  in	  its	  multiple	  dimensions,	  but	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  speak	  directly	  to	  the	  colonial	  elite.	  In	  a	  similar	  sense,	  it	  is	  important	  not	   to	   elevate	   to	   too	   great	   a	   height	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   ‘colonial	   state’	   to	  imbibe	   this	   knowledge	   and	   act	   upon	   it.	   The	  modus	  operandi	   of	   these	   early	  accumulators	  of	  Afghanistan	  knowledge	  was	  just	  as	  tribal	  as	  the	  communities	  they	  purported	  to	  understand.	  Their	  capacity	  to	  influence	  and	  inform	  policy	  sprung	  more	  from	  their	  proximity	  to	  the	  fraying	  ends	  of	  colonial	  authority	  in	  this	   region	   than	   from	   their	   part	   in	   some	   form	   of	   all-­‐pervasive	   monolithic	  imperial	  entity.	  However,	  their	  shared	  endeavours	  on	  the	  fringes	  of	  the	  East	  India	   Company	   territories,	   and	   their	   relative	   scarcity	   did	   encourage	   the	  pooling	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  views.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  an	   Afghanistan	   colonial	   knowledge	   community,	   one	   whose	   opinions	   and	  works	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  thinking	  of	  key	  decision-­‐makers.	  	  	  
Policy	  	  As	  James	  C.	  Scott	  reminds	  us,	  societies	  that	  are	  relatively	  opaque	  to	  the	  state	  can	  be	  insulated,	  to	  some	  degree,	  from	  certain	  forms	  of	  state	  intervention.	  In	  such	   instances	   ‘[t]he	   interventions	   it	   does	   experience	   will	   typically	   be	  mediated	   by	   local	   trackers	  who	   know	   the	   society	   from	   inside	   and	  who	   are	  likely	   to	   interpose	   their	   own	   particular	   interests.’5	  Chapter	   three	   looked	   at	  such	  ‘trackers’	  in	  more	  detail	  by	  considering	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  knowledge	   community	   on	   the	   policy	   decisions	   that	   led	   to	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   War.	   To	   varying	   degrees,	   these	   individuals	   and	   their	   works	   were	  socialised	   into	   the	   policy-­‐making	   community	   of	   the	   EIC	   during	   the	   1830s.	  European	   explorers	   were	   therefore	   instrumental	   in	   crafting	   a	   ‘regime	   of	  legibility’6	  for	   the	   colonial	   state.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   ‘idea	   of	   Afghanistan’	  developed	   into	  a	  new	   form	  of	  official	  knowledge.	  This	  was	  always	  a	  partial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State,	  78.	  6	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State.	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model,	   stymied	   by	   the	   prejudices	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   knowledge	   upon	  which	  it	  drew,	  and	  inescapably	  shaped	  towards	  the	  policy	  agenda	  it	  sought	  to	  inform.	  Moreover,	   as	   chapter	   three	  demonstrates,	   the	   crisis	  moment	   of	   the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  served	  to	  enact	  a	  process	  of	  ‘closure’	  upon	  this	  model.	  Certain	  core	  narratives	  concerning	  the	  political	  history	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  its	  social	  structure	  began	  to	  take	  hold.	  In	  certain	  cases,	  for	  example	  the	  case	  of	  the	   Barakzai/Saddozai	   schism,	   these	   narratives	   became	   received	   wisdom.	  Once	  again,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  claim	  too	  much	  for	  colonial	  knowledge	  and	  its	  capacity	  to	  shape	  policy	  prescriptions,	  but	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  this	  body	   of	   understanding,	   explanations	   for	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   British	  chose	  to	  intervene	  in	  1838	  can	  only	  go	  so	  far.	  	  	  Contrary	   to	   received	   wisdom,	   the	   British	   were	   not	   completely	   ignorant	   of	  Afghanistan	  prior	   to	   their	   intervention,	  but	   their	  knowledge	  was	  extremely	  limited,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   connections	   with	   collaborators	   within	  Afghanistan,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  own	  worldviews	  on	  the	  little	  knowledge	  that	  they	  had	  developed.	  In	  addition,	  in	  chapter	  three	  we	  saw	  how	  government	  structures	  themselves	  served	  to	   induce	  a	  warping	  effect	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  certain	  policy	  problems.	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Britain	  was	  not	  only	  facing	  new	  foreign	  policy	  challenges	  in	  India,	  but	  it	  was	  evolving	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  dealt	  with	  these	  problems.	  In	  the	  period	  preceding	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  was	  becoming	  marginalised	  by	   the	   Crown.	   Britain	  was	   beginning	   to	   act	   in	   a	  more	   deliberate	   way	   as	   a	  global	  power.	  The	  British	  Government	  in	  India	  was	  beginning	  to	  develop	  its	  own	   foreign	   policy	   as	   an	   ‘Asiatic	   power’.	   This	   necessitated	   a	   period	   of	  adjustment	   that	   raises	   interesting	   questions	   relating	   to	   ‘ontological	  security’.7	  	  	  Whilst	   the	   British	   may	   have	   been	   an	   Asiatic	   ‘power’,	   they	   were	   not	  necessarily	  an	  Asiatic	  ‘state’	  –	  and	  certainly	  not	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Mitzen,	  ‘Ontological	  Security	  in	  World	  Politics’;	  Mitzen,	  ‘Anchoring	  Europe’s	  civilizing	  identity:	  habits,	  capabilities	  and	  ontological	  security’;	  Steele,	  ‘Ontological	  security	  and	  the	  power	  of	  self-­‐identity:	  British	  neutrality	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War’.	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addition,	  whilst	  it	  had	  become	  fashionable	  to	  speak	  of	  Britain’s	  ‘empire’,	  acts	  of	   ‘imperialism’	   were	   generally	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   ‘purportedly	   despotic	  municipal	   politics	   of	   France’.8	  This	   began	   to	   change	   in	   the	   1870s,	   but	   the	  observation	   is	   a	   reminder	   that	   the	   capacity	   for	   ‘identity’	   to	   generate	  constitutive	  effects	   -­‐	  or	   in	  other	  words	   the	  capacity	   for	  actors	   to	  determine	  what	  they	  want	  based	  on	  who	  they	  are,	  and	  to	  interact	  with	  others	  based	  on	  this	  identity	  -­‐	  must	  appreciate	  that	  this	  identity	  is	  not	  fixed.	  Imperial	  history,	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  colonial	  state	  provides	  intriguing	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  respect.	   As	   chapter	   three	   further	   demonstrates,	   the	   construction	   of	   ‘threat’	  was	  partly	  location-­‐specific.	  Whilst	  London	  was	  more	  fixated	  on	  geopolitical	  concerns	   and	   Russia	   in	   particular,	   Calcutta	   was	   more	   preoccupied	   with	  regional	   issues,	   including	   rivalries	   between	   local	   powers,	   internal	   threats,	  ‘rumour’,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   trade.	   Despite	   this,	   exchanges	   between	  centre	  and	  periphery	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  new	  understandings	  of	  policy	  problems	  at	  the	  ‘contact	  zones’	  of	  colonial	  administration.	  	  	  	  By	  adopting	  a	  more	  local	  perspective	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	  in	  the	  period	  preceding	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  this	  study	  has	  surfaced	  a	  previously	   underdeveloped	   aspect	   of	   this	   relationship.	   Alongside	   colonial	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  regime	  of	  legibility	  that	  was	  provided	  by	  advisors	  such	  as	  Burnes	  and	  Masson,	   the	  British	  spent	  much	  of	   the	  1830s	  quietly	  observing,	  and	  occasionally	   interfering	   in	  Afghan	  political	  developments.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  three,	   this	  period	  encompassed	  the	  various	  attempts	  made	  by	  Shah	  Shuja	   to	   reclaim	   his	   throne.	   These	   efforts,	   and	   the	   close	   relationship	   that	  developed	   between	   the	   British	   and	   Shuja’s	   coterie	   also	   served	   to	   shape	  British	  perceptions	  of	   legitimate	  Afghan	  government.	  The	  tenuous	  nature	  of	  the	   information	   system	   that	   the	   British	   had	   established	   in	   the	   north-­‐west	  during	  the	  1830s	  was	  ameliorated	  in	  part	  by	  their	  contact	  with	  such	  exiles	  as	  Shah	   Shuja.	   When	   the	   British	   came	   to	   consider	   an	   alternative	   to	   Dost	  Muhammad	   Khan,	   the	   exiled	   former	   ruler	   was	   able	   to	   warp	   British	  perceptions	   in	   favour	   of	   his	   dynastic	   authority	   in	   an	   example	   of	   ‘epistemic	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  Bell,	  ‘Victorian	  visions	  of	  global	  order:	  An	  introduction’,	  5.	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insurgency’.9	  This	   is	   an	   overlooked	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   for	  why	   Claude	  Wade,	   the	   political	   officer	   at	   Ludhiana,	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   warp	   Burnes’	  dispatches	   from	   Kabul.	   Similarly,	   Burnes’	   time	   in	   Kabul	   led	   to	   his	  encountering	   a	   number	   of	   disaffected	   communities,	   notably	   the	   Qizilbash,	  who	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  presented	  a	  potential	  threat	  as	  a	  Persian	  proxy,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  presented	  a	  potential	  facilitator	  for	  a	  return	  to	  Saddozai	  rule	  under	  Shah	   Shuja.	   The	   capacity	   of	   these	   indigenous	   communities	   to	   exploit	   the	  presence	   of	   outsiders	   to	   their	   own	   ends,	   and	   to	   warp	   their	   views	   in	   a	  deliberate	  manner,	   offers	  much	   in	   terms	   of	   recovering	   local	   agency,	   and	   is	  worthy	  of	  more	  research	  in	  the	  Afghan	  context.	  	  	  
Exception	  	  As	  with	   the	   period	   preceding	   the	   First	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	   the	   period	   after	  this	  war	  has	  escaped	  scholarly	  attention.	  Chapter	  four	  sought	  to	  recover	  this	  history.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   are	   covered	   in	   the	  literature,	  it	  is	  generally	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  presents	  Afghanistan	  as	  distinctly	  a	  no-­‐go	  area	  for	  the	  British.	  Whilst	  this	  was	  certainly	  the	  case	  for	  much	  of	  the	  1840s,	  this	  sense	  of	  exception	  was	  productive	  in	  itself	  of	  a	  ‘violent	  geography’	  feeding	  off	  the	  memories	  of	  the	  First	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War,	  and	  shaping	  British	  perceptions	   of	   the	  Afghan	   space.	   Partly	   this	  was	   a	   perception	   sustained	   by	  the	   feeble	   information	   sources	   they	   possessed.	   A	   series	   of	   ‘information	  panics’,	  normally	  surrounding	  rumours	  of	  marauding	  tribes,	  ensured	  that	  the	  British	   remained	   comfortable	   in	   their	   view	   of	   the	   Afghans	   as	   violent	  collective.	  Added	  to	   this	  was	   the	   innate	  bias	  of	   the	   frontier	  officers	   through	  whom	   this	   information	   came,	   and	   who	   projected	   their	   prejudice	   of	   the	  frontier	  tribes	  beyond	  the	  passes.	  	  	  The	  consolidation	  of	  the	  frontier	  under	  military	  rule	  following	  the	  Anglo-­‐Sikh	  wars	   created	   to	   an	   extent,	   a	   sense	   of	   security	   for	   colonial	   officials,	   and	  reduced	   the	   imperative	   to	   expand	  beyond	   their	   boundaries.	   This	   allowed	  a	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  Walsh,	  ‘Political	  Epistemic	  Insurgency,	  Political	  Movements	  and	  the	  Refounding	  of	  the	  State’.	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tentative	  recovery	  of	  diplomatic	  intercourse	  between	  Kabul	  and	  Calcutta,	  but	  one	  that	  remained	  stunted	  by	  British	  prejudice,	  and	  mutual	  fear.	  Chapter	  four	  provides	   a	   reminder	   that	   for	   empires,	   the	   ‘frontier’	   exists	   as	   a	   distinct	  geographic	  unit,10	  not	  necessarily	  a	  territorially	  delimited	  unit	  –	  at	   least	  not	  in	  a	  cartographic	   sense	  –	  but	  an	   ‘imagined	  geography’,	  more	  of	  a	   locational	  concept.	  This	  observation	  highlights	  a	  further	  area	  of	  research	  for	  IR	  scholars	  that	  offers	  an	  opportunity	   to	  escape	   the	   ‘territorial	   trap’11	  and	  consider	   the	  role	  of	  alternate	  forms	  of	  political	  community	  in	  world	  politics.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  north-­‐west	   frontier	  of	   India,	   this	   locational	  concept	  attracted	  an	  aura	  of	  mystique,	  of	  danger,	  and	  of	  intrigue;	  one	  that	  arguably	  persists	  to	  this	  day.	  	  Taming	   this	   imaginative	   knowledge	   in	   the	   1850s	   were	   the	   processes	   of	  professionalization	  that	  reformed	  the	  military	  and	  civil	  service	  in	  this	  period.	  Afghanistan	   itself	   became	   subject	   to	   a	   new	   techno-­‐cultural	   mediation	   that	  included	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘scientific	  frontier’;	  one	  that	  was	  ‘part	  geographical,	  part	   ethnological’12	  but	   generally	   loosely	   defined.	   The	   ‘scientific	   frontier’	  offered	  the	  illusion	  of	  control	  over	  a	  geographic	  space	  that	  continued	  to	  exert	  a	  powerful	  sway	  over	  the	  imperial	  imagination.	  	  	  The	  argument	   that	   imperial	   competition	   in	  Central	  Asia	  was	  a	  precursor	   to	  the	  Cold	  War	  provides	  powerful	  sense	  of	  historical	  continuity	  but	  it	  misses	  a	  far	  more	   complicated	   history,	   and	   a	   far	  more	   revealing	   argument.	   Chapter	  four	   showed	   how	   in	   confronting	   the	   policy	   problem	   of	   their	   frontier	   the	  British	  were	  forced	  to	  accept	  the	  imperial	  urge	  in	  themselves	  as	  an	  ‘empire’,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  forced	  to	  recognize	  and	  accept	  that	  urge	  in	  Russia.	  A	  new	  discourse	   of	   ‘civilized’	   and	   ‘uncivilized’	   states	   encouraged	   this	   shared	  imperial	  vision	  and	  entailed	  a	  duty,	  upon	  the	  part	  of	  the	  ostensibly	  ‘civilized’	  empire	   to	   tame	   the	   ‘uncivilized’	   wilds.	   This	   promoted	   instances	   of	   great	  power	   collusion	   during	   this	   period,	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   prevailing	  narrative	   of	   rivalry	   that	   often	   describes	   this	   era.	   In	   addition,	   these	   shared	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  Van	  Der	  Pijl,	  Kees,	  Nomads,	  Empires,	  States:	  Modes	  of	  Foreign	  Relations	  and	  Political	  
Economy,	  Volume	  I,	  (London:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2007),	  76.	  11	  Agnew,	  ‘The	  Territorial	  Trap:	  The	  Geographical	  Assumptions	  of	  International	  Relations	  Theory’.	  12	  Anderson,	  ‘Politics	  and	  Poetics	  in	  Ethnographic	  Texts’,	  98.	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imperial	   visions	   of	   global	   order	   perpetuated	   a	   divide	   in	   which	   the	   legal	  standing	  of	   ‘uncivilized’	   states	  remained	  suppressed,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  were	  permanently	  at	  risk.	  	  	  
Beyond	  the	  Great	  Game	  	  Every	   generation	   writes	   its	   own	   history,	   and	   with	   respect	   to	   Afghanistan	  perhaps	  this	  generation	  is	  writing	  it	  from	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  current	  war.	  Nonetheless,	   many	   recent	   histories	   of	   Afghanistan’s	   nineteenth	   century	  colonial	   encounter	   still	   prioritise	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   rivalry.	   As	   such,	   these	  histories	  remain	  inflected	  by	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  preoccupations	  with	  great	  power	  politics,	   and	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   great	   game	  was	   simply	   a	   precursor	   to	   this	  global	   conflict.	   It	   is	   time	   to	  move	  on	   from	   this	  narrative	  –	  not	  because	   it	   is	  wrong,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  relative	  analytical	  weakness	  of	  great	  power	  rivalries	   in	   explaining	   the	   nature	   of	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   relations	   during	   the	  nineteenth	  century.	   In	  many	  ways	   it	  was	   the	   inability	  of	   the	  British	   to	  read	  the	  Afghan	  polity	  that	   led	  to	  their	  fears	  for	  their	  own	  position	  in	  India.	  This	  raises	   a	   host	   of	   questions	   with	   contemporary	   relevance	   concerning	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   states	   understand	   regions	   they	   have	   little	   knowledge	   or	  insight	   into.	   Anglo-­‐Russian	   relations	   mattered,	   and	   at	   times	   of	   crisis	   they	  were	   critical,	   but	   they	   did	   not	   matter	   all	   of	   the	   time,	   and	   they	   offer	   little	  insight	   into	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  relations	   in	  the	   interim.	  These	  periods	  have	  often	  evaded	  in-­‐depth	  analysis,	  perhaps	  because	  they	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  drama	  of	  diplomatic	   frisson,	  but	   they	  are	  crucial	   in	   tracking	   the	  development	  of	  what	  was	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   introduction	   as	   the	   ‘idea’	   of	   Afghanistan.	   These	  temporal	   spaces	   in	   between	   allowed	   narratives	   to	   take	   hold,	   they	   allowed	  intellectual	  trends	  to	  rise	  and	  become	  influential,	  and	  they	  allowed	  powerful	  institutions	   of	   thought	   and	   practice	   to	   establish	   their	   grip	   over	   diplomatic	  intercourse.	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Imagining	  Afghanistan	  Today	  	  After	   over	   a	   decade	   of	   international	   presence	   in	   Afghanistan	   it	   is	   easy	   to	  forget	   the	   sheer	   sense	   of	   intrigue	   and	   unfamiliarity	   that	   the	   country	  presented	   in	   late	   2001.	   The	   BBC	   reporter	   John	   Simpson	   provides	   a	   telling	  reminder.	  On	   the	  eve	  of	   the	   launch	  of	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom,	  eleven	  days	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  Simpson	  and	  his	  cameraman	  were	  spirited	  across	  the	   border	   with	   Pakistan,	   by	   ‘heavily	   armed	   smugglers’	   into	   Nangahar	  Province,	   ‘becoming	  the	  only	  television	  reporter	  to	  broadcast	  from	  Taleban-­‐held	  Afghanistan’.	  The	  brief	  account	  of	  his	  trip	  shows	  just	  how	  far	  beyond	  the	  pale	  the	  Afghan	  state	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  at	  this	  time.	  	  	   On	   the	   advice	   of	   their	   escorts,	   the	   two	   men	   donned	   burqas	   -­‐	   the	  traditional	   full-­‐length	   garment	   compulsory	   for	   all	   women	   living	   in	  Taleban-­‐controlled	   Afghanistan.	   …	   Mr	   Simpson,	   who	   has	   reported	  from	  many	  of	   the	  world's	   trouble	   spots	   over	   the	  past	   20	   years,	   said	  the	   disguises	   worked	   "superbly",	   despite	   both	   of	   them	   being	   more	  than	   six	   feet	   tall.	   "Merely	   putting	   on	   the	   burqa,	   I	   found,	   has	   an	  extraordinary	  effect	  -­‐	  it	  seems	  to	  make	  you	  disappear,"	  he	  said.13	  	  The	   representations	   of	   Afghanistan	   portray	   its	   archetypal	   status	   as	   an	  ‘outlaw	  state’;	  a	  ‘black	  world’,	  ‘silent	  and	  foreboding’,	  yet	  ‘at	  the	  crosshairs	  of	  manifest	   destiny’.14	  Despite	   the	   ‘heavy	  Taleban	  presence’	   Simpson	   reported	  on	  the	  “eerie	  emptiness”	  in	  the	  province	  they	  visited,	  as	  the	  local	  population	  were	  either	  ‘keeping	  their	  heads	  down’	  or	  had	  already	  fled	  the	  anticipated	  US	  strike.	  	  Given	  this	  apparent	  and	  actual	  sense	  of	  exclusion	  from	  Afghanistan,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Afghanistan	   ‘experts’	  were	  a	  rare	  breed	   in	  2001.	  As	  Barfield	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  ‘Simpson	  smuggled	  into	  Afghanistan’,	  BBC	  News	  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/22/newsid_4073000/4073858.stm,	  22	  September	  2001).	  14	  Trevor	  Paglen,	  ‘Groom	  Lake	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Production	  of	  Nowhere’,	  244.	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commented	  on	  his	  chosen	  area	  of	  expertise,	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  ‘[c]ritics	  of	  the	   university	   tenure	   system	   undoubtedly	   put	   me	   among	   those	   useless	  faculty	   who	   purveyed	   esoteric	   and	   irrelevant	   knowledge	   to	   the	   young	  without	  fear	  of	  termination.	  Wise	  policymakers	  had	  already	  determined	  that	  such	  remote	  places	  and	  people	  could	  be	  safely	  excluded	  from	  America’s	  New	  World	   Order.’15	  In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   9/11	   attacks,	   policy-­‐makers	   gathered	   in	   those	   who	   were	   knowledgeable.	   Profiting	   from	   this	  renewed	  interest	  were	  the	  journalist	  Ahmed	  Rashid	  and	  the	  political	  scientist	  Barnett	  Rubin	  who	  both	  served	  as	  close	  advisors	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  US	  State	  Department	   from	   2001	   onwards,	   and	   were	   key	   advisors	   over	   the	   Bonn	  Process	   in	   2001	   that	   led	   to	   a	   new	  Afghan	   constitution.16	  Rubin	  would	   later	  serve	  as	  a	  Special	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Obama	  administration.	  Others,	  such	  as	  Rory	  Stewart,	  found	  themselves	  courted	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  US	  officials	  including	  the	  former	   US	   Special	   Representative	   for	   Afghanistan	   and	   Pakistan,	   Richard	  Holbrooke,	   who	   reportedly	   placed	   Stewart	   next	   to	   Hilary	   Clinton	   at	   one	  Washington	  event,	  instructing	  him	  to	  say	  ‘exactly	  what	  you	  think.	  If	  you	  don't,	  I	  never	  -­‐	  ever	  -­‐	  want	  to	  hear	  you	  criticise	  the	  policy	  again.’17	  	  	  The	  role	  of	  such	  experts	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  today	  remains	  an	  under-­‐researched	   yet	   intriguing	   area,	   not	   simply	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   actual	  influence,	  which	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  be	  minimal,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  genesis	   of	   the	   peculiar	   form	   of	   knowledge	   that	   they	   propound. 18 	  A	  contemporary	  study	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  policy-­‐relevant	  knowledge	  presents	  a	  gap	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   is	   potentially	   an	   important	   gap	   in	   this	   era	   of	  academic	  ‘impact’	  surveys.	  For	  Stewart,	  who	  has	  himself	  spoken	  out	  over	  the	  apparent	   lack	   of	   ‘expertise’	   within	   the	   policy-­‐making	   community,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Barfield,	  Afghanistan,	  x.	  16	  Ahmed	  Rashid,	  Descent	  into	  Chaos	  (New	  York:	  Viking,	  2008);	  Lucy	  Morgan	  Edwards,	  The	  
Afghan	  Solution	  (London:	  Bactria	  Press,	  2011),	  iv-­‐v.	  17	  Stewart,	  Rory,	  ‘Midnight	  Moments:	  Exposing	  the	  truth	  and	  taking	  full	  responsibility	  for	  Afghanistan’,	  Huffington	  Post	  (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rory-­‐stewart/post_1457_b_799063.html,	  20	  December	  2010).	  Manan	  Ahmad,	  ‘Flying	  blind:	  US	  foreign	  policy’s	  lack	  of	  expertise’,	  The	  National	  	  (http://www.thenational.ae/arts-­‐culture/books/flying-­‐blind-­‐us-­‐foreign-­‐policys-­‐lack-­‐of-­‐expertise,	  10	  May	  2011).	  18	  For	  an	  excellent	  study	  on	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  Foreign	  Policy	  advisers	  see:	  Bruce	  Kuklick,	  Blind	  
Oracles:	  Intellectuals	  and	  War	  from	  Kennan	  to	  Kissinger	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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problem	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  absence	  of	  policy	  experts	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  expertise	   and	   ‘the	   new	  mass	   brand	   of	   international	   intervention’	   that	   they	  propound.19	  From	  this	  perspective,	  foreign	  policy	  failure	  in	  situations	  such	  as	  the	   state-­‐building	   projects	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan	   are	   partly	   due	   to	   the	  flattening	  impact	  that	  a	  generic	  approach	  to	  such	  projects	  carries.	  According	  to	   this	   argument	   cultural,	   and	   linguistic	   expertise	   is	   overlooked	   as	   the	  Foreign	   Office	   seeks	   greater	   flexibility	   in	   its	   staffing	   and	   operating	  principles.20	  	  	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  some	  merit	  in	  this	  argument.	  The	  BBC	  reported	  in	  2010	  that	  in	  the	  previous	  five	  years	  the	  UK	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  had	  trained	   just	  six	  staff	   in	  Pashto,	   the	   language	  spoken	   in	  Helmand,	  which	  was	  the	  site	  of	  the	  main	  UK	  military	  presence	  at	  the	  time.	  It	  had	  trained	  34	  staff	  in	  Dari.	  Of	  the	  161	  diplomats	  in	  Afghanistan	  at	  the	  time,	  just	  three	  spoke	  Dari	  or	  Pashto	   fluently.21	  Such	  perspectives	  on	  policy-­‐making	   today	  have	   in	   certain	  circles	   prompted	   a	   nostalgia	   for	   empire. 22 	  The	   demands	   that	   counter-­‐insurgency	  places	  on	  accurate	  ‘cultural	  understanding’	  has	  only	  added	  to	  the	  perception	   that	   colonial	   ‘small	   wars’	   somehow	   contain	   the	   lessons	   for	  success	  in	  campaigns	  such	  as	  those	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  	  As	  this	  research	  has	  shown,	  this	  argument	  should	  be	  seriously	  questioned.	  In	  the	   first	   instance,	   as	   Manan	   Ahmed	   has	   pointed	   out,	   to	   argue	   for	   a	   more	  ‘imperial’	  approach	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  foreign	  policy	  is	  patently	  illogical.	  It	  is	  a	  suggestion	   that	   is	  morally,	   politically,	   normatively,	   and	  probably	   financially	  unsustainable	  in	  the	  modern	  era.	  But	  on	  a	  more	  practical	  level,	  arguing	  for	  a	  return	   to	  colonial-­‐era	  cultural	  understanding	  simply	  reprises	   the	   illusion	  of	  ‘knowledge’.	  Nineteenth	  century	  Afghanistan	  experts	  were	   just	  as	  partial	   to	  the	  intellectual	  fashions	  of	  their	  day,	  and	  to	  the	  cultural	  bias	  of	  their	  heritage,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Stewart,	  The	  Places	  in	  Between,	  272.	  20	  In	  a	  recent	  debate	  in	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  on	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  Rory	  Stewart	  laid	  out	  a	  similar	  argument.	  'Iraq	  invasion	  was	  the	  'worst	  foreign	  policy	  decision'	  since	  1839	  -­‐	  MP',	  BBC	  News	  (http://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-­‐of-­‐commons-­‐22891120,	  13	  June	  2013).	  21	  Ray	  Furlong,	  ‘Knowledge	  of	  Afghanistan	  ‘astonishingly	  thin’,	  BBC	  News,	  31	  July	  2010.	  22	  For	  example,	  the	  former	  UK	  Ambassador	  to	  Afghanistan,	  Sir	  Sherard	  Cowper-­‐Coles,	  questioned	  in	  his	  memoirs	  ‘whether,	  in	  an	  entirely	  benevolent	  sense,	  America	  had	  …	  [the]	  qualities	  for	  successful	  empire-­‐building’.	  Sherard	  Cowper-­‐Coles,	  Cables	  from	  Kabul	  (London:	  Harper	  Press,	  2011),	  285.	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as	   we	   are	   today.	   Despite	   their	   longer	   periods	   ‘in	   country’,	   they	   were	  hidebound	  by	   the	  administrative	  structures	   they	  worked	   in;	  constrained	  by	  the	   policy	   goals	   they	   were	   instructed	   to	   achieve;	   and	   blinded	   by	   wider	  societal	   norms	   that	   often	   seem	   offensive	   to	   us	   today.	   In	   addition,	   cultural	  understanding	  may	   improve	  with	   time,	   but	  when	   this	   knowledge	   becomes	  adapted	   to	   a	   policy	   agenda,	   it	   necessarily	   becomes	   warped.	   This	   process	  seems	   inescapable.	   Understanding	   how	   this	   might	   happen	   requires	   an	  approach	   that	   is	   appreciative	   of	   the	   sociology	   of	   knowledge;	   of	   knowledge	  becoming,	   rather	   than	   simply	   being.	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   insight	   that	   can	  inform	  policy	  as	  much	  as	  it	  can	  inform	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR.	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